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MULTIDIMENSIONAL EPIDEMIOLOGICAL TRANSFORMATIONS: 
ADDRESSING LOCATION-PRIVACY IN PUBLIC HEALTH PRACTICE 
Philip Sami Onsy AbdelMalik 
Abstract 
The ability to control one’s own personally identifiable information is a worthwhile 
human right that is becoming increasingly vulnerable. However just as significant, if not 
more so, is the right to health. With increasing globalisation and threats of natural 
disasters and acts of terrorism, this right is also becoming increasingly vulnerable. 
Public health practice – which is charged with the protection, promotion and mitigation 
of the health of society and its individuals – has been at odds with the right to privacy. 
This is particularly significant when location privacy is under consideration. Spatial 
information is an important aspect of public health, yet the increasing availability of 
spatial imagery and location-sensitive applications and technologies has brought 
location-privacy to the forefront, threatening to negatively impact the practice of public 
health by inhibiting or severely limiting data-sharing. This study begins by reviewing the 
current relevant legislation as it pertains to public health and investigates the public 
health community’s perceptions on location privacy barriers to the practice. 
Bureaucracy and legislation are identified by survey participants as the two greatest 
privacy-related barriers to public health. In response to this clash, a number of 
solutions and workarounds are proposed in the literature to compensate for location 
privacy. However, as their weaknesses are outlined, a novel approach - the 
multidimensional point transform - that works synergistically on multiple dimensions, 
including location, to anonymise data is developed and demonstrated. Finally, a 
framework for guiding decisions on data-sharing and identifying requirements is 
proposed and a sample implementation is demonstrated through a fictitious scenario. 
For each aspect of the study, a tool prototype and/or design for implementation is 
proposed and explained, and the need for further development of these is highlighted. 
In summary, this study provides a multi-disciplinary and multidimensional solution to 
the clash between privacy and data-sharing in public health practice. 
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1. Impetus 
1.1. INTRODUCTION 
The state of public health, it seems, is one of confused conflict.  
 
Public health has been defined as one of society's organised efforts to protect, promote 
and restore people's health [1]. Unfortunately it is not that organised and in spite of this 
generally accepted definition, much of what is at its core lacks clear and globally 
accepted definitions, often times creating confusion. Nonetheless, the contributions of 
public health to individuals, societies and nations are tangible, plentiful and significant, 
ranging from outbreak response and investigation to vaccination programs, prenatal 
care to smoking cessation, substance abuse to injury prevention, disease surveillance 
to risk factor analysis and emergency preparedness and response to name only a few. 
At the core of these activities is a chain of health data, starting with the building blocks 
at the micro, or individual, clinical level, and ending at the macro, or population level. 
Without the starting point – without the micro health data – public health would be 
impossible to do. Yet the acquisition of this data – so fundamental to the "practice" – is 
arguably in conflict with another fundamental human right.  
 
For decades, and in spite of their interdependence on one another [2], the debate has 
raged between the fields of privacy – an acknowledged human right and evolving 
―principle as old as the common law‖ [3] – and public health [3]. So much so, in fact, 
that one sometimes cannot help but wonder if privacy is, indeed, the enemy of public 
health [4] and whether the two could ever peacefully co-exist [5]. With e-health already 
a reality in countries like Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States, and as 
information giants continue to pursue their stake in health information [6,7], privacy 
continues to become an increasingly critical concern. Catalytic to this concern is the 
increasing use of Geographic Information Systems (GIS) – and therefore the 
incorporation of place – in public health. 
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A key discipline at the heart of public health is epidemiology – "the study of the 
distribution and determinants of health-related states or events in specified populations 
and the application of this study to the control of health problems" [1]. The three 
fundamental pillars of descriptive epidemiology are person, place and time. 
Traditionally, the privacy debate has revolved around the first of these pillars – person. 
This has resulted in a variety of anonymisation techniques in public health. Numeric 
codes are assigned, names and other identifiers are stripped or abbreviated, k-
anonymity [8] and other techniques are applied, and the privacy issue is addressed. 
The problem with place is that, at its most granular – and arguably useful – scale, it 
identifies us. The greater the level of geographic detail one has regarding an individual, 
the more readily that individual can be identified. Consequently, the acquisition of 
geographic data tends to be either limited, or at a sub-optimal or unusable scale [9,10]. 
Not only do privacy issues impact data acquisition and use for analysis, but also 
visualisation and dissemination of the results. Researchers have been able to ―reverse 
engineer‖ maps, for example, to successfully re-identify individuals [11-13]. 
 
While some argue that this debate is the product of a lack of understanding of the 
legislation and regulations by the public health community [2,14], there has been no 
formal collection and synthesis of the corresponding views and perspectives of those 
directly involved in public health activities. Although some solutions have been 
developed [8,10,15-18], they not only generally result in a concerning loss of data 
quality, but none to date are comprehensively adaptive, adjusting for important public 
health dimensions such as age and sex in concert with location. Lastly, there is 
currently no framework to guide public health professionals, custodians and research 
ethics boards in the appropriate assessment of the privacy implications - particularly 
including location privacy - for data-sharing. This research addresses all three of these 
issues: a public health survey was conducted and the findings published; novel 
solutions were explored with several being co-authored and a novel dynamic, adaptive 
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algorithm published; and a conceptual framework with a prototype application has been 
developed and is presented.  
1.2. CROSS-NATIONAL VALIDITY 
Cross-national research provides a rich source of data and information, allowing 
countries to learn from the methods, successes, and failures of one another. It is not 
uncommon to find cross-national comparisons of health care systems around the world 
– particularly between member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD). Within World Health Organisation (WHO) and 
Commonwealth Fund reports on health care systems, four countries repeatedly appear 
in comparisons: Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States [19-22]. 
When the Naylor Report was completed in response to the 2003 SARS outbreak in 
Toronto, Canada, a comparison of international systems focused solely on these 
countries, because it was felt their ―organisation and governance of public health to be 
particularly informative‖ [23]. Comparisons between various aspects of public health 
and privacy have therefore been included, where applicable, for these countries, as 
well as, where appropriate, the European Union, the WHO and the OECD. 
1.3. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The objectives of this research are to contribute to the resolution of the public health-
privacy debate by: 
1. Reviewing privacy legislation as it pertains to place and public health in Canada, 
the UK, and various other countries around the world; 
2. Formally collecting and synthesising the perspectives and requirements of public 
health professionals in Canada and the UK on the current issue, with a focus on the 
role of place; 
3. Exploring the development of novel techniques to allow spatial public health 
analysis at a granular level without compromising privacy; 
5 
 
4. Developing a conceptual framework to guide public health practice in the 
appropriate evaluation of the privacy implications of data-sharing with a particular 
emphasis on location-privacy. 
 
 
In pursuing this work, this research heeds the warning of Curtis et al.: ―…health and 
spatial scientists should be proactive and suggest a series of point level spatial 
confidentiality guidelines before governmental decisions are made which may be 
reactionary toward the threat of revealing confidential information, thereby imposing 
draconian limits on research using a GIS."[11] 
1.4. ORIGINALITY AND CONTRIBUTION 
The originality and contribution of this research can be found in the last three of its 
objectives as stated above: 
1. The formal collection and synthesis of public health perspectives and 
requirements on the issue of privacy – including location privacy – and public 
health. This is the first such survey of its kind and was published in BMC Public 
Health in 2008. This survey contributes British and Canadian perspectives to 
the body of research and knowledge.  
2. The exploration of the development of novel techniques to allow spatial public 
health analysis at a granular level without compromising privacy. To address 
this, a novel multidimensional algorithm was developed and has been accepted 
for publication in Methods of Information in Medicine. The algorithm has been 
named the "MPT" - Multidimensional Point Transform. It is a dynamic, adaptive 
algorithm that addresses many of the recognised deficiencies in already existing 
techniques as discussed in the manuscript. In addition to this novel technique, 
direct contributions were made to three related original approaches, two of 
which have been published in BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 
and the Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association and the third of 
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which was submitted as a report to the Public Health Agency of Canada and is 
currently being prepared for peer-review submission. 
3. The development of a conceptual framework to guide public health practice in 
the appropriate evaluation of the privacy implications of data-sharing with a 
particular emphasis on location-privacy. Currently, no such framework has been 
found.  
 
In addition to the above, a summary of legislative findings was authored and published 
in the International Journal of Health Geographics. A prototype tool or tool idea has 
also been developed to facilitate each of the legislative, transform and framework 
aspects of this work as they apply to public health and privacy, with particular emphasis 
on location privacy, offering some contribution to the future development of such 
implementations.  
 
The concepts and overall findings need not be limited to any particular country or 
health event, and have the potential to promote further research into more complex and 
comprehensive functional analyses involving the complete epidemiological triad. This 
research is unique and innovative in that it takes a holistic epidemiological approach 
whilst building on existing and novel technologies and concepts. 
1.5. STRUCTURE & ORGANISATION 
The thesis is organised into two volumes. Volume I contains the body of the research, 
composed of five parts reflecting the three original aspects of the study as stated 
above, future developments and the references: 
 
Part I sets the stage by identifying the issues underlying this study. It establishes 
common ground for definitions relating to public health practice and privacy, reviews 
privacy concepts and legislation as related to location and public health, and describes 
the results of a novel public health practitioner survey and its findings. 
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Part II focuses on concessions that attempt to reconcile public health practice with 
location privacy concerns by reviewing existing solutions, describing contributions to 
novel applications through collaborative efforts, and ending with a detailed description 
of an original novel algorithm and its preliminary implementation. 
 
Part III is dedicated to the development of a proposed generalisable novel framework 
for guidance on data-sharing, particularly in light of location privacy issues, and gives a 
sample implementation using a fictitious scenario. 
 
Part IV concludes the thesis body, describing suggested prototypes for implementing 
some of the research, proposing future research ideas informed by the current work, 
reviewing the objectives and accomplishments, and concluding the study. 
 
Part V contains all references. 
 
Volume II forms Part VI of this work and contains the appendices. These include a 
description of the survey logistics and business specifications, original copies of the 
surveys, the full results of the survey findings, the Multidimensional Point Transform 
algorithm code (written in SAS), the preliminary code developed for creation of a 
synthesised Canadian population using census data (also in SAS), and copies of all 
publications and reports arising from this work, either directly or in collaboration with 
others. 
 
It is my hope that you find this study informative, inspiring, enjoyable to read and, quite 
possibly, even useful to public health. 
8 
 
PART I 
THE BACKDROP
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2. Establishing Common Ground 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
Before delving into the sort of complex multidisciplinary discussion required by this 
study, it is necessary to first establish some common terminology and definitions on 
which to stand as well as set the backdrop against which this thesis unfolds. Chapter 1 
began by stating that public health is seemingly in a state of confused conflict. No 
doubt this begged the questions: what is the confusion and where is the conflict? While 
these were briefly described, a more thorough explanation is required for concepts 
fuelling the confusion and conflict form the foundation on which this study is built.  
 
The confusion referred to is at the very heart of public health and has to do with the 
very definition of the "practice" of public health and the identification of its core or 
essential functions. The conflict is equally as concerning and critical since it revolves 
around the perceived clash of two fundamental human rights: the right to privacy and 
the right to health. The right to privacy has obvious restrictive implications for data-
sharing. Data-sharing, however, is a fundamental requirement for public health. And so 
it is that the two continue to lock horns with increasing concerns on both sides and no 
clear resolution in sight. 
2.2. PUBLIC HEALTH "PRACTICE" & "FUNCTIONS" 
Since the entire content of this study is intended for use in public health practice, it 
behoves us to define the phrase before we start using it everywhere. The phrase 
"public health practice", much like the focal ―privacy‖ issue at hand, lacks a globally 
accepted or consistent definition. While its overall goals are more or less universally 
acknowledged - the improvement and protection of the health of individuals and 
communities - the methods and functions implicated by the word "practice" are not, 
particularly where research is involved [1]. Some define public health practice in terms 
of its vehicles, as both a science and art that includes education, promotion, research, 
intervention and prevention [24]. Others argue that a distinction must be made between 
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the direct practice itself as a legally authorised and ethical duty and the research which 
serves to inform it [25,26]. Others still have defined it in terms of functions, further 
differentiating between those essential for and unique to public health and its essence, 
and those that establish, maintain and enable public health to operate [27]. In many 
cases, frameworks and guidelines have been developed to attempt to clarify some of 
these distinctions [25,27,28], but in the absence of common definitions, such guidelines 
are region-specific at best and no global or definitive approach exists. 
 
Contributing to the ambiguity of the ―practice‖ is the similar lack of agreement on the 
core or essential functions of public health (sometimes referred to as EPHF - Essential 
Public Health Functions) and even how to define the term. Some define it in terms of 
the ―conditions‖ required to facilitate and improve public health practice [29], while 
others in terms of ―activities‖ undertaken to achieve its objectives [30]. To illustrate the 
inconsistent approaches, consider the following: in 1997, the World Health 
Organisation (WHO) in consultation with over 130 public health experts from around 
the world identified 37 functions grouped into nine EPHF categories [29,31]. A few 
years later, the Pan American regional office of the WHO (PAHO) added two more to 
make them eleven [29] while the Western Pacific regional office (also of the WHO) 
made some slight modifications but kept them at nine [32]. The original nine did not 
include research as an EPHF; the two revisions mentioned above did. The United 
States, operating under a different definition, identifies only three overarching public 
health functions (assessment, policy development and assurance) attained through ten 
essential ―services‖ which do include research [33,34]. Canada identifies six core 
functions [30] based on the recommendations of the post-SARS Naylor report [23], 
while Australia subscribes to nine [35] and the UK to ten (the tenth being identified as 
quality assuring the other nine functions) [36]. In the case of both Canada and 
Australia, research is not considered to be among the core functions, whereas in the 
United Kingdom it is. It is no wonder that public health is struggling with the concept of 
privacy and personal control over health information – we cannot even universally 
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agree on a concise set of the core functions that define it! A comprehensive 
comparison of the functions across groups is beyond the scope of this research as it is 
complicated by conflicting terminologies and inconsistent sub-categorisation of services 
and activities. However, a useful overview is provided by the Ministry of Health 
Services for the Province of British Columbia, Canada, in their work to develop their 
own framework for core functions in public health [27]. 
 
The current study adopts a broad definition of the phrase "public health practice" to 
reflect the range of activities and tasks necessary to achieve its goal (i.e. improving and 
protecting the health of individuals and communities). This therefore captures core 
public health functions as well as the activities required to perform them. The latter 
include research, which is therefore considered to be a part of public health practice 
though not a public health function. Another example which is perhaps more obvious is 
immunization; while it contributes to the function of prevention and control of disease, it 
is not in and of itself a core function of public health. Yet it is a vital component of public 
health practice. By adopting this wide definition, this study allows relevance and 
application to whatever definitions and distinctions may be made with regards to 
functions, services, activities and conditions that together make up the overall practice. 
It is important to note that within this one all-encompassing word, ―practice‖, the ability 
to differentiate between types of activities is important, as they may have legal, ethical, 
political and procedural implications. For example, classifying an activity as research 
ordinarily requires ethics approval by a review board or committee; surveillance of 
some diseases may be mandated by law; and preparedness and response for 
emergency situations and public health threats are necessary governmental and 
societal responsibilities.  
 
Since many uses of the work of this study will likely revolve around research, it merits a 
brief commentary. While a discussion on research methodology is beyond the current 
scope, it should be noted that there are different kinds of health research and study 
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designs, such as population-based research, targeted clinical trials, retrospective 
studies, longitudinal studies and so on. As will be clarified and emphasised throughout, 
this current study does not apply to all research scenarios, but rather research 
involving secondary use of personally identifiable data in the absence of consent. This 
often leads to debates on privacy, which invariably leads to the next set of terms 
requiring definition. 
2.3. PRIVACY & PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE DATA 
 
The problem with the word privacy is the term itself. Everybody has their own idea of 
what it means, which allows the courts to stretch from contraception to abortion to 
whatever. 
Taken from http://davidboyd.org/posts/1131586492.shtml 
 
The concept of something being ―private‖ is embodied in ownership, engrained in 
creation, and evolving through history. We speak of various species being territorial, 
and as humans we set up fences and mark our geographical boundaries, reflecting the 
concept of private property. We have clear definitions of what is ―mine‖ – indeed, one 
need only spend a few minutes or hours with a child to observe this in action. However 
as suggested above, and just like public health practice and functions, privacy is a 
complex, multifaceted construct that is heavily context-dependent and inconsistently 
defined. It can refer to personal opinions, communication, actions, information, space 
or physical property. Therefore, when discussing privacy, we must ask ―privacy of 
what?"  
 
Today, privacy is generally differentiated from the concepts of confidentiality and 
security. Privacy and security are often discussed hand in hand, but by mitigating either 
one does not necessarily mitigate the other. In order to establish common ground, a 
distinction is made between various terms as used throughout this study: 
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Personally Identifiable Data:  This generally refers to any information that can 
be used to identify an individual and it is within 
this context that privacy is used within this study. 
A review of personally identifiable information as a 
component of privacy legislation is provided in 
Chapter 4.  
 
Privacy:  This reflects the ability of an individual to control 
the collection, use, retention, disclosure and 
destruction of  his or her personal information. It 
has been defined as a right in various legislative 
pieces.  
 
Confidentiality: Distinguished from privacy, this is not a right but 
rather an obligation of a second party to respect 
the privacy of an individual concerning his or her 
personal information. This may be at the wish of 
the individual to whom the data pertain, or 
guardians, representatives, etc. responsible for 
the individual (e.g. in the case of children or 
patients who are incapable of making decisions 
for themselves). 
 
Security: This refers to the protocols and procedures put in 
place  to safeguard the confidentiality of personal 
information and respect the privacy of the 
individual. 
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Now that the main terms have been defined, let us clarify the nature of the conflict 
before probing more deeply into some of the background and legislation surrounding 
privacy. 
2.4. PUBLIC HEALTH AND PRIVACY 
 
There is nothing more public than privacy 
Berlant and Warner 
Sex in Public, Critical Inquiry (1998) 
 
Issues of patient privacy and confidentiality in public health and medicine are not new 
[8]; they have been, and continue to be, perceived as a major obstacle for public health 
research, complicating data mining, sharing, acquisition, and analysis, ultimately 
impeding accurate, evidence-based decision-making [15,16,23,37-45]. The genesis of 
much of the health data used for public health purposes begins with the clinician. In 
many parts of the world, however, this fiduciary relationship between patient and doctor 
is so revered that it has been compared to that between a parishioner and priest [46]. 
Yet at what point does it become acceptable to compromise this confidentiality, and by 
extension privacy, and inevitably trust? Is such a compromise justified when to do 
otherwise could potentially jeopardize the health of society or a third party? Consider 
the following example: when presented with the same scenario involving an injured 
drunk driver presenting to the emergency department in the absence of a police escort, 
six different physicians gave varying and opposing responses as to whether or not they 
would breach confidentiality and inform the authorities [46]. The ethical question for the 
clinician therefore becomes whether the preservation of this confidentiality is 
subservient to a greater good [46]. In this particular case, the subject has violated a 
socially defined and accepted norm. While many members of the public may therefore, 
in this instance, advocate a breach of confidentiality, it seems that when it comes to 
matters of public health – which, by definition, is concerned with the greater good – 
most individuals within a society would be less inclined to support the breach. A breach 
of confidentiality, however, would also constitute a breach of privacy since as per the 
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definitions established above the patient would have no control over the release of his 
or her information. 
 
The inability to share information due to privacy and confidentiality legislation was cited 
as a major obstacle in Toronto’s response to SARS in Canada in 2003 [23]. Even 
critical events relating to national security, such as bio-terrorism surveillance, are 
negatively impacted by this problem [42]. The issue at hand is not so much the 
importance of and need for privacy laws and confidentiality agreements – protecting 
the identity of patients is an acknowledged and recognized necessity [37,40,46]. 
Rather, it is the constraining effect of such legislation on a practice that, by definition, 
can only appropriately improve the health of populations by using data on the very 
individuals it comprises. The perceived good of the individual seems to outweigh the 
effective betterment of the whole - which, ironically, is intrinsically dependent back on 
the good of the individual; an interesting contrast to the drunk driving scenario 
previously presented. 
 
As electronic patient health records become a reality, there is a growing concern that 
patients may not seek medical attention, or may withhold information from their care-
providers, for fear of privacy breaches. While this assumes that the average individual 
values privacy more than his or her health and the health of the society in which they 
live, all too often the debate focuses on highlighting the losses people might incur by 
revealing personal information, as opposed to the gains of sharing this information with 
the appropriate individuals and/or organisations. It is also important to differentiate 
between personal information recipients and their underlying agendas or motives (e.g. 
journalist vs. practitioner). The media, which thrives on sensationalism and society’s 
curiosity of the personal affairs of others, is more likely to attempt re-identification of 
individuals given any amount of personal information. However, a public health 
practitioner is less likely to jeopardise his or her career, reputation and ethical duty in 
this way, and typically has very different motives and objectives. 
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Further complicating the conflict is the rapid rise of technology and the ubiquitous 
availability of information. With increased availability comes increased utility – as well 
as the potential for increased intrusion. This is particularly the case with the explosion 
of location-based technology. Satellite and aerial imagery dominate Web-based 
mapping tools, geomatics tools are no longer for the privileged few and the power of 
today’s normal personal computer makes the integration and linkage across volumes of 
information a growing concern. All one need do is simply open up a popular mapping 
Website, such as Google Earth, and let curiosity follow its natural course. 
2.5. FOCUS ON LOCATION  
We are, by nature, curious, nosey and resourceful creatures. Given access to the 
appropriate tools and/or skill set this can become a recipe for innovation and success, 
or privacy breaches and lawsuits. 
 
Clara Poole, a young, fictitious and ambitious entrepreneur, decides to open up her 
own pool business. In order to identify her potential customers, she uses Google Earth 
to carefully dissect various neighbourhoods. Using the aerial imagery, Clara quickly 
identifies neighbourhoods and houses with in-ground pools. Armed with this 
knowledge, she aggressively targets pool-less homes in pool-rich neighbourhoods for 
new pool projects, and develops neighbourhood-targeted pool-maintenance packages. 
 
Meanwhile, Rob Beri (also fictitious) has just finished using Google Earth to draw up 
his own plan. Though he has been looking for exactly the same thing as Clara, his 
intent is completely different. Pool-rich neighbourhoods, he reasons, generally have 
higher incomes…and homes with pools in those neighbourhoods are particularly more 
appealing for his line of work – breaking and entering. 
  
As mentioned in Chapter 1, in spite of ―place‖ being one of the three fundamental 
pillars of descriptive epidemiology - which is at the heart of public health - it is, of the 
three pillars, the most weakly utilised. This is, however, changing – albeit relatively 
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slowly. As location-specific information becomes more readily available and 
analysable, its significance to public health practice is becoming more recognised as it 
contributes the lacking and important dimension of spatial intelligence and relates 
health states to the world around us. However, location-specific information can 
immediately identify individuals: given a patient’s age, one has little to work with. Given 
an address, however, the whole picture changes, and passions in the privacy debate 
ignite. Even releasing (or not releasing) a large and seemingly harmless geographic 
area, such as province in Canada, can be court-of-law material [47] depending on what 
additional information is released or known. 
 
Location information, therefore, while immensely useful and in many cases vital to 
good public health practice, is also of increasing concern in the public health-privacy 
world. In their 2004 review of data-sharing and the development of a Web-enabled 
geographic information statistics service, the South East Public Health Observatory 
(SEPHO) in the UK cited privacy and confidentiality issues as a major challenge to 
data-sharing, and the greatest barrier uncovered by a preliminary feasibility study [43]. 
As will become evident throughout the body of this work, the frustrating experience of 
the UK’s SEPHO is not unique, and the call for the identification and implementation of 
appropriate solutions must be taken seriously. To do so, one must first gain a better 
understanding of the legislative privacy landscape that currently frames the debate, 
and the perceptions and requirements of the public health community as they pertain to 
privacy, and more specifically, location privacy. 
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3. Privacy Concepts and Principles 
 
Good people do not need laws to tell them to act responsibly, while bad people will find 
a way around the laws. 
Attributed to Plato 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
Viruses, bacteria, parasites…disease agents in general, along with their vectors, come 
in all shapes and sizes. However, they could not care less about political and 
administrative boundaries. Indeed, they know no borders, save those that lead to 
unfavourable environments or conditions...and even then, they do not necessarily know 
this, or opt out of travelling to such places; they simply do not survive if they do. They, 
and by extension the concept of health and well-being, transcend jurisdictional 
boundaries. Legislation, on the other hand, which also comes in all shapes and sizes, 
has traditionally been very much the opposite. 
 
For over a century, political leaders have presented public health as society’s most 
important responsibility. Benjamin Disraeli reportedly stated that ―the health of the 
people is really the foundation upon which all their happiness and all their powers as a 
state depend‖. Health, as a state of wellbeing, has been dubbed our ―most valuable 
asset―, worthy of vigorous defence [48], and a universal and fundamental human right 
that is a critically significant world-wide social goal [49]. As the active and fundamental 
social construct of this right, it is imperative that public health impact and influence the 
legal system as much as it is impacted and influenced by it. Yet simply introducing 
legislation to cover any and all scenarios is an impossible task and damaging to 
society. After all, legislation may be implicated in the moral decay of society.  
 
Laws attempt to infuse society with structure and rules that, to a very large extent, 
define how we relate to one another. It is no wonder, therefore, that they suffuse every 
facet and discipline of the world in which we live. The world’s response to atrocities and 
periods of difficulty has typically been legislative. When problems strike fear in the 
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population, governments respond by instituting laws and enforcing them. Since ancient 
times, the resolution of issues or disputes has typically involved escalation through 
some sort of hierarchical structure. In most cases, this is the preferred and most 
frequently used approach. Eventually, however, if all else fails and as a ―last-resort‖, 
legal action is taken. Modernised and enforceable legislation that accurately reflects 
current practices and future directions is therefore an important societal requirement. 
However, the proliferation of legislation also has a negative side effect: it begins to 
create a prescriptive method for living, thereby slowly eroding our ability to think and 
act in an ethical and moral manner. When a question or issue arises, our response is 
not ―what is the right thing to do‖ but rather, ―what is the legal thing to do‖; more 
specifically, what does the legislation say? 
 
The role of the legal system in the field of public health has been the driving force 
behind this study. More and more, particularly with increasing emphasis on individual 
rights and concerns, public health practitioners around the world are recognising the 
importance of having some understanding of the legal system, and a working 
relationship with the legal profession [2]. Unfortunately, the relationship typically tends 
to be unidirectional. Just as privacy is a multifaceted and complex concept, so too is 
the required collaboration resulting from the interdependency of public health and 
legislation. And yet, in this particular area, the legal profession has not fully recognised 
the interdependence of the two fields [2]. After all, a sense of control over one’s own 
information brings with it a certain peace of mind that is an important contributor to 
psychological well-being.  
3.2. PSYCHO-SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY 
We must know you to serve you 
 
The psycho-social dimension of privacy is influenced by the prevailing societal and 
individual philosophical perspectives. As defined within this study, privacy has become 
such an important personal concept because of the sense of control it affords the 
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individual and the view that it is a precondition for equality and social justice [50]. While 
the issues of consent are outside the scope of this study, it is common practice for any 
research involving human subjects to first seek the consent of the subjects for the 
collection, use and disclosure of their personal information. And indeed, based on the 
literature, most individuals would not object to the use of their information for health-
specific purposes [14,51]. In these cases, however, individuals have been given the 
power to choose what to disclose and to whom. But they are very largely powerless 
when it comes to the health event itself; pathogens do not seek consent prior to 
infection. So in a sense, while people do have some degree of control over the 
determinants of their health (such as exercise, smoking, etc.), health in and of itself is 
dictated by a hotchpotch of controllable and non-controllable factors.  
 
In his review of the history and importance of privacy legislation in civil society [50], 
Martin Lengwiler of the University of Zurich suggests that there has been a move from 
defining privacy in negative terms in the nineteenth century, to a more positive one in 
the twentieth century. He relates this to a change in paradigms, contrasting 
libertarianism and communitarianism (or what he refers to as a sociological paraidgm). 
Libertarian views prioritise the rights of the individual as superseding those of a group, 
society, nation, religion, ideology, etc. This is in direct contrast with communitarian 
views which focus on the responsibility of the individual to communities and societies 
when addressing ethical questions. Similarly, privacy has been framed within a political 
context, with distinction being made between historical ―paternalistic privacy‖ and more 
recent ―democratic privacy‖. While the latter facilitates the libertarian paradigm, it does 
not exclude communitarian ideology; giving individuals the fundamental democratic 
right to own and control their own information simply places the power to choose 
between individual and societal good in the individual’s hands. Legislation must 
therefore counter-balance this power by considering the cost of privacy protection; 
failing to do so and focusing solely on legitimising the power of the individual can have 
dire consequences for individuals and society [52].  
22 
 
Another changing social consideration is the relative terminology used in the 
legislation. In the US, for example, there is a reasonable expectation of privacy. 
Reasonable is very much individually, socially and culturally defined; what is 
reasonable to one individual may not be so to another, and differs between countries. 
Even within a nation, ―reasonable‖ can take on different meanings within different 
contexts. Wire-tapping a suspected terrorist, for example, may be justified since the 
suspect does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy; or perhaps more 
accurately, the breach of the person’s privacy is not unreasonable. There is 
unfortunately no clear definition, however, of what would be considered a reasonable 
context for ―breaching‖ an individual’s privacy.  
 
It is obvious that differing psychological, societal and cultural norms and expectations 
play a major role in the concept of privacy, making it necessarily context-dependent. 
―Privacy laws are most burdensome and least effective when they apply broadly, 
without proper concern for the settings in which they operate, the types of information 
that they cover, the obligations that they impose and the purposes they were designed 
to serve‖ [52]. Unfortunately, in spite of an increasingly globalised world, it is difficult to 
transcend the jurisdictional boundaries and create universally acceptable context-
specific and public health sensitive privacy legislation. Before embarking on a whirlwind 
tour of the legal landscape, however, let us pause, reflect on and consider the 
disharmony that currently exists in the concept’s underlying principles. 
3.3. PRIVACY AND INFORMAT ION PRACTICE ―PRINCIPLES" 
In the late nineteenth century, privacy invasions were perceived to primarily be the 
result of proliferating media attention as suggested by Samuel D. Warren. In his 1890 
seminal article in the Harvard Law Review, Warren suggests the natural development 
of legislation as ―man‖ becomes more aware of the importance of various faculties [3], 
culminating in his focus on the necessity of privacy legislation – privacy then being 
defined as the ―right to be left alone‖. Warren’s passionate argument is made in light of 
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increasing invasions of privacy by the media extending beyond idle gossip to ―satisfy a 
prurient taste‖ and ―occupy the indolent‖. Since then, definitions of privacy have 
evolved to capture more than just the right to be left alone, but rather a prime social 
value and human right encapsulating ―the claim of an individual to determine what 
information about himself or herself should be known to others‖ [53]. It was this 
emphasis on control by the individual that formed the basis for the development of 
fundamental privacy ―principles‖. 
 
In 1973, the United States Advisory Committee on Automated Personal Data Systems 
in the Department of Health, Education and Welfare proposed five principles which 
later underpinned the US Privacy Act: no personal data record-keeping systems whose 
existence is secret (transparency), availability to an individual to find out what 
information is in a record about him or her, and how it is used (access), ability of an 
individual to prevent personal information that was obtained for one purpose from being 
used or made available for other purposes, without the person’s consent (use 
limitation), ability of the individual to correct or amend a record (correction, data 
quality), and the assurance of the reliability of the data and prevention of its misuse 
(data quality, security) [54]. Of these five, three very clearly emphasise the concept of 
control by the individual to whom the data pertain.  
 
Since then, privacy frameworks, guidelines and legislation have pivoted around the 
continued creation and expansion of such principles – also referred to as Fair 
Information Practice Principles (FIPPs) – intended to offer a transparent foundation and 
set of governing concepts. As described in the recommendations issued by the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the implementation 
of these principles serves two functions: to preserve the right of individuals to privacy 
as a fundamental human right and to provide harmonised guidelines to facilitate 
national data flows [55]. However, despite the underlying right to privacy being 
recognised as a fundamental one, accepted and adopted as a standard in many 
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countries, the principles have remained vague and variable, creating multiple recipes 
with varying ingredients. For example, eight general and overarching principles are 
espoused by the OECD [55] compared to five by the Federal Trade Commission [56] 
and nine by the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation group [57] – though all three have 
overlapping content. National legislation has been enacted around such principles and 
different business areas have also made their contributions, but they remain 
inconsistent. For example, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
(AICPA), together with the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA), have 
adopted ten Generally Accepted Privacy Principles (GAPP, not to be confused with 
GAPS, Geographic Area Population Size, which is a concept used in re-identification 
risk minimisation [58] and discussed in more detail in Part II of this study) to govern 
business practices [59]. It is worth noting in this context that these principles do not all 
map directly to those of the relevant Canadian federal legislation, the Personal 
Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act [60], although there is some 
overlap. Comparisons of and comments on some of these and others have been 
published [54,61], demonstrating a lack of standardisation, differing interpretation and 
resultant difficult translation into implementable requirements.  
 
There are two fundamental issues that should be brought to light with regards to ―Fair 
Information Practice Principles‖. The first is simply a question around ―fairness‖ and the 
second lies in the expensive and illusionary ―devolution‖ of their application. 
 
The question of fairness is an important one for public health. The development of 
these principles is anchored in the libertarian rights of the individual, particularly to 
control his or her own personal information, hence principles around consent, 
accessibility of the information to the individual, the ability of the individual to correct 
the information and to limit or restrict its use. But in much of public health practice, such 
principles are often impractical and un-implementable since much of public health is 
concerned with secondary use of clinically collected data; use that is not detailed at the 
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time of data collection. As such, much has been published on the impracticability of 
consent and the potential biases and implications to research when individuals are 
given such control [62-66]. Given a requirement for such data for public health practice, 
does this therefore make the use of such data in public health – and therefore the very 
application of public health – ―unfair‖? The issue lies in the universal application of this 
control as being a ―fair practice‖. Furthermore, this application focuses exclusively on 
the individual’s right to privacy in absolute isolation; it is not a comprehensive approach 
that takes into consideration other fundamental rights and societal implications. But 
privacy is not an "absolute right" [67]. Public health is the societal effort to protect, 
promote, restore and maintain health [1], both for society and for the individual [68], 
which itself also happens to be a fundamental human right. In the absence of good 
public health practice, including measures and controls, we significantly compromise 
our individual rights to health, life, security, freedom of movement, peaceful assembly 
and leisure, to name a few. Imagine the implications if we had no societal means to 
detect and control infectious diseases, monitor and warn of the health effects of 
radiation, respond to and control outbreaks or simply advocate for and promote 
healthier lifestyles. The identification of these "fair information practice principles" as 
necessary for the right to privacy has ignored the interplay between these rights; it has 
promoted them within a vacuum and reduced them to mechanically independent silos 
as opposed to meaningfully interacting ethical values for the holistic good of individuals 
and the societies they compose.  
 
The related issue of the devolving application of these types of principles – that is, 
increasing individual control of and access to personal information – is that we have 
become reliant on legislation within an increasingly restrictive paradigm of control-
based data protection. As local and global information flows increase, so, too, do 
privacy risks. We attempt to compensate by implementing and revising regulative 
control mechanisms through globally-inconsistent directives and legislation. In doing 
so, we increase costs and bureaucracy whilst giving the illusion of individual control 
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through notices and lengthy consent forms [54,62]. Meanwhile, we are crippled by 
overemphasised potential costs, the potential benefits are not realised, and as the 
underlying issues remain unaddressed, we find ourselves having to re-visit and update 
the regulations. To borrow from and rephrase Fred H. Cate, we have become so 
enamoured with a control-based approach that we are blinded to the need for 
developing better alternatives [54]. But the need to alter our approach is critical, and 
the current methods, whilst emphasising only one aspect of the individual’s rights, fail 
to address real and context-specific issues. They also provide an easy scapegoat for 
prioritising one right at the expense of others. In today’s socially-networked world of 
instant access to an overwhelming amount of linked information, these ―fair information 
practice principles‖ are, for public health purposes, out of date, inappropriate, 
unrealistic, and detrimental. Either that or we are forced to label public health as an 
―unfair‖ practice. 
 
As stated earlier, we have moved from a right to be left alone by the media to a right of 
control over one’s information in all circumstances. However, using this definition 
leaves little room for privacy in the world of public health. Public health is not interested 
in ―proclaiming from the housetops what is whispered in the closet‖, or the ―evil of the 
invasion of privacy by the newspapers‖ [3], but neither can it operate under the mercy 
of individual control. More specifically, public health is typically more concerned with 
context than with identity; it does not care that John Doe specifically has a particular 
condition, unless that condition poses some grave risk to John Doe or to others. 
Rather, public health is more concerned with the fact that a 32 year old male in a 
particular neighbourhood with specific demographics has a given condition at a given 
time, and the surrounding context in which that condition occurs (including others with 
and without the same or other conditions). It is these characteristics that form the pillars 
of the descriptive epidemiological triad and not the actual identity of the individual. An 
effective and efficient public health system is neither privacy-centric libertarian nor 
socialist communitarian. Rather it must be understood and framed as a means for 
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achieving a harmonised balance between societal protection (―the whole‖) and the 
general protection of the individuals of which that society is composed (―the parts‖); the 
two are interrelated and inseparable. Within such a construct there is no room for 
individual consent or control over personal data, but there is a role for its ethical use. 
Public health practice should not be seen as a foe of privacy protection but rather the 
latter as a necessary component of the ethical pursuit of the former. In many scenarios, 
this will mean that either privacy will have to be implemented at the potential expense 
of public health, or public health at the potential expense of privacy. Which potential 
outweighs the other depends on a variety of factors, and it is these factors that are at 
the heart of this study.  
 
It is important to emphasise that public health is not being used to justify or suggest a 
dilution of the right to privacy. Privacy proponents suggest that public safety and 
national security have been used as excuses to do just this [67] just as the argument is 
being made that privacy has also been used as an excuse to impede these activities. 
However, as stated, the clashing of rights is inevitable and some must sometimes be 
prioritised at the expense of others. To deny this would be to deceive ourselves, and 
the development and implementation of appropriate solutions requires that we 
recognise and accept this. Threats to privacy have certainly grown over the years, but 
so too have threats to health, life, security and safety.  
 
This study therefore, and in particular the framework proposed in Part III, attempts to 
burrow down to the underlying concepts that instil fear over misuse of data and 
individual identification rather than implement incongruous control-centric privacy 
principles. The approach is not an attempt to reconcile the free flow of information with 
individual privacy and data protection concerns through regulatory control, but rather a 
drive towards governance of the necessary sharing of information based on a balanced 
and ethical approach to individual and societal good.  
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4. International Whirlwind Tour of Legislation 
 
Original contribution as published in the International Journal of Health 
Geographics (2009) [69] 
 
A discussion on location privacy solutions for health research would be incomplete 
without reflecting on some of the underlying reasons that necessitate their 
development. The very notion of privacy is itself a complex fabric of interwoven 
philosophical and psychosocial threads. Perhaps this is why the associated 
bureaucratic and legal landscape is as complex as it is – and often blamed for the 
issue. A large majority of public health professionals consider privacy to be an obstacle 
to public health; when asked for the underlying reasons, survey respondents in Canada 
and the UK most commonly identified bureaucracy and legislation [70].  
 
There is no universal legislation to guide and govern the activities of public health 
professionals, particularly where issues of privacy are concerned. Instead, nations 
have their own constraining or enabling privacy and data protection laws, with some 
being such a maze of cross-referenced ―legalese‖ that familiarising oneself with them – 
let alone gaining a thorough understanding of them – becomes a daunting task. What 
ensues is a brief compilation and comparison of relevant personal information and 
privacy legislation in Canada and the United Kingdom (UK), with particular focus on 
location and public health as seen and understood by an epidemiologist.  
4.1. OVERVIEW 
The Canadian privacy-legislation landscape is additionally muddled by its political 
system: ten provinces and three territories, each with its own legislation and jurisdiction 
over its own health system. Overarching is the federal government, providing 
guidelines, support, oversight and funding. Although the words ―privacy‖ and ―personal 
information‖ do not occur anywhere in Canada’s Constitution (Charter of Rights and 
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Freedoms) [71], Section 7, granting the right to life, liberty and security, and Section 8, 
guaranteeing protection from unreasonable search and seizure, have been determined 
by the courts to capture the right to privacy [72,73]. These cases have expanded on the 
Charter sections to include privacy as related to protection from government or other 
intrusion, autonomy, and dignity.  
 
Federally, Canada has two privacy laws. The Privacy Act [74] governs roughly 160 
federal public bodies, whereas the Personal Information and Protection of Electronic 
Documents Act (PIPEDA) [60] governs private sector organisations regulated federally 
and provincially. Provinces with privacy legislation similar to PIPEDA are exempt from 
its provincial aspect. At the time of writing, British Columbia, Alberta and Québec have 
such legislation, and Ontario has health-specific legislation that exempts it from the 
corresponding section.  
 
All provinces and territories have legislation similar to the Privacy Act, whereas only 
three provinces have private-sector legislation similar to PIPEDA. In addition, four 
provinces have specific health information legislation: Alberta, Manitoba, Ontario and 
Saskatchewan.  
 
The UK has three legal jurisdictions: England and Wales, Scotland and Northern 
Ireland. However, it itself is also part of a larger community - the European Union (EU). 
European Union legislation is generally intended to "direct" that of its member states, 
and takes precedence in cases where there is no concurrence; the UK is obligated to 
align itself with EU law (referred to as Community law) [75] or else give way in a court 
of law to the latter [76]. Let us therefore begin with the EU. 
 
The concepts of privacy and personal information are captured in core EU legislative 
documents as fundamental rights. The European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), building on the 1948 Universal 
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Declaration of Human Rights [77], includes a ―Right to respect for private and family 
life‖ in Article 8 [78]. The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 
proclaimed in 2000, builds on the ECHR [79]. Updated in 2007, the Charter includes 
two particularly relevant articles. Article 7 reiterates the ECHR’s position on the respect 
for private and family life, whereas Article 8 explicitly limits the processing of personal 
data to specified purposes, requiring either individual consent or legislated 
―permission‖.  
 
Recognising the importance of data-sharing and the threats and benefits of developing 
technologies, the EU introduced a number of legislative pieces to harmonise, regulate 
and facilitate the flow of personal information. In 1995, Directive 95/46/EC was adopted 
for the protection of personal data [80] - the core directive at the heart of data 
protection in EU member states. It does not, however, apply, to personal information 
used solely for personal reasons, household activities, public security, national defence 
or criminal law enforcement, and falls short when dealing with issues around 
communication. Two years later, the EU adopted Directive 97/66/EC for protecting 
privacy and confidentiality in telecommunications [81]. As technology and the Web 
became increasingly ubiquitous, this directive quickly became limited in scope. It was 
therefore replaced in 2002 by Directive 2002/58/EC [82] covering electronic 
communications more broadly, and updated again in 2006 by Directive 2006/24/EC 
[83]. In addition, Data Protection Regulation (EC) 45/2001 [84] ensures the protection 
of personal information in EU institutions and bodies, such as the European 
Parliament, for example, and accountability to a governing body, the European Data 
Protection Supervisor. 
 
In the UK, the Data Protection Act was first enacted on July 12, 1984, thereby 
preceding the Directive on Data Protection adopted by the European Union (EU) by 
more than a decade. Upon adoption of the EU directive, however, the Act was 
amended in 1998. Though simpler than Canadian legislation in the sense that it applies 
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to both public and private entities, it is none-the-less a complex document. In 2003, 
Lord Phillips of the Supreme Court of Judicature, Court of Appeal (Civil Division) in the 
UK referred to it as ―…a cumbersome and inelegant piece of legislation‖ [85]. Other UK 
health-related Acts have been amended to reference the Data Protection Act 1998, 
including the Access to Health Records Act 1990, the Access to Medical Reports Act 
1988 and the Access to Personal Files and Medical Reports (Northern Ireland). The UK 
also has a Health and Social Care Act 2008 [86], which replaced its 2001 predecessor 
and legislated the creation of a Care Quality Commission for the protection and 
promotion of the health, safety and welfare of the public. The Act makes it an offence to 
recklessly disclose confidential personal information obtained by the Commission that 
―relates to and identifies an individual.‖ (S. 76) 
 
Scotland has a Freedom of Information Act 2002, but a search on the UK Office of 
Public Sector Information Website [87] yielded no specific data protection legislation for 
either Scotland or Northern Ireland. Scotland also has a Public Health Act enacted in 
2008 [88], which obligates Scottish Ministers, health boards and local authorities to 
protect public health. It allows for the disclosure of information to facilitate its directives 
despite any other legal prohibition or restriction, except, interestingly, the Data 
Protection Act 1998 (S. 117(6)). Northern Ireland's Health and Social Care (Reform) 
Act 2009 [89] has a similar clause (S. 13(8)). 
  
Both Canada and the UK have a tapestry of legislative documents in place to protect 
the privacy of personal information ―…as something worth protecting as an aspect of 
human autonomy and dignity.‖ [90] But what, exactly, constitutes personal information? 
4.2. DEFINITIONS 
There is no consistent definition for "personally identifiable data" or ―personal 
information‖ in Canadian legislation. Where a definition is included, it ranges from 
―information about an identifiable individual‖ in Alberta’s Personal Information 
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Protection Act [91] to very well-defined and explicit components in Manitoba’s Freedom 
of Information and Protection of Privacy Act [92]. Of the 30 acts and regulations 
reviewed, four include health information in their definition of personal information, 
three include location information, 14 include both and nine include neither (Table 1). 
 
This definition of personal information as pertaining to an ―identifiable individual‖ 
appears quite often in legislation, including in Directive 95/46/EC. However, the 
Directive goes one step further to clarify: ―…an identifiable person is one who can be 
identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identification number or 
to one or more factors specific to his physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural 
or social identity" [80]. Health information is defined as a ―special‖ category of personal 
information (S. III, Article 8 (1)), but there is no specific mention of location information 
in the Directive. 
 
In the UK, the Data Protection Act 1998 defines "personal data" vaguely as any 
information that, in isolation or in concert with other data available to the data 
controller, can identify a living individual. The Act also includes health in the definition 
of "sensitive personal data", but does not capture location information specifically. As 
mentioned previously, the Health and Social Care Act 2008 also identifies confidential 
personal information as that which ―relates to and identifies and individual‖, but does 
not specifically identify location as part of that definition. 
 
As recent as April 2009, the Supreme Court of Canada stated that ―Privacy analysis is 
laden with value judgements that are made from the independent perspective of the 
reasonable and informed person who is concerned about the long-term consequences 
of government action for the protection of privacy‖ [93]. As described, the definition of 
―personal information‖ in most cases casts a wide net, capturing anything and 
everything that can subjectively be argued as identifying. This has obvious implications  
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Table 1: Inclusion of health and location information in the definitions of "personal information" in Canadian legislation 
Jurisdiction Act Reference 
In Definition 
Health Location 
Canada The Privacy Act [190] R.S.C. 1985, c. P-21   
Canada Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act [191] S.C. 2000, c. 5 P-8.6   
B.C. Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act [395] R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 165   
B.C. Personal Information Protection Act [396] S.B.C. 2003, c. 63   
B.C. Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Regulation [397] B.C. Reg 323/93   
B.C. Personal Information Protection Act Regulations [398] B.C. Reg. 473/2003   
B.C. British Columbia Cancer Agency Research Information Regulation [399] B.C. Reg. 286/91   
B.C. Privacy Act [400] R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 373   
AB Health Information Act [401] R.S.A. 2000, c. H-5   
AB Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act [402] R.S.A. 2000, c. F-25   
AB Personal Information Protection Act [393] S.A. 2003 c. P-6.5   
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Table 1: Inclusion of health and location information in the definitions of "personal information" in Canadian legislation (continued) 
 
Jurisdiction Act Reference 
In Definition 
Health Location 
AB Personal Information Protection Act Regulation [403] AR 366/2003   
SK The Health Information Protection Act [404] S.S. 1999, c. H-0.021   
SK The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act [405] 
SS. 1990-91, c. F-
22.01 
  
SK The Local Authority Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act [406] SS. 1990-91, c. L-27.1   
MB The Personal Health Information Act [407] C.C.S.M., c. P-33.5   
MB The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act [394] C.C.S.M., c. F-175   
ON Personal Health Information Protection Act [408] S.O. 2004, c. 3   
ON Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act [409] R.S.O. 1990, c. F-31   
ON Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act [410] R.S.O. 1990, c. M.56   
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Table 1: Inclusion of health and location information in the definitions of "personal information" in Canadian legislation (continued) 
 
Jurisdiction Act Reference 
In Definition 
Health Location 
QC 
An Act respecting Access to documents held by public bodies and the protection of 
personal information [411] 
R.S.Q., c. A-2.1   
QC An Act respecting the Protection of personal information in the private sector [412] R.S.Q., c. P-39.1   
N.B. Protection of Personal Information Act [413] S.N.B. 1998, c. P-19.1   
N.S. Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act [414] S.N.S. 1993, c. 5, s. 1   
N.S. Health Protection Act [415] S.N.S. 2004, c. 4, s. 1   
P.E.I. Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act [416] 
R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. F-
15.01 
  
NL Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act [417] S.N.L. 2002, c. A-1.1   
YK Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act [418] R.S.Y. 2002, c. 1   
N.T. Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act [419] S.N.W.T. 1994, c. 20   
NU Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act [420] S.N.W.T. 1994, c.20   
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on the use of disaggregate geographic data in health research. Or does it? The answer 
depends on the applications and exceptions made in the legislation. 
4.3. APPLICATION AND EXCEPTIONS 
Legislation in Canada, the EU and the UK specifically limits the processing of personal 
information. What constitutes ―processing‖, however, is not consistently defined across 
legislation. The broadest definition to capture what this means is found in EU Directive 
95/46/EC: "any operation or set of operations which is performed upon personal data, 
whether or not by automatic means, such as collection, recording, organisation, 
storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by 
transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or combination, 
blocking, erasure or destruction". Generally, any such processing of personal 
information is prohibited in the absence of the individual’s informed consent, unless it is 
first stripped of all identifying information (thereby ceasing to be personal information 
according to the legal definition).  
 
In public health research, however, it is often impossible or impractical to pursue 
informed consent. Despite being incredibly information and data-rich, health 
researchers in both Canada and the UK have often expressed frustration over their 
inability to use existing data due to privacy concerns [70]. Is the prohibition based on 
the legislation? 
 
Generally, in the absence of an individual's consent, the legislation does explicitly allow 
for some exceptions, particularly in the interests of national security. However, there is 
a lack of clarity and consistency, specifically around processing for public health 
purposes. Article 35 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
emphasises the right to health care, and states ―A high level of human health protection 
shall be ensured in the definition and implementation of all Union policies and activities‖ 
[79]. In almost all cases, exceptions are also made for research, as long as the 
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individuals whose data are processed are not identified in the results. Generally, the 
individual whose information has been disclosed should be informed; however, 
provisions are also made for cases where doing so is impossible or unreasonable.  
 
The decision around whether or not the processing of the information is permitted 
under these exceptions is somewhat vague and inconsistent. In Canada, for example, 
the four provinces with health information legislation delegate the decision making 
authority to research ethics boards; otherwise, it is generally delegated to the head of 
the data-holding organisation. In the case of EU institutions, processing is only 
permissible after consultation with the European Data Protection Supervisor [84], 
whereas the UK Data Protection Act 1998 exception for research (S. 4(33)) is unclear 
as to the decision-making authority. This leads to issues around governance. 
4.4. GOVERNANCE 
In Canada, the Office of the Privacy Commissioner (OPC) is responsible for protecting 
and promoting the privacy rights of Canadians by overseeing compliance with 
Canadian federal privacy legislation [94]. Each province and territory also has its own 
privacy commissioners who oversee their respective jurisdictions. As previously noted, 
health information legislation in Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba and Ontario also 
delegates decision-making authority on these matters to research ethics boards. 
 
The EU, as previously mentioned, has established the office of the European Data 
Protection Supervisor [95] for oversight of EU institution activities. The UK’s equivalent 
of Canada’s Office of the Privacy Commissioner is the Information Commissioner's 
Office (ICO) [96]. The legislation does not specifically mention research ethics boards 
or committees, and is unclear as to decision-making authority – in most cases, it seems 
to lie with the data controllers.  
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4.5. IMPLICATIONS AND FINAL THOUGHTS 
The privacy of personal information is a recognised and important human right, 
protected through multiple intertwined acts and regulations in Canada, the EU and the 
UK. In the absence of informed consent, the legislation generally allows for the 
processing of an individual’s personal information – which is any information that can 
identify the individual, and therefore includes health and disaggregate location 
information – for research purposes, subject to approval by the appropriate authority. 
However, guidelines are lacking, and authorities tend to err on the conservative side, 
resulting in much expressed frustration by health researchers. In the absence of 
frameworks to inform the processing of personal information, the only other alternative 
(besides seeking informed consent from every individual) for health researchers is the 
use of de-identification techniques, such as might be applied through privacy-
preserving solutions involving disaggregate geographic data. 
 
It has been suggested that privacy in the United States, Canada and the European 
Union have their bases in slightly different philosophical constructs: in the United 
States, privacy is anchored in protection from the government; in Canada, in principles 
of autonomy and control; and in the European Union, the focus is more on dignity and 
public image [97]. The argument is made that the Canadian model offers the 
appropriate ―middle-ground‖ – after all, if individuals truly do have control over their own 
personal information, then they can choose to protect it from the government and 
others, and their dignity as far as public image is concerned is in their own hands. If we 
accept this definition of privacy – that is, having control over one’s own personal 
information – then one might ask whether de-identification really solves the issue. 
Perhaps what is really needed is public health specific clarification in the legislation, 
public and practitioner education, and clear and concise frameworks and guidelines. 
 
The importance of having some understanding of the legal system and a working 
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relationship with the legal profession is becoming increasingly recognised in public 
health [2]. However, while the privacy debate in public health may be fuelled in part by 
misperceptions of public health practitioners, it is very much coupled with a lack of 
understanding of the requirements of public health by legal practitioners. ―Privacy laws 
are most burdensome and least effective when they apply broadly, without proper 
concern for the settings in which they operate, the types of information that they cover, 
the obligations that they impose and the purposes they were designed to serve‖ [52]. 
The issue can only be truly addressed through interdisciplinary collaboration. Until that 
happens, and until we recognise the importance and value of public health research 
and its implications on the health of individuals, we will continue to grapple with 
alternate de-identification solutions and sub-optimal data. 
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5. Public Health Practitioner Perceptions 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
Having established some of the historical, social and legal background to the concept 
of privacy, it is only fitting to proceed by documenting and quantifying its effects on 
public health as experienced and perceived by public health practitioners. A review of 
the literature revealed a gap in this area, leading to the development and 
implementation by the author of a Web-based survey conducted in Canada and the UK 
between November 2006 and January 2007.  
 
Both Canada and the UK have many similarities in their health care models, and 
consequently share some of the same pros and cons. Canada’s model was based on 
the UK’s National Health Service (NHS) [19,98], while the Canadian health care system 
continues to be studied for lessons that may apply to the UK [99]. From a health 
research perspective, both Canada and the UK place strong emphasis on evidence-
based public health policies and services [23], yet in both countries, this continues to 
be hampered by privacy issues. 
 
The survey was developed in paper form by the author and converted to a Web-based 
format by the ALPHA Project [100] team at the Public Health Agency of Canada 
(PHAC). The process involved a complete business submission to the ALPHA team, 
and the necessary functional and logistical details are included in Appendix A (Volume 
II). Two country-specific versions of the survey were developed: one for Canada, and 
another for the UK, each with country-relevant response options. In addition, because 
Canada is officially bilingual, the Canadian content was also officially translated to 
produce English and French versions. The three survey versions are provided in 
Appendix B (Volume II), and a high-level overview of the survey’s structure and flow is 
illustrated in Figure 1. 
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The survey contained both quantitative and qualitative components, and confirmed the 
following: 
 
1. There is a definite requirement by public health professionals for personally 
identifiable data, including spatial data. The requirement for this spatial data is 
at its most granular level – latitude and longitude, or exact street address – 
which necessarily compromises patient privacy. 
 
2. Participants generally rated privacy as an obstacle to public health practice 
(Figure 2); interestingly, the more highly the self-rated knowledge of privacy 
legislation, the more of an obstacle privacy was generally rated (Figure 3). 
 
3. The most critical obstacles implicated in this perception of privacy as a critical 
issue in both countries are bureaucracy and legislation  
 
While many individuals recognised the importance of privacy legislation, participants 
generally indicated a concern and, in some cases, first-hand frustration that legislation 
unduly restricts public health activities, compromising surveillance and research. 
 
All of the compiled results from the survey are provided in Appendix C (Volume II), and 
the most salient details were published as an original research article in BMC Public 
Health [70]. 
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Figure 1: Sections and flow of the Web-based survey to collect practitioner perceptions on the impact of privacy on public health practice 
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Figure 2: Participant rating of the degree to which privacy restrictions pose an 
obstacle to public health practice 
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Figure 3: Relationship between self-rated knowledge of privacy legislation and 
policies and the degree to which privacy was rated as an obstacle by survey 
participants. 
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5.2. THE PERCEIVED IMPACT OF LOCATION PRIVACY 
Original research article as published in BMC Public Health (2008) [70] 
5.2.1. OVERVIEW 
Background 
The ―place-consciousness‖ of public health professionals is on the rise as spatial 
analyses and Geographic Information Systems (GIS) are rapidly becoming key 
components of their toolbox. However, ―place‖ is most useful at its most precise, 
granular scale – which increases identification risks, thereby clashing with privacy 
issues. This paper describes the views and requirements of public health professionals 
in Canada and the UK on privacy issues and spatial data, as collected through a Web-
based survey. 
 
Methods 
Perceptions on the impact of privacy were collected through a Web-based survey 
administered between November 2006 and January 2007. The survey targeted 
government, non-government and academic GIS labs and research groups involved in 
public health, as well as public health units (Canada), ministries, and observatories 
(UK). Potential participants were invited to participate through personally addressed, 
standardised emails. 
 
Results 
Of 112 invitees in Canada and 75 in the UK, 66 and 28 participated in the survey, 
respectively. The completion proportion for Canada was 91%, and 86% for the UK. No 
response differences were observed between the two countries. Ninety three percent 
of participants indicated a requirement for personally identifiable data (PID) in their 
public health activities, including geographic information. Privacy was identified as an 
obstacle to public health practice by 71% of respondents. The overall self-rated median 
score for knowledge of privacy legislation and policies was 7 out of 10. Those who 
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rated their knowledge of privacy as high (at the median or above) also rated it 
significantly more severe as an obstacle to research (P<0.001). The most critical cause 
cited by participants in both countries was bureaucracy. 
 
Conclusions 
The clash between PID requirements – including granular geography - and limitations 
imposed by privacy and its associated bureaucracy require immediate attention and 
solutions, particularly given the increasing utilisation of GIS in public health. Solutions 
include harmonization of privacy legislation with public health requirements, 
bureaucratic simplification, increased multidisciplinary discourse, education, and 
development of toolsets, algorithms and guidelines for using and reporting on 
disaggregate data. 
5.2.2. BACKGROUND 
Although ―place‖ has been coined one of the three pillars of epidemiological data, only 
relatively recently has it garnered significant attention in the public health field, as 
Geographic Information Systems (GIS) have increasingly become more affordable, 
accessible, and intuitive. Indeed, the public health community’s ―place-consciousness‖ 
is on the rise as spatial analyses and GIS, now defined as part of the medical and 
health literature [1,101,102], are rapidly becoming key components of the public health 
professional’s toolbox [44].  
 
Privacy, an evolving ―principle as old as the common law‖ [3], has been cited as an 
issue in a variety of public health events, reports, and media releases [23,43,103-106]. 
So much so, in fact, that one sometimes cannot help but wonder if privacy is, indeed, 
the enemy of public health [4], and whether they could ever peacefully co-exist [5]. A 
distinction should here be made between the related concepts of privacy, 
confidentiality, and security within the context of the current discussion (these were 
defined in Chapter 2 but are included here as published in the manuscript). Privacy is 
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attributable to the individual about whom identifiable information pertains, and refers to 
that individual’s right to control such information, thereby freeing the individual from un-
invited intrusion and identification. Confidentiality obligates others who have been 
entrusted with such information to respect the individual’s privacy, and is therefore 
attributable to third parties; a breach of confidentiality violates the privacy of the 
individual because the individual has had no control over the release of the data. 
Finally, security refers to tools and methods used to safeguard confidentiality and 
privacy [2,107]. This research deals specifically with privacy issues as regulated and 
defined by legislation and ethical guidelines surrounding consent. From within this 
context, an individual’s privacy is not deemed to have been violated if data shared in 
the absence of consent cannot be used to identify the individual. Exception clauses 
generally exist in legislation, allowing authorities to release personally identifiable data 
under various circumstances – such as where it is deemed to be in the best interest of 
society or where it is impractical to obtain consent. Examples include Section 60 of the 
UK’s Health and Social Care Act 2001 [108], and Sections 8 and 7 of Canada’s Privacy 
Act [74] and Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act [60], 
respectively. While an analysis of privacy legislation as it pertains to health data and 
the concept of ―place‖ is beyond the scope of this paper, suffice it to say that such 
clauses are often ambiguous and subjective, particularly when combined with vague 
definitions of ―sensitive personal information‖ and the scale at which geographic data 
become ―identifiable‖. The concept of place, for example, is not explicitly specified as 
―sensitive personal data‖ in the UK’s Data Protection Act 1988 [109], nor in the generic 
EU Data Protection Directive of 1995 [80] (though it is explicitly mentioned in various 
telecommunications directives), but postcodes are specifically mentioned in a 2005 
NHS data protection and medical research POSTnote [110]. In Canada’s Privacy Act 
[74], ―address‖ is specifically listed as ―personal information‖, while in the Personal 
Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act [60], it is not (though implied). 
Such ambiguities deter the sharing of data, causing organisations and authorities to err 
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on the side of caution and not release identifying information [111], including spatial 
data. 
 
It is no surprise, therefore, that the increasing popularity of ―place‖ in public health has 
further exacerbated the public health research-privacy debate. Traditional health-data 
anonymisation techniques, such as pseudonymisation and aggregation, cannot be 
applied to spatial data without significantly altering or destroying the spatial 
relationships under investigation [9,10,15,112], and hence the very reason for which 
they are to be used in the first place. The problem with ―place‖ is that it is most useful at 
its most precise, granular scale [15,107]. Yet with increasing spatial precision and 
accuracy comes a corresponding increase in the risk of identification, and therefore a 
breach of privacy [107]. This becomes particularly troublesome when the spatial data 
are linked to health, social or demographic data. The development of methods by 
which to mitigate these risks continues to be an active area of research, but thus far, 
proposed solutions have limitations, risks and tradeoffs, and lack guidelines on their 
appropriate use. Consequently, the acquisition of geographic data tends to be either 
limited, or at a sub-optimal or unusable scale. Not only do privacy issues impact data 
acquisition and use for analysis, but also visualisation and dissemination of the results. 
Researchers have been able to ―reverse engineer‖ maps, for example, to successfully 
re-identify individuals [11-13].  
 
While the debate between the fields of privacy and public health has raged on for 
decades [3] despite their interdependence on one another [2], tension continues to rise 
in concert with the rampant growth of information technology and e-Health. From a 
health research perspective, both Canada and the UK place strong emphasis on 
evidence-based public health policies and services [23], yet in both countries, this 
seems to be hampered by privacy issues. While some argue that this debate is the 
product of a lack of understanding of the legislation and regulations by the public health 
community [2,14,113], there is little in the way of formal collection and synthesis of the 
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corresponding views and perspectives of those directly involved in public health 
activities. This paper describes the views and requirements of public health 
professionals in Canada and the UK on privacy issues and spatial data, as collected 
through a Web-based survey. Given that Canada’s health care and public health 
systems were both largely modelled after those of the UK [19,23,98], that each 
continues to be studied by the other for improvements and lessons learned [23,99], and 
that privacy issues for public health have been cited in both, it is expected that survey 
responses in the two countries will also be similar. 
5.2.3. METHODS 
Development & Content 
 
The survey was first developed on paper in the summer of 2006, and piloted with select 
public health individuals in Canada and the UK. It was then submitted for privacy 
assessment by the Access to Information and Privacy Branch of Health Canada, and 
for ethics review and approval from the Health Canada Research Ethics Board and the 
Southwest Multicentre Research Ethics Committee in the UK. Throughout the process 
it was clear that the survey would be developed as a closed Web-based survey, 
running between November 2006 and January 2007. The final paper version of the 
survey can be found on the research Website and in Appendix B (Volume II) of this 
work [114]. 
 
The paper survey was converted to a Web-version by the ALPHA Project [100] team at 
the Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC), and piloted by the author and several 
colleagues within the PHAC. The survey launch was delayed by two weeks, with only 
some of the concerns identified during the pilot being implemented due to limitations of 
the ALPHA architecture. Issues and limitations with the design of the Web-based 
survey are addressed in a later section. 
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Three versions of the survey were developed and launched: Canada-English, Canada-
French and UK-English. A summary of the survey’s structure and contents is given in  
Table 2. 
 
Target 
 
The survey targeted government, non-government and academic GIS labs and 
research groups involved in public health, as well as public health units (Canada), 
ministries, and observatories (UK). Potential participants were identified through Web 
searches of public health sites, mailing databases, personal contact, referrals / word of 
mouth, and postings on the research Website [114], a PHAC Public Health Portal 
Website [115], and the NHS Public Health Informatics Community Website [116].  
 
Table 2: Sections of the survey  
Section Title Description 
I A little about you… Participant scope, roles, use of GIS, etc. 
II Current access to data Asks participants with current access to PID to 
score 15 kinds of PID* on various dimensions, 
such as ease and frequency of access, usefulness 
and importance, etc. 
III No current access to 
data 
Asks participants without current access to PID to 
score same as above 
IV Privacy issues Collects participant opinions on the overall impact 
of restricted access to PID on public health 
practice (research, surveillance, health service 
delivery, etc.) 
V Current data holdings 
and provision to 
others… 
Collects information on the sharing of PID within 
and between participant organisations 
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Table 2: Sections of the survey (continued) 
 
Section Title Description 
VI Solutions and research Presents two distinct solutions to overcome 
barriers posed by privacy to public health research, 
and gather participant views on usefulness, 
usability and preference for each 
VII Qualitative component Allows participants to provide views and opinions 
on knowledge of privacy and confidentiality issues / 
legislation, impact of privacy, proposed research 
and solutions, and additional thoughts or 
comments 
VIII Further participation 
and contact 
Allows participants to provide contact information if 
they choose, for follow-up, updates, or piloting of 
potential solution(s) 
* For all participants: first name; last name; initials; sex; date of birth; date of death; 
registered GP or family physician; street address; postal code; community name; city 
/ town / village; region / geographic area; latitude / longitude.  
For Canadian participants: provincial health insurance plan number; hospital ID.  
For UK participants: old NHS number; new NHS number 
 
Participation 
 
Potential participants were invited to participate through a standardised but personally 
addressed email outlining the reason for the invite, the mechanisms by which their 
contact information was retrieved, a brief summary of the research and survey, a 
description of the data handling methods, an estimate of the time it would take to 
complete the survey (approximately 20 minutes), a unique user ID and password, the 
URL to the survey site, the URL to the research Website, and the principle 
investigator’s contact information. A copy of the email content is provided in Appendix 
A (Volume II). 
 
The survey Website had no other content. In order to participate, invitees were required 
to (1) successfully log in, and (2) consent to participation. Only the most recent 
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responses for any given user ID were collected, ensuring only one survey was 
completed per participant. The consent screen outlined the voluntary and anonymous 
nature of the survey, indicated the approximate time it would take to complete the 
survey, the risks and benefits to the participants, the intellectual property and 
ownership of all data collected, and the protection of any personal data provided under 
Canadian and UK law. Failure to successfully complete either of these two 
requirements resulted in termination of the survey. After consenting, participants were 
given the option to select their country and language of choice, and the relevant survey 
then commenced.  
 
All questions included a ―Skip‖ option. Progress through the survey required the 
selection of a response for each question, and participants could terminate the survey 
at any time or complete it over multiple sessions, at their convenience. Questions were 
not randomized or alternated, but adaptive questioning was utilized. Question types 
varied, and included single-choice, multiple-choice, scale, and free-form response 
questions, thereby collecting both quantitative and qualitative responses. There was 
typically only one question per screen with multiple potential responses, the maximum 
number of which was 17. Depending on the responses of the participants, the survey 
was distributed over approximately 40 screens.  
 
Key questions addressed by the survey included the following: 
 
Is there a requirement for personally identifiable data, including spatial data? 
What spatial resolution is ideal for public health research? 
Is privacy perceived to be a significant obstacle to public health practice? 
How knowledgeable do public health professionals consider themselves on 
privacy? 
What is the most critical obstacle to the access and use of personally identifiable 
data? 
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What are the views of the public health community on public awareness and 
perceptions?  
Which is preferred: raw, case-level data, or aggregated, anonymised data? 
 
Collected responses were analysed using basic descriptive statistics and non-
parametric methods in SAS 9.2. The Checklist for Reporting Results of Internet E-
Surveys (CHERRIES) [117] was used as a guideline in the reporting of the Web-based 
survey methodology. 
5.2.4. RESULTS 
Of 112 invitees in Canada and 75 in the UK, 66 (59%) and 28 (37%) participated in the 
survey, respectively. Of the Canadian participants, three responded to the French 
version. The completion proportion for Canada was 91%, and 86% for the UK.  
 
There were no differences in the distribution of roles reported by participants in both 
countries, with most participants (49% in Canada; 64% in the UK) identifying their main 
role as falling within the research and analysis domain (Table 3). Participant expertise 
varied, and included aboriginal health (Canada only), chronic diseases, paediatric 
public health, infectious diseases, dental public health, emergency preparedness and 
response, environmental public health, ethics and public health law, food and nutrition, 
health services, injuries and disabilities, mental health and substance misuse, social 
determinants of health, surveillance, and education. 
 
No response differences were observed between the two countries on each of the key 
questions, and the overall, combined results are therefore reported. A summary of the 
findings is given in Table 4. 
 
Is there a requirement for personally identifiable data, including spatial data? 
Almost all participants identified a need for personally identifiable data (PID) in their 
roles; only one Canadian participant indicated no need for PID. Five Canadian 
participants and one UK participant chose not to answer the question. In total 93% of 
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participants indicated a requirement for PID in their public health activities.  
 
Table 3: Number and percentage of survey participants by main role and 
geographical scope  
Scope 
Main Role 
Strategic 
decision 
/ policy 
maker 
Manager / 
Coordinator 
Consultant 
Research 
& 
Analysis 
Front-Line 
Responder 
/ Patient 
Care / 
Clinical 
Other 
Canadian Participants 
North 
American 
or 
National 
3 
(4.5%) 
6 
(9%) 
- 
9 
(13.6%) 
1 
(1.5%) 
2 
(3.0%) 
Provincial 
/ 
Territorial 
1 
(1.5%) 
3 
(4.5%) 
4 
(6.1%) 
6 
(9.1%) - 
2 
(3.0%) 
Local / 
Regional 
2 
(3.0%) 
7 
(10.6%) 
1 
(1.5%) 
17 
(25.8%) 
1 
(1.5%) 
1 
(1.5%) 
Totals 
6  
(9.1%) 
16 
(24.2%) 
5 
(7.6%) 
32 
(48.5%) 
2 
(3.0%) 
5 
(7.6%) 
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Table 3: Number and percentage of survey participants by main role and 
geographical scope (continued) 
 
Scope 
Main Role 
Strategic 
decision 
/ policy 
maker 
Manager / 
Coordinator 
Consultant 
Research 
& 
Analysis 
Front-Line 
Responder 
/ Patient 
Care / 
Clinical 
Other 
 
UK Participants 
 
European 
or 
National 
1 
(3.6%) 
1 
(3.6%) 
- 
1 
(3.6%) 
- - 
Regional 2 
(7.1%) 
1 
(3.6%) 
2 
(7.1%) 
12 
(42.9%) 
- - 
Local 2 
(7.1%) 
- - 
4 
(14.3%) 
- 
1 
(3.6%) 
Totals 
5 
(17.9%) 
2 
(7.1%) 
2 
(7.1%) 
17 
(60.7%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
1 
(3.6%) 
*One UK participant who identified a main role in research and analysis declined a response to 
the question on scope. 
 
What spatial resolution is ideal for public health research? 
All participants identified geographic location of health data as a requirement for their 
roles or organisation. When asked ―...what level of geography would you ideally like to 
visualise your data and/or conduct spatial analyses‖, 69% of respondents identified 
―latitude and longitude, exact street address, or exact household‖. 
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Table 4: Summary of survey findings 
Question Response Summary† 
1. Is there a requirement for personally identifiable 
data? 
Yes (93%) 
2. What spatial resolution is ideal for public health 
research? 
Lat/Long or address (69%) 
3. Is privacy perceived to be a significant obstacle to 
public health practice? 
Yes 
 
(71%) 
4. How knowledgeable do public health professionals 
consider themselves on privacy? 
High Knowledge* 
 
(53%) 
 
5. What is the most critical obstacle to the access and 
use of personally identifiable data? 
Bureaucracy 
Legislation 
(33%) 
(25%) 
6. What are the views of the public health community 
on public awareness and perceptions? 
Less than 30% of 
the public is aware 
(84%) 
7. Which is preferred: raw, case level data, or 
aggregated, anonymised data? 
Raw, case-level data (66%) 
†Numbers in parentheses are the percent of participants who responded as described 
*Participants rating their knowledge as high were also more likely to rate privacy as a 
more severe obstacle (P<0.001) 
 
Is privacy perceived to be a significant obstacle to public health practice? AND 
How knowledgeable do public health professionals consider themselves on 
privacy? 
When asked ―Are you or have you been restricted in your use of GIS for any public 
health activity because of privacy concerns (i.e. map or data might identify an individual 
or community)?‖ 79% of respondents marked ―YES‖. 
 
Of 83 participants who responded to the question ―In your opinion, do current 
restrictions to PID pose an obstacle to any aspects of public health practice?‖ 59 (71%) 
agreed, rating the obstacle severity at 6 or higher. Of these 59, 36 (61%) rated their 
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knowledge of privacy and confidentiality issues/legislation at 6 out of 10 or higher, with 
a mean score of 7.5 (std = 1.0) and a median score of 7.  
 
Using the median, respondents with a self-rated knowledge score lower than 7 were 
classified as ―low‖ on knowledge (47%), while those at or above the median score were 
classified as ―high‖ (53%). Those classified as high were more likely to rate privacy as 
an obstacle (one-sided Wilcoxon exact P<0.001). A trend was evident for the overall 
correlation between restriction score and self-rated privacy knowledge score 
(Spearman r=0.22, P=0.057).  
 
What is the most critical obstacle to the access and use of personally identifiable 
data? 
The most common obstacles were reported as bureaucracy and legislation by 33% and 
25% of the participants, respectively. Other responses included public 
disapproval/paranoia (15%), practitioner paranoia (7%), lack of knowledge (6%), 
combination of these factors (4%), other (2%), and none (skipped question, 7%).  
 
What are the views of the public health community on public awareness and 
perceptions? 
Fifty seven percent of participants felt that under 10% of the public population is aware 
of the impact of restricted access to PID on public health practice; 74% felt it to be 
under 20%, and 84% felt the proportion to be less than 30% (cumulative frequencies). 
Most identified education and awareness (through media, reports, case studies, 
scenarios, etc.) as the best methods to increase this proportion. When then asked what 
proportion of the public they felt would allow the use of their PID if they were educated 
on the usefulness of such data to public health practice, 67% said 50% or higher.  
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Which is preferred: raw, case-level data, or aggregated, anonymised data? 
More respondents identified a preference for having access to granular-level rather 
than aggregate data (53 vs. 27; 66% of those responding to this question).  
5.2.5. DISCUSSION 
This survey and user-needs assessment on privacy and public health shows a definite 
requirement by public health professionals – in various fields and positions in both 
Canada and the UK – for personally identifiable data, including spatial data. The 
requirement for this spatial data is at their most granular level – latitude and longitude, 
or exact street address – which necessarily compromises patient privacy. It is not 
surprising, therefore, that public health professionals perceive privacy to be a 
significant obstacle to public health practice.  
 
There are those who would argue that this perception is the product of a lack of 
understanding of the legislation and regulations by the public health community. The 
results of this research, however, indicate the contrary. Not only did public health 
professionals in both countries generally rate themselves high on knowledge of privacy 
legislation and related issues, but those with the highest self-rated scores also tended 
to rate privacy as more of an obstacle. That these self-ratings of knowledge are not 
representative of actual knowledge remains possible. 
 
Participants perceived the most critical obstacles to sharing or acquisition of health 
data with PID to be bureaucracy, followed by legislation.  
 
Bureaucracy surrounding health research in both Canada and the UK generally 
revolves around data ownership, academic competitiveness, ethics review boards or 
committees, and in particular, requirements for informed consent, even if they 
compromise public health, or are not in the best interests of the patients involved [118-
120]. Since seeking subject consent with every new hypothesis to be tested or model 
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to be developed is an impossible task, some have suggested that thought be given to 
―blanket‖ consent. At the Canadian Institutes for Health Research (CIHI) 2003 
workshop on the legal and ethical issues facing the Canadian Lifelong Health Initiative 
[121], participants spent some time discussing such issues, only to emphasise the 
importance of the establishment of ethical governance and structure; essentially, more 
necessary bureaucracy. Interestingly, while the debate continues, a relatively recent 
survey found that most of the British public did not consider the use of their National 
Cancer Registry PID for public health research and surveillance to be an invasion of 
their privacy [14]. While the ethics of blanket consent are not discussed in this study, it 
is nonetheless offered as a potential solution in light of the requirements of the public 
health community. This does not, however, address other issues of data ownership and 
control that contribute to the bureaucratic debate. 
 
While many individuals recognised the importance of privacy legislation, participants 
generally indicated a concern and, in some cases, first-hand frustration that legislation 
unduly restricts public health activities, compromising surveillance and research. Many 
phrases were used by respondents to describe the implications of privacy legislation on 
public health, including, among others: ―increasingly restrictive‖; ―serious‖; ―incomplete‖; 
―fuzzy‖; ―does more harm than good‖; ―two-edged sword‖; ―causes challenges‖; ―delays 
and restricts access [to data]‖; ―[is a] hindrance to the improvement and efficiency of 
public health‖; ―disappointing‖; ―frustrating‖; ―difficult to interpret‖; ―very worrisome‖; 
―disadvantages the public interest‖; ―not properly understood‖; ―over-protective‖; 
―limiting‖; ―hinders knowledge‖; and ―used as an excuse not to share data‖. A large 
proportion of the public health community represented in this sample clearly expressed 
major concerns with the impact of privacy legislation on their work – both in Canada, 
and in the UK – in spite of having a good understanding and acceptance of its purpose 
and necessity. It is also important for legislation to be written in an unambiguous 
manner that is clearly understood by both public health professionals and the general 
public [44]. 
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Public health professionals are largely of the opinion that the general public’s level of 
awareness of the impact of restricted access to PID on public health practice is 
extremely low. Surveys by the Office of the Privacy Commissioner in Canada [122] 
repeatedly show that the majority of Canadians surveyed (up to 80%) place an 
extremely high level of importance on strong laws to protect personal information, 
particularly health information, and that they feel that the level of protection of their 
personal information has declined over the past ten years. Yet interestingly, only 20% 
are clearly aware of existing laws, and even fewer (12%) are aware of their rights 
around the collection, use and disclosure of this information. The ―need to raise 
Canadians’ awareness about the current laws in place and what their rights are‖ [122] 
must therefore be coupled with the corresponding need to address this from within the 
context of public health requirements. 
 
Educating the public, therefore, as well as practitioners, data users, policy makers and 
politicians, was not surprisingly identified by participants as a potential solution. 
Participants put emphasis on the utilisation of the media to educate and increase 
awareness, as well as demonstrating the impact of a lack of data, and the benefits of 
its use when available. Demonstration of the benefits to the individual (e.g. streamlining 
of the system, not being asked for personal information with every visit to a new 
clinician, improved dissemination of public health information and intelligence directly to 
the public) was also offered as a solution, and summed up by one participant in the 
phrase ―seeing is believing‖. It is worth noting, however, that a number of participants 
displayed a certain level of pessimism that until a crisis or extreme event occurs, no 
amount of education or awareness-increasing activities would make a difference. 
  
Public health professionals generally prefer disaggregate, case-level data, but access 
to this data is an issue. The limitations imposed by privacy on public health have 
resulted in the development of a variety of techniques for data anonymisation 
[15,17,107]. However, all unavoidably have their issues, risks and limitations, and there 
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is currently no framework to guide public health professionals in their appropriate use 
and interpretation.  
 
Generalisability 
 
Although the findings of this paper may be generalisable to public health professionals 
in Canada and the UK, issues of privacy and public health are not unique to these 
countries. Privacy is defined as a fundamental human right in the legislation of many 
countries, and the concept is enshrined in Article 12 of the United Nations’ Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights [77] and Article 8 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights [123]. Similarly, public health is an international discipline; both diseases and 
information are ubiquitous, and neither is constrained by political boundaries and 
oceans. The increasing requirement for spatial data and the inherent clash with privacy 
legislation therefore extend beyond the UK and Canadian contexts, and the results, 
requirements and conclusions drawn from this research can be generalised to 
wherever such a clash exists. The implementation of solutions by national governments 
may be further exacerbated by issues of social political trust. General public distrust in 
government initiatives and motives, such as in most countries of the European Union, 
Canada, and the United States [124,125], complicates changes that may be perceived 
by the public to be intrusions of privacy. Such issues may currently be less of a 
concern in countries such as Finland, Sweden, Denmark, and the Netherlands, where 
social political trust, though declining, has traditionally tended to be much higher [126-
129]. However, even in such nations where privacy and health have traditionally not 
clashed, increased international data-sharing requirements and spatial data 
implications may pose unanticipated and challenging obstacles. 
 
Limitations 
 
No comprehensive lists of public health and health GIS professionals were found in 
either country, so it was not possible to invite a random sample. In addition, the 
response rate in the UK was relatively low, and it is therefore uncertain that the sample 
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is representative of all public health professionals in the two countries. However, 
responses between the two countries were consistent, with no significant differences. 
 
Since knowledge of privacy legislation and policies was based on self-rated scores, a 
thorough review and assessment of privacy legislation as it pertains to public health 
practice is required in both Canada and the UK to validate the findings of this survey. 
 
A number of limitations and issues pertaining to the Web-survey were identified. Most 
notable of these was the presence of a scroll bar in sections II and III which most 
participants missed, thereby eliminating the ability to capture items in reference to 
―place‖, such as usefulness. However, these items were also captured more broadly in 
other sections of the survey. Other issues involved the inability of the architecture to 
support various designs and types of questions that would have facilitated the 
completion of the survey, and shortened the length of time required. Participants also 
noted frustration with the navigation and structure of the survey pages. A document 
outlining these issues and others was submitted to the ALPHA team after the initial 
pilot for future enhancements to the architecture. 
5.2.6. CONCLUSIONS 
It is clear that privacy is perceived to be a major obstacle and issue for public health – 
the literature illustrates it, and the current study provides both quantitative and 
qualitative evidence. Together, these provide a more holistic portrayal of public health 
community viewpoints, and can be used to educate the public, and as evidence for 
decision makers to implement changes in policies and legislation. The clash between a 
requirement for personally identifiable data – including exact, individual location - by 
public health professionals, and the limitations imposed by privacy and its associated 
bureaucracy, must be addressed and appropriate solutions developed, particularly 
given the increasing utilisation of geographic information systems in public health and 
the imminent completion of comprehensive electronic health systems. Privacy 
63 
 
legislation is critical for the protection of this fundamental human right, and to prevent 
the abuse of personal information, particularly in the health field. However, the 
legislation must be harmonised with the requirements of public health practice if the 
health of societies and populations is to be maintained and improved. Since health is 
not limited by political boundaries, this must be pursued at an international level, and 
solutions must address these perceptions in the public health community, simplify the 
bureaucratic process, promote multidisciplinary discussions between legislators, 
bureaucrats and the public health community, educate communities, and develop and 
provide public health professionals with toolsets, algorithms and guidelines for using 
and reporting on disaggregate data. While the results of this study should inform and 
justify the development of techniques that better anonymise health data with minimal 
impact on their integrity and frameworks for implementing them, it seems fitting to once 
again echo the warning of Curtis et al.: ―...health and spatial scientists should be 
proactive and suggest a series of point level spatial confidentiality guidelines before 
governmental decisions are made which may be reactionary toward the threat of 
revealing confidential information, thereby imposing draconian limits on research using 
a GIS.‖ [11] 
 
64 
 
  
65 
 
PART II 
CONCESSIONS 
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6. Brief Overview of General Solutions 
6.1. INTRODUCTION 
In light of the complications imposed by privacy issues on public health research, 
several strategies have been utilized and/or suggested for working around the problem. 
Much of the methodology devised to protect the privacy of individuals in health data 
has also been applied to location information. These methods include access control 
and the implementation of secure networks; suppression of information; data 
aggregation; data anonymisation; implementation of automated analytical software 
agents; and mathematical transformations. Unfortunately, none of these solutions is 
without its problems.  
6.2. ACCESS CONTROL AND SECURITY 
“Computer security is not privacy protection” [8] 
 
One potential solution to the issue of privacy is the development of secure networks 
and technology for the sharing of information [8,15,44,130], provided the relevant 
legislation and policies are complied with. Unfortunately, this solution is not optimal for 
some jurisdictions. In Canada, for example, health is a provincial matter, and data 
ownership can adversely affect collaborative efforts. Furthermore, the establishment of 
data-sharing agreements, and the development of the required infrastructures and 
networks is costly in terms of financial, human and temporal resources. The area of 
health informatics has also been slow to develop; although Canada has consistently 
ranked among the most technologically advanced and healthy countries in the world by 
the United Nations [131], progress in marrying these two fields has been quite slow, as 
evidenced by the 2004 outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in 
Toronto. In fact, in response to Toronto’s inefficient response to SARS, the city’s chief 
medical officer of health at the time stated that part of the problem was due to the use 
of ―nineteenth century tools to fight a twenty-first century disease‖ [23]. Access control 
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and security measures are data-indiscriminate, meaning they can be applied to any 
type of information including location information.  
 
Even if one were to implement streamlined and efficient access control and secure 
networks, this would not equate to real privacy protection [8]; rather it equates to 
restricted information access, as well as increased politics and bureaucracy as 
researchers try to go through the necessary steps and channels to gain access to data 
that still do not protect privacy. So while security is a fundamental aspect of a 
governance structure, it does not, in and of itself, constitute privacy protection. This 
significance to governance is reflected in the suggested framework in Part III. 
6.3. SUPPRESSION OF INFORMATION 
 
“Suppression (of sensitive information) can drastically reduce the quality of the data, 
and in the case of statistical use, overall statistics can be altered, rendering the data 
practically useless.” [8] 
 
Suppression of sensitive information is also data-indiscriminate and typically involves 
the complete removal of identifying and potentially identifying (or ―quasi identifying‖) 
data – for example, gender, age, location, etc. – before sharing or releasing them. 
While this can protect the identity of the individual, it can also severely compromise the 
integrity and analytical capacity of the event data [8]. For example, two of the most 
fundamental and commonly used attributes in public health analyses are gender and 
age. When combined with location, however, even if the latter is only at a seemingly 
general scale such as zip code or postal code, the risk for identification is quite 
dramatic. In the United States, roughly 87% of the population can be identified by just 
the 5-digit ZIP code, gender and date of birth [8], while in Canada postal codes can be 
even more sensitive: almost 98% of the population in the city of Montréal, Québec, 
Canada is identifiable given these three fields [132]. 
 
Suppression need not only apply to the health data, however – it may also apply to 
contextual data. For example, it may mean refraining from using street-level geography 
69 
 
in a spatial analysis, or omitting other geographical layers that might help identify 
individuals [130] such as schools or other features. In this case, while the integrity of 
the health data may be maintained, the potential environmental and contextual 
relationships are compromised. Either way, suppression of information makes for poor 
data, resulting in poor analyses and inappropriate decisions. 
6.4. DATA AGGREGATION 
“The areal units used in many geographical studies are arbitrary, modifiable, and 
subject to the whims and fancies of whoever is doing, or did, the aggregating.” [133] 
 
Another solution to the privacy issue that is frequently used in epidemiological analyses 
is that of aggregation. Data may be spatially aggregated – or grouped – in several 
ways, depending on a variety of factors, such as environment, demography, event 
distribution, etc. Unfortunately, aggregation is fraught with problems. For example, 
information is invariably lost in aggregation, some of which may be related to the 
quantities of interest [134] demonstrating the sensitivity of analyses – particularly 
cluster detection – to the areal boundaries aggregated to. Several papers have been 
published on the types and effects of aggregation, particularly its impact on disease 
cluster detection [9,10,16,135]. While there potentially exist an infinite number of 
different ways one could aggregate the data [133], this is typically done based on 
existing political and administrative boundaries which may have no bearing on the 
investigation at hand [44]. Aggregation to existing political and administrative 
boundaries may also be particularly problematic if it results in a study area larger than 
that of interest. For example, the distribution of incident cases at a very local level, 
such as in a neighbourhood in a small rural community, or even urban core, would 
most likely not be accurately reflected through aggregation. This is referred to as a 
―zoning‖ issue.  
 
                                                 

 Quoted in the cited article from a 1984 book by S. Openshaw entitled The modifiable areal unit problem 
in the series Concepts and Techniques in Modern Geography, No. 38, by GeoBooks – the author of this 
study did not have access to this original source. 
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In the context of the current discussion, the issue of how large a geographical area 
needs to be in order to maintain anonymity is entirely a function of its population; 
smaller urban areas with a much larger population are more likely to achieve anonymity 
requirements and thresholds than larger rural areas with sparser populations. This 
concept, based on "Geographic Area Population Size" - GAPS - is elaborated on in the 
next chapter, since the author has contributed to research and publication in this area.  
 
From a statistical and technical perspective, the smallest possible spatial unit of 
analysis is the most preferred [136]. Aggregated datasets are subject to a problem 
called the Modifiable Areal Unit Problem (MAUP), akin to the ecological fallacy in 
epidemiology. The MAUP consists of two related issues – scale and zone – both of 
which can change the results of analyses [45,136-140]. The issue of scale deals with 
the magnitude of aggregation; for example, a series of street addresses can be 
aggregated up to a neighbourhood level, to a census subdivision level, to a public 
health observatory level, and so on. The choice may be arbitrary, or it may be defined 
by law to prevent identification, or may depend on the analysis required and event 
under investigation. The larger the areal unit of aggregation, the more likely it is to 
conceal variations that would otherwise be visible at smaller scales [139-141]. Not only 
is the degree of spatial aggregation modifiable, but so is temporal aggregation, if a 
temporal component is present. The issue of zone has to do with the geographies to 
which the data are aggregated, and was mentioned briefly above.  
 
Since aggregation is modifiable, the best recourse to considering such areal allocation 
is to visualize the point data – just as one would in the case of tabular data with a chart. 
Indeed it may, at times, be essential for the public health practitioner to be able to 
visualize the individual level data in order to help determine the best analytical 
methodology to pursue; this is, after all, the first step taught to budding statisticians – to 
plot and visualize the raw data. This is also argued to be a necessary first step in all 
spatial data analysis [140], particularly in real-time, such as in outbreak, emergency 
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and bio-terrorist planning and response scenarios. For example, during the SARS 
outbreak in 2003, Hong Kong cases were mapped at the individual building level in 
near real-time, thereby ―providing a unique and rare GIS opportunity that resulted in 
some very comprehensive public Internet mapping services.‖ [44] Individual level data 
also provide maximum flexibility for healthcare delivery planning and application based 
on analysis of actual trends and patient locations. This is a rapidly growing use of GIS 
and spatial analysis in public health. In summary, data at the smallest level of detail are 
the best data for accurate and efficient analysis and interpretation [136], since 
information is unavoidably lost in aggregation [45]. From a location perspective, the 
smallest practical level of detail is the street address. 
6.5. DATA ANONYMIZATION 
Lying somewhat between data suppression and data aggregation is data 
anonymisation. This method of identity masking involves the slight alteration of data – 
by suppression if necessary or generalization if possible [42] – such that every record 
(or tuple) becomes indistinguishable from a certain minimum number of other records. 
The term k-anonymisation refers to this technique where every record becomes 
indistinguishable from at least k-1 other records [8,42]. To clarify, consider the Table 5 
below showing (fabricated) incident cases of tuberculosis in a Native Canadian 
community, and the corresponding 2-anonymized table (―First‖ and ―Last‖ refer to first 
and last name; ―Ident.‖ refers to the aboriginal identity, such as Metis, Inuit, or First 
Nations): 
 
Table 5: Fabricated tuberculosis cases and the 2-anonymised result 
First Last Gender Age Ident.  First Last Gender Age Ident. 
Rob Jones M 19 Metis  Rob * M 
15-
20 
* 
Mark Smith M 29 Inuit  M S * 
20-
30 
Inuit 
Mary Swan F 27 Inuit  M S * 
20-
30 
Inuit 
Rob Tobias M 17 
First 
Nation 
 Rob * M 
15-
20 
* 
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Based on the above 2-anonymized example (i.e. k = 2), each record is 
indistinguishable from at least one (k-1) other record; the first and last records are 
indistinguishable from each other, as are the second and third record.  
 
This method of anonymisation is somewhat complex and time-consuming [42], but has 
been adopted in a variety of applications. The terminology is also often used to refer to 
anonymisation levels, and will be used and discussed further throughout the remainder 
of this study.  
6.6. ANALYTICAL SOFTWARE AGENTS 
A relatively novel and innovative approach to the problem privacy poses to public 
health research is the introduction of software agents. Essentially, these intelligent 
applications would perform the spatial analysis on the disaggregate data whilst still in 
the possession of the data owner, and only return the results of the analyses to the 
researcher [15,16,142]. The agents can also be designed to explore issues of scale by 
performing multi-scale analyses [15], or be sent to simply return a visual (map) that 
masks the identity of individuals [16]. The issue with having agents automatically 
perform the analyses is that often-times one may not know exactly what type of 
analysis is optimal until one has visualized the raw data. As was previously mentioned, 
this is the first step taught to statisticians, and is cited as a necessary first step in all 
spatial data analysis: 
 
“D. Unwin (1996) specifically focuses on visualization as a necessary first step in all 
spatial data analysis, simply because the position of particular attribute values on a 
map induces associative processes in the analyst, drawing upon analogies, possible 
prior information, or memory (for instance of possible sources of data error).” [140] 
 
However, given an appropriate ―transforming‖ task as described below, an agent would 
be the perfect tool to return a visual result and data that have been transformed to 
mask identity. 
                                                 

 Taken in the cited article from Unwin DJ, GIS, spatial analysis and spatial statistics. Progress in Human 
Geography, 20:540-551 (1996) – the author of this paper did not have access to this original source. 
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6.7. TRANSFORMATIONS 
Another approach to preserving the privacy of the individuals when dealing with health 
data is to apply a mathematical transformation while preserving the relative locations of 
the events (to each other). For example, one could translate all the cases by shifting 
them over x number of degrees in longitude, and y number of degrees in latitude; or 
one could rotate the points around a fixed centre, or introduce random perturbations 
within a fixed radius [16]. Comparisons can then made with the original data – if 
available – to assess the efficacy, accuracy and validity of the applied transformations.  
 
Much of the recent focus on location transformations for public health has been on 
random perturbation algorithms [112,143-145], as they tend to ―outperform‖ others in 
terms of the privacy-loss of information trade-off [16]. These algorithms, however, tend 
to either ignore important attributes of the population and its distribution (such as age 
and sex, for example), or treat the anonymisation of the location information separately 
from these features. In the case of the latter, approaches have adjusted for the 
attributes on an aggregate basis by ―weighting‖ the degree to which the location is 
perturbed. Instead, what is needed is an algorithm that adjusts for location as part of 
the overall anonymisation design, and not merely as a weighted afterthought.  
 
Another more fundamental geographic problem is that transformations can also perturb 
the relationships of the events themselves to critical or influential data in the 
surrounding geography. For example, if an outbreak of influenza were to occur in a little 
town in a group of children, public health practitioners would certainly be interested in 
the distribution of the cases relative to one another – this relationship can be somewhat 
preserved in the currently proposed transformations, and the effects can be quantified. 
However, in considering time and place (the other two components of the 
epidemiological triad), the practitioner is also interested in the time of year, as well as 
proximity of the cases to schools, nurseries, nursing homes, etc. By shifting or 
transforming only the health event data, relationships to these other factors are 
74 
 
potentially lost. Transformations can therefore also have a profound effect on common 
spatial statistics used in public health, and an appropriate transform must therefore 
allow for the perturbation to be influenced by such factors if required. 
 
As the name of this study implies, the focus is on this category of solutions, and a novel 
solution that builds location into the overall anonymisation design and allows for the 
integration of additional features was developed and published as presented in Chapter 
8. Additional critical review of similar existing methods is also provided in that chapter 
as part of the manuscript. Paving the way for the exploration of this novel approach, 
however, were various other projects focusing on concepts fundamental to a proper 
understanding of the required goal.  
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7. Paving the Path To A Novel Transform 
7.1. INTRODUCTION 
Before the ―a-ha‖ moment of creative inspiration, the journey toward it requires a 
deeper understanding of some of the core concepts at the heart of anonymisation 
algorithms. Two related concepts emerge: uniqueness and re-identification risk. The 
understanding and implementation of these concepts is also related to previously 
mentioned methods, in particular aggregation and k-anonymity. By relating these 
together we begin to form a more comprehensive and accurate view of anonymisation 
and how together they can inform a spatial transform. 
7.2. UNIQUENESS 
Uniqueness is the degree to which an individual is unique in a given sample or 
population and can be influenced by aggregation. Aggregation in this sense is not 
merely limited to spatial aggregation, but also non-spatial, in which it can also be 
referred to as generalisation or categorisation. The higher the aggregation, the lower 
the uniqueness; this in turn translates to higher anonymity. For example, a 97 year old 
male in a certain neighbourhood is likely to be unique; he is probably the only one. 
Aggregating several neighbourhoods may capture additional 97 year-old males, 
thereby reducing his uniqueness or making it more difficult to distinguish him from other 
97 year-old males if other attributes are not disclosed. Since it is likely that one would 
have to aggregate over a very large area to capture another one or more 97 year-old 
males, an easier method would be to generalise age into categories. Revealing that 
this male is over 50 years old, for example, will more than likely capture a large group 
of males within this age group in the given neighbourhood. The spatial aggregation and 
age categorisation can also be combined to limit overall information loss, depending on 
what is appropriate for the purpose. For example, while generalising age in the 
neighbourhood to 85 years and over will likely not change the individual’s uniqueness 
level, doing this in combination with an aggregation over several neighbourhoods will 
increase this likelihood. In some circumstances, it may be impossible to change 
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uniqueness on a combined set of attributes (also referred to as an equivalence class) 
thereby necessitating the suppression of some attributes or of the record itself. 
 
In order to assess the appropriateness of and requirement for a transform, a 
measurable uniqueness threshold should be identified. This is often reflected through 
the use of k-anonymity terminology. As described in the previous chapter, k-anonymity 
renders any given record with a set of attributes in a dataset indistinguishable from at 
least k-1 other records on all or a subset of those attributes. In this way, the level of 
anonymity afforded to the individual implicated by that record becomes quantifiable. 
Note that a k-anonymity threshold of k = 5 means that any given record is 
indistinguishable from at least 4 other records on the selected attributes, or that the 
probability of correctly identifying that individual is 1 in 5 which is 20%. 
 
Typically in the literature the reference for this assessment is the dataset itself; in other 
words, any given record in the dataset is indistinguishable from at least k-1 other 
records within the same dataset. However, this is not necessarily sufficient as the 
underlying population may also affect the effective uniqueness threshold – such as the 
example of the 97 year-old male given above. Furthermore, when considering the 
underlying population, uniqueness likelihood is generally inversely proportional to the 
population size; that is, as population size increases, the likelihood that an individual is 
unique on a given set of variables decreases [146]. It is, however, impractical to 
demand a uniqueness threshold of 0 (i.e. every single other individual in the 
comparison group shares the same values for the set of attributes of interest). This 
would result in extensive suppression and/or aggregation of values that would render 
the data useless for public health purposes. Some studies have suggested using 
population uniqueness thresholds of k=5 and k=20, but no standards currently exist 
[146].  
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7.3. RE-IDENTIFICATION RISK 
Re-Identification risk is the degree to which an individual can be identified from the 
dataset and is itself a multi-faceted concept. The underlying assumption in phrasing it 
as re-identification (as opposed to simply identification) is that the data have been ―de-
identified‖ and released, and an intruder then attempts to ―re-identify‖ individuals.  
 
Let us first address the relationship between identification risk and uniqueness. Within 
this context, different types of risk have been suggested. El Emam and Dankar 
describe prosecutor re-identification risk as an attempt to re-identify a record belonging 
to a specific individual known to be in the dataset, and journalist re-identification risk as 
an attempt to re-identify any individual simply for the sake of demonstrating being able 
to do so [147]. In the case of the former, the maximum probability of re-identification, as 
discussed in the previous section, is given by 1/k, where k reflects the anonymity 
threshold within the dataset. In the case of the latter, the effective anonymity threshold 
is a function of a larger identifiable sample or population dataset accessible to the 
intruder. The same authors have also described a third type of risk which they refer to 
as marketer re-identification risk. This risk is described as an attempt to identify as 
many individuals as possible within a given dataset, also using a reference identifiable 
dataset [148]. Aggarwal and Yu have also published on these and other kinds of re-
identification risk, though with different terminology [149].  
 
It is vital to keep in mind that re-identification risk in the presence of additional 
information - be it in the form of knowledge or an existing repository - is not only a 
function of the equivalence class size but also of the overall uniqueness of the records. 
For example, let us assume that we know that John Doe, aged 32 years, has been 
tested for HIV and that a dataset containing patient gender, age and a binary HIV test 
result variable (positive or negative) is released. Because HIV status is perceived by 
most to be sensitive information, we transform the data to achieve 20-anonymity on 
age and sex by categorising age into 10-year intervals. If we look at the dataset and 
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find that it contains 25 males aged 30-39 years, then our equivalence class size is 25. 
In this case, we have improved on our re-identification probability of 1/k since the 
probability of correctly identifying the specific record that belongs to John Doe is 1/25 
or 0.04. Looking only at the equivalence class in this scenario, though, is quite useless, 
since not only does it not add anything, but it even tells us less than we already know 
(since we know his exact age)! If, however, of the 25 individuals in the equivalence 
class of interest, 20 tested positive, then we actually have a 20/25 or 0.8 probability of 
correctly inferring that John Doe tested HIV positive - a whopping 2000% difference! 
 
Another aspect of re-identification more specific to location is related to the graphical 
release of the data. It has been shown that it is possible to use published maps of 
health events to identify individuals [11,150]. In such cases, while the transform may be 
sufficient to de-identify cases within a dataset, the visualisation of the cases in relation 
to their surrounding geography presents a re-identification risk. 
 
Yet another re-identification risk of some location transforms is associated with 
repeated random perturbation. Repeated iterations of location transforms that employ 
controlled random spatial perturbations may increase the risk of re-identification simply 
because of the principles of central tendency and dispersion. This is particularly the 
case if the perturbed points are randomly placed within defined distances of the original 
without consideration of the population's spatial distribution patterns or underlying 
geographical features. As iterations of such transforms increase, so too does the risk of 
being able to identify the individuals concerned [16,144,151]. 
7.4. MANAGING RE-IDENTIFICATION RISK 
As noted above, there are various considerations that impact re-identification risk, with 
uniqueness constituting just one of these. One method for managing re-identification 
risk through uniqueness is by controlling the geographic area population size (GAPS). 
Generally, the larger the GAPS, the less unique a given individual will be on a 
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controlled set of attributes. However, GAPS cut-offs are also variable, dependent on 
the number and nature of these attributes. To provide an empirically grounded basis for 
using GAPS cut-offs, a study using 2001 census data for Canada was conducted [58]. 
The study proposed a model for predicting GAPS cut-offs by aggregating nested 
geographies and assessing uniqueness on a combination of quasi-identifiers. The 
maximum number of possible combinations of these quasi-identifiers, referred to as 
MaxCombs, was used. The results demonstrated the variable nature of the GAPS cut-
offs and suggested that for most of the Canadian population, individuals are 
anonymous on age and sex within the geography defined by the first three letters of 
Canadian postal codes. This geography is referred to as the Forward Sortation Area 
(FSA). 
 
To further refine and confirm the findings of this study as related to the appropriateness 
of releasing information at the urban FSA level, a follow-up study was conducted using 
granular micro-data from the 2001 Canadian census [146]. Although these data 
represented a 20% sample of the Canadian population, permission to access and use 
them had to be granted through the Statistics Canada Research Data Centres (RDC) 
because of their granularity. Uniqueness thresholds of 5% and 20% were explored 
using the population size of the FSAs (FSA GAPS) and the MaxCombs for various 
quasi-identifiers. The models developed can be used to manage re-identification risk 
and provide recommendations on uniqueness threshold choice. 
 
Since the micro-data were only available at the Census Tract level, however, a method 
was required to allow mapping of these Census Tracts to the corresponding FSA. The 
author devised such a method by creating a Canada grid relating the two geographies. 
The method was published with this study in BMC Medical Informatics & Decision 
Making in 2010 and is given below, as published.  
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7.4.1. CREATING THE CANADA GRID 
Original contribution to co-authored study as published in BMC Medical 
Informatics & Decision Making (2010) [146] 
 
Background 
The smallest geographic unit provided in the census micro-data file available through 
Statistics Canada’s Research Data Centre (RDC) is the Census Tract (CT). CTs are 
only defined for census metropolitan areas and census agglomerations with urban core 
populations of at least 50,000 individuals. They are defined by Statistics Canada as 
―…small, relatively stable geographic areas that usually have a population of 2,500 to 
8,000.‖[137] The 2001 census contained a total of 4,798 CTs distributed over 9 
provinces (no CTs are defined for the Territories or the province of PEI; see Figure 4) 
 
In order to compute re-identification risk by forward sortation area (FSA) in our current 
study, we needed to devise a method to estimate conversion between census and 
postal geography. A gridding methodology similar in nature to the Gridded Population 
of the World Project (GPW) [139] at the Center for International Earth Science 
Information Network at Columbia University [140] was utilized, allowing assignment of 
geography based on areal weighting using a population grid for Canada. 
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Figure 4: Distribution of 2001 census tracts across Canada 
 
 
Methods 
Population-based weights were assigned to CT-FSA unions based on a created 
population grid for all of Canada. The grid cell size was one kilometre by one kilometre, 
and assigned populations were based on the 2001 census profile at the dissemination 
area level (DA). This is the smallest geography at which census profile information is 
released by Statistics Canada [45]. Similar to the PCCF+ product [134] from Statistics 
Canada, these population weights were then used to randomly assign census tracts to 
their associated FSAs. Details of the steps taken to create the population grid are 
described below. 
 
Twenty six (26) complete grids of dimensions 1554 by 546 Kilometres were created 
using a script in ESRI’s ArcMap 9.2 [152], as specified in Table 6. This created 848,484 
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one kilometre square cells per grid, for a total of 22,909,068 cells covering the 
Canadian landmass. The script for creating the grids was downloaded from the ESRI 
scripts Website [130].  
 
Once the grids were created, the next task was to assign an estimated population to 
each cell. This was done using the Statistics Canada DA file [133]. First, all DA 
polygons identified as water (water code = 1) were removed. A new DA shape file 
containing only land DAs was created. DA boundaries were then dissolved so that DAs 
with disparate polygons were captured within one record. Areas and perimeters were 
summed for each polygon to give the total DA area and perimeter. This reduced the 
number of records from 62,015 to 52,924. The 2001 DA populations were then 
extracted from Statistics Canada’s 2001 Census files using Beyond 20/20 [141]. Total 
population, as well as sex and age-stratified populations were extracted for all DAs 
across Canada, using four separate profile files (Western Canada and the Territories, 
Ontario, Quebec and Atlantic Canada). The DA variable name was renamed to DAUID 
to match the boundary file naming convention, and appropriate names were given to 
the population variables. Next, the 2001 DA population file was joined with the 2001 DA 
boundary file to create a 2001 Canada DA boundary file containing total and sex and 
age stratified populations. 
 
Table 6: Canadian grid development sections and attributes 
Grid 
Section 
x y Rows Cols. # Cells 
# Cells  
(DA-clipped) 
# Cells  
(populated 
DA-clipped) 
00 -2341699 310266 1554 546 848,484 147,282 95,225 
01 -1795699 310266 1554 546 848,484 323,759 292,052 
02 -1249699 310266 1554 546 848,484 400,335 352,048 
03 -703699 310266 1554 546 848,484 421,104 252,417 
04 -157699 310266 1554 546 848,484 442,583 112,863 
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Table 6: Canadian grid development sections and attributes (continued) 
 
Grid 
Section 
x y Rows Cols. # Cells 
# Cells  
(DA-clipped) 
# Cells  
(populated 
DA-clipped) 
05 388301 310266 1554 546 848,484 444,187 47,006 
06 934301 310266 1554 546 848,484 588,000 220,587 
07 1480301 310266 1554 546 848,484 514,762 202,006 
08 2026301 310266 1554 546 848,484 222,848 139,035 
09 2572301 310266 1554 546 848,484 79,825 30,635 
10 -2341699 1864266 1554 546 848,484 490,304 181,644 
11 -1795699 1864266 1554 546 848,484 843,129 253,796 
12 -1249699 1864266 1554 546 848,484 753,391 84,386 
13 -703699 1864266 1554 546 848,484 749,156 802 
14 -157699 1864266 1554 546 848,484 563,822 1,239 
15 388301 1864266 1554 546 848,484 192,569 1,005 
16 934301 1864266 1554 546 848,484 587,718 1,420 
17 1480301 1864266 1554 546 848,484 342,289 683 
18 2026301 1864266 1554 546 848,484 220,305 48,694 
19 2572301 1864266 1554 546 848,484 55,829 25,720 
20 -2341699 3418266 1554 546 848,484 21,506 0 
21 -1795699 3418266 1554 546 848,484 168,942 531 
22 -1249699 3418266 1554 546 848,484 135,498 686 
23 -703699 3418266 1554 546 848,484 229,560 0 
24 -157699 3418266 1554 546 848,484 424,214 1,101 
25 388301 3418266 1554 546 848,484 258,726 210 
26 934301 3418266 1554 546 848,484 26,188 160 
        
TOTAL     
22,909,
068 9,647,831 2,345,951 
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A ―Select by attributes‖ function where population was not zero (0) was completed on 
the above file to create a new boundary file containing only DA polygons with reported 
populations. This further reduced the number of records to 49,153, creating a boundary 
file for non-water, populated DAs only. A ―Select by location‖ function was completed 
on all 26 grids, for any cells that intersected the boundary file from the previous 
function. The resultant grids had a combined total cell count of 2,367,457. 
 
A model (Figure 5) was created using the ArcGIS model builder, and run for each of 
the 26 grids, to create grid section intersects with 2001 DAs, FSAs and CTs. The 
model also calculated proportional grid sub-section areas and the corresponding 
population, based on underlying DA population and an assumption of uniform 
population distribution within each of the geographic areas.  
 
A summary was done by each CT-FSA combination, to create unique CT-FSA records 
with the corresponding sum of the calculated grid-section populations. These summed 
populations were then divided by the total sum of the gridded-CT population to give the 
proportion of the population in each CT that lay within the corresponding FSA. In 
essence, this creates a population-based weight for each CT-FSA combination, 
allowing us to randomly assign any given record within a CT to its most likely 
(population-weighted) FSA.  
 
A simplified hypothetical example of the end result is given in Table 7 and Figure 6. In 
this example, 64.07% of the population in CT16003 is found in FSA K2S, and 35.93% 
in FSA K2T. For CT 16004, 49.35% of its population is in K2R, 19.48% in K2S and 
31.17% in K2T. This reduces the table to five rows, with a population-based weight for 
each unique CT-FSA combination. If, for example, there were then 28 records from the 
micro-data file falling in CT 16003, 18 (~65.86%) would be allocated to K2S, and 10 
(~34.14%) to K2T. 
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Figure 5: ArcGIS model for building grid-Dissemination Area – Forward Sortation Area – Census Tract intersect polygons 
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Table 7: Simplified hypothetical example of the weighted association between 
Census Tracts and Forward Sortation Areas 
CT FSAsa 
FSAsa Pop 
Density (/Sq. Km.) 
CT Area in FSA 
(Sq. Km.) 
Pop 
CT 
Pop 
Weight 
16003 K2S-1 50  0.95 48 128 0.3750 
16003 K2S-2 25 0.56 14 128 0.1094 
16003 K2S-3 42 0.48 20 128 0.1563 
16003 K2T-1 20 1.23 25 128 0.1953 
16003 K2T-2 56 0.37 21 128 0.1641 
16004 K2R-1 37 1.03 38 77 0.4935 
16004 K2S-1 42 0.36 15 77 0.1948 
16004 K2T-2 56 0.42 24 77 0.3117 
CT is Census Tract; FSA is Forward Sortation Area; FSAsa is FSA sub-area; Pop is Population 
 
 
Figure 6: Example Census Tract - Forward Sortation Area sub-area overlay to 
illustrate the hypothetical example 
 
 
Results 
The CT population assignments based on the gridding methodology proved to be very 
similar to the 2001 Statistics Canada Census Tract population profile (Table 8). 
The mean difference between the populations was 3.45 individuals, with a standard 
deviation of 48.96 individuals (median was 0). A graphical representation of the 
distribution of the population differences, by census tracts, is given in Figure 7.
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Table 8: Census Tract population comparison between created population grid 
and 2001 census profile 
 2001 Statistics Canada 
Population Profile 
Census Tract 
Canada Population Grid 
Project 
Census Tract 
Total n 4757 4757 
Mean population 4413.99 4410.54 
Standard 
Deviation 
1911.77 1911.33 
Minimum 
population 
40 0 
Median 
population 
4290 4287 
Maximum 
population 
20635 20636 
 
Figure 7: Distribution of Census Tract Population Difference between Grid-
Calculated Population and 2001 Census Profile 
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Provincial analyses also showed a high concordance between the CT populations 
using the gridding methodology as compared to the 2001 Statistics Canada Census 
Tract population profile (Table 9). The greatest differences were in New Brunswick 
(mean difference = 6.97 individuals, standard deviation = 75.26 individuals) and Alberta 
(mean difference = 6.75 individuals, standard deviation = 81.67 individuals).  
 
Table 9: Provincial differences between Profile and grid Census Tract 
populations 
 NL NS NB QC ON MB SK AB BC 
N 45 85 70 1246 2001 164 101 449 596 
Mean 3.71 2.6 6.97 1.55 3.68 2.93 -1.18 6.75 4.79 
Std Dev 12.01 19.37 75.26 26.19 51.38 27.14 37.86 81.67 51.38 
Median 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
 
 
Conclusions 
The population grid created in this study provides a means for linking census 
geography to postal geography in Canada. While creating population grids in and of 
itself is not a novel idea, the created grid in this project allows the mapping of census 
geography to postal geography, based on population weights. The procedure assumes 
a uniform population distribution within the geography being used. However, since CTs 
only occur in highly populated urban areas, this was felt to be an appropriate 
assumption. A similar assumption would not hold in rural or less densely populated 
areas, and this technique would therefore not be appropriate. However, it could be 
utilized, and further refined, by incorporating additional information, such as ecumene 
areas, satellite imagery for residential and inhabited areas, address data, etc.  
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7.5. RETHINKING SPATIAL AGGREGATION 
Aspects of this section were submitted to the Public Health Agency of Canada in 
the form of a report as included in Appendix G (Volume II). 
 
While clinical health information at the individual level is typically associated with the 
patient's full residential address, it is seldom if ever available to public health 
practitioners. Instead, the patient location is often provided at a much less granular 
scale, such as the zip code in the United States, or the postal code or forward sortation 
area in Canada as described above. In these instances, all cases falling at the same 
geography are typically geocoded such that they are geographically represented at the 
same point - usually this is the geographic or weighted centroid of the polygon 
represented by that geography. In the two studies described above, aggregation was 
really a case of nested geographies – instead of postal codes, the larger geography of 
aggregated postal codes with the same first three characters (FSA) was used. 
However, what if aggregation is required across non-nested geographies? A study was 
therefore also conducted looking at aggregation across urban FSAs. The methodology, 
while illustrated with FSAs, can be applied to any geography, since as has already 
been demonstrated the urban FSA in Canada is generally sufficiently large for data 
release (though this depends, as has been previously mentioned, on the number and 
nature of attributes). 
 
The algorithm aggregates adjacent geographies (Figure 8), so the first step in the study 
was to generate an adjacency matrix for Canadian FSAs. This indicates, for each FSA, 
all other adjacent FSAs in the same province. A first-order adjacency matrix was 
conducted by the author using the GIS software ArcMap 9.2.  
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Figure 8: An example of a Forward Sortation Area ―K1G‖ and those adjacent to it.  
 
Note that one FSA can be a collection of multiple nested, contiguous or non-contiguous 
polygons 
 
The aggregated areas also had to be minimally dispersed; in other words, distances 
between adjacent FSAs had to be minimised, thereby favouring aggregation in 
―clusters‖ as opposed to ―long strips‖ (Figure 9). This was accomplished by defining a 
homogeneity metric which reflects the proportion of FSAs of interest that a given 
―eligible‖ FSA is adjacent to in a cluster formation. For example, consider the FSAs in 
Figure 10 around the capital city of Canada, Ottawa. Our primary FSA that we are 
aggregating to is K1G, and we have begun by combining it with the FSA denoted by 
K1N. These, then, are our FSAs to aggregate to. As the figure illustrates, the FSA 
denoted by K1K is adjacent to both of these, and is therefore adjacent to 100% of the 
FSAs we wish to aggregate to; it therefore has a homogeneity value of 1. The FSA 
denoted by K1X is only adjacent to K1G, and therefore is only adjacent to 50% of the 
FSAs we wish to aggregate to; it therefore has a homogeneity value of 0.5. By setting a 
minimum threshold homogeneity requirement, we can control the degree of 
connectivity of the aggregated geographies and therefore reduce spatial disparities. 
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In addition to reducing spatial disparity, however, we must also minimise the amount of 
population ―noise‖ added through aggregation. For example, given two FSAs eligible 
for aggregation with the same homogeneity value, how do we decide on the one to 
use? If one has a population of 20,000 and the other a population of 30,000 then 
aggregating the latter will add more noise to the end result. In order to adjust for this in 
scenarios where the homogeneity values are not the same, this value is therefore 
multiplied by the population size and the FSA with the lower result is given preference. 
 
By using the MaxCombs to predict the acceptable population size cut-off (GAPS), this 
aggregation algorithm can then be used to provide a better aggregation of geographies 
to meet the required GAPS. The method improves on existing aggregation methods by 
incorporating information on the quasi-identifiers as given through MaxCombs, 
maximising the aggregation of spatially proximal geographies and minimising the 
amount of noise added to achieve the required GAPS. 
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Figure 9: Aggregation options for Forward Sortation Area polygons adjacent to 
K1G: (a) ―clustered‖, minimizing distance between aggregated FSAs, and (b) 
―string‖, where aggregation is stretched based on other parameters, irrespective 
of geography 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
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Figure 10: Illustration of the ―homogeneity metric‖ based on the adjacency of 
Forward Sortation Areas 
 
Considering two adjacent Forward Sortation Areas, K1G and K1N, this figure shows how K1K is 
adjacent to both, and therefore has a homogeneity metric of 1. K1X, however, is only adjacent 
to K1G and therefore has a homogeneity metric of 0.5 
 
It is worth noting that this methodology is only described with FSA geographies for 
convenience because of the availability of postal codes. In urban areas, these are 
sufficiently small that they may, in some studies, be an appropriate unit of aggregation. 
However, consider the scenario in which toxic substances are released into the 
environment by a source located at a given point. It is highly unlikely for such a source 
to be located smack in the middle of an urban area, and for a study investigating cases 
presenting with a given related toxin, the residential location of the case relative to the 
source may be critical. Aggregating to the FSA in these cases may lead to erroneous 
conclusions. Figure 11 shows an obvious example, where not only does the rural FSA 
"K0A" in Ottawa, Ontario, Canada extend over 130 kilometres, but it also crosses into 
multiple census subdivisions. The 2006 census population of this FSA was 92,716 
individuals. Note that the 130 kilometres is the shortest possible (geodesic) distance 
from one end to the other; minimum travel distance, for example, on the road network, 
will be at least this much, with travel through urban (i.e. likely high-traffic) areas of 
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Ottawa. Assuming a source of interest that lies at the east end of this FSA, aggregating 
cases to the FSA will place all of them either at the representative centroid shown by 
the green star, or, if the centroid is forced to fall inside the FSA polygon, the green 
circle - both shown in Figure 11. This effect can be mitigated by either using more 
granular areas (such as smaller census boundaries), creating one's own geographic 
areas or making use of the grid methodology described previously in this chapter. It is 
therefore crucial to consider the impact of aggregation and the context in which it is 
carried out. 
 
Additional aggregation-related thoughts are discussed briefly in Chapter 12 of this 
study as there is potential for further enhancement and future implementation of spatial 
aggregation methods. 
 
Figure 11: Extent of the K0A Forward Sortation Area and the Ottawa Census 
Subdivision in Ontario, Canada (2006 Census) 
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8. The Multidimensional Point Transform 
 
A condensed version of this chapter was submitted as an original research 
article and published ahead of print in Methods of Information in Medicine (2011) 
[153] 
8.1. BACKGROUND 
Privacy, as related to personal and identifiable health information, has repeatedly been 
a subject of contention within public health practice and health research: the literature 
is littered with comments and complaints [65,154,155], surveys have sought to assess 
the perceptions of public health professionals and the general public 
[14,51,70,156,157], and both privacy advocates and public health professionals appeal 
to a vaguely painted patchwork of legislation [154,158]. The issue does not generally 
lie with direct identifiers such as name or an identifying number, but rather with 
attributes or variables that are not in themselves identifiable but that can be used in 
combination to re-identify individuals. These are referred to as key attributes [159] or 
quasi-identifiers [160]. As an example, age and sex are commonly used public health 
quasi-identifiers that have been characterised as having ―high utility to an intruder‖ 
attempting to re-identify individuals from a dataset [146].  
 
As public health methods advance with ever-evolving technology to better capture the 
entire context within which health events occur, requirements for privacy–protective 
methods also increase. In an attempt to address the privacy issue, algorithms for 
anonymisation and privacy enhancing techniques (PETs) have been proposed and 
implemented [161], and calls for public health professionals to challenge policies and 
lobby legislators have been made [65].  
 
As has been described, anonymisation algorithms are often measured as a function of 
indistinguishable records (uniqueness) and re-identification risk (measured as a 
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probability of re-identification). The term k-anonymisation refers to the concept where 
every record becomes indistinguishable from k-1 other records [8,42]. While no 
standards for acceptable anonymity thresholds have been established for public health, 
k values of 5 and 20 (representing re-identification probabilities of 20% and 5% 
respectively) have been suggested and used in the literature [69,146]. 
 
One particular area that has seen a dramatic increase in concern is location privacy, 
particularly given the increasingly recognised importance of spatial information in public 
health [44,107]. With the ubiquitous use of Global Positioning Systems (GPS), online 
mapping applications that provide high-resolution aerial images, and the increasing use 
of spatial intelligence in public health, location privacy is becoming increasingly 
contentious – perhaps more so than with other information technologies [107,158]. The 
realisation of these issues is not particularly novel. Over a decade ago, Armstrong et al. 
published a paper on various mathematical transformations to mask original point 
location [16]. The authors describe three main masking categories: those that 
transform across records, for example aggregating all records within administrative or 
political boundaries; those that transform attributes, such as categorising age, for 
example, or suppressing ethnicity; and those that displace records such as spatially 
moving a point from one location to another by adding noise to its coordinates. Of the 
methods described, random perturbation was found to perform best overall as 
measured by retention of pair-wise relations, event-geography relations, clusters, 
trends and directional relationships (anisotropies) [16]. Other public health studies – 
including this study – have therefore continued to build on this type of spatial transform 
[112,143-145] and a good overview can be found in [107]. 
 
In a classical random perturbation, a circle of radius r is drawn around the point to be 
masked such that sufficient population is captured to render the point anonymous, and 
the point is randomly displaced within the area. This is repeated for each point, and if r 
is sufficiently large (i.e. captures enough population), one ends up with a series of 
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points that are difficult to trace back to their original locations due to the stochastic 
nature of the transform. Not all random perturbations are created equal, however, and 
advances in their development and implementation have been slow. Ideally, the 
displacement as measured by the perturbation distance should be minimised, and 
generally, the more densely populated the area in which a point (case) falls, the less it 
has be spatially perturbed to meet a desired anonymity threshold. Adjustments to 
random perturbation therefore create dynamic radii dependent for each point on its 
underlying population [143]. This "context-sensitive approach" can be further improved 
by stratifying on other attributes, such as age and sex, to give a more accurate 
displacement that minimises information loss [143]. More elaborate revisions of random 
perturbation have been developed in recent years, including the use of Linear 
Programming (LP) [144] and a ―donut‖ method of geomasking [145]. However, all of the 
proposed versions of these transforms modify location-based information almost as an 
afterthought or secondary anonymisation technique, either assuming that all other 
identifying information – including important quasi-identifiers such as age and sex – 
has already been anonymised or stripped, or adjusting the transform accordingly for 
selected underlying demographics using generalised weighting schemes. Instead, what 
is needed is a transform that operates discreetly on multiple attributes, in concert with 
location as part of the overall anonymisation algorithm. 
8.2. OBJECTIVES 
The current methodology refines the random perturbation approach by combining new 
and previously studied methods to propose a flexible, dynamic and customisable 
multidimensional point transform (MPT) acting on attribute data. In this context, 
attributes of interest – such as location, age, sex, education, etc. – are referred to as 
dimensions since they define the scope of the transform. Like previous context-
sensitive studies [112,143,145], the approach presented is an adaptive geomask. 
However, unlike others, it allows these other dimensions to be incorporated into the 
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anonymisation algorithm directly based on custodian and user tolerances and 
requirements. 
8.3. METHODS 
8.3.1. ALGORITHM: OVERVIEW 
The proposed algorithm is dependent on the availability of a base population (real or 
synthesised) matrix, A, of N individual records with Q attributes. The dimensions of 
interest must be elements of the attribute set, and given the spatial nature of the 
transform, must include a location attribute – ideally the geographic coordinates of the 
individual’s relevant address. Given a list of patients, B, from this base population A, 
the goal of the algorithm is to randomly "move" each patient in B within a maximum 
perturbation distance , while controlling on all dimensions of interest for a defined 
anonymity threshold, k. ―Move‖ in this case means randomly selecting an alternate 
record from A to represent the patient; in this way, the locations are realistic and non-
random, but the selection is random.  
 
Consider the simple example where the controlled pre-selected dimensions of interest 
are location, age and sex (other dimensions can be added, provided they are elements 
of both datasets). In other words, the algorithm's function is to ensure that the 
anonymity level k is maintained based on the location, age and sex of each individual 
in the dataset and does so by comparing the number of other individuals within a given 
distance matching on age and sex as required. While ensuring that the anonymity 
threshold k is maintained based on these dimensions, the algorithm sequentially 
perturbs or masks them as required based on pre-defined conditions and perturbation 
tolerances. Location perturbation is measured as the distance moved from the original 
point, and its maximum tolerance is defined by ; the age perturbation tolerance allows 
the dimension to be categorised, for example in 1-year increments, up to a maximum 
number of categories; and the sex perturbation tolerance is binary, either requiring a 
perfect match on gender or not.  
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The acceptable anonymity threshold is defined by k. For example, k = 5 means that a 
given patient is indistinguishable from at least k - 1 = 4 other individuals within the 
selection area. So if, within 300 metres of a male patient aged 12 there are four other 
male patients aged 12, then randomly choosing any one of them including the original 
has a 20% chance of correctly identifying the patient. The maximum perturbation 
distance  is the maximum acceptable threshold for spatial displacement. This does 
not mean that all eligible records for displacement will be up to  away from the original 
point, only that this is as far as the algorithm is allowed to go to achieve the desired k. 
The actual maximum perturbation radius, R, will depend on the data and defined k. 
 
Given the patient dataset B with j = 1 to n patients, all patients in B are removed from A 
to give the complement non-patient base population, C. Removing the patient dataset 
individuals from the base population records at the onset of the algorithm has two key 
effects: it prevents selection of one patient in place of another, and it reduces re-
identification risk by forcing k - 1 to consist entirely of non-patients. Next, for each 
record in B, all records in C matching Bj on sex and age are isolated and the distance 
between each one and Bj is calculated. If fewer than k - 1 matching records are found 
within , then the sex and age dimensions are perturbed (i.e. grouped or categorised), 
based on the pre-defined conditions and in parallel in both the case dataset and the 
population dataset, and the matching is re-done. This is repeated until at least k - 1 
matching records are found. If the algorithm is unable to reach the desired k-
anonymity, then the record is non-transformable within the current requirements, is 
flagged as such, and the algorithm proceeds to the next record. Otherwise, the 
algorithm continues. 
 
Of the matching records, the closest k - 1 records are identified and a small random 
distance, r, is added to the farthest k – 1 match distance, max, to define the 
perturbation radius R. The addition of this random distance ensures inclusion of the 
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point used to set the farthest match distance in case any rounding occurs and 
guarantees a minimum k-anonymity. It also adds a small stochastic aspect that 
complicates re-identification of the original patient location. This is because not only 
does the selection of the transformed point become different with each run, but so also 
does the underlying pool from which the point is selected. A record within R of Bj is 
then randomly selected from C, and its location assigned as the perturbed point. This is 
repeated for the next record until all patient records in B have been transformed or 
flagged. The algorithm flow and components are illustrated in Figure 12. 
8.3.2. DATA 
Synthesised population data for New York County were acquired from the MIDAS 
project [162] by request. The dataset contained synthesised records at the individual 
level, with the dimensions of interest being age, sex and residential location (latitude 
and longitude in decimal degrees). For each record, latitude and longitude were 
converted from decimal degrees to radians prior to algorithm execution for use in 
extent and distance calculations.  
 
New York county was specifically chosen as the study area to allow for comparisons 
with existing published methods - namely the results of the LP approach by Wieland et 
al. [8] - on distances required to achieve specified k-values when additional dimensions 
are taken into consideration. The two approaches are also similar in that they both 
seek to minimise perturbation distance and both rely on the presence of underlying 
spatially-referenced population data. 
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Figure 12: Multidimensional Point Transform flow 
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8.3.3. ALGORITHM: PRELIMINARY PROOF-OF-CONCEPT 
IMPLEMENTATION 
Preliminary testing of the algorithm was completed using Monte Carlo simulations for 
various patient sizes. One thousand iterations were run for each of 25, 50, 100, 200 
and 400 patient datasets, generated by randomly sampling records from the 
synthesised New York County population.  
 
The controlled dimensions were sex, age and distance. The anonymity threshold k was 
set to 5 and the maximum perturbation distance  to 1 kilometre. An exact match to 
sex was required (i.e. no perturbation allowed), and 5 levels of age categorisation were 
permitted (including exact age). Age categories were created by increasing the age 
range by one year for each successive level: for the first level, age range is 0, so it is 
the exact age; for level 2, the range is 1 to give age categories 0-1, 2-3, 4-5, etc. A 
simplified illustration of the implementation of the age categorisation is given in Figure 
13. Note that level 5 matches the age categories generally used in census profiles and 
population surveys for age and sex stratified population counts such as the Canadian 
census [163], the United Kingdom census [164] and the American Community Survey 
[165].  
 
Extent-limiting steps were also added to the algorithm to improve computational 
performance. At the beginning of each iteration and after creation of the patient 
dataset, one kilometre was added to the maximum and minimum latitudes and 
longitudes of the patient dataset and used to constrain the extent of the base 
population (i.e. reducing the number of base records used in the algorithm, thereby 
improving performance). This method was also used when determining the eligible 
population for each record.  
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The small random distance, r, added to create R was restricted to a range of 1 and 10 
metres to minimally impact geographic displacement. Distance was measured using 
the great circle formula. 
 
Cumulative descriptive statistics (mean and standard deviations, as well as the 
minimum, maximum and median) were calculated for successive iterations to assess 
the effects of the transform on the perturbation distance. Analysis of the age dimension 
sought to identify the proportion of records requiring categorisation on age to achieve 
the required minimum k for each patient dataset size. The effect of adding the small 
random distance r on k was also described through descriptive statistics, as was the 
final perturbation radius. The displacement of the spatial mean of each patient dataset 
was also calculated in terms of perturbation distance (i.e. distance moved or 
displaced). 
 
The algorithm was coded and run in SAS v9.1; the results were also analysed in SAS 
v9.1 and graphed using Microsoft Office 2007. The code was run on multiple dual-core 
machines in Random Access Memory (RAM) using RAMDisk software [166], as 
preliminary tests showed this to be much faster than mechanical hard drives.  
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Figure 13: Simplified example of age categorisation using one-year intervals with 
5 levels and k=5.  
 
 
Note that categorisation always starts at age 0 years (i.e. birth, consistent with census age 
strata) 
8.4. RESULTS 
In total, 775,000 records were randomly chosen from the synthesised New York 
population of 1,482,104 unique individuals and tested with this algorithm. These 
represented 601,790 unique individuals, thereby capturing 41% of the New York county 
population (Table 10). 
 
Time taken to complete the algorithm ranged from about 5 minutes per iteration for the 
25-patient dataset size, to just under two hours per iteration for the 400-patient dataset 
size. 
 
The age dimension was seldom transformed, as summarised in Table 10. Only one 
record required an age-transform in each of the 50, 100 and 400-patient datasets, 
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representing 0.0005% of the tested unique individuals. In the case of the 50-patient 
dataset this was an 83-year old male; for the 100-patient dataset an 88-year old male; 
and for the 400-patient dataset a 15-year old female. 
  
The mean and median perturbation distances (46 metres and 39 metres respectively), 
as well as the mean and median perturbation radii (70 metres and 60 to 61 metres 
respectively), were consistent irrespective of the patient dataset size (Table 10). 
Cumulative means of the distance between the original and the transformed points are 
presented in Figure 14  for successive iterations, showing a plateau within 1 metre after 
less than 200 iterations.  
 
The actual k-anonymity achieved across all runs averaged 5 individuals, matching on 
sex and age within the defined perturbation radius as prescribed by the pre-defined k 
requirement. Ignoring age and sex, the average number of individuals within the 
perturbation radius from which the random selection was made was just over 800 
individuals. The change in the actual k-anonymity range was also just as dramatic 
when taking all dimensions into consideration versus only location, with a median of 6 
in the former compared to almost 600 in the latter. 
 
The overall spatial mean of the transformed points was within 5.6 metres of the original 
spatial mean across all runs, and was inversely related to the patient dataset size 
(Table 10). 
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Figure 14: Mean cumulative perturbation distance for successive runs of the 
tested patient dataset sizes 
 
 
 
Table 10: Results of the Multidimensional Point Transform algorithm with 
different patient dataset sizes for New York County 
 PATIENT DATASET SIZE (n) 
 25 50 100 200 400 
SETTINGS      
Total records 25,000 50,000 100,000 200,000 400,000 
k-anonymity setting 5 5 5 5 5 
Maximum  setting 
(kms) 
1 1 1 1 1 
Unique Individuals 24,569 49,191 96,056 187,101 348,947 
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Table 10: Results of the Multidimensional Point Transform algorithm with 
different patient dataset sizes for New York County (continued) 
 
 PATIENT DATASET SIZE (n) 
 25 50 100 200 400 
MEASURES      
Age-Perturbed records 0 1 1 0 1 
Perturbation Distance 
(kms) 
     
Mean 0.046 0.046 0.046 0.046 0.046 
Standard Deviation 0.035 0.034 0.035 0.034 0.034 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 
Median 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.039 
Maximum 0.975 0.979 0.914 0.980 0.992 
Perturbation Radius 
(kms) 
     
Mean 0.070 0.070 0.070 0.070 0.070 
Standard Deviation 0.042 0.042 0.042 0.042 0.042 
Minimum 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 
Median 0.060 0.060 0.061 0.061 0.061 
 Maximum 0.994 0.997 0.983 1.000 1.005 
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Table 10: Results of the Multidimensional Point Transform algorithm with 
different patient dataset sizes for New York County (continued) 
 
 PATIENT DATASET SIZE (n) 
 25 50 100 200 400 
Actual k-anonymity 
level 
     
Mean (rounded down) 5 5 5 5 5 
Standard Deviation 1 1 1 1 1 
Minimum 5 5 5 5 5 
Median 6 6 6 6 6 
Maximum 17 15 66 17 16 
Location Only k-
anonymity 
     
Mean (rounded down) 809 818 818 817 820 
Standard Deviation 909 918 976 931 933 
Minimum 19 19 15 19 7 
Median 587 590 589 593 591 
Maximum 38,122 43,782 68,449 66,100 58,965 
Spatial Mean 
Displacement (kms) 
     
Mean 0.010 0.007 0.005 0.003 0.003 
Standard Deviation 0.006 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.001 
Minimum 0.0004 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 
Median 0.009 0.007 0.005 0.003 0.002 
Maximum 0.057 0.027 0.016 0.011 0.007 
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8.5. DISCUSSION 
This study describes a multidimensional point transform (MPT) for anonymising data 
for public health use that includes location perturbation as a core component of the 
overall anonymisation algorithm. This novel approach provides the flexibility to allow 
dynamic and interdependent transformations on health data; by perturbing the location 
dimension in concert with other user-defined dimensions, the MPT offers a more 
comprehensive and valid anonymised dataset than existing proposed random 
perturbation transforms. 
 
A preliminary test of the algorithm was completed to observe its functionality on a 
synthesised New York County population. Three dimensions were included in the 
transform: sex, age and location. The perturbation tolerance for the sex dimension was 
set to 0, indicating a perfect match requirement; the age dimension perturbation 
tolerance was set to a maximum of 5, allowing for the age to be perturbed by up to 4 
years; and the geographical distance perturbation tolerance was set to a great circle 
distance of 1 Km, thereby allowing a maximum spatial displacement of up to 1 Km. The 
overarching anonymity threshold was set to 20% (i.e. within the one kilometre radius of 
any given case, at least 4 other records are indistinguishable from the case on the 
dimensions controlled for). Patient dataset sizes of 25, 50, 100, 200 and 400 patients 
were tested with 1,000 iterations each.  
 
The quality of the transformed data was found to be high on the three transformed 
dimensions: since the sex perturbation tolerance was 0, there is no loss of information 
on the sex dimension; the age dimension was unaltered for the vast majority of runs 
(99.9995%); and the mean spatial displacement of the transformed records was 46 
metres from the original patient point, irrespective of patient dataset size. Fifty percent 
of points being displaced across all runs were moved less than 40 metres. In addition, 
all transformed records were spatially accurate in that their locations represented 
actual household locations within the synthesised population. 
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Since New York County has a very high population density, it is not surprising that a 
k=5 anonymity level was achieved within such a small distance and with no impact on 
the age dimension. To further illustrate the multi-dimensional aspect of the algorithm, 
ad hoc analyses were completed using 100 iterations of sample sizes of 25 cases with 
k=20 and =50m, thereby testing a total of 2,500 records. With these tightened 
constraints, only 19 of the total records were transformed with no age-categorisation 
required; 148 were transformed with a level 2 age categorisation (i.e. a 1-year interval; 
recall level 1 is the exact age with no categorisation); 274 were transformed with a level 
3 age categorisation; 292 were transformed with a level 4 age categorisation; and 290 
were transformed with a level 5 age categorisation. The total successfully transformed 
records of the 2,500 was thus 1,023 (41%) with a mean perturbation distance of 31 
metres. The remaining 1,477 records could not be transformed within 50 metres of the 
original point at a k=20 level, and all 1,477 reached level 5 age-categorisation as 
expected. If this were a real scenario, the user at this point, in collaboration with the 
data custodian, would have to decide on the best approach; for example, from the 
user's end, additional levels could be added to the age categorisations, gender 
perturbation could be allowed or maximum perturbation distance could be increased. 
From the custodian end, k could be decreased, for example conditional on the user 
meeting specific security and data handling requirements as evaluated within an 
appropriate framework (see Part III). Note that, as described, increasing the distance 
threshold does not translate to a non-optimal distance transform because the minimum 
distance required to achieve the desired k is used for each record independently.  
 
Previously described algorithms treat other record attributes separately from location, 
sometimes with a weighting to account for the generalised underlying population 
demographics. For example, Armstrong et al. assume that all other potentially 
identifying attributes such as health information, age, sex, and so on are sufficiently 
―non-individual specific‖ [16]. Even in previous studies where the random perturbation 
transforms have been carried out within the context of the underlying population, they 
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have not done so in parallel with other dimensions, but rather by applying generic 
weights. For example, Kwan et al. [112] acknowledge the arbitrary nature of their 
weight factors, and the fact that only one run was performed for each perturbation and 
analysis. They also state that the results are specific to the unique and particular 
combination of their underlying population and the case-data. Similarly, Cassa et al. 
[143] implemented a probabilistic Gaussian-skewed random perturbation transform 
based on the underlying age-based population density. This consideration allowed 
case points lying in less densely populated areas (based on census block groups) to be 
probabilistically perturbed over larger distances to meet required k-anonymity 
thresholds. As with the Kwan et al. study [112], this was done using generalised age 
and age-based population density weights, which the authors refer to as ―multipliers‖. 
Also as with previous studies, k-anonymity calculations were probabilistically based, 
without taking into consideration other individual dimensions (e.g. age and sex). In 
other words, a male individual aged x years who is moved within a certain distance that 
captures 1,000 other people can be considered to have a k-anonymity level of 1,000, 
even if he was the sole male aged x years within that area. One could reasonably 
argue that, given the general importance of and requirement for retention of these 
dimensions in public health practice and in light of the actual k-anonymity findings of 
this study, they must be included in any assessment of the anonymisation level of an 
algorithm. The other issue that this potentially raises is that, without including an 
adjustment for attribute-stratified population, everyone gets treated in the same way 
such that anonymisation is based on the underlying overall population density and not 
in concert with the individual's relevant attributes. Consider, for example, two cases in 
the same rural area of 200 people, one 35 years old and the other 92 years old. Using 
a non-stratified population-specific algorithm with a k-anonymity requirement of k=20, 
for example, would anonymise both within the rural area. However, while it is possible - 
and possibly probable - that there are at least twenty 35-year olds in the area, it is 
highly unlikely that there are at least twenty 92-year olds. The MPT algorithm described 
in this study resolves these issues. 
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Building on geographical masks, Wieland et al. [144] used linear programming to 
perturb patient points given a maximum re-identification probability such that the 
perturbation distance is minimised in New York county. As with this approach, the MPT 
algorithm seeks to minimise perturbation distance and relies on an existing spatial 
population to do so. However, it accomplishes this while simultaneously transforming 
on multiple dimensions (in this case, sex, age and location), thereby further minimizing 
information loss. This has a demonstrably significant impact on the implications of the 
transform. For example, Wieland et al. [144] suggest that aggregating to zip code in 
New York county yields a k value of about 884 and a corresponding perturbation 
distance of 519 metres; the LP method they describe has an associated perturbation 
distance of only 3.3 metres for the same k, although it is based on moving patients 
grouped by census blocks. As shown in the results for this transform, a similar k-value 
acting on non-grouped individual points requires a perturbation of, on average, 46 
metres. However the actual k when taking the other dimensions into consideration 
drops dramatically to only 5.  
 
More recently, Hampton et al. [145] published on a "donut method" of geomasking 
which simply added a minimum perturbation distance to existing context-sensitive 
approaches [143]. The authors argue that allowing a case to be perturbed to its original 
location presents a re-identification risk, since an intruder will know that a few 
individuals may still be correctly identified. The study also prevents cases from being 
perturbed outside of their original administrative boundaries, arguing that demographic 
characteristics of the boundaries are often significant for public health purposes, 
though also dependent on the "research environment". This is generally true: the 
relevance of the demographics depends on the scale of the area of study and the 
study's intent. The authors also suggest that their approach is adaptive because it not 
only adjusts for the underlying population density, but also for minimum and maximum 
k-anonymity - whereas other random perturbation methods are only "semiadaptive" 
because they fail to be bound by a minimum anonymity constraint. However, one could 
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just as easily argue that the donut method as described is also only semi-adaptive 
because it fails to consider the details of the population demographics, such as age 
and sex. Given the aggregate use of underlying population density, the authors' 
suggestion that other dimensions such as age and sex could be incorporated into the 
algorithm would have to rely on weighting mechanisms similar to those previously 
described [112,143]. The donut-algorithm also does not address the possibility of 
randomly generating a point in a residentially-improbable or impossible location, such 
as a river or park, and is subject to a re-identification risk associated with multiple 
iterations [150,167]. In contrast, the MPT resolves many of these issues, and can 
easily exclude original patient locations, incorporate a ―donut-like‖ effect if desired, and 
retain points within defined geographies. 
8.5.1. RE-IDENTIFICATION RISK 
One of the most important noted issues with random perturbation algorithms thus far is 
the fact that repeated iterations on the same dataset increase the likelihood of re-
identification [150,167]. The MPT in the current study reduces this risk in two ways: (1) 
by using the actual underlying population distribution and (2) by incorporating the 
random small distance, r, to create the maximum selection area. The use of the actual 
underlying population distribution and its corresponding geographic points, as opposed 
to randomly placed points, avoids inaccurate or unrealistic placement of a point and 
can add a skew to the point pattern. In other words, repeated random point generation 
within a circle of radius r will have a uniform distribution, the mean of which will 
approximate the original patient point. However, repeated random selection from pre-
defined points within a changing radius will have varying distributions based on the 
locations of those points, which may be skewed. The addition of the random and 
variable perturbation radius r also has an added stochastic factor that potentially 
creates a slightly different selection pool with every run. Therefore, the mean location 
of repeated iterations will depend on the spatial distribution of the underlying population 
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and the variability of r, and will not necessarily approximate the original location unless 
the population is uniformly distributed around the patient.  
 
A possible re-identification weakness of the MPT lies in the prevention of selection of 
one case as a transform of another. For example, given two cases of identical age and 
sex within R of one another, it could be discovered that each is excluded from the 
transformed options for the other in favour of a more distant point, allowing potential re-
identification of both original points. Removing the preventative selection criterion can 
resolve this, though it may also allow re-identification since repeated iterations will 
result in case location selection twice as many times as others. Yet another potential 
for re-identification exists if the parameter settings for perturbation tolerances and 
thresholds used are known, though this would require extensive time and computing 
power since an intruder would have to re-create all possible selections. The 
multidimensional nature of the transform helps complicate re-identification efforts – the 
more dimensions are permitted to be perturbed, and/or the greater the perturbation 
allowance, the more difficult re-identification becomes – while exact dimension 
matching is mitigated by the user-defined anonymity threshold.  
 
There are a number of key issues that make a comparison between the current 
algorithm and standard k-anonymity methods difficult, most notably the "reference" 
dataset used to anonymise the records. In many cases of standard k-anonymity 
methods, records are anonymised within the dataset with methods proposed to 
optimise the anonymisation process [168]. Therefore, the case data are their own 
"reference", such that, once completed, cases are indistinguishable from one another. 
In the MPT, data are anonymised across datasets; the reference dataset in this case, is 
the underlying population, such that cases are indistinguishable within the population. 
This also means that the two approaches essentially deal with different types of re-
identification risk.  
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Another important difference is that the MPT was developed with a specific focus on 
the inclusion of granular spatial information. This has profoundly significant implications 
for the issue raised above. In the case of many standard k-anonymity algorithms, exact 
residential coordinates are unusable since they are essentially direct identifiers - unless 
they represent apartment buildings. The standard approach would be to either strip 
them or aggregate them, for example to postal or zip code. Once aggregated, use of k-
anonymity algorithms is possible. However, this introduces two new issues: (1) the loss 
of granularity, context and analytical accuracy inherent to aggregation, as illustrated in 
the scientific literature and referenced in previous sections, and (2) potentially 
increased risk of re-identification. To expand on the second issue, let us assume that 
the points have been aggregated to the postal or zip code level, and a k-anonymity 
algorithm such as the Optimal Lattice Anonymisation algorithm [168] has been 
implemented. If the value of k is larger than the population with the anonymised values 
of the smallest postal or zip code area, then the risk of re-identification is necessarily 
increased. For example, if 5 records are indistinguishable from one another in area A 
as males aged 10-15, then it is true that we have successfully achieved a k-anonymity 
of 5 within the case dataset. However, if there are only 5 males aged 10-15 years in 
area A anyway, then the actual risk of re-identification is 100% - it does not matter that 
I cannot tell which case is which, the fact is I now know they are all cases and can re-
identify all of them as such. Similarly if there are 10 such individuals in area A, my 
effective population-based k value is only 2 - a 50% probability of correct re-
identification. Therefore, in order for this to effectively work, the underlying areal 
population matching on the variables or dimensions being anonymised on must be at 
least k2. 
 
The MPT, on the other hand, was specifically developed to allow anonymisation on the 
most granular level of spatial data, though as described, it can also work on 
aggregated spatial data if that is all that is available. Since it allows for anonymisation 
on multiple dimensions as well beyond just location, it is suggested as an improvement 
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over existing geomasking algorithms where spatial information is important (and the 
case is made that such information is becoming increasingly relevant to and critical for 
public health practice). Because it anonymises based on the underlying population, it 
avoids the second issue raised above. However, it should be noted that as described, it 
does not anonymise within the case data itself. Therefore, re-identification may be 
possible if an intruder knows that an individual is in the dataset and knows the 
individual's attributes. So, for example, there may be 100 females in the population 
aged 48 years within the acceptable distance threshold of a 48 year-old female case, 
but if she is the only 48-year old case and an intruder knows that Ms. Jane Doe is 48 
years old and is in this case dataset, then her record will be easily identified and any 
additional data will be revealed. Hence the different re-identification risks addressed by 
the different approaches.  
 
Because the reference datasets are necessarily different in the two scenarios 
described, performance metrics are therefore also different. With algorithms 
anonymising a case dataset relative to its own records, performance will be related to 
the size of the case dataset since that is the only dataset of consequence. However, 
with the MPT, performance is a multiplicative function of the size of all datasets used to 
anonymise; at minimum with granular data such as those used in the current 
methodology, this will be the product of the number of individuals in the case data and 
the number of individuals in the underlying population who are not cases. The MPT can 
be configured to anonymise a dataset relative to itself if so desired as noted briefly 
below under Strengths. This approach, however, was not tested and is not the focus of 
the current study since in the context of location privacy it only works with generalised 
or aggregated locations. 
 
One of the previously mentioned issues of re-identification is particularly important in 
public health practice and can be rephrased in common public health terminology: 
meaningful privacy preservation is a function of prevalence or incidence. To further 
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stress this important point, consider 50 HIV cases in a population of 1,000. Random 
selection of any one individual has a 5% chance of correctly identifying an HIV case. If 
all information were stripped for the 50 cases except for their location, each individual 
would be otherwise unidentifiable from 999 other individuals (i.e. k=1,000). However, 
while this has achieved the maximum possible k for this population, it still remains that 
correctly identifying an individual as having HIV has an effective k-value of only 20 
because the prevalence is known. 
8.5.2. LIMITATIONS 
The MPT relies on the presence of an underlying base population containing the same 
dimensions as those required by the data-user. In the current implementation, for every 
age-sex combination in the patient dataset, there must be at least k-1 other identical 
age-sex combination individuals in the non-patient dataset. As the number of 
dimensions controlled for increases, the number of available matches decreases, 
thereby potentially necessitating dimensional compromises which can be controlled by 
increasing the allowable perturbation of the individual dimensions. The MPT allows 
exploration of the optimum context-specific combinations for appropriate data release 
and use. 
 
The current algorithm also makes use of a synthesised population. Its validity, 
therefore, depends on how well the synthesised data mirror reality on all dimensions of 
importance, if a synthesised base population is used. This is discussed in further detail 
below. 
 
Some issues were encountered that impacted overall performance, including periodic 
file locks, competing background applications, power outages, and system resources. 
Although using RAM allowed faster completion, future implementations may be limited 
by the amount available for allocation and machine specifications. Other performance-
enhancing factors may include use of solid state drives, multithreading and multiple 
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processors, and coding and implementation within an environment other than SAS, 
which is input/output intensive (i.e. it frequently reads and writes data, which affects 
performance). Performance will also be a function of the underlying population matrix 
size; the greater the number of dimensions and the larger the population, the longer the 
algorithm will take and the more resources it will require.  
 
No amount of masking, de-identification or anonymisation can prevent the misuse of 
data. For example, information on patients with HIV can be misused irrespective of the 
scale at which it is released, though the ramifications may vary with that scale. So, in 
the extreme example where the algorithm is used to perform a multi-dimensional 
transform with a stringent k-anonymity requirement that perturbs points across the 
entire extent of the base population, as in the case of the HIV example, it will still show 
the prevalence of HIV in that base population. The release of data must therefore 
always be based on other important considerations, such as the level of trust in the 
user, the purpose and scientific or applied merit for which the data will be used, 
implemented security measures and so on. Such considerations form a framework 
from within which data-sharing decisions can be made and this is the focus of Part III of 
this study. 
8.5.3. STRENGTHS 
Strengths of the MPT algorithm are its powerful flexibility and customisability, easily 
allowing criteria to be set on appropriate dimensions relevant to both the study and the 
target population as opposed to irrelevant or arbitrary political and administrative 
boundaries. For example, in the current implementation, every individual is associated 
with five age classes. Depending on the user requesting the information and the 
intended use of the data (both important aspects to consider within a data-sharing 
framework), a minimum age class can be set. In this way, information deemed more 
sensitive might only be released if age is categorised within the appropriate classes. If 
the base population file uses only age classes based on census information then it can 
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still be used. This would also allow different ages to be classed differently based on the 
population distribution within the region of interest. For example, given a population 
where the majority is between the ages of 18 and 65 years, one may choose to create 
age categories from birth to 18 years old, as well as over age 65 years, but keep exact 
ages intact for those between the ages of 19 and 64 years inclusive (given their higher 
numbers). One method of achieving this can also be to apply the transform on the base 
population using itself as the reference, on the age dimension only. This will ensure 
that within the defined threshold for anonymity and distance, the age dimension is 
categorised appropriately without transforming the location information. This new, 
transformed population can then be used as the base population for patient-list 
transforms.  
 
Another advantage of the MPT is its use of a granular base population which can be 
assigned to increasingly coarser geography. For example, given only zip codes or 
postcodes for the patient dataset, points can still be approximated using the base 
population and other dimensions provided in the patient record and any given record 
would still have to meet the required anonymity threshold on all the dimensions within 
the underlying granular population. In such cases, a match on the dimensions within 
the zip code would be transformed according to the algorithm, using all the individual 
points around it in the population - the age and gender issue would be accounted for 
because the individual points are still being used to assess anonymity level, and the 
algorithm would not be subject to the modifiable areal unit problem as previously 
described. If the distance threshold used remains within the area defined by the zip 
code then the MPT will modify age and gender according to the specifications given it 
in order to meet the required k-anonymity. Therefore, a 32 year old female patient in 
postcode X1X1X1 can be assigned to any point within that postcode matching on age 
and sex within the allowable perturbations as part of the MPT algorithm. This will 
introduce a maximum error approximated by the sum of the maximum distance 
between residential points within the postcode area and the perturbation radius R. In 
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spite of this error, this would still be a better approach than current 
perturbationmethods or use of the area's centroid since it still adjusts for the desired 
attributes to achieve the appropriate anonymity requirement and uses real locations to 
prevent unrealistic or impossible placement. Since the patient dataset is at a coarser 
geographic scale, the method would also further confound potential re-identification, 
with each run yielding different results based on a different point of origin. 
 
The MPT also does not apply blanket rules to the entire patient dataset; rather, it 
anonymises each record individually for its own optimum transform. The merits of such 
a local transform as opposed to a global one are context specific; one can easily argue 
that, from a practical aspect, as long as the recoding is done consistently, local 
recoding is actually better since it allows one to satisfy the anonymisation requirements 
while releasing maximum data without being impacted by a few extremes or outliers - 
leaving it up to the user to decide whether or not to then apply some or all of the 
recoding more globally if informed of the recoding hierarchy. There is debate as to the 
better approach (in terms of local versus global recoding), but in the current case, the 
local recoding allows release of the data with the best possible configuration. It also 
allows for more sophisticated integration of contextual information, facilitating 
comparison and calculation across datasets. For example, given a dataset containing 
the locations of schools in the extent of the base population, the algorithm can easily 
include distance to the nearest school as an added dimension. So if, for example, one 
wanted to apply the algorithm to include preservation of the relative spatial distance to 
schools, a maximum spatial displacement of each record from its closest school can be 
specified in combination with the other relevant dimensions. The incredible power and 
flexibility this affords can also be reflected by implementing dimension-specific rules. 
For example, the algorithm can be modified to apply different rules to different records 
based on the values of one or more dimensions; if the case is a male, for example, 
allow this level of perturbation to these dimensions, if female then allow a different level 
to the same or different dimensions. 
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As has been mentioned, the algorithm is also not independent of the underlying 
geography. Because it uses pre-established locations for the random selection to meet 
the required anonymity threshold, knowledge of the existence of non-inhabitable 
regions or features will not increase re-identification potential (a noted issue with some 
of the current random perturbation techniques [16,144]). These factors allow the spatial 
aspect of the transform itself to be bound by multiple, contextually appropriate rules 
defined by the user.  
 
If specific dimensions are not known a priori, such as education and income, an areal 
dimension can be added as part of the control to allow retention of the patient within 
the specified political or administrative boundary if desired. For example in the case of 
census boundaries, including a requirement for an exact match on the boundaries' 
codes will ensure that the case remains within that census area or flag it as not-
anonymisable if the requirement cannot be reached with the perturbation rules. This 
allows the flexibility to use as little or as much data as are available to achieve optimum 
results. The advantage to including additional dimensions beyond administrative or 
political boundaries is the incorporation of actual contextual variables as opposed to 
potentially artificially-related areal units.  
 
As mentioned, New York county is extremely population dense making it relatively easy 
to achieve reasonable anonymity with very little spatial displacement, even when 
multiple dimensions are considered. As the ad hoc analyses show, however, the MPT 
allows users and custodians to identify this and modify the parameters in order to 
achieve acceptable results. In this case, for example, the custodian may agree to lower 
the k-value if acceptable or pending certain requirements on the part of the user (e.g. 
use restrictions, security requirements, etc.). Conversely or simultaneously, the user 
may accept additional perturbations (i.e. of sex or age) or increased spatial 
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perturbation. The same decisions would have to be made for a sparsely populated rural 
area; either way, population density does not impair the MPT. By allowing the user and 
custodian to have complete control over the various aspects of the transform, including 
the appropriate or acceptable anonymity threshold, the MPT provides a powerful, 
flexible and truly adaptive ―user-sufficient mask‖ [16] which minimises divergence from 
the original dataset on a case-by-case contextually sensitive basis.  
8.5.4. USING SYNTHESISED POPULATIONS 
Health data are most valuable and informative in their most granular form, and 
developing a transform that works on individual point-level data at the address level is 
highly beneficial. However, such a transform would require knowledge of the underlying 
population – also at the individual point-address level. Although available through 
population registries, these data are themselves subject to privacy and confidentiality 
restraints, and are therefore generally not accessible for public health use. Instead, 
public health practitioners rely on aggregated census data to infer various population 
demographics. This is where synthesised populations may play a role. For example, a 
―synthesised, geospatially explicit‖ US population based on the year 2000 census has 
been generated to facilitate agent-based infectious disease modelling for the Modelling 
of Infectious Disease Agents Study (MIDAS) [169]. This population ―correctly and 
appropriately‖ describes the age and sex demographics by household, and accurately 
reflects the actual US population. Details on the methodology and population 
characteristics have been published [169].  
 
As previously stated, since the MPT makes use of a synthesised population, its validity 
depends on how well the synthesised data mirror reality on the dimensions of interest. 
Since the population is based on the year 2000 census, it may inadequately reflect 
population demographics for earlier or more recent studies. However, given the 
recurring nature of the census, algorithms used to build the synthesised populations 
can be re-run to generate new and relevant populations with each census year [169]. A 
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synthesised population may also be invaluable in exploring the relationships between 
perturbation distance and a variety of quasi-identifiers as illustrated through this study. 
Their use also allows for the creation of realistic, non-circular disease clusters for 
investigation – an issue that impacts other studies in this field [145]. 
 
Synthesised populations for the US and several other countries have been produced 
for MIDAS and are available by request. These populations were developed for 
epidemiological modelling, not for de-identification algorithms, further highlighting their 
general utility in public health. As such, the development of representative synthetic 
populations would be highly beneficial for public health practice in general. Indeed, 
development of a synthetic 2010 US population is currently underway by MIDAS 
scientists, as are tools to allow researchers to generate custom populations based on 
demographic variables of interest [162]. 
8.5.5. ALGORITHM REFINEMENT 
Further refinement of the MPT would allow the user to set priority levels for the various 
dimensions. In the current example, the priority is given to age; age is perturbed only if 
the anonymisation threshold is not met within the prescribed maximum distance. 
Instead, the algorithm can be modified to prioritise minimum distance moved within a 
maximum age perturbation (i.e. the algorithm could begin with the maximum age 
perturbation to minimise distance and work backwards to achieve the optimum result). 
This provides maximum flexibility in exploring the optimal transform for a given dataset 
and context, as minimising changes in one dimension will necessarily impact the effect 
of other dimensions.  
 
As an example, assume our dimensions of interest are distance, age, sex and race 
with decreasing priority assignment. In this case, the MPT as illustrated in Figure 12 
will first search for k-1 exact matches on age, sex and race. In the absence of meeting 
this requirement, it will generalise race within the defined generalisation threshold and 
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look for k-1 exact matches on age, sex and generalised race. Assuming it still fails, it 
will then generalise sex, and look for k-1 exact matches on age and generalised sex 
and race. And so on. Based on the current design, it will only move on to generalising 
the next dimension once it has reached the maximum designated generalisation of the 
previous dimensions with failure to identify k-1 matches in the population, since the 
loop is intra-dimensional. The loop can also easily be changed to allow several 
dimensional generalisations within an iteration - i.e. across dimensions. In this case, 
and using the same example, race would be transformed to its first generalisable level, 
followed by sex if required, then age; assuming failure, it would then loop back and 
generalise race to its next level, etc. The intent is to minimise loss on those dimensions 
deemed by the user to be more important to retain closer to their original value, as 
opposed to finding an overall perceived "optimal" solution, while minimising spatial 
disturbance (i.e. distance perturbed). 
 
The MPT settings can also be informed by other research in this area. For example, 
the maximum number of combinations (MaxCombs, as previously described) of 
variables of interest is a good predictor of uniqueness [58,146] and can be used to 
determine appropriate ―geographic area population size‖ (GAPS; also previously 
described) [58] for privacy preservation. This can be used to inform preliminary 
decisions on setting k and  for the MPT; for example, one can begin by setting  to 
the approximate mean radius of the census geography most closely corresponding to a 
calculated GAPS cut-off. MaxCombs can also be used to inform the dimensional 
categorisation levels, particularly since it is dependent solely on the number of 
response categories and not the types of the quasi-identifiers.  
 
It has been shown that k-anonymity can, in some cases, be ―over-protective‖, 
particularly for smaller sampling fractions, resulting in unnecessary information loss 
[147]. The current methodology helps reduce such information loss by incorporating the 
relevant dimensions directly into the anonymisation algorithm, allowing the user to set 
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permissible categorisation and priority levels, and performing local recoding (i.e. 
allowing observations to have different and overlapping response intervals [147]). 
Appropriate k values should be a function of the user and the use of the data, as well 
as the governance structures in place; for example, a much higher k would likely be 
appropriate for publicly-available data or researchers with low security measures in 
place while lower k values may be appropriate for studies that have a high impact on 
population health, or trusted researchers with strong security measures in place. Some 
general criteria for setting this threshold have been proposed [146] and should be 
incorporated into a more comprehensive framework for the disclosure of data as 
described in Part III of this study. 
 
Preliminary MPT testing was conducted on three dimensions: sex, age and location. 
Additional dimensions, larger patient datasets and different base populations with 
varying population densities should also be explored, as should the effects on common 
spatial statistics used in public health. Since random perturbation techniques generally 
increase Type II error probability (e.g. cluster dilution) and do not affect Type I error 
probability [16], further studies on appropriate thresholds and applications of this 
algorithm are required in various contexts and with different base populations. 
Additional analyses quantifying the relationship between the anonymity level achieved 
and the distance displaced for specific contexts and base populations can also serve 
as part of a framework for assessing appropriate uses. Currently, privacy legislation 
applies to "identifiable individuals". However, with the growing literature around 
anonymisation, one can now ask the question "at what k-value does an individual 
cease to become identifiable under the legislation"? Acceptable anonymity thresholds 
therefore need to be set and standardised, and the legislation needs to be revised to 
better reflect this in privacy definitions. 
 
Sophisticated software agents [15,16] could be used to combine the ingredients 
required (e.g. the base population from a municipal population registry, the health data 
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from the custodian, and the user requirements) and return an appropriately and 
optimally transformed dataset (or null result, if no adequate transform is feasible given 
the data and user specifications). This allows the user to explore analyses that may 
only become evident after visual exploration of the data’s distribution. A graphical user 
―front‖ would be highly beneficial for this purpose, and an image of such an interface is 
suggested and described in Chapter 11. 
8.6. CONCLUSIONS 
The multidimensional point transform proposed in this study works concertedly on 
multiple attributes, including the spatial attributes, to give a more complete and 
appropriate transform that builds location privacy into the anonymisation model from 
the beginning. Unlike previous studies, this algorithm does not leave other attributes 
―untouched‖, but it does result in a transformed matrix with the same dimensions of the 
original matrix [16]. 
 
The ideal transform preserves the confidential and private nature of individual health 
records, as well as the geographic integrity of the data, to facilitate public health 
practice [16]. The optimal approach depends not only on the purpose for the data use 
and the acceptable disclosure risk [16], but also on the characteristics of the data. 
Acceptable disclosure risk by the custodian is also a multifaceted consideration based 
on acceptable anonymity thresholds, trust in the user, adequate security measures, 
and so on. However, such algorithms cannot substitute for secure and ethical conduct, 
and a framework for the appropriate disclosure, use and dissemination of data 
containing personal identifiable information is required [154]. There are also instances 
in which the release and use of identifiable information in public health are essential 
[170], and consideration must be made within a developed framework to allow for such 
cases. The proposed algorithm in this study presents a multidimensional approach that 
allows one to tweak and optimise the trade-offs for any given dataset and purpose, 
presenting a necessary component of the much-needed public health framework. 
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PART III 
GUIDANCE 
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9. Towards A Conceptual Framework 
 
The more important the subject and the closer it cuts to the bone of our hopes and 
needs, the more we are likely to err in establishing a framework for analysis. 
Stephen Jay Gould 
9.1. INTRODUCTION 
As has been discussed and exemplified through the body of literature, various 
perturbations and transforms have been developed and explored as a means of 
addressing location-privacy issues in public health and other fields. However, these are 
not all created equal and their application is context specific. Given a particular 
scenario, how does a public health professional or custodian decide on whether a 
transformation should be applied for a given objective? How would a custodian and a 
data recipient assess the privacy concerns around data release and use? In the 
context of health research, ethics boards often have discretion over whether or not a 
custodian can release data to the researcher, but how does the research ethics board 
assess the appropriateness of data release from a privacy perspective? What factors 
should be considered in the implementation of a given transform and the use of its 
outputs? In attempting to address these questions, it quickly became apparent that a 
framework with a broader and more general approach to data-sharing within the sphere 
of public health is required. 
 
The purpose of this framework is to provide guidance to the public health community 
on appropriate data release assessment from a privacy perspective, stemming from the 
current research on location-privacy. By consolidating a large body of literature and 
various recommendations across multiple disciplines, this workable framework 
presents five interrelated domains, each with various dimensions, to describe and 
evaluate the risks associated with data-sharing and its anonymisation in public health 
practice. It is important to note that the application of the framework would benefit 
greatly from the development and adoption of universally accepted standards, 
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definitions and structures, many of which are currently lacking for many of the 
components. This does not detract from the framework itself, which can be used as a 
guide to help inform the development of such standards, but only from its universal and 
consistent application. Like any tool, what one gets out of it depends on what one puts 
into it.  
 
The motivation for this framework initially came from the required guidance to the 
public health community on the appropriate disclosure of location-sensitive information 
as documented in the literature [70,154]. However, as mentioned, the requirement for a 
broader approach was quickly recognised. The development of such a new approach is 
also supported by the Committee on Health Research and the Privacy of Health 
Information in the United States as evidenced in their 2009 book published by the 
National Academy of Science [68]. As such, while the overall framework and methods 
used themselves are generic, the results and their exact applications will be context-
specific, based on scenario-defined parameters. In other words, the framework 
presented herein forms an operational base or foundation from which specific public 
health scenarios and contexts can then be extruded. Its application, therefore, will vary 
from scenario to scenario, and will be largely defined by the user’s settings of various 
parameters relating to relevant aspects of the scenario. In this way, it lends itself to a 
dynamic model that allows scoring and weighting to be iteratively modified to achieve a 
"best fit" scenario, providing for a powerful, flexible and adaptable structure for decision 
making. 
 
9.2. FRAMEWORK OVERVIEW 
In their recommendations [68], the Committee on Health Research and the Privacy of 
Health Information in the United States endorsed a goal-oriented approach to 
developing guidelines that enabled appropriate decision-making as opposed to 
prescriptive regulations; instead of defining permissible and rigid activities which may 
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not apply in all situations, the focus must be on providing adaptable and enabling 
governance structures to facilitate required public health activities. It is in this spirit that 
this framework has been developed, based on five core domains which in turn are each 
composed of four dimensions. Guidance for the assessment of each dimension can be 
augmented through a series of proposed measures, which could be translated into a 
"Yes/No" checklist for ease of use and reduction of bias. The overall structure of the 
framework is illustrated in Figure 15 and the flow is provided in Figure 16. The 
collection of domains, dimensions and criteria is based on what has been reported in 
the public health literature, as well as the ethical and legal literature surrounding 
privacy and general data use and disclosure, a number of surveys and best practice 
guidelines, and the author's personal experiences and interactions within the public 
health communities in Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom, all of which 
are referenced throughout this study. Not only does the implementation of such a 
framework provide invaluable guidance on aspects to consider in the data-sharing 
decision-making process and how to assess them, but in doing so it also allows for an 
evidence-base for the decision making process. This allows users of the framework to 
concisely and clearly identify the justification for either sharing the data or not, the 
requirements and conditions for data-sharing, and issues that must be addressed in 
order to facilitate the process if required. 
 
The domains of the framework address the recipient of the data, the data being 
requested, the purpose for which the data are being requested or shared, the 
implications of any transformations performed on the data, and the intended output 
or eventual dissemination of the data beyond the recipient. Note that the output 
domain is a super-domain assessed on the other four domains, but contributing to the 
overall assessment for data release. A summary of these domains and their 
corresponding dimensions is given in Table 11. 
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It is important to note that a subject domain (referring to the individuals to whom the 
data pertain) has not been included since the framework is based on the absence of 
individual control-based principles as previously discussed. The framework provides 
guidance on the non-mandatory release of identifiable or de-identified data for 
purposes other than those for which it was originally collected (as previously 
mentioned, this is sometimes referred to as secondary use) for public health practice.  
 
 
Figure 15: Structure of the proposed public health data-sharing framework 
showing domains and their corresponding dimensions 
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Figure 16: Flow of the proposed public health data-sharing framework 
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Table 11: Outline of the proposed framework domains and their corresponding 
dimensions 
Domain Dimension Description 
RECIPIENT   
 TRUST The degree to which the provider of the data is 
confident that the recipient will handle them in an 
agreed-upon appropriate, ethical and 
professional manner.  
 SECURITY The policies and safeguards enforced and 
implemented by the recipient to ensure the 
secure handling of the data and to minimise and 
mitigate potential breaches 
 TRAINING The recipient's level of awareness and training 
related to data-sharing and use, personal data, 
privacy, confidentiality and security. 
 CONTRACT The implementation of an enforceable 
agreement between the data provider or 
custodian and the data recipient. 
DATA   
 GRANULARITY The specificity of a each variable  
 MULTIPLICITY The number of variables in the dataset and/or 
recurring records for a given individual 
 SENSITIVITY Measured by the impact of public access to the 
data on the individual or communities 
 SIZE The size of the dataset relative to the size of the 
population at risk or population of interest 
represented by the data 
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Table 11: Outline of the proposed framework domains and their corresponding 
dimensions (continued) 
Domain Dimension Description 
PURPOSE   
 CONTRIBUTION The actual or potential relevance and application 
of the purpose for which the data are requested 
to the goals of public health practice 
 NECESSITY The relevance of and requirement for each 
requested data element to achieve the purpose  
 EFFORT The effort required to share the data including 
consideration of the appropriate legislation of the 
relevant jurisdictions 
 IMPACT The potential costs and benefits associated with 
data-sharing 
TRANSFORM   
 UNIQUENESS The degree to which an individual in a given 
population is unique on a combination of 
attributes 
 IDENTIFICATION 
RISK 
The ease of identifying an individual, either from 
the data alone or in combination with other 
information 
 EROSION The loss of Information within the dataset (for 
example loss of complete values and changes to 
data values) as well as in relation to other 
contextual or environmental features 
 ANALYTICAL 
EFFECT 
The quality and validity of the knowledge 
gleaned from the data through analysis 
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Table 11: Outline of the proposed framework domains and their corresponding 
dimensions (continued) 
Domain Dimension Description 
OUTPUT   
 "Super-Domain" Re-assess on previous four domains in the 
context of the required output 
 
The framework does not provide measures for situations in which release of 
information is mandatory or legally required. It should be reiterated that in general, 
legislation allows the release of identifiable information in the interests of public safety, 
or for research and/or statistical purposes, in the absence of consent [154]. Also note 
that once information and data have been de-identified, they are no longer considered 
personal information, and therefore neither fall under privacy legislation nor carry any 
legislated requirement for consent.  
 
Descriptions of the framework domains, dimensions and suggested criteria are given in 
the remainder of this section along with some proposed measures for the 
implementation of the framework. 
 
9.3. THE RECIPIENT 
The recipient domain refers to the individual(s) receiving the data but more specifically 
and importantly, the individual(s) who will be responsible for the data. In some cases, 
this may be the custodian of the data (for example when being given custodianship), 
though in most cases it will likely be an individual or group of individuals (e.g. 
researchers, epidemiologists, etc.) requesting data from a custodian for a specific 
purpose. This can also include ―agents of the custodian‖, who use the data on behalf of 
the custodian for secondary purposes [146]. Custodians can still use this framework to 
assess the adequacy of their own environment as well. 
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In scenarios where there are multiple recipients, it is up to the framework user to 
decide whether to assess each recipient individually, one recipient as a representative 
of the others (and therefore on whom the responsibility for the data lies as far as that 
relationship is concerned), the ―weakest link‖ on each dimension, or the group 
collectively as an entity or organisation: 
 
1. Each recipient individually: while this is the most accurate method, it is also the 
most time-consuming. However, it can also allow each individual to be 
assessed once and given a domain-specific identity-based score, which can 
then be used for that specific individual in future contexts.  
 
2. One representative recipient: in most cases, this will likely be an individual- and 
role-based decision – for example, where the chosen representative is the 
principal investigator on a research project, or the designated data custodian, 
etc. In this case, the recipient’s roles and responsibilities must be clearly 
defined, and the composite score becomes a context and domain-specific 
identity- and role-based score.  
 
3. The "weakest link": the benefit of this approach is that it uses the most 
conservative measure for each dimension; however, in doing so, it may 
inappropriately withhold data from a group of recipients. This method therefore 
uses dimension-specific identity-based scores. 
 
4. The group as an entity: In this case, each dimension is scored based on the 
qualities attributed to the entire group or organisation, therefore becoming a 
group-identity-based score. 
 
 
Identification 
 
The recipient should be clearly identified along with name, role and contact information.  
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Dimensions 
 
Assessment of the domain is based on the dimensions of Trust, Security, Training and 
Contract and therefore includes identity- and role-based components. Note that an 
identity-based measure is simply one that is based on the identity of the individual (e.g. 
reputation, trustworthiness, history, etc.) whereas a role-based measure is one based 
on the individual's role (e.g. the principal investigator of a research project, a medical 
officer of health, a quarantine officer, a primary care-giver, etc.).  
 
9.3.1. TRUST 
Trust is the lubrication that makes it possible for organizations to work 
Warren G. Bennis 
Distinguished Professor 
University of Southern California 
 
Trust is a critical component of our daily social and professional relationships and has 
been differentiated into different types under different paradigms [129,171]. For 
example, the past decade or so has witnessed incredible growth in the ―e-
phenomenon‖. Be it e-mail, e-commerce, e-banking, e-mapping, or e-health, this 
phenomenon has brought with it increased convenience, time-savings, and vast 
amounts of accessible information. Inevitably, this has also resulted in an increase in 
personal information intrusion. In response, commercial entities have adopted privacy-
related standards, identified on their sites through ―seals‖. It has been suggested that 
having the privacy policies and governance structures in place – in this case, as 
represented by these seals – builds consumer trust and therefore facilitates the sharing 
of information [172]. In this case, it is suggested that the mere presence of privacy 
policies is an antecedent to trust, which in turn is an antecedent to information-sharing. 
If only it were that simple!  
 
The issue in the above argument is that in many cases, the trust is based on a false 
sense of assurance; there is no guarantee that the proclaimed privacy policy will be 
adhered to, or that any proposed enforcement mechanisms exist; only the word of the 
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commercial entity. Trust is therefore a more complex dynamic, dependent on a 
combination of the policies presented to the consumer, as well as the consumer’s 
knowledge of the entity and its reputation (including, if applicable, the requirements of 
the relevant ―seal‖ program). Indeed, surveys on the public’s perceptions of personal 
information use have shown differences in trust ratings based on the identity of the 
data-recipient, particularly when government institutions are implicated 
[124,125,128,173]. In primary health care, trust between care-providers is crucial, and 
often assumed; the Direct Project [174] in the United States, which aims to provide 
standards and guidance to facilitate the sharing of health information between health 
providers, is entirely built on the assumption of pre-existing trust between parties [175]. 
However, trust can be a considerable problem in the context of public health, since 
much of public health is a governmental mandate. It comes as no surprise therefore 
that building trust is a critical component for data-sharing in public health practice. 
Since the notion of privacy is heavily dependent on trust, it is suggested that the 
presence of a strong privacy governance structure is not by itself sufficient, though it is 
certainly a requirement as reflected throughout this framework. 
 
Within this framework, trust refers to a generalised trust in the recipient to manage and 
use the data in an ethical, responsible, secure and accountable fashion. Care must be 
taken to assess this independently of technical capacity to do so, which more 
appropriately falls under the security dimension. The trust dimension is therefore purely 
identity-based. Analogous to an assessment at a job interview, the recipient is 
assessed on ―personal suitability traits‖ for handling and safeguarding the data being 
requested. Although this can be somewhat subjective in nature – particularly if the 
parties involved have no history together or known incidents – several measures are 
proposed to help assess the trust dimension: 
 
MOTIVES: Not to be confused with purpose (addressed under its own domain), 
motive has more to do with the recipient’s underlying drivers and reasons for 
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     requesting the data as opposed to their intended use. Considerations to help 
assess motive include whether or not the recipient has anything to gain from 
acquiring the data or lose from not acquiring them, though it should be noted 
that potential gains and losses do not in and of themselves imply motive. If a 
potential does exist, it should be addressed directly with the recipient and 
mitigating conditions be included in a signed agreement between the parties 
involved (this is captured in the contract dimension). Gains are not limited to the 
more commonly thought of commercial and financial gains, but also extend to 
reputation gains, criminal gains, and even malicious ―gains‖ such as the 
embarrassment or defamation of an individual, group or organisation, including 
the data custodian. Likewise, examples of losses to the recipient may include 
commercial, financial or reputational losses. 
  
REPUTATION: The reputation of the recipient captures a multitude of relevant 
assessment criteria. Is the recipient competent? Is the recipient experienced in 
data use? What is the level of experience? How mature is the recipient in his or 
her respective field? Does the recipient have a history of and reputation for 
ethical handling of personal information? What is the recipient’s track record / 
previous performance? 
  
CHARACTER: Perhaps the most difficult to assess, character assessment here 
does not refer to commonly conducted personality assessments. Rather, it 
addresses whether or not the recipient has demonstrated integrity, responsibility 
and good ethical judgment in his or her career and professional and social 
interactions, and is tightly knit with motives and reputation. 
 
IMPACT: Do personal gains from breaching trust outweigh the costs? In other 
words, is it in the recipient's best interests to safeguard the data and the data 
provider's trust? 
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HISTORY: Has the user provided data to this recipient in the past? If so, were there 
any issues encountered that compromised trust? Has the recipient had any 
breach incidents in the past? If so, what was the effect, and what was done to 
prevent similar future occurrences? Have appropriate and corrective or remedial 
actions been taken / implemented to ensure no recurrence? Was the incident 
handled transparently and appropriately? 
 
ACCOUNTABILITY: Defined as the "state of being answerable for decisions and 
actions" [101], accountability is a recurring principle and theme in privacy 
management and governance models and legislation [60,61,176]. Methods for 
assessing accountability include whether or not the recipient has data-privacy 
policies in place to govern the collection, use and disposal of personal 
information, and if so, whether such policies are regularly reviewed and 
updated, clear and exhaustive, recent and relevant, and enforceable. If they are 
enforceable, how is this accomplished? It would be beneficial to have such 
policies reviewed, approved and endorsed by an independent authority, such as 
an Office of the Privacy or Information Commissioner. Does the recipient report 
to another individual? Who ensures that the recipient remains compliant with 
policies and agreements? In addition to the accountability models and 
structures the recipient(s) may have within their own organisation, accountability 
to the data custodian is also important. It would therefore also be beneficial to 
address whether or not the recipient will report back to the custodian and if so, 
how often and on what. This is best captured through a signed agreement 
between the parties involved as described under the contract dimension. 
 
TRANSPARENCY: This speaks to the recipient's open disclosure of policies, 
practices and outcomes to external parties, including the public. In their 2006 
report on the attitudes and expectations of Canadians on privacy and the use of 
their personal information for health research [51], the Canadian Policy 
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     Research Networks reported that the public identified transparency as a critical 
part of accountability, which in turn could lead to increased trust and therefore 
increased acceptance of the use of their information. Transparency should be 
included within the recipient's relevant policies (captured in the security 
dimension) but has been included here since it has been implicated as a 
significant contributor to the development of trust.  
9.3.2. SECURITY 
The only truly secure system is one that is powered off, cast in a block of concrete and 
sealed in a lead-lined room with armed guards – and even then, I have my doubts. 
Gene Spafford 
Professor of Computer Science 
Purdue University 
 
Information security refers to the policies and safeguards put in place to ensure the 
data's integrity, confidentiality and appropriate management. It is necessitated by 
examples of loss, theft and inappropriate use, and is thus an ever evolving critical 
component to the success and survival of any enterprise. Standards organisations 
such as the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) [177] have developed 
various security standards (e.g. ISO 27K), forming the foundations for enterprise 
information security management systems and establishing certification methodology, 
and guidelines have been published by international and national entities.  
 
Given its personal nature, it comes as no surprise that health information features 
prominently in these standards and guidelines. In some cases, it is addressed within 
the broader framework, such as in the supplementary ISO 27799:2008 standards [178], 
the US Department of Homeland Security Privacy Office guidelines [179], the EU Data 
Protection Directive [80], and the OECD Information Security Guidelines [180]. In 
others, it is afforded its own dedicated guidelines by an appropriate body, such as the 
NHS code of practice for information security management in the UK [181] or 
addressed within broad health research guidelines such as the Canadian Institutes of 
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Health Research best practices for protecting privacy in health research [182]. In spite 
of these inconsistent approaches, one thing is clear: information security is critical to 
health information management. 
 
In this framework, the security dimension is used to refer to the policies and physical 
and technical safeguards in place to ensure ethical management of the data. This 
includes its secure storage, controlled access, use and dissemination, and appropriate 
measures to minimise and mitigate breaches. Suggested measures to aid in the 
assessment of the recipient's security dimension include the following: 
 
 
POLICIES: Does the recipient have a privacy and information security policy in 
place? Are the recipient's information security policies and practices accredited 
by a recognised and trusted organisation? Are these policies transparent (tied in 
to the trust dimension above)? Do the policies provide an accountability 
framework? The assessment of such policies is exemplified through the 
standards for information governance against which one is measured for 
compliance by the NHS in the UK [183]. 
 
STORAGE: Where and how the data will be stored is a fundamental security issue 
and addresses both physical and technical storage issues. For example, will 
they be stored on a locked medium only, such as a USB key or a standalone 
computer, or a networked system? Consider, for example, the difference 
between encrypted storage on a non-networked password-protected computer 
in a locked, restricted access room and a shared drive on a server accessible to 
all individuals within an organisation. The former may not be necessary, but the 
physical and technical security differences are clear.  
 
AUTHENTICATION: Who will be allowed access to the data, and how will 
authentication be enforced? Ideally, only recipients should be authenticated 
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     unless they are given explicit, documented and regulated power to delegate or 
transfer responsibility for the data. Authentication can also be assigned different 
levels. For example, one level may be simple read access, another might be 
read and write access, and yet another might include the ability to transfer or 
transport the data. 
 
ACCESS: Once an individual is authenticated, how will he or she be able to access 
the data? This is related to the storage measures above; for example, access to 
the facility, access to workstations, access to the data media and so on.  
 
USE: Are appropriate measures in place to ensure that the data are used 
appropriately and within any parameters agreed upon? Are controls in place to 
ensure the data are used for the specified purpose and in compliance with any 
terms agreed upon? 
 
TRANSFER: Methods of transferring data can present various security issues in 
their own right. For example, compare the transfer of data over an open 
wireless network with that over a secured network or actual physical transfer of 
a storage medium. Included in this are issues around how the data are 
transmitted or provided to the recipient by the provider in the first place.  
 
ENFORCEMENT: Are there established procedures and appropriate resources for 
enforcing the security measures put in place? Are breach consequences and 
mitigating responses acceptable? 
 
DESTRUCTION: are the means for destroying the data once the purpose has been 
accomplished acceptable? 
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9.3.3. TRAINING 
Excellence is an art won by training and habituation. 
Will Durant (summing up some of Aristotle's ideas) 
The Story of Philosophy: The lives and opinions of the world's greatest philosophers 
The training dimension captures professional qualifications and memberships, relevant 
training and experience. Recommendations for educating professional communities on 
privacy issues and handling of data abound in the literature and published 
organisational guidelines [94,179]. The entity providing the data can define how 
credentials are evaluated based on its mandate and operational requirements. Data 
custodians may develop privacy training sessions specific to their data holdings and 
requirements, and request that all applicants undergo these prior to being granted 
access to the data. However, a better approach would be to have standardised training 
developed by an office of a privacy or information commissioner where such an office 
exists (and establishing such an office where it does not).  
 
It is suggested that training be measured as a function of the following:  
 
AWARENESS: Recipients should be aware of the right to privacy and its 
importance to individual identity and autonomy, and should be able to identify 
what is personal information. Awareness training should also capture the 
sensitivity of personal data, particularly health data, and the privileged 
responsibility that comes with access. 
 
LEGISLATION: Recipients should be aware of the relevant legislation in their 
jurisdiction, as well as the data custodian’s jurisdiction, and provided access to 
tools that facilitate this awareness. A suggested example of such a tool has 
been designed and created and is described in Chapter 11. 
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USE: Training on proper and acceptable use of personal information, including 
enforceable security protocols for access, use and storage. 
 
DISSEMINATION: Training on proper and acceptable dissemination of personal 
information, if at all, the methods and formats in which it can be disseminated, 
the audience to whom it can be disseminated and methods for documenting 
and safeguarding dissemination.  
 
BREACHES: standard procedures to be followed in the event that a breach is 
suspected or confirmed, and the responsibilities of the various parties that may 
be involved, including how, when and where to report a breach, and the role(s) 
of privacy and information commissioners. 
 
It is important to keep in mind that the function of the training is not to saturate the 
individuals with privacy information, but rather give them the awareness and tools 
required to make responsible and privacy-respecting decisions. Any custodian-specific 
policy requirements should be clearly outlined in the contract (see below) and agreed 
upon by the recipient prior to data release. 
9.3.4. CONTRACT 
What usually comes first is the contract 
Benjamin Disraeli 
This dimension simply indicates the comprehensiveness of a signed data-sharing 
agreement between the parties involved, governing standard operating procedures and 
best practices irrespective of the mechanism used for implementation (e.g. in the case 
of government organisations, for example, this may be through a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU)) or, as is the case with the NHS in the UK, assurances as 
assessed through the Information Governance Toolkit [184]. Unlike Disraeli's quote, 
however, the contract should actually come last - once all other components of this 
framework have been assessed leading to the necessary inclusions within it as 
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described below (framework domains appear in bold type where relevant). It is 
proposed that a contract include as many of the following considerations regarding the 
data being released as possible in order to be considered comprehensive: 
 
RECIPIENT: The recipient of the data should be explicitly and uniquely identified. 
This allows clear identification of the responsible individual(s) and thus also 
provides a level of accountability.  
 
CONTENT: This should reflect the data domain, detailing the specifics of the data 
including fields or variables being provided to the recipient and the total number 
of records, as well as any transforms carried out to alter the data. 
 
PURPOSE: A statement on the scope of work for which the data will be used, as 
reflected in the purpose domain. This may be for a specific project or set of 
projects only, projects and any related activities (―consistent use‖), or the 
generic activities of the recipient.  
 
POTENTIAL GAINS: This should outline any potential gains to the recipient, along 
with details on how they will be addressed. Potential gains to the provider 
should also be considered. 
 
RETENTION: An indication of the length of time for which the recipient may keep 
the data, and should therefore reflect the purpose. Indefinite durations should 
be acceptable, provided they are justified in writing in the contract, and agreed 
upon by both parties. (purpose) 
 
DESTRUCTION: Guidelines on how data will be deleted once the duration has 
expired (recipient) 
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STORAGE: Details on how and where the data may be stored, including any 
jurisdictional restrictions (recipient) 
 
AUTHENTICATION: Guidance on requirements for accessing the data and levels 
of authentication if appropriate. For example, will all members of the research 
team have equal access authority, or will this be assigned at the discretion of 
the recipient? Will the data provider need to approve such authority on an 
individual basis? This should also take into consideration any cross-
jurisdictional issues (for example where recipients are in different legal 
jurisdictions, if relevant, such as an individual in Canada collaborating with 
another in the United Kingdom.) (recipient) 
 
ACCESS: Details on how the data will be accessed once authentication is 
successful. Will this be via a password on a networked computer, for example? 
(recipient) 
 
POLICIES: Any custodian-specific policies not already covered in the previous 
sections and to which the recipient is expected to adhere should be clearly 
outlined. (recipient) 
 
DISCLOSURE: confidentiality clauses governing the recipient’s disclosure of the 
records provided, as well as agreement on the conditions and formats under 
which disclosure is acceptable (e.g. for publication; what can be disclosed, at 
what scale, and in what format). This should reflect the output domain. 
 
ACCOUNTABILITY: Requirements for the recipient to inform the custodian of 
progress, breaches, etc. (recipient) 
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BREACH: Identification of what would constitute a breach and how it will be 
handled should one occur. (recipient) 
 
ENFORCEMENT: What are the consequences to the recipient if a breach were to 
occur with the current data? How will this be enforced? (recipient) 
 
It should be reiterated that the assessment of the contract dimension is based on the 
comprehensiveness of the agreement, not on an assessment of the components listed 
above which are more appropriately assessed under the corresponding domain. For 
example, two agreements identical on all components listed except for access, where 
one is stricter than the other, would be assessed identically on this dimension. The 
stricter access controls, however, would be captured in the assessment of the security 
dimension of the recipient domain. 
9.4. THE DATA 
Much of the literature and legislation seek to identify specific variables that can either 
alone, or in combination with others, identify individuals (the latter often being referred 
to as "quasi-identifiers"). However, assessing the privacy-risk of data-sharing based 
simply on the presence or absence of specific identifiers or quasi-identifiers is overly 
simplistic and potentially unnecessarily prohibitive. Arguably, any data about an 
individual are personal and fall along a contextually influenced continuum of 
"identifiability" - the ability to identify a specific individual. Identifiability is a function of 
how specific the data are, as well as the amount of data involved. The latter can be in 
the form of multiple records for the same individual, or simply a combination of different 
attributes (captured through variables). In addition to identifiability, one must also 
consider the potential negative impact or consequences for individuals and 
communities from the release of this data to the recipient, as well from inadvertent 
release to others. The more sensitive the information, or the more readily it can be 
combined with other information, the greater the potential for negative impact. At times, 
however, this may also translate to greater value for or be justified by the purpose.  
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In combination with the dimensions of this domain, consideration must also be given to 
the ease with which one can link a given dataset with another. The higher the 
granularity and/or the multiplicity, the more information there is to inform accurate 
linking to other datasets. This then creates somewhat of a "feedback loop", since 
linking datasets would in turn increase multiplicity and, depending on the contents of 
the linked data, granularity. In doing so, this increases identifiability, which can be an 
issue if the linkage involves de-identified sensitive information or results in a dataset 
with higher representation in a smaller population. 
 
Identification 
 
The name(s) of the dataset(s) being considered for sharing should be clearly identified 
along with a data dictionary and metadata for each one. The dictionary should identify 
each variable of field in the dataset, along with a description of what it captures and 
how it is coded or categorised if applicable. The metadata does not need to be 
exhaustive, though it is good practice to include metadata with any data release. At 
minimum, it should include the date and version, if applicable, of the dataset and 
identify the custodian, the sampling frame (or underlying population to which the data 
pertain) and the geographic extent captured by the sampling frame (e.g. name of 
neighbourhood, city, county, country, etc. as applicable). Another useful descriptor is 
the methodology employed for the data collection.  
 
Once the dataset has been deemed appropriate for sharing, the metadata should also 
include the assessments from this domain. If the data have been modified 
(transformed) to facilitate sharing, the metadata should include the assessments from 
this domain pre- and post- transform. 
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Dimensions 
 
The data domain characterises the nature of the data being assessed for sharing 
based on the tightly interwoven dimensions of Granularity, Multiplicity, Sensitivity and 
Size as defined below. 
 
9.4.1. GRANULARITY 
Every man's life ends the same way. It is only the details of how he lived and how he 
died that distinguish one man from another. 
Ernest Hemingway 
Granularity is essentially the level of detail in the data. It affects the specificity of a 
single variable for a given record, and hence the probability it can be attributed to a 
specific individual. Thinking spatially, this becomes an issue of scale. For example, 
given only a street address of a patient and nothing more, the probability of correctly 
identifying the patient is 1/i where i is the number of individuals at that address. This is 
more granular than neighbourhood, which in turn is more granular than city, etc. A 
more common example in public health practice is the categorisation of age; the 
greater the categorisation span, the lower the granularity. Therefore as granularity 
increases, so too does identifiability.  
 
Changes in granularity must match the purpose and requirements of the intended use; 
increasing granularity to render a dataset anonymous or de-identified only makes 
sense if doing so will not compromise the purpose for which it will be used. It is 
therefore important to note that granularity can have a significant impact on the utility of 
the data; an issue addressed in the erosion dimension of the transform domain.  
9.4.2. MULTIPLICITY 
Multiplicity: (1b) the number of components in a system; (2) a great number 
Merriam Webster-Dictionary Online 
Multiplicity refers to the number of variables, either explicit or implicit, in the dataset, as 
well as the recurrence of individuals within the data. It affects the specificity of 
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combined variables for a given record and across multiple records if applicable, and 
thus the probability that together they can be attributed to a specific individual. The 
greater the multiplicity, the more unique individuals can become on data combinations 
and the greater the identifiability.  
 
Explicit variables are self-explanatory: they are simply present in the data. Implicit 
variables are those that are characterised or implied by the dataset itself. For example, 
geography can be an implicit variable if it is known that a list of patients are all within a 
given area; sex can be an implicit variable in a dataset of patients with prostate cancer 
(which is therefore implicitly all male).  
 
Recurrence of individuals within a dataset is akin to additional variables if the records 
are not identical (and assuming the recurrence is not an error). For example, a patient 
may recur in the dataset with multiple symptoms and one record per symptom. Or, 
recurrence can be due to a temporal factor - for example, multiple hospital visits or 
diagnoses, or a longitudinal study. In either case, such a "long" data format can often 
be converted to a "wide" format such that each individual only has one record, but all 
the data are reflected as added variables - hence the inclusion within the multiplicity 
dimension. 
9.4.3. SENSITIVITY 
The sensitivity of men to small matters, and their indifference to great ones, indicates a 
strange inversion 
Blaise Pascal 
There is no clear definition for what constitutes sensitive information. Some have taken 
a blanket approach, simply defining health or medical information as being sensitive, 
and thereby applying blanket rules and regulations [185-187]. Others have taken a 
more relative stance, defining it in terms of the potential consequences on individuals, 
organisations and communities: harm, distress, embarrassment, discrimination, 
inconvenience or financial loss [179,188]. Still others have mashed the two together, 
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Figure 17: Twentieth century 
poster promoting smoking 
through the medical 
profession 
 
acknowledging that while sensitive information is context and consequence-dependent, 
any physical and mental health information is to be considered sensitive [60,189]. In 
several cases, the definition is predicated on the data being lost, compromised, 
misdirected, or accessed by unauthorised individuals [179,189]. 
 
If sensitive information is defined in absolute 
terms to include all health information then public 
health practice will invariably always require the 
use of sensitive information. Such a uniform 
application of non-discriminating blanket rules 
poses unnecessarily prohibitive, bureaucratic and 
potentially inappropriate restrictions. Under this 
approach, there is no differentiation between 
having a fever and being diagnosed with a 
sexually transmitted infection; they are both 
considered "sensitive information" since they both 
pertain to an individual's health, and under the policies and legislation which take such 
an approach, both should be treated in the same manner. However, as one respondent 
indicated in a survey on the issue, ―I don’t like the idea of sensitive data. All data is 
potentially sensitive, depending on the context‖ [190]. Not all health information, 
therefore, is equally ranked on the sensitivity continuum, and sensitivity will vary by 
circumstance and/or individual (see [191] for example). Sensitivity will also vary by 
time, culture and societal norms. In the early twentieth century, smoking was portrayed 
as a pleasurable and even desirable societal norm as illustrated by advertisements 
such as the one shown in Figure 17 (this image and others can be found at the 
Standford School of Medicine at http://lane.stanford.edu/tobacco/index.html). Today, 
however, it may be considered sensitive information in many parts of the world using 
the definition given within this framework; not only is it increasingly becoming a 
shunned activity that has profoundly impacted diplomacy and foreign policies [192], but 
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it can also impact such things as insurance rates and even job eligibility [193]. 
Therefore, instead of attempting to define sensitive information in simple absolute 
terms, it is more appropriate to return to the relative perspective and define it in terms 
of potential consequences based on context. 
 
As mentioned, the relative approach is sometimes couched within the context of some 
form of unauthorised access. However, while data sensitivity is indeed context-specific, 
this context is independent of method of access. Data that are not sensitive in the 
hands of an authorised user do not suddenly become sensitive if inappropriately 
revealed or if they fall into unauthorised hands. Let us therefore be clear and 
consistent; in keeping with the definition, data sensitivity is based on the potential 
consequences of their misuse, be it by an authorised or unauthorised individual. Within 
this relative approach, we simply consider the potential consequences.  
 
Within this framework, then, sensitive information is defined to be any information 
which can be used to cause harm, distress, embarrassment, discrimination, 
inconvenience or financial loss to an individual or community. In this context, 
community is used broadly to refer to a group of individuals homogenous on at least 
one characteristic (e.g. belief, ethnicity, neighbourhood, habit, social media groups, 
profession, organisation, etc.). While assessment on these risks can inform the 
sensitivity of the data, however, sensitivity must be viewed within the broader and more 
comprehensive context outlined in this framework. Sensitivity is not a reason to 
withhold data if the purpose justifies their use within an appropriate ethical governance 
framework. 
9.4.4. SIZE 
The number of records in a dataset and the underlying population are both important 
because together they reflect the proportion of at-risk individuals or population of 
interest who are captured by the data. This is therefore dependent on both the size of 
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the dataset (i.e. number of different individuals it captures) and the size of the 
underlying relevant population. This relationship presents two different types of 
associated identification risk.  
 
The first type of risk is perhaps the most frequently addressed in the literature and is 
the ability to identify individuals in the dataset. More directly related to the underlying 
population size, it is often mitigated through data suppression or areal aggregation and 
is referred to as the geographic area population size (GAPS) [58]. Generally, the 
smaller the GAPS, the fewer the number of individuals with common attributes and 
therefore the greater the identifiability ("generally" because this may not be the case in 
deliberately more homogenous communities, such as nursing homes). For example, 
consider a dataset containing a single male aged 78 years. The probability of 
identifying this individual if it is known that the data are from a small rural community is 
much greater than if they are from a large urban centre or even a nursing home where 
it is more likely that there will be more males ages 78 years. This risk is therefore also 
intertwined with the granularity and multiplicity dimensions; if instead of 78 years we 
were to provide a less granular age, such as 70-80 years, the size of the "eligible" 
underlying population pool increases and identifiability therefore decreases. However if 
we then add a variable such as ethnicity, we increase multiplicity and the size of the 
eligible underlying population pool decreases.  
 
GAPS cut-offs can be estimated by using a composite "score" that considers both the 
granularity and multiplicity of the dataset. The maximum number of different possible 
combinations of the variables within a dataset is taken to be the product of the number 
of possible values for each one. This product is referred to as the MaxCombs 
(maximum number of combinations) [58,146]. The higher the MaxCombs value, the 
more ―parsed‖ the data, and therefore the greater the potential for identifying an 
individual and the greater the GAPS cut-off. I have co-authored on this methodology; 
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please see Chapter 7 for more details and Appendix G (Volume II) for the relevant 
publication. 
 
The second type of risk is less obvious and is the ability to assign an attribute or 
characteristic to any given individual or group without necessarily identifying the 
individual. Consider, for example, a dataset for Canada of females aged 10 to 14 years 
vaccinated for Human Papilloma Virus (HPV) in 2006, containing 3,900 records (the 
year 2006 is used for convenience and illustrative purposes as it allows for use of the 
2006 Census for Canada). This count represents about 0.38% of Canada's female 
population aged 10-14 years and in the absence of additional identifying information it 
is impossible to point to any randomly selected 10-14 year old female and confidently 
state that she has been vaccinated. However, if instead of Canada, this dataset were 
for the town of Ajax in Durham, Ontario, Canada, it would actually represent almost 
100% of the population of interest. One can then quite confidently infer that any given 
female aged 10-14 years in Ajax has received the HPV vaccine. While in this particular 
example the inference may be inconsequential, it illustrates the potential impact of the 
dataset size relative to the population it represents, particularly if the data were 
deemed to be of a sensitive nature.  
9.5. THE PURPOSE 
A recurring principle and theme in privacy legislation and indeed many of the proposed 
management models is that the data collected, stored and used be the minimum that is 
required to accomplish the purpose for which they are collected 
[60,61,80,176,182,194]. In many instances of public health, this requirement is violated 
as usage is typically for secondary purposes. The purpose, therefore, must merit this 
"violation" and must consequently be properly documented and assessed. This 
increases transparency which feeds back into the recipient domain.  
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Identification 
 
A clearly articulated statement describing the purpose for which the data are being 
requested should be included. 
 
Dimensions 
 
The purpose domain is assessed using the dimensions of contribution, necessity, 
effort and impact. 
9.5.1. CONTRIBUTION 
As previously described, there is no standard definition or list of public health functions, 
activities or services, and the definition of public health practice is similarly inconsistent. 
What everyone does seem to be in general agreement about, however, is that the goal 
of the functions, services and activities is the same. Since our shrinking world also 
demands a global perspective, it is therefore suggested that the Public Health Agency 
of Canada’s inclusion of a ―healthy world‖ be adopted within the goal statement [30], 
which can therefore be phrased as follows:  
 
The goal of public health practice is to ensure healthy individuals and communities in a 
healthy world. 
 
This dimension therefore seeks to measure the relevance and scope of the purpose for 
which the data are requested to the goal as stated above.  
9.5.2. NECESSITY 
The necessity dimension addresses whether or not the purpose can be accomplished 
in the absence of the data under consideration for sharing and is directly related to the 
dimensions of the data domain. This is impacted by both the nature of the data fields, 
as well as their granularity. For example, age is often a necessary field for public health 
use, but it may not always be necessary in its most granular form (i.e. exact age). In 
some cases, distinctions between age groups may be adequate and little to no benefit 
is derived from additional detail. This dimension needs to be assessed for every field 
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being considered for sharing in the data, and may therefore impact dimensions and 
measures within the data domain such as granularity and the MaxCombs measure. 
 
To avoid ambiguity, it is suggested that the assessment of this dimension take on a 
binary form; a simple Yes/No response for each field under consideration. Either the 
output is necessary or it is not as decided by the custodian or an external body and 
justified by the recipient. As with all components of this framework, dimensions and 
domains are intended to work together to inform the data-sharing process. 
9.5.3. EFFORT 
This dimension captures the ease with which the data can be shared, and takes into 
consideration the two key barriers identified by practitioners in the previously 
conducted survey: legislation and bureaucracy.  
 
Naturally, the purpose for which the data will be used must be legal. Although this may 
seem to be a somewhat obvious and simple requirement, assessment of this 
dimension can be quite complex due to two key factors: our ever-shrinking world and 
the blazing speed of technological advancement. Whether it is the mobility and 
resilience of pathogens in an increasingly connected and mobile world, the continued 
evolution of technological development with global environmental impacts, or the ability 
to reach millions across the globe with humanitarian aid and health-promoting 
propaganda within mere minutes of an event, it is clear that health events have no 
regard for man-made boundaries and jurisdictions and the pace of technology far 
exceeds that of legislative reform. Cross-jurisdictional collaboration and data-sharing is 
no longer a "nice-to-have" but a "must-have". Just as individuals function within 
societies, societies function within nations, which in turn function within a much larger 
global construct. Good public health must therefore be practiced within a global 
paradigm, and the increasing roles of and collaboration between nations and global 
organisations such as the World Health Organisation (WHO), the Pan-American Health 
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Organisation (PAHO) and the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control 
(ECDC) are evidence of this. This recognition is exemplified through the vision 
statement of the Public Health Agency of Canada: "Healthier Canadians and 
Communities in a healthier world" [30] (italics added). It is also succinctly expressed on 
the home page of the Association of Schools of Public Health Website: "Global health 
is public health; Public health is your health; You are only as healthy as the world you 
live in" [195]. However, in the words of Shakespeare's Hamlet, "there's the rub": this 
global approach is significantly complicated by the legal landscape. 
 
As previously discussed, privacy legislation in general permits the use of personal 
information in the interests of public safety or for research purposes, though there is no 
universal or standard application [154]. The solution, it is proposed, is not to introduce 
additional constraining legislation, but rather enabling guidelines for ethical professional 
conduct and consequences for unethical use. In assessing this dimension, the users 
should determine whether the purpose has any legal ramifications within all 
jurisdictions implicated, and whether any current legal issues or legislation prevent the 
distribution and/or use of the data, or if much effort is required to obtain legal 
permission and draw up the necessary legal documentation (if required). Cross-
jurisdictional data-sharing should therefore also be assessed in terms of its 
practicability. In the end, these mechanisms must allow users to feel comfortable being 
accountable for their use of the data as opposed to fearing potential consequences due 
to misconceptions and misunderstanding of these mechanisms. In some cases, as has 
been previously mentioned, the sharing of the data may be made legally obligatory by 
the purpose. However even in such cases, it seems that the fear of privacy implications 
and the related issues around risk, trust and other dimensions addressed within this 
framework can outweigh considerations for public safety and mandatory reporting 
obligations [196]. 
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The bureaucracy aspect is related to the legality aspect; generally, the greater the 
number of implicated jurisdictions the greater the bureaucracy involved. It will also be 
related to the processes and policies in place by the parties involved. 
 
This dimension therefore rates the effort required to implement the data-sharing 
agreement or process and is, to a large degree, countered by the contribution 
dimension. If contribution is low but effort is high, the parties involved may wish to 
revisit the purpose and assess whether a different approach is required, or if it merits 
the required effort.  
9.5.4. IMPACT 
Impact refers to the benefits and risks related to both, the approval and the rejection of 
the data-sharing request. These must be considered in terms of multiple aspects: the 
individuals to whom the data pertain (we shall refer to them simply as the individuals), 
the general public or population (i.e. societal impact), specific communities, the 
custodian, the recipient, and public health knowledge. The most difficult of these to 
reconcile are the individual and societal impacts since they revolve around 
individualistic versus communitarian philosophies. These approaches have been the 
subject of much research and debate, but in the end, they amount to subjective 
philosophies with vague and non-committal legislative backing. The impact will be 
largely determined by the intent; research, for example, will have more of a positive 
impact on contribution to knowledge than a public health service, for example. An 
impact matrix summarising some of the benefits and risks to each aspect is suggested 
in Table 12 both for data disclosure and non-disclosure.  
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Table 12: Impact matrix showing examples of the benefits and risks of disclosure 
and non-disclosure of data to implicated groups 
 
 
DISCLOSURE NON-DISCLOSURE 
IN
D
IV
ID
U
A
L
 
 
 
 
 
RISKS 
 
 
 
 
 No control over personal 
information 
 Potential for embarrassment, 
stigmatisation, discrimination, 
financial loss and refusal of 
services  
 
 Compromised public health 
system 
 Inefficient public health 
services 
 Delayed or untimely response 
 Increased potential for illness 
 Compromised diagnostic and 
response functions 
 Safety at risk 
BENEFITS 
 Access to improved services 
for health protection 
 Increased awareness and 
education  
 Well-informed promotion 
initiatives 
 Improved health through 
enhanced prevention & 
control strategies 
 Engagement in public health  
 Contribution to community 
and population health  
 Contribution to knowledge 
 No risk of breach or 
inappropriate disclosure 
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Table 12: Impact matrix showing examples of the benefits and risks of disclosure 
and non-disclosure of data to implicated groups (continued) 
 
 
DISCLOSURE NON-DISCLOSURE 
S
O
C
IE
T
Y
 
 
 
 
RISKS  
 
 
 
 
 Generalised mistrust in the 
event of a breach  
 
 
 Compromised public health 
system 
 Inefficient public health 
services 
 Delayed or untimely response 
 Increased potential for illness 
 Compromised diagnostic and 
response functions 
 Safety at risk 
BENEFITS 
 Improved health through 
enhanced prevention & 
control strategies 
 Contribution to population and 
global health 
 Contribution to knowledge 
 None identified (unless one 
believes that ignorance is 
bliss!) 
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Table 12: Impact matrix showing examples of the benefits and risks of disclosure 
and non-disclosure of data to implicated groups (continued) 
 
 
DISCLOSURE NON-DISCLOSURE 
C
O
M
M
U
N
IT
Y
 
 
 
 
RISKS  
 
 
 
 Potential for embarrassment, 
stigmatisation, discrimination, 
financial loss and refusal of 
services  
 
 Compromised public health 
system 
 Inefficient public health 
services 
 Delayed or untimely response 
 Increased potential for illness 
 Compromised diagnostic and 
response functions 
 Safety at risk 
BENEFITS 
 Contribution to community, 
population and global health 
 Contribution to knowledge 
 No risk of breach or 
inappropriate disclosure 
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Table 12: Impact matrix showing examples of the benefits and risks of disclosure 
and non-disclosure of data to implicated groups (continued) 
 
 
DISCLOSURE NON-DISCLOSURE 
C
U
S
T
O
D
IA
N
 
RISKS 
 Liability due to limited control 
over released information 
 Potential backlash from 
individuals to whom the data 
pertains 
 Potential loss of trust, 
credibility & financial 
implications in the event of a 
breach  
 Loss of reputation (unless 
non-disclosure is justified) 
 Impact on individuals, society 
and communities 
 May be perceived as an 
obstacle to knowledge and 
public health practice 
 Potential breach of 
legislation, public trust or 
ethical duty  
BENEFITS 
 Building and fostering of 
partnerships and networks  
 Contribution to individual, 
population, community and 
global health 
 Contribution to knowledge 
 No risk of breach or 
inappropriate disclosure 
 Potential legal or ethical 
justification 
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Table 12: Impact matrix showing examples of the benefits and risks of disclosure 
and non-disclosure of data to implicated groups (continued) 
 
 
DISCLOSURE NON-DISCLOSURE 
R
E
C
IP
IE
N
T
 
RISKS 
 Implementation of 
governance structure and 
protective measures 
 Potential loss of trust, 
credibility & financial 
implications in the event of a 
breach 
 May clash with existing 
policies; political tensions 
 Inability to accomplish 
purpose 
 Potential for inappropriate or 
un-informed decisions or 
public health actions 
 Decision-based evidence-
making 
BENEFITS 
 Ability to conduct desired 
activity 
 Contribution to individual, 
population, community and 
global health 
 Contribution to knowledge 
 Evidence to inform decision-
making, policies and positive 
reform 
 Evidence-based decision-
making 
 None identified 
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Table 12: Impact matrix showing examples of the benefits and risks of disclosure 
and non-disclosure of data to implicated groups (continued) 
 
 
DISCLOSURE NON-DISCLOSURE 
K
N
O
W
L
E
D
G
E
 
RISKS 
 May clash with existing 
policies; political tensions 
 Resistance to change 
 Lack of information and 
evidence; no advancement, 
improvement or contribution 
of generalisable knowledge 
BENEFITS 
 Contribution to individual, 
population, community and 
global health 
 Contribution to knowledge 
 Improved methodology 
 Affect positive change 
 Build evidence-base 
 None identified 
 
9.6. THE TRANSFORM 
As described in Part II, several tools and methods have been developed to anonymise 
textual data in public health, such as pseudonymisation, k-anonymity techniques and 
data suppression. However, there is very little in the way of location-anonymising tools 
and methods are limited, focusing largely on adaptive and semi-adaptive geomasking 
techniques. Within the current context, this framework domain focuses specifically on 
the assessment of location-transforms and their implication to the spatial dimension of 
the data.  
 
Identification 
 
The name and brief description of the transform (if one is conducted) should be clearly 
stated, along with reference to its methodology. The parameters and settings of the 
transform should also be included.  
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Dimensions 
 
The transform domain assesses the data on four dimensions: Uniqueness, 
Identification Risk, Erosion and Analytical Effect. These dimensions reflect the effects 
commonly discussed in the literature, and also consequently addressed through the 
novel Multidimensional Point Transform (MPT) algorithm proposed by the author 
(please see Part II; manuscript has been accepted for publication [153]). All four 
dimensions require a comparison with the data prior to the application of a transform 
since they seek to assess the transform’s effect. 
9.6.1. UNIQUENESS 
The uniqueness dimension reflects the degree to which an individual in a given 
population is unique on the combination of attributes released through the data 
requested (this is described in more detail in Part II of this study) 
 
Within this framework, acceptable uniqueness thresholds must be defined by the data 
custodian prior to data release and should be a function of the data contents and the 
closely linked concept of re-identifiability as given below. A transform that is applied on 
the data – whether it is suppression, aggregation, or a more comprehensive 
multidimensional transform such as the one proposed by the author – must be able to 
estimate the effective anonymity level and operate in accordance with the established 
threshold requirements. However consideration must also be given to the utility of the 
transformed data (this is addressed by the last two dimensions of this domain).  
 
The measure for this dimension, therefore, is how well a given transform can not only 
estimate the anonymity level of each record, but more importantly modify the data to 
meet the required threshold. Also, the transform should be able to allow the user to 
specify whether the anonymity is to be achieved within the dataset only, within the 
underlying population, or within both. If the latter two, the transform should also be able 
to perform the necessary operations using the underlying population if available (ideal) 
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or an appropriately synthesised population (acceptable). More details on and 
implementation of these aspects of location-transforms are given in Part II and the MPT 
manuscript [153]. 
 
9.6.2. IDENTIFICATION RISK 
Within this framework, the terms identification risk and re-identification risk are 
considered synonymous since the underlying issue is the same - the ability to identify 
an individual. Identification risk is itself a multi-faceted concept as briefly described in 
the data domain and is closely related to uniqueness, as well as the nature of the 
transform and the way in which the data are released (as discussed in the output 
domain). 
 
Within this dimension of the transform domain of this framework, the probability of 
being able to identify an individual using a given transform must be assessed based on 
the risk tolerance of the custodian. This must be done in the context of various types of 
identification risks as outlined in Chapter 7, and the necessary metrics must therefore 
be agreed upon for assessment. An appropriate transform must therefore include 
measures or estimates to mitigate the appropriate identification risk. The MPT 
proposed by this author mitigates several of these risks as described in Part II and the 
forthcoming publication [153] 
9.6.3. EROSION 
Erosion refers to the loss of Information both within the dataset (for example loss of 
complete values and changes to data values) as well as in relation to other contextual 
or environmental features. A description of how each attribute will be or has been 
transformed should therefore be provided to the recipient to assess whether or not the 
data will remain useful for the purpose for which they were requested. Transforms can 
impact the granularity of the data (e.g. by grouping attributes into categories), the size 
of the data (e.g. by suppressing records that do not meet uniqueness requirements) 
169 
 
and the multiplicity of the data (also through suppression, for example). This will 
ultimately affect the data’s utility.  
 
From a location privacy perspective, a fundamental geographical principle is that 
features that are closer together geographically are more related than those that are 
more distant. Therefore, the farther a record is displaced from its original location, the 
greater the erosion of its relationship to the geography, the environment and 
surrounding patients. Consider, for example, a study looking at a environmental risk 
factors for patients with a respiratory condition. The farther any given patient is moved 
from their original location, the less valid the attributions to surrounding factors which 
may have otherwise been significant, such as vegetation, air pollution, the presence of 
industrial buildings, exposure to car fumes based on proximity to a busy road, etc.  
 
Therefore, a dynamic and adaptive transform that allows users to define priorities for 
the erosion of various attributes relative to their own values as well as within the 
context of other attributes and features is ideal. To date, the only such transform that 
allows such an adaptive approach while including the spatial dimension by design in 
the overall anonymisation algorithm is the MPT [153]. 
9.6.4. ANALYTICAL EFFECT 
Closely related to the dimension of erosion is the resulting analytical effect. For any 
given transformation of the data, the impact on analyses should also be assessed. For 
example, there is sufficient evidence to show the detrimental impact of aggregation on 
cluster detection [9,10,135]; aggregation also suffers from the commonly referred to 
MAUP: modifiable areal unit problem which has been previously discussed. The effects 
on simple descriptive spatial statistics is also important, and in some cases can be 
minimised by user-defined parameters to control the transform’s algorithm. For 
example, in the MPT, the spatial mean of a set of points will be directly related to the 
allowable perturbation distance. However, this in turn will be influenced by other user-
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defined settings for the algorithm [153]. From a location-privacy perspective, it is 
desirable to achieve a minimum geographic distance perturbation from the original 
point to reduce the analytical impact. However, the ideal transform will allow the user to 
control the degree of perturbation to each field or variable individually to minimise 
negative analytical effects specific to the purpose. For example, it may be more 
important to allow a slightly larger geographic distance transform (i.e. compromise the 
minimum geographic distance requirement) in favour of a reduced age transform (i.e. 
minimum age-perturbation) if age is more important for the analysis or has a larger 
effect on a dependent variable. 
 
This dimension therefore seeks to assess and minimise the effects of a transform on 
the quality and validity of the information inferred or acquired through the data. The 
purpose is to reflect, as closely as possible, the information that would have otherwise 
been gleaned from the original, granular and non-transformed data. Once again, the 
MPT's flexible and adaptive methodology provides a powerful foundation on which to 
build [153]. 
9.7. THE OUTPUT 
Better health is not a science problem, it's an information problem 
Thomas Goetz 
The output domain assesses the release, if any, of the final product created by the 
recipient. In most cases, this will likely be a summary of the recipient's findings, but it is, 
in essence, a ―super-domain‖ since it is simply another instance of data-sharing. 
Output reflects the "so what" of the purpose - how is the information derived from the 
use of the data going to be disseminated, if at all, and to whom. This may itself be a 
specified component of the purpose (e.g. if the purpose is to inform a policy maker on 
the impact of an environmental exposure to cancer risk then once the recipient has 
completed the analysis, the findings will then have to be output to the appropriate 
policy maker). As indicated in the recipient domain, it is strongly suggested that 
disclosure requirements in a contract be based on the assessment of this domain 
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which should therefore be assessed and agreed upon by all parties involved in the 
data-sharing process. 
 
Output is a critical domain, as it can be the least controllable and therefore have the 
most profound and tangible of consequences. It can provide the information and 
evidence required to fuel forces for positive change and improved health, or it can 
destroy reputations and individual and organisational livelihood. A map published in a 
local newspaper showing appropriately transformed locations of cases with 
schizophrenia may be acceptable, identifying areas in need of resources or support 
and commenting on mental health issues and the stresses that contribute to them. 
However if the locations are not appropriately transformed and can be reverse-
engineered to identify individuals, the implications are far-reaching; not only will this 
impact the patients themselves, but it may also alienate neighbourhoods, generate a 
societal response and diminish the credibility of those involved.  
 
Since the output is essentially, as stated, a form of "data-sharing", its assessment is 
based on the same four domains described above, with some minor nuances. It should 
be noted that the recipient does not become the custodian of the data once the data 
are shared, and the purpose for which the data-sharing is initiated may necessitate a 
particular type of output. It is therefore very important to include output as a domain 
because it is a necessary consideration in the initial data-sharing assessment between 
the custodian and the recipient. This also allows the output to be assessed holistically 
and independently of the original data-sharing assessment, ,  
 
Recipient 
The recipient domain in this case reflects the audience and therefore focuses on who 
will have access to the output. The dimension must be assessed in conjunction with 
the purpose for the output and the data being output. The audience may be the 
general public, senior management, other researchers, clinicians, etc. In many cases, 
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the audience will likely be the general public; in a scoring scheme where a value of 
zero is used to indicate non-existence (e.g. no trust, no security, no training and no 
contract), the general public would score 0 on all four dimensions giving an overall 
output recipient score of 0. This would therefore necessitate a high score in other 
domains as appropriate and as illustrated and discussed in the next chapter. 
 
Data 
The data to be released must be assessed in the context of the recipient, and in 
conjunction with the dimensions of the transform and purpose domains. As with the 
output recipient domain, the output data domain will also be assigned a very low 
score if the audience is the general public. 
 
Purpose 
Again, assessment of the output purpose will depend heavily on the audience. For 
example, it may be necessary to output more granular and specific information for a 
core function of public health practice during an emergency than during routine 
surveillance using the same data. This would differ still from the relevant information 
being released to the public for a health promotion campaign. 
 
Transform 
The output transform domain is the means by which risks associated with the output 
mitigated, and in this case addresses the specific output medium. Mediums can 
include written reports, oral presentations, posters, graphs, tables, maps, newscasts, 
etc. and must be considered in combination with the other domains. As previously 
mentioned, for example, publicly published maps can be used to identify individuals 
[11,150]. This may be appropriate for a quarantine team (audience) during a highly 
contagious outbreak (necessity) but not for public dissemination in a local newspaper.  
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10. From Conceptual to Concrete 
10.1. INTRODUCTION 
The framework as presented is built on five core domains, of which one, the output 
domain, is a "super-domain" requiring re-assessment on the other four domains. 
Together, these domains broadly capture the areas to be taken into consideration 
when evaluating the appropriateness of releasing or using public health data. The 
overall assessment and recommendation arising from the application of the framework 
is based on the combined and weighted scoring of these five domains.  
 
Each domain is in turn built on a set of four dimensions, each also with its own scoring 
scheme and weight. The score for each of the domains is therefore a composite of the 
domain’s weighted dimension scores. This gives a total of 16 dimensions, scored as a 
set for each data-sharing instance, of which the initial sharing request is one, and the 
output domain is a second such instance. Therefore, any given data-sharing 
assessment will involve scoring of at least two instances of the dimension set. These 
dimensions are not to be confused with those described in the multidimensional point 
transform presented in Part II. 
 
As has been mentioned, the domains are interconnected, since they necessarily affect 
one another. The user should be given the ability to customise the scoring and 
weighting based on need and context within the framework's implementation. 
Consequently, situation-specific scoring schemes can be defined allowing the resulting 
recommendations to flexibly morph with contextual needs: 
 
Dimension Weight:  For each dimension, the user can indicate the  
   dimension’s relative importance, which will be  
   used to weight it in the domain’s composite score.  
    
174 
 
Domain Weight:  For each domain, the user can indicate the   
   domain’s relative importance, which will be used  
   to weight it in the overall computed score.  
 
Acceptable Thresholds: Requirements to classify and assess the   
   acceptability of weighted scores for the various  
   dimensions and overall domains. 
There are therefore two aspects to this framework and each of its components: the 
qualitative rationale, given by the actual content and criteria captured by the domains 
and dimensions, and the corresponding quantification that gives relative tangible 
results to help assess the former, issue guidance and inform decisions. The results of 
implementing the framework in this way may also identify changes that the custodian 
and/or recipient may benefit from. To better understand the scoring relationships 
between the various domains and dimensions and illustrate how the framework can be 
used to guide a data-sharing decision and learn from it, let us consider an 
implementation scenario.  
10.2. SCENARIO SETUP 
Suppose that your division is looking to explore the relationship between geographical 
neighbourhood and the prevalence of sexually transmitted infections (STIs) in order to 
inform health promotion and sexual education campaigns. You are the senior advisor 
and principal investigator, and therefore have agreed to assume responsibility for your 
division. You therefore request an STI database from the appropriate health custodian 
in your jurisdiction, containing patient age, sex, address, primary diagnosis, number of 
partners, alcohol use, drug use, occupation and marital status. Together with the 
custodian, you complete a profile and assessment using the framework.  
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Weighting 
For each dimension and domain, the custodian has implemented a consistent 
weighting scheme from 1 to 5; the higher the weight, the more heavily the dimension or 
domain is weighted (signifying higher ascribed importance). A weight of 0 is possible, 
however not preferred since ideally, every dimension and domain in the framework 
should be utilised. However, the ability to set a weight of 0 allows the user(s) to 
customise the framework to specific scenarios. The custodian has provided the 
following attributions to each weight: 
 
1. The dimension or domain is of very low significance to the custodian's 
determination of whether or not to share the data in a given context, and 
the assigned score is therefore used as is, without being weighted. 
 
2. The dimension or domain is of some significance, but relatively low.  
 
3. The dimension or domain is of reasonable significance 
 
4. The dimension or domain is of high significance 
 
5. The dimension or domain is of critical significance.  
 
The custodian has therefore pre-assigned weights to the various dimensions and 
domains as described below. Note that dimensions within a domain can have the same 
weight if the custodian ascribes the same significance level to them. Furthermore, the 
weights are relative to one another and the effect is compounded by the assigned 
scoring scheme as explained below. 
 
  
176 
 
Table 13: Example of a 
custodian weighted-score 
matrix 
  WEIGHT 
  1 2 3 4 5 
S
C
O
R
E
 1 1 2 3 4 5 
2 2 4 6 8 10 
3 3 6 9 12 15 
 
Scoring 
For each dimension and domain, the custodian 
has implemented a rating scheme of low, medium 
and high. The ratings are then quantified as 
scores: 1 where the dimension is rated as low, 2 
for a medium rating, and 3 for a high rating. Since 
overall higher scores favour data-sharing, the 
scoring scheme is reversed where appropriate 
(this is clarified through the scenario). The 
custodian has also implemented a score of 0 where a rating cannot be given (for 
example there is insufficient information or the dimension is completely absent).  
 
The weighted score for any given dimension is calculated as the product of the 
dimension's score and weight. Therefore, as illustrated in the custodian's weighted 
score matrix (Table 13), a dimension of reasonable significance (weight=3) with a low 
rating (score = 1) will have the same weighted score (3) as a dimension of very low 
significance (weight = 1) and a high rating (score = 3).  
 
The overall domain score is calculated as:  
 
𝑆 ≡
  𝑠𝑑 × 𝑤𝑑 
𝑛
𝑑=1
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑤𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒
 
 
Where S is the domain score, s is the dimension score, d is the dimension (i.e. first, 
second, third or fourth dimension), n is the number of dimensions (4), w is the 
dimension weight and maxwscore is the maximum possible weighted score for the 
domain calculated as 
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑤𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 ≡   𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑠𝑑 × 𝑤𝑑 
𝑛
𝑑=1
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Where maxs is the maximum score that dimension d can have – in this case the 
contract dimension has a maximum score of 1, whereas the other three dimensions 
have a maximum score of 3 each.  
 
As will be clear by the end of the scenario, the calculations and settings, along with 
their relationships between and within domains, are easy to change and define by the 
user, adding to the power and flexibility of the framework's implementation. 
 
Thresholds 
The custodian has pre-determined that data-sharing will depend on an overall scoring 
profile where a score of 85% or higher is considered low risk (i.e. safe to share data), 
70% to 85% considered medium risk, and anything under 70% to be high risk (data-
sharing not acceptable).  
10.2.1. RECIPIENT DOMAIN 
Identification 
Primary Contact: Pat Smith 
Role:   Principal Investigator / Public Health Promotion Advisor 
Credentials:  MD, MHSc 
Training:  No relevant privacy training 
Contact:  STI Health 
   Health Promotion Division 
   123 Imasample Drive, Imunreal 
   1-888-STI-HELP x. 123 
 
Secondary Contact: Alex Jones 
Role:   Section Manager 
Credentials:  MHSc, MBA 
178 
 
Training:  No relevant privacy training 
Contact:  STI Health 
   Health Promotion Division 
   123 Imasample Drive, Imunreal 
   1-888-STI-HELP x. 111 
 
Other Contacts: Drew White; PhD; Senior Analyst 
   Tracy Green; MSc; Health Promotion Advisor 
 
Rating 
Trust: You and the custodian have had no previous interactions and are only known to 
one another through your respective organisational memberships. The lack of a 
relationship makes you both reluctant to rate this dimension as high, however your 
respective credentials, expertise, job requirements, lack of historical privacy breaches 
and motives as identified through your purpose allow the custodian to feel comfortable 
rating this dimension as Medium (score = 2).  
 
Security: You provide detailed documentation of the policies and security measures 
implemented by your organisation; since you work for STI Health, it comes as no 
surprise to the custodian that these measures are in place. As a result, the security 
dimension is rated as high (score = 3) 
 
Training: As indicated in your identification profile, you have had no relevant privacy 
training. Scoring on this dimension is therefore quite straightforward and you are rated 
as low (score = 1). 
 
Contract: The custodian is used to these sorts of requests and has therefore 
implemented a detailed agreement to which you must agree prior to being approved for 
data-sharing. You have reviewed the agreement and after some discussion and 
179 
 
clarification with the custodian are prepared to sign it. In this case, the custodian has 
chosen to score this dimension on a binary scale – either 0 for no, or 1 for yes. The 
custodian is pleased that the requirements for this dimension have been fulfilled, and 
rates it as yes, a contract is (or will be) present (score = 1). 
 
Weighting 
The custodian reasons that in situations where there has been no previous interaction 
with the recipient, the security dimension is the most important, greatly outweighing the 
rest, followed by the contract dimension, then the trust dimension, which in turn is more 
important to the custodian than whether or not you have had relevant privacy training. 
The trust dimension is therefore given a relative weight of 2, the security dimension a 
much higher weight of 5, the training dimension a weight of 1, and the contract 
dimension a relative weight of 4.  
 
Scoring 
In this domain, a high score on any dimension is a better score for the domain overall.  
 
Therefore, the overall score for this domain is calculated as follows: 
 
𝑆 =
 2 × 2 +  3 × 5 +  1 × 1 +  1 × 4 
 3 × 2 +  3 × 5 +  3 × 1 +  1 × 4 
=
23
28
= 0.86 
 
Your recipient domain score is therefore 86%; based on the custodian’s thresholds, 
this rates you as ―high‖, and therefore ―low risk‖. 
10.2.2. DATA DOMAIN 
Identification 
Dataset Name: Imunreal STI Data 
Dataset Date:  July 1, 2011 
Custodian:  Imunreal Public Health 
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Patient Count:  704 
Geographic Extent: City of Imunreal 
Extent Population: 41,000 
Fields Requested: Age    (non categorised; range 21 – 71 years) 
   Sex    (male / female) 
   Address   (Street level) 
   Primary Diagnosis  (STI diagnosis: Chlamydia / Gonorrhoea /  
      Syphilis / Candidiasis / Hepatitis B /  
      Herpes / HIV / HPV) 
   Number of partners (range 0 – 4) 
   Alcohol use   (binary: Yes / No) 
   Drug use   (binary: Yes/No) 
   Occupation   (free text) 
Marital Status   (single / married / common law / divorced /  
    separated / widowed) 
 
Rating 
Granularity: Given that you are requesting street-level address, the custodian 
immediately rates this dimension as high (score = 1) 
 
Multiplicity: Each record in the dataset represents a unique individual, so from that 
perspective multiplicity is low. However, given the number of variables you are 
requesting, the custodian feels that multiplicity is bordering on high. After some 
discussion, you agree to drop the occupation field as you reason that, given that it is 
free text, it is likely not as useful to your purpose as you had hoped. The custodian 
decides to rate this dimension as medium (score = 2). 
 
Sensitivity: There is not even a slight pause on this one, and the dimension gets rated 
as high (score = 1). 
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Size: To put this in perspective, you and the custodian agree to look at two values: the 
proportion of individuals in Imunreal that this dataset represents, and the calculated 
maxcombs value. The proportion is the quotient of the patient count to the extent 
population, and is therefore quite low: 0.017. This is expected, since you already knew 
that the prevalence of STIs in Imunreal was around 2%. The maxcombs value is 
calculated as the total number of combinations given by the data fields. Age has 51 
possible values; sex has 2; address has 704; primary diagnosis has 8; number of 
partners has 5; alcohol use has 2; drug use has 2; and marital status has 6. The 
product of these gives a maxcombs value of 68,935,680, which is considerably higher 
than the population of Imunreal, causing the custodian great concern – the high 
maxcombs value suggests a high likelihood that each individual in the dataset is unique 
in the population on their combination of variable values. The custodian therefore 
suggests that you consider implementing a location transform and rates this dimension 
as high (score = 1). 
 
Weighting 
The custodian has determined that granularity and sensitivity are of high significance 
and substantially more important than multiplicity and size. Therefore, granularity and 
sensitivity are assigned a weight of 4 each, whereas multiplicity and size are each 
assigned a weight of 2.  
 
Scoring 
In this domain, a high score on any dimension is actually a worse score for the domain 
overall, and therefore to maintain consistency, the scoring for the rating is reversed. In 
other words, ―high‖ is re-assigned a score of 1, and ―low‖ a score of 3 so that the score 
is ―normalised‖ – the higher the score, the better the rating. Therefore, the overall score 
for this domain is calculated to be 0.39. 
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Your data domain score is therefore 39%; based on the custodian’s thresholds, this 
rates poorly, and therefore as ―high risk‖. Given the nature of the data, and the fact that 
we have not transformed it in any way, this is not surprising. 
10.2.3. PURPOSE DOMAIN 
Identification 
The purpose of this study is to explore the relationship between geographical 
neighbourhood and the prevalence of sexually transmitted infections (STIs) in order to 
inform health promotion and sexual education campaigns. More specifically, 
campaigns will focus on the relationships between sexually transmitted infections and 
each of alcohol use, drug use, and sexual habits as reflected by the number of 
partners. The gender, age, address and marital status of cases will help inform different 
methods and target groups within defined neighbourhoods in order to tailor the 
campaigns to the specific population demographics. 
 
Rating 
Contribution: Although the prevalence of STIs in Imunreal is less than 2%, you and 
the custodian both agree strongly that continued informed promotional and educational 
campaigns would be greatly beneficial to Imunreal. The custodian therefore rates this 
dimension as high (score = 3). 
 
Necessity: You outlined the way you would be using each variable in your purpose 
statements, so you have started off on the right foot. The custodian quizzes you on the 
necessity of exact age, as opposed to age groups, as well as whether or not you really 
need marital status, but in the end the custodian agrees to rate this dimension as ―high‖ 
provided you add some rationale to your purpose for requiring all the variables 
requested. You agree (score = 3). 
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Effort: Since you and the custodian are both in the same jurisdiction, this is somewhat 
simple. Neither of you has read through the entire relevant legislation, but after 
consulting the relevant sections as outline in the Public Health Guide to Privacy 
Legislation prototype at http://www.personplacetime.org/tools and the legislation links 
on the site, you rate the effort as low. Because low effort is good, the scoring for this 
dimension is reversed as was the case with the data domain (score = 3). 
 
Impact: To assess this dimension, the custodian decides to assign a composite score 
based only on the rating of the risks and benefits of sharing the data. The reasoning, 
the custodian argues, is that the risks of disclosing the data reflect the benefits of non-
disclosure. So if, for example, there is a breach risk associated with disclosure, this 
translates to an absence of that risk associated with non-disclosure, and rating both 
would then cancel the other out or compound the effect, depending on the scoring 
scheme used. Therefore, only disclosure benefits and risks are rated. 
 
Disclosure benefits: Because of the importance of the contribution as agreed 
on by you and the custodian, the custodian decides to rate the impact of 
disclosure benefits as "medium". However, you manage to argue that this is a 
significant issue, and show the custodian some literature indicating that the 
prevalence of STIs in Imunreal has actually increased slightly over the past few 
years. This gives more credence to your argument, and the custodian revises 
the rating to ―high‖ (score = 3). 
 
Disclosure risks: Given the high sensitivity of the data, as well as its 
granularity, the high risk associated with its size and the potential serious 
consequences of a breach, the custodian rates the risk associated with data-
sharing as high (score = 3). 
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Weighting 
The custodian and you agree that contribution is a critical dimension of the purpose 
domain, followed by impact as a highly significant dimension, necessity as being of 
reasonable significance and finally effort as being of some significance. Contribution is 
therefore given a weight of 5, impact a weight of 4, necessity a weight of 3 and effort a 
weight of 2.  
 
Scoring 
In this domain, high scores on contribution, necessity and beneficial impact of 
disclosure favour data-sharing, whereas high scores on effort and risks of disclosure 
discourage it. In order to remain consistent with the overall scheme where higher 
scores favour data-sharing, scoring of effort and the impact of disclosure need further 
consideration. As indicated in the effort dimension, the scoring is reversed; it is rated as 
low and therefore receives a score of 3.  
 
The impact dimension, however, is given a composite score based on the combined 
disclosure benefit and risk ratings. Furthermore, the custodian has decided to weight 
the risk-impact score based on the security dimension score for the recipient domain.  
 
The custodian reasons that if no security-adjustments are made, then a high benefit 
score would be negated by a high risk score, irrespective of the security measures in 
place by the recipient. Therefore, the custodian decides to adjust this by multiplying the 
benefit score by the security dimension score, and subtracting the risks score. 
Therefore, when the security is low (score = 1), then if both benefits and risks are rated 
as high, both receive a score of 3 and therefore balance one another out, giving an 
overall composite impact score of 0. If security is medium or high (score = 2 or 3 
respectively) then the security-weighted impact of the benefits will increase (will 
become 6 or 9 respectively) resulting in a positive difference. Since a higher score 
favours data-sharing, this will be the case. However, if the benefits are rated as low 
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(score = 1) and the risks are high (score = 3), then if security is low (score = 1), the 
security-weighted impact score will be -2. When you consider that this can be 
compounded by the weight assigned to the impact, this can potentially indicate an 
extremely high risk (again, recall that a higher score favours data-sharing) In this 
scenario, this is the only dimension that can receive a negative score, which may be 
appropriate – if weighted highly and there is a high risk, then this will certainly skew the 
results and flag it as such. 
 
Therefore, the overall score for this domain is 1. Note that in the calculation of 
maxwscore for impact, the maximum impact score is achieved with high benefit and 
low risk, and is therefore 3-1=2 (not 3), multiplied by the security dimension score (in 
this case 3). Also, in this scenario, rating impact risk as unknown will assign it a score 
of 0, thereby favouring data-sharing; alternatively, it can be assigned a score of 4 to 
guarantee a conservative approach if the risks are not identified and all calculations will 
have to be adjusted accordingly. 
 
Your purpose domain score is therefore 100% - a perfect score! 
10.2.4. TRANSFORM DOMAIN 
Identification 
In spite of the custodian's suggestion, you feel that any transform you apply to the data 
would have a negative effect on achieving your purpose. Specifically, you argue that 
any perturbation in the location may result in a change in neighbourhood, and that the 
granularity of the other variables is equally as important. After some conversation with 
the custodian you agree to revisit this dimension should the final verdict be 
unfavourable.  
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Rating 
Uniqueness: Since exact address is provided without a transform, along with various 
other quasi-identifiers, the custodian immediately rates this dimension as "high". Again, 
because this does not favour data-sharing, the dimension is assigned a low score 
(score = 1). 
 
Identification Risk: In the absence of a transform and given the granularity size of the 
data, the custodian rates this dimension as "high". As with uniqueness, it is therefore 
assigned a low score (score = 1). 
 
Erosion: Since no transform is being conducted, there is no erosion and the dimension 
is rated as low. The custodian has decided that sharing more precise data is more 
favourable, and that this would be balanced out by the uniqueness and identification 
risk dimensions - in other words, the most favourable scenario is one in which all 
dimensions in this domain are low. Therefore, a low rating on this domain is given a 
high score to favour data-sharing (score = 3) 
 
Analytical Effect: as with erosion, this is rated as low (score =3) 
 
Weighting 
The custodian has decided that uniqueness and identification risk are critical, whereas 
erosion and analytical effect are of reasonable significance. The former two are 
therefore assigned a weight of 5, and the latter two a weight of 3. 
 
Scoring 
Your transform domain score is 58%; based on the custodian's thresholds, this rates 
your transform as "low", and therefore "high risk" (expected given that no transform is 
carried out and therefore consistent with the scoring of the data domain).  
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10.2.5. OUTPUT DOMAIN 
Identification 
You stated in your purpose that your end goal is to inform health promotion and sexual 
education campaigns. To do this, you plan on working with your colleagues within your 
health promotion division to create and release various reports to the public. You will 
also be engaging an education specialist, a designer and your communications 
division, all of whom will be assessed as members of the public. The public will only 
have access to high-level generic results at the neighbourhood level. Reports and 
campaigns will include aggregated data, figures, maps and tables. You therefore 
proceed to rate and score this "super-domain" on each of the previous domains and 
their dimensions: 
 
Rating 
Recipient: The audience is the public. This domain is therefore rated low on all 
dimensions, and the contract dimension is given a "no" response. All dimensions are 
given a weight of 1. 
 
The final score of the recipient domain within the output super-domain is low at 30%. 
 
Data: The data to be released will be summarised by no more than 5 age groups to be 
determined by the findings, as well as gender differences. In agreement with the 
custodian, there will be no fewer than 20 age- and gender-stratified individuals within 
each neighbourhood (i.e. k=20). Address will not be released in any format. Primary 
diagnosis will only be related to generic statements for the whole of Imunreal (i.e. no 
neighbourhood-specific diagnoses). The number of partners will be reflected through 
educational campaigns based on the findings across neighbourhoods, as will inclusion 
of alcohol and drug-related content, though with increased targeting of problematic 
neighbourhoods. Marital status will be used to inform STI counselling centres using the 
overall findings across neighbourhoods. No point-maps will be created - only 
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choropleth maps, to visually demonstrate differences, if any, between neighbourhoods 
on the above factors. Similarly with graphs and tables. 
 
As with the request assessment, the custodian has determined that granularity and 
sensitivity are of high significance and substantially more important than multiplicity and 
size. Therefore, granularity and sensitivity are assigned a weight of 4 each, whereas 
multiplicity and size are each assigned a weight of 2.  
 
Based on this information, all dimensions within the Data domain are rated as low. The 
final score of the data domain within the output super-domain is therefore high at 
100%. 
 
Purpose: The purpose within the output domain is essentially to reduce the impact 
and incidence of STIs in the population of Imunreal, inform educational campaigns in 
schools, community centres and neighbourhoods, and provide support to STI 
counsellors. As such, contribution, necessity and impact in terms of benefits are rated 
as high, and the effort and risks are rated as low. 
 
The custodian has decided that contribution is critical, as is impact, and therefore gives 
each of these a weight of 5. Necessity and effort are weighted as 4 and 2 as before. 
  
The final score of the purpose domain within the output super-domain is high at 100% 
 
Transform: Since the data being released are obviously different from those being 
requested by the recipient, one or more transforms will have to be carried out on the 
data to ensure the minimum k =20 requirement is met using the appropriate age 
categories. By meeting the minimum k requirement, the custodian is happy to rate 
uniqueness and identification risk as low, although this also means that erosion and 
analytical effect are high.  
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As before, the custodian has decided that uniqueness and identification risk are critical. 
However, since the data are not being released for further analysis, erosion and 
analytical effect are of very low significance. The former two are therefore assigned a 
weight of 5, and the latter two a weight of 1. 
 
The final score of the transform domain within the output super-domain is high at 
89%. 
 
Weighting 
Within the output super-domain, the custodian has decided that the recipient domain 
is not very significant, since it is the general public, however the remaining three 
domains of data, purpose and transform are of high significance. Therefore the 
former is given a weight of 1, whereas the latter are each given a weight of 4. 
 
Scoring 
The scoring for the output super-domain is done in exactly the same way as for each 
domain, except in this case, the domains become the dimensions in the formula. 
Therefore, the final output score is high at 90%. 
 
TOTAL SCORE 
Now that each domain has been scored, it is time to calculate the overall score to see 
whether or not the request can be fulfilled and the data shared. The final score is based 
on weighted domain scores. 
 
Weighting 
The custodian recognises that in most cases, the data domain will score quite poorly 
simply because of the nature of STI data. Therefore, the custodian has implemented a 
domain weighting scheme where the three most important domains are the recipient, 
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the purpose and the output, considered to be critical to the data-sharing decision. The 
reasoning is that if the recipient can demonstrate the necessary requirements for 
safeguarding the data, the purpose merits its use and the output poses no risk, then 
this is more important than the fact that the data, by its very nature, lends itself poorly 
to data-sharing, and the transform dimension would therefore have to dramatically alter 
the data in order to facilitate their release. The custodian has not assigned these latter 
two domains a weight of zero, however, which means that they will still be considered 
in the final scoring; instead, they are considered to be of reasonable significance. The 
domain weighting scheme, therefore, is as follows: the recipient, purpose and output 
domains are each given a weight of 5, whereas the data and transform domains are 
given a weight of 3. 
 
Scoring 
Using the above weights as applied to the score from each domain gives a total score 
of 80%. This is below the custodian's threshold of 85% for low-risk data-sharing, but 
within the "medium risk" range. The recommendation therefore is to review low-scoring 
domains and assess. For example, the recipient could agree to implement a transform, 
or omit one or more variables (e.g. marital status) which may therefore increase the 
score. 
10.3. SCORING BIAS 
As may have been evident in the scenario, scoring of the dimensions can be quite 
subjective. Different raters may consistently favour lower or higher ratings, may 
intentionally give specific ratings to favour a desired outcome, or simply have different 
thresholds and understanding of the ratings that can easily lead to inter-rater variability. 
One way to reduce such biases was mentioned in Chapter 9: rate each dimension on a 
checklist of predefined ―Yes/No‖ measures, which reduce subjectivity. Potential 
checklist measures were suggested for some of the dimensions in Chapter 9. Another 
way to reduce bias is to require a rationale for each rating, as suggested in the above 
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scenario, along with having the custodian and the recipient jointly involved in 
completing the assessment. The nature of the request and the results of the 
assessment could even be made publicly available, as is common with scientific grant 
applications. Given the appropriate governance structure, these various checks create 
a level of accountability for the rater(s) that would also help reduce bias. In any case, 
testing and evaluation of the selected rating scheme is required by users of the 
framework, who would benefit from the adoption of organisational standards and 
possible training on its consistent implementation. The weighting and scoring schemes 
would in turn be dependent on the organisation’s policies for information governance 
and data sharing. 
 
10.4. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The scenario as presented above is a simple example of how the framework may be 
used in a very flexible and customisable implementation to help assess the decision of 
whether or not to share data in response to a data-sharing request. The domain and 
dimension weights, scores and thresholds are all individually customisable, allowing 
context-specific settings. Furthermore, interactive relationships can be built in, as 
illustrated by factoring the security dimension into the impact-risks dimension scoring. 
The implementation also allows the custodian and the recipient to quickly and easily 
identify the dimensions and/or domains that require additional changes in order to meet 
the required thresholds. Along with each domain and dimension, both the recipient and 
the custodian have the responsibility of documenting the requirements, the scoring and 
weighting justification or rationale, and the steps taken to address the requirements. 
These, along with the final results, can then be used to justify the data-release to a 
research ethics committee or review board if required. 
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PART IV 
MOVING FORWARD
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11. Facilitating Practice Through Tools  
11.1. INTRODUCTION 
Much of the content of Part I through Part III has much utility beyond this written tome; 
indeed, as indicated by many of the survey responses outlined in Part I, this research is 
much needed by the public health community. Information, however, is rather useless 
in isolation; it is meant to inform, and must therefore be made available for 
consumption. 
 
To facilitate the sharing of information and knowledge, a research Website was created 
at study inception and can be found at http://www.personplacetime.org. One of the 
key ingredients on the home page of the site is the inclusion of an automated news-
feed on privacy-related news items in public health from around the world. The feed 
was created by using Yahoo Pipes, which is a Web-based tool that allows the user to 
aggregate and mashup content from around the Web [197]. This was then integrated 
into the research site. The pipe incorporates updates from a variety of Web sources, 
filters on specific keywords in the description and title, sorts by date, checks for 
duplicates and outputs the resulting unique news items; a flow schematic as created in 
pipes is shown in Figure 18 and the result as displayed on the research home page is 
shown in Figure 19. This is a useful way of staying abreast of the most recent news 
and updates related to the areas of interest while maintaining a historical thread. 
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Figure 18: Yahoo Pipe created to automate RSS feed collection from several 
Website on privacy and health headlines 
 
In addition to using the Web to disseminate information, it is beneficial to develop 
intuitive and user-friendly tools to help guide public health practitioners in the relevant 
aspects of the research. While the development of such tools was not the focus of this 
study, some examples and prototypes were none-the-less designed as "proof of 
concept" models. These are presented below and are all available through the 
research site at http://www.personplacetime.org/tools. 
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Figure 19: Screenshot of the Website homepage showing the results of the 
Yahoo Pipe for the news feed mashup 
 
11.2. DEMISTIFYING THE LEGISLATION 
In Part I we reviewed the current legislative landscape as it pertains to privacy and 
public health practice, and identified the public health professional community's 
perceptions. Indeed, according to the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, it 
is a lack of understanding of legislation that leads to the perception that privacy laws 
impede or compromise safety and security [113]. As the Office acknowledges: 
 
Departments have been taken to task by our Office for disclosing personal information 
when they should not have, so it is not surprising that they might often err on the side 
of caution…There is a presumption in favour of non-disclosure unless there are 
compelling arguments to the contrary. [113] 
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We also argued for the requirement for a global approach to public health, which 
therefore necessitates a capacity for data-sharing on a global scale, which in turn 
necessitates cross-jurisdictional legislation or legislative reform. In addition, within the 
framework presented in Part III, we identified a requirement for the purpose to be 
consistent with legislative requirements in the relevant jurisdictions. Yet legislation is 
often difficult to read and understand, and for the public health professional, allaying 
data-sharing fears over legal obligations is important for facilitating the flow of 
information.  
 
To avoid "erring on the side of caution" and facilitate this flow, it would be useful to 
have a user-friendly tool that clearly summarises legislation as it pertains to privacy and 
public health issues for practitioners to consult. An example of such a tool was 
developed by the author as a flash. As a prototype only, the tool currently contains 
information for Canadian federal legislation and provincial legislation specific to British 
Columbia. Only legislation relevant to the issues around privacy and public health is 
covered. A quick walk-through of the tool's legislative summaries is provided below. 
 
On accepting the terms presented in the disclaimer (Figure 20), the user is then taken 
to a world map to select the jurisdiction of interest. Available countries appear darker 
than the others, and currently only Canada is selectable (Figure 21).  
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Figure 20: Splash screen of the demo tool designed as a public health guide to 
privacy legislation (available through the study Website) 
 
 
 
Figure 21: World map in the public health guide to privacy legislation; selectable 
countries - currently Canada only - appear darker 
 
 
Upon selection, the user is then shown a summary of the relevant legislative 
components (Figure 22). On the left, a summary of the jurisdiction is shown, along with 
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a map of selectable sub-jurisdictions, if appropriate. In the case of Canada, for 
example, the nation is composed of ten provinces and three territories, each of which 
has its own legislation. These are reflected in the map of Canada on the left-hand side 
of the screen (Figure 22).  
 
 
Figure 22: Summary of relevant privacy legislation for Canada as shown in the 
public health guide for privacy legislation tool 
 
 
The right-hand side of the screen displays the legislative summary in a grid. The first 
row of the grid contains the name of the Act or Statute; clicking on the name will display 
additional information in the box below the grid. The items in the grid are as follows: 
 
Reference: Clicking this opens up a copy of the Act or 
Statute  
Scope: The entities to whom the Act or Statute 
applies 
Exemptions: Exemptions to those covered under the 
scope 
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PID Definition: Whether or not "personally identifiable data" 
is defined.  
Includes Geography: Whether or not the PID definition includes 
geography 
Includes Health Info: Whether or not the PID definition includes 
health information 
Includes Research: Whether or not the PID definition includes 
research 
Exceptions made for:  
Geography: Whether or not the Act or Statute provides 
any exceptions or circumstances that allow 
the release or use of geography 
Health Info: Whether or not the Act or Statute provides 
any exceptions or circumstances that allow 
the release or use of health information 
Research: Whether or not the Act or Statute provides 
any exceptions for research purposes 
 
The design of the tool provides a quick and intuitive visual of what is and is not covered 
in the legislation, as well as the relevant sections and links for further reference. 
 
11.3. APPLYING THE MULTIDIMENSIONAL POINT TRANSFORM 
In Part II, we explored some novel methods for working with data. Among these was 
the novel Multidimensional Point Transform, and a static image of what an application 
might look like was designed and referenced in the published manuscript [153]. Since 
publication, however, a slightly modified design has been created as found in Figure 23 
and through the tools page of the Website. 
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Figure 23: Example of a user interface for a tool to implement the 
Multidimensional Point Transform 
 
 
The proposed design splits the screen into two parts. The top part is where the user 
identifies the location of the case data (e.g. C:\My Data\NY_patients.csv), the base 
population to use (e.g. New York County) and whether to use an areal or coordinate-
based location. If an aerial location is chosen, the user must identify the appropriate 
field in the case data (e.g. postcode or zip code). In the current example, a coordinate-
based location is chosen and the case data fields containing the latitude (Y) and 
longitude (X) for each record have been specified. Once the data are successfully 
imported, the tool then indicates the number of successfully read records (e.g. 400) 
and allows the user to preview the data (e.g. to check for import errors). 
 
The next part of the screen is where the user defines all the parameter settings. The 
minimum required k-anonymity, the minimum and maximum perturbation distances, the 
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minimum and maximum added random distance, and whether or not to allow selection 
of the original point. The user can then set the dimensions on which the transform will 
operate, specifying the field name for each, the priority, whether or not the dimension is 
allowed to be perturbed, and if so, the degree to which it can be perturbed. Since the 
transform is designed to integrate location, which in this example is specified by 
latitude and longitude, the "LOCATION" dimension will not appear in the user's case 
data - instead, it is a function that would be built into the application and would use the 
location information specified above (in this example, the latitude and longitude as 
defined by the user to be represented by Y and X respectively).  
 
In the example appearing in the published manuscript ([153]; 
Figure 24), the data are transformed on the dimensions of location, age and sex. All 
three are given equal priority, which will cause the algorithm to proceed as described in 
Chapter 8. Location is allowed to be perturbed, but as indicated in the image (and 
described in Chapter 8) the transform can also be allowed to perturb other dimensions 
only if so desired, thereby disregarding the location dimension altogether. The age 
dimension is allowed to be perturbed, as described in Chapter 8 - that is, in 1-unit 
intervals to a maximum of 4-unit increments (in the case of age, the units would 
typically be years). Note that, as described in the algorithm, this does not simply 
increment the age as provided in the case data, but rather slots the age into the 
calculated categories defined by the increments and intervals, starting at age 0. In 
other words, for an individual case who is 3 years of age, the age perturbation does not 
categorise to 3-4 years, 3-5 years, 3-6 years and 3-7 years, but rather 2-3 years, 3-5 
years, 0-3 years and 0-4 years, thereby maintaining consistent categorisation across 
the dataset. 
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Figure 24: Multidimensional Point Transform tool interface design as originally 
published showing example settings 
 
 
 
11.4. GUIDING DATA-SHARING 
Finally, in Part III, we explored a novel framework for assessing data-sharing initiatives 
and providing guidance on domains and dimensions to consider, and illustrated its use 
through its application to a fictitious scenario. To facilitate this use, and also allow 
individuals to "play" with the results, the scenario was implemented through a 
functioning Microsoft Excel workbook, allowing users to set weights and thresholds and 
experiment with scoring of the dimensions. In addition, a design of a prototype Web-
based application (Figure 25) has been developed using Microsoft Expression Blend 
Sketchflow. The prototype requires an internet connection, a Web browser capable of 
using Microsoft Silverlight, and Microsoft Silverlight itself. Silverlight can be 
downloaded at no cost at http://www.microsoft.com. Both the Excel file and the 
prototype can be found in the tools section of the research Web site as specified 
previously.  
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Figure 25: Prototype tool available through the study Website showing an 
example of how a practical implementation of the framework might look 
 
 
The Microsoft Excel Workbook allows users to implement the framework by defining 
weights and thresholds, and scoring the individual domains and dimensions. The 
results are displayed graphically through colour-coded circles (only visible with MS 
Office Excel 2007 or higher) and a colour-coded recommendation to allow quick visual 
assessment and identification of strengths and weaknesses. This provides the 
quantitative scoring aspect of the framework which should be complemented, as 
described previously, with qualitative justification.  
 
The workbook consists of eight tabs: 
 
ASSESSMENT: This is where the user scores the domains and dimensions (Figure 
26). For each of the first four domains - Recipient, Data, Purpose and Transform - 
the user provides a score for the initial request, as well as for the Output super-
domain. These scores inform the final Output score, and the final results are also 
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automatically computed. Based on the final weighted score, a colour-coded 
recommendation is given at the top and bottom of the worksheet: red for high risk 
(data-sharing not recommended), yellow for medium risk (review required) and green 
for low risk (data-sharing okay) based on the user-defined thresholds. 
 
Figure 26: Assessment worksheet of the Microsoft Excel workbook developed as 
an example implementation of the data-sharing framework.  
 
The figure illustrates the scoring of each dimension and domain, the visual assessments and 
recommendation 
 
 
ADMINISTRATION: This worksheet is where the user sets the weights for each 
domain and dimension, and the thresholds for each domain and the final result (
Figure 27). Note that the weights for the domains under the output heading (appearing 
in black) should not be modified, as they are set in the Output super-domain box (in 
beige) and automatically reflected. 
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Figure 27: The Administration worksheet of the Microsoft Excel workbook 
developed as an example implementation of the data-sharing framework allowing 
users to set domain and dimension weights as well as assessment scoring 
thresholds 
 
 
The remaining tabs are where the calculations are performed for each domain, and are 
provided to allow the user to view the logic and formulae and encourage exploration of 
the effects of various changes. 
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12. Future Directions 
12.1. LEGISLATION 
As has been indicated throughout this study, the clash between the right to privacy and 
the right to health is not a mere perception, but rather a reality. However, there is a lack 
of clarity around the patchwork of legislation surrounding the two rights. Expansion of 
the legislative tool to multiple countries and jurisdictions would be beneficial, 
particularly if reviewed and endorsed by a legal entity (though care must be taken for it 
to remain in plain language). Tools such as this are a good start to helping the public 
health practice community determine the legal circumstances and implications of the 
sharing of personally identifiable information, but as described in Part I, we must move 
beyond the prescriptive legal approach to one of ethical and professional responsibility. 
Furthermore, the lack of unified legislation both across and within countries does not 
benefit individuals when it comes to primary and public health. 
 
As stated in this study, the legislation is, in many cases, out-dated, and must therefore 
be modernised. This provides a good opportunity to harmonise the legislation not only 
with the requirements of public health practice, but also across national and 
international jurisdictions. The European Union has recently initiated renewal efforts of 
its Data Protection directive, and therefore has an opportunity to pioneer such an 
approach. However, as stated by the United Kingdom's Right Honourable Kenneth 
Clarke, Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice, this must be done within the 
context of a robust and appropriate paradigm that facilitates data-sharing, not a 
restrictive and prescriptive one: 
 
...we must also guard against regulations or reactions...that become obsessed with 
privacy or data protection without recognising the harm that also results to citizens from 
failure to share information, as well as from careless stewardship of data. Detailed 
prescription will not in itself make our citizens safer, or more free, in this complex, 
modern world. [198] 
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Legislation must therefore be grounded in principles that are inclusive of individual and 
societal rights and benefits, lucid enough to provide clarity and guidance yet flexible 
enough to allow changes consistent with evolving technologies. Public health must gain 
the appreciation and understanding of society of its significance to individual and 
societal health, and its practitioners must adopt ethical standards that foster the public's 
trust in the what, why and how of the practice. Such changes will take time to 
implement and will no doubt have to overcome political, legal and philosophical 
obstacles. However, in the absence of such a concerted approach and with the 
increasing adoption of electronic health records, both medical and personal, the chasm 
between privacy and public health practice will only increase.  
12.2. TRANSFORMATIONS 
Even in the presence of appropriate regulatory frameworks, governance structures and 
enabling legislation, there may still be scenarios and circumstances in which the right 
to privacy supersedes a public health activity. In such circumstances, data 
transformations are a reasonable consideration, provided the concerns raised 
throughout this study (and presented in the transform domain of the framework) are 
taken into consideration. This provides fertile ground for the exploration and 
development of novel transformations.  
12.2.1. SMART AGGREGATION 
One example of novel transformations is the improvement of traditional aggregation 
algorithms. As described in Part II, traditional aggregation methods are subject to the 
modifiable areal unit problem in which areal units are arbitrarily, politically or 
administratively defined and therefore irrelevant or not well suited to the study at hand. 
Such aggregations can also blur demographic differences which in turn significantly 
impacts public health practice. Aggregation has also been shown to have a negative 
analytical impact, as demonstrated through studies on disease cluster detection.  
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Two novel approaches were described in this study that can be combined and 
enhanced to provide what I refer to as "smart aggregation" - or SMAGGRO for short. In 
the contribution to the work on the management of re-identification risk, I created a 
Canada Grid in which each cell was 1Km by 1Km. Such a grid can be re-created using 
smaller cell sizes, with each cell containing the summarised attributes of the population 
it captures. An adjacency matrix as described under "Rethinking Spatial Aggregation" 
can then be built for the grid cells to include spatial proximity, along with other relevant 
attributes such as population and socio-demographic factors. Cells can then be 
aggregated based on pre-defined rules for attribute similarities. This allows the 
aggregation of areal units small enough (based on the defined cell-size) and similar 
enough (based on pre-defined attribute requirements) to minimise aggregation effects 
on analysis. Areal units are then also dynamically aggregated, not based on pre-
defined boundaries, thereby overcoming the issues created by the modifiable areal unit 
problem.  
 
Assigning the cells population counts and demographics based on a granular 
underlying population would further enhance the aggregation effects, as well as allow 
for control of uniqueness and identification risk. In the absence of a real granular 
population, it would be useful to use a synthesised population instead, as was 
discussed in the multidimensional point transform. This is therefore another area for 
additional work. 
12.2.2. SYNTHESISED POPULATIONS 
As described in Part II, a synthesised population for the United States has already 
been developed and proven useful for agent-based modelling of infectious diseases. 
The multidimensional point transform demonstrated a novel use for such a population, 
but such a population's usefulness to public health – particularly in light of privacy-
related issues – are tremendous. A synthesised population can be used in the 
SMAGGRO method described above, or to model impacted populations for 
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environmental health risks, analyse the impact of chemical, biological, radiological and 
nuclear events, assess changes in demographic factors, synthesise social networks, 
etc. Provided the synthesised population appropriately mirrors the real population, the 
possibilities for its use are limited only be one's initiative and creativity.  
 
After much searching and consultation across various academic institutions and public 
health organisations in Canada, it became apparent that while all those consulted 
agreed that such a synthetic population would be immensely useful, none had created 
one. I therefore took the initiative to begin synthesising one, starting with the city of 
Ottawa as a prototype using the 2006 census of Canada at the smallest released 
census profile geography - the Dissemination Area (DA). This work is yet to be 
completed, however the SAS code pursued to date is attached in Appendix F (Volume 
II). Future work would continue the development of models to create, validate and use 
synthesised populations, updated with every census release and incorporating 
projections between census years. 
12.2.3. THE MULTIDIMENSIONAL POINT TRANSFORM 
As outlined in Chapter 8, and through the suggested interface design, the MPT 
algorithm can be further refined to allow the user more control over various settings 
and the flow of the transform. For example, the user can be allowed to set priority 
levels to the transformable dimensions, thereby allowing control over what dimensions 
get transformed when and by how much. Minimum thresholds can also be set, in 
parallel with maximum ones, and further control over anonymisation within the dataset 
as well as within the underlying population can be integrated. Other future work in this 
area would also allow the transform to operate across multiple spatial datasets to allow 
for inclusion of additional geographic and demographic attributes.  
 
The MPT algorithm also requires further testing on its data erosion and analytical 
effects. The impact on cluster detection, for example, should be assessed and the code 
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to do so has been created as an addendum to the current code (please see Appendix 
E in Volume II). Further testing on different-sized cities, as previously mentioned, 
different population densities and additional dimensions is also required. 
12.3. GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES & DATA-SHARING 
Complementing the proposed legislative-paradigm shift is the implementation of 
governance structures within public health practice to facilitate and regulate the sharing 
of information. One step in this direction is through the development, adoption and 
implementation of decision-making frameworks such as the one developed and 
presented in this study. Continued testing and development of the framework across 
multiple scenarios and contexts will not only be informed by requirements but will also 
help define them, identify gaps and establish standards.  
 
Standards around thresholds for anonymity and re-identification need to be further 
explored and implemented. Again, there is no one-size fits all solution, and thresholds 
will therefore have to be context-specific. What frameworks and governance structures 
must allow is the inclusion of multiple domains and dimensions in the assessment of 
context-specificity. It is not sufficient to apply blanket rules to a given health event or 
scenario, but consideration must also be given to the person or organisation with whom 
the information is being shared, the purpose for which it is being shared, the contents 
of the data, any modifications or transforms performed on them and their implications, 
and the end result and its delivery or dissemination. Future work must therefore test 
and refine the proposed framework, moulding it to the requirements of the user and 
providing an intuitive application to facilitate its implementation.  
  
Public health should also take advantage of the tremendous potential of electronic 
medical and personal health records. As they become the de-facto method of recording 
and sharing health information between the individual and clinicians, they can also be 
used to facilitate public health. Where appropriate, patients can be given the ability to 
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indicate consent for the use of their information in public health practice, making such 
an approach more practicable and feasible than current consent requirements. Such an 
electronic medium can then also be used as a feedback loop, providing findings and 
back to the patient, thereby making these records a means of transparency, 
accountability, education and promotion. As indicated, surveys suggest that the public 
would be agreeable to such uses of their personal information. Such control, however, 
must be tempered by its necessity and assessed within the guidance offered through 
implemented frameworks - as mentioned in this study, consent is not always beneficial 
or appropriate for public health practice (e.g. in an outbreak situation, or where it will 
introduce sufficient bias so as to render the practice uninformative).  
12.4. TOOLS 
As demonstrated in the previous chapter, there is much opportunity to develop tools to 
implement the various novel aspects of this study. The continued development of Web-
based technologies provides an ideal medium through which to develop and deliver 
such tools, and continued work on the secure delivery of applications over the Web 
must be considered where data are involved (such as with the implementation of a 
Web-based application of the MPT). Continued refinement of security protocols must 
therefore also be a part of tool development. Most important, though, is the 
development of multi-disciplinary tools that do not simply address public health issues 
in isolation of other issues - both within public health and across other disciplines. In 
the current study, the proposed solutions span multiple disciplines, including 
epidemiology, law, mathematics, geomatics and informatics. These disciplines are not 
to be treated as silos but rather as synergistic fields that inform and influence one 
another. Just as privacy should not be an afterthought in public health policies, neither 
should location be an afterthought in anonymisation algorithms. Future developments 
and applications must therefore be multidisciplinary. 
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13. Review and Concluding Remarks 
13.1. OBJECTIVES REVISITED & ACCOMPLISHMENTS 
REVIEWED 
In Chapter 1, the objectives of this research were framed within the context of a 
contribution to the resolution of the public health-privacy debate. Four objectives were 
identified and addressed throughout this study: 
13.1.1. OBJECTIVE 1 
The first objective was to review privacy legislation as it pertains to place and public 
health in Canada, the UK, and various other countries around the world 
 
A review of the privacy legislation was completed and an original contribution to a 
manuscript was published in the International Journal of Health Geographics. The 
review formed the backdrop against which the current study was set. In addition, a 
prototype tool was developed and presented as a means to summarise the relevant 
legislation in plain language to public health practitioners and provide the relevant 
legislative sections for public health events and research. 
13.1.2. OBJECTIVE 2 
The second objective was to formally collect and synthesise the perspectives and 
requirements of public health professionals in Canada and the UK on the current issue, 
with a focus on the role of place. 
 
A survey was completed with public health practitioners in Canada and the United 
Kingdom, and the study was published in BMC Public Health. Up until that point, no 
other study was found directly assessing the perceptions of public health professionals 
on the implications of privacy to public health, particularly from a location-privacy 
perspective. The findings of the survey further informed and justified the remainder of 
the study. 
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13.1.3. OBJECTIVE 3 
The third objective was to develop a novel technique to allow spatial public health 
analysis at a granular level without compromising privacy 
 
Several approaches were explored in the course of the study, and contributions were 
made to manuscripts on managing re-identification risk and rethinking spatial 
aggregation. These involved the development of a Canadian spatial grid and adjacency 
matrices, both of which were original contributions to the studies. The culmination of 
this work, however, was the development of the novel and flexible multidimensional 
algorithm named the "MPT" - Multidimensional Point Transform. As demonstrated with 
a New York County synthesised population, it is a dynamic, adaptive algorithm that 
addresses many of the recognised deficiencies in already existing techniques. The 
algorithm has been submitted and accepted for publication in Methods of Information in 
Medicine and is currently available on the journal Website as an electronic publication 
ahead of print. In addition, a user-interface for the implementation of the MPT was 
designed and further developments and areas for refinement and improvement 
proposed. 
13.1.4. OBJECTIVE 4 
The final objective was to develop a conceptual framework to guide public health 
practice in the appropriate evaluation of the privacy implications of data-sharing with a 
particular emphasis on location-privacy 
 
This was accomplished through the proposed conceptual framework presented in 
Chapter 10. A run-through implementation of the framework using a fictitious scenario 
was described to demonstrate its use using a customisable and therefore fully flexible 
and context-specific scoring approach. A workbook was developed in Microsoft Excel 
to demonstrate the implementation, and allow users to experiment with the effects of 
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domain and dimension scoring and weighting, and threshold settings. A prototype 
application was also developed and made available. 
 
To facilitate the sharing of findings and the tools as appropriate, a research Website 
was created and maintained at http://www.personplacetime.org. All four objectives 
have been successfully accomplished, though there is yet much work to be done to 
facilitate data-sharing – particularly identifiable location-data – in public health practice. 
13.2. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
You cannot make men good by law; and without good men, you cannot have a good 
society 
C.S. Lewis 
Mere Christianity 
Because privacy is a broad ―catch-word‖ of sorts capturing subjective and potentially 
emotionally-charged perspectives, simply uttering the word tends to draw attention and 
immediate reaction. It is rather interesting – and sometimes amusing – to sit in on 
meetings, collaborations and conferences within the public health community and 
simply watch the commotion and discussion caused by simply asking if everyone has 
considered the privacy implications, or simply, ―..and what about privacy issues?‖ Yet 
the flurry of opinions quickly offered in response to such questions sometimes lack 
rationality, prompted instead by a flawed emotional conviction that if a little privacy is 
good, more must be better; if one does not think so then one must be against privacy 
[199]. However, as part of the paradigm shift we must undergo, we need to 
acknowledge the reality that, whether we like it or not, privacy is circumstantially at 
odds with other rights and privileges. Suggesting the temporary suspension of privacy 
in order to save lives does not imply that one is against privacy. Unfortunately, 
however, the prioritisation gradient along which we are willing to suspend our privacy is 
itself subjective and muddy at best. In the face of immediate, life threatening danger, 
we are more likely to quickly acquiesce, often with an expectation of imminent results, 
leading to a mindset of ―you can have my data, but only in an emergency‖. But how 
about not-so-obvious threats with not-so-immediate results? What if the use of 
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identifiable information could lead to policies that would significantly reduce the 
incidence of a cancer, thereby not only saving thousands of lives but also prolonging 
others? What if such data could lead to healthier citizens in a healthier world? Is this 
not the very purpose of public health practice? The foremost epidemiologist of the 
twentieth century, Sir William Richard Doll, did exactly that. The first to establish a link 
between lung cancer and tobacco smoking , he was quoted by the Academy of Medical 
Sciences to have said "much of my research on the effects ionising radiation and the 
use of oral contraceptives, leave alone smoking, would have been impossible without 
the facility of obtaining unbiased access to medical records" [200]. His work would not 
have been possible had he not had access to granular, identifiable data. Although the 
human condition has not changed much since Sir Doll's publication of his findings in 
1950, privacy legislation has, making such work considerably more difficult to conduct 
today.  
 
The issue lies not with privacy itself, but rather in the fact that as technology has 
progressed at an incredible pace, privacy issues have come to the forefront and 
policies and legislation have become more reactive than proactive, trying to keep up 
and leaving public health trailing far behind. What is required is a sensible and 
proportionate approach, and an attempt has been made to capture this within this 
study. Use of personally identifiable information in public health practice must be 
addressed on a case-by-case basis; privacy for the sake of privacy is grossly 
inappropriate, and has the grave potential of forsaking the most basic right to life and 
health in favour of the right to control one's own information. In doing so, it has the 
potential to not only harm society as a whole, but also those individuals whose very 
privacy is being protected. Ideally, informative and protective mechanisms and 
frameworks such as the novel approaches presented in this study would be in place 
prior to data collection; privacy requirements must be built into the design phase of 
studies and projects, as opposed to being an after-thought or requirement forced by 
public, ethical, operational, technological or other demands.  
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In advocating for such change, one must be diligent in carefully weighing out potential 
harm with potential benefit; the aim of instituted policies is generally to prevent harmful 
use, but in doing so, their focus tends to overlook the encouragement and facilitation of 
beneficial use. Society is so busy implementing restrictive policies to prevent harmful 
use when in contrast the focus should be on implementing governance structures that 
not only permit but also facilitate beneficial use of data in public health. One of the 
issues is that it seems to be much easier to focus on what cannot be done as opposed 
to what can in the context of ―blanket control‖ residing with the individual. As put by 
Fred H. Cate, ―...focus on control ignores the extent to which many uses of personal 
information pose no risk of harm to individuals, while creating significant benefits for 
data subjects and society more broadly. Laws that facilitate that control, therefore, 
often create significant costs, without yielding net benefits.‖ [199] Obvious examples of 
this are the legal documents (e.g. licence agreements, terms of use, etc.) often signed 
by customers or clients in exchange for a service or product, but which are rarely 
actually read [199]. What is needed is a shift in perspective and emphasis, though it 
should be noted that just as the right to privacy should not be used to justify or 
legitimise a public health injustice, the right to health should likewise not be abused. 
 
It is interesting to note that we are very much predominantly social beings who crave 
not only contact with others, but also the sharing of our lives and details with others - to 
a large degree, we behave in a communitarian fashion, sharing our information rather 
freely. A simple reference to the explosion of social media is sufficient to demonstrate 
this. Our lives have become intricately intertwined with one another in a complex social 
web, and the explosive growth spurt experienced by rapidly-devoured and integrated 
social media sites such as Facebook, Twitter and Foursquare in their relatively short 
life spans is evidence of the human hunger for social contact, networking and sharing 
of personal events and details. Facebook – whose mission is to "give people the power 
to share and make the world more open and connected" – currently claims to have 
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over 500 million active users since its February 2004 launch, with over 250 million 
logging 
into the site on any given day. According to the site, the average user has 130 friends, 
creates 90 pieces of content every month and spends, on average, somewhere in the 
neighbourhood of 1.5 hours per day on the site [201]. Twitter, launched in July 2006, 
reported a mind-boggling 14 million new accounts created in the space of just one 
month spanning February to March, 2011 and about one billion tweets per week [202]. 
Foursquare, which allows users to share their location, was launched in March 2009 
and has managed to amass over 10 million users in just over two years [203]. As much 
as we might like to feel like we have control over our personal information, we still give 
it away quite liberally.  
 
It has been said that the future of medicine is not about drugs and procedures, but 
rather about data [204]. For public health, this future is now. Although implications are 
extremely complex, requiring us to sift through seemingly conflicting human rights to 
health, to information, and to privacy, we must nonetheless rise to the occasion, look 
beyond the politics and controls, and focus instead on the enabling of trusted and 
ethical professionals whose goal is, indeed, healthy individuals in healthy communities 
in a healthy world. 
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A. Web Survey Logistics & Business Specifications 
A.1. PLAIN LANGUAGE STATEMENT 
In public health research, the location of any specific health event is of paramount 
importance to investigating the event and trying to identify intervention or prevention 
strategies. However, once such a location is provided, it becomes quite easy to identify 
the specific individual to which it refers. This, in turn, violates privacy laws, which, of 
course, is unacceptable. Therefore, in public health research, events are either 
grouped (aggregated) and investigated within larger areas that prevent the 
identification of individuals, or access to the information and its analysis at the finer 
level of detail is simply restricted or prohibited. In either case, this hinders the research, 
and provides less-than-optimal information for improving public health systems. 
 
The aim of this study is to improve the capacity of public health research around the 
globe by providing an innovative and accurate method for the analysis of real health 
data at the individual level - particularly in space and time (i.e. spatial-temporal) - while 
simultaneously respecting the privacy and confidentiality of the individual. To assess 
the importance of this study, though, a survey will first be conducted to ask public 
health professionals whether or not they do consider this to be an issue, and therefore 
whether or not such a study would be useful and valuable to them.  
 
The survey will be divided into eight short sections to better categorize and organize 
the type of information being captured, and should take no more than 20 minutes to 
complete. Respondents may skip any question(s) they would rather not answer, though 
they are reminded that this compromises the quality of the research. The survey will 
utilise skip logic – that is, logic that allows questions posed to be dependent on 
response received – wherever possible to streamline the survey and shorten the 
respondents‟ participation time as much as possible. Question types will vary, but 
include single-choice, multiple-choice, scale and free-form response questions.  
 4 
 
Initial contact with potential participants will be through direct email invitation to specific 
public health professionals. Recipients of this email will also be asked to forward the 
invite to any other public health professionals they may deem appropriate within the 
larger target population. The quality of the research will be maximised by ensuring that 
each participant only completes the survey once, and that only public health 
professionals participate. Participation is completely voluntary, and each participant will 
have to give their consent to participate on the first page of the survey.  
 
The responses received from this survey will help inform the direction of the research. 
Participants will not otherwise have any direct role in the design and development of 
the research itself. 
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A.2. FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR WEB 
IMPLEMENTATION 
The following requirements were specifically identified to the ALPHA group prior to the 
commencement of the Web implementation: 
 
- Will be administered externally to the public health communities in Canada and 
the UK 
- Must incorporate skip logic: ability to ask different questions based on 
responses received (see process flow) 
- Must require the participant to enter a unique code in order to complete the 
survey. This ensures that only qualified respondents complete the survey. 
Participants can acquire a unique code by directly contacting Philip AbdelMalik 
- Must allow participants to complete the survey over multiple sessions 
- All questions are optional in terms of response requirements 
- Must allow for “pop-up” boxes with definitions when italicised words are clicked 
(a glossary of sorts) 
- Data collected from the response must be downloadable to a local computer as 
a comma delimited file for analysis 
- Question types: 
o Multiple choice, single response 
o Multiple choice, multiple responses 
o Yes / No 
o Rating scale 
o Matrix / cross tabular 
o Free text 
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A.3. TARGET POPULATION 
Staff of the following institutions and organisations were invited to participate in the 
Web-based survey: 
 
Canada 
- Public Health Agency of Canada  
o Office of Public Health Practice 
o GIS Infrastructure  
o Field Epidemiology Program  
o Skills Enhancement 
o Information Sharing Practices 
o Public Health Law 
o Centre for Emergency Preparedness and Response 
o Emergency Operations Centre  
o Foodborne, Waterborne and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases (Guelph) 
o Laboratory for Foodborne Zoonoses (Québec) 
o Pandemic Preparedness Secretariat 
o Tuberculosis Prevention and Control 
o FluWatch 
 
- Health Canada 
o First Nations & Inuit Health Branch  
o Communicable Disease Division 
o Healthy Environments and Consumer Safety Branch 
o Access to Information and Privacy 
 
- GIS Infrastructure clients on the Map and Data Exchange (n~300) 
- Public Health Sciences staff (University of Toronto; University of Ottawa) 
- Grey Bruce Health Unit, Ontario 
 7 
 
- Nova Scotia Organized Breast Cancer Screening Program 
- New Brunswick Lung Association 
 
The United Kingdom 
- City University GIS Masters Program 
http://www.soi.city.ac.uk/pgcourses/gis/index.html 
 
- University of Sheffield Public Health GIS unit (Centre of Excellence) 
http://www.shef.ac.uk/scharr/sections/ph/research/gis 
 
- Imperial College Environmental Epidemiology and Small Area Health Statistics 
Unit 
http://www1.imperial.ac.uk/medicine/about/divisions/ephpc/eph/projects/eresh/ 
 
- NLH/NHS Informatics UK Health GIS Special Interest Group (SIG) 
http://www.informatics.nhs.uk/groups/group3/index.html  
 
- UK AGI Health SIG 
http://www.agi.org.uk/bfora/user/systems/sig/view.asp?sig=278&arg=1 
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A.4. SAMPLE EMAIL INVITATION 
Canadian E-Mail Invitation 
Dear NAME, 
 
Re: The Impact of Privacy on Public Health Practice – Survey 
 
You have been identified as a Public Health professional in Canada, either through the 
Web, mailing lists, personal contacts, referrals, or word of mouth. As a public health 
professional, your input and opinions on the impact of privacy on public health practice 
are critical to shaping the current research project, being conducted simultaneously in 
Canada and the United Kingdom. The target audience for the survey is all public health 
professionals (including directors, consultants, analysts, researchers, strategic staff, 
managers, epidemiologists, etc.) in the two countries, and your contribution may help 
significantly improve the ways in which public health is researched and applied.  
 
Click here to complete the survey, or visit http://www.personplacetime.org for 
more information. Your Unique Access Code is XXXXXXXXX. 
 
Privacy and confidentiality issues have repeatedly been identified as potential 
obstacles to public health research in many parts of the world. However, there is limited 
literature on the extent of their impact, sensitivity around further research, and a 
resultant lack of a satisfactory solution. This survey is part of a PhD research project 
aimed at investigating, developing, and evaluating novel transformations on the 
fundamental building blocks of the epidemiological triad – person, place and time – in 
order to promote public health analysis at a granular level whilst protecting individual 
confidentiality.  
 
The objectives of the survey, which will take about 20 minutes to complete, are as 
follows: 
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1. To assess the impact of privacy and confidentiality on public health research in Canada 
and the UK 
2. To assess the usefulness of the proposed project to public health in Canada and the UK 
3. To allow public health professionals in Canada and the UK to volunteer to pilot and 
evaluate the end result  
 
The results of this survey will be critical to guiding further research and the 
development of valid transformations. A document containing study details and a 
glossary of terms used throughout the survey is also attached as a separate file. 
 
All information collected will be completely anonymous (i.e. your access code will be 
disassociated from the results, unless you specify otherwise. Please note that as a 
survey sponsored by the Office of Public Health Practice, Public Health Agency of 
Canada, your personal information will be protected according to the Access to 
Information Act and the Privacy Act. For more details on survey privacy and 
confidentiality policies, please visit http://www.personplacetime.org/SurveyPrivacy 
 
Please pass this email on to any other public health personnel you feel 
appropriate for participation. Please be sure to have them contact me for their 
unique access code.  
 
Thank you again for your assistance with this important research. 
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A.5. CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE 
Invited participants who agreed to complete the survey were presented with a consent 
screen prior to beginning. Consent was required in order to proceed; invitees who did 
not consent were thanked for their consideration and logged out of the survey. The text 
of the consent screen appears below: 
 
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE 
 
By clicking below and completing this survey, you are giving consent to participate in 
this PhD research project, entitled “Multidimensional Epidemiological Transformations”.  
All questions in the survey are voluntary, and you may choose to skip any that you do 
not wish to answer. Please keep in mind, however, that this compromises the quality of 
the research.  You may terminate the survey at any time, and have the option of 
completing it over multiple sessions, at your convenience.  To minimise error, please 
ensure that you respond to the survey once, and once only.  All responses will remain 
anonymous, and can in no way be linked back to you (your login information will be 
disassociated from your responses), unless you specifically indicate otherwise in the 
last section of the survey.  Similarly, your provision of your contact information at the 
end of the survey is completely voluntary, and will only be used for the items you 
specify (e.g. follow-up, networking and future participation).  Participating in this survey 
poses no risks or benefits to you, other than the time spent completing the survey 
(about 30 minutes); rather, gathered responses will benefit the scientific community as 
a whole, and have the potential to improve public health practice wherever issues of 
privacy are of concern. 
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Please note that any intellectual property rights in your responses will vest in, and 
remain the property of Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, and as such, may 
also be made available to and used by the Public Health Agency of Canada to improve 
their operations and service provision to the public health community.  As an Office of 
Public Health Practice, Public Heath Agency of Canada survey, all data collected, 
including your personal information, will be protected according to the Access to 
Information Act (R.S., 1985, c. A-1) and the Privacy Act in Canada (R.S., 1985, c. P-
21), as well as the confidentiality, privacy and data protection laws of the UK. 
 
For more details on data storage and handling policies, as well as contact information, 
please click here.  More details on the research and the survey itself can be found on 
the research website at www.peopleplacetime.org. 
 
If you do not consent, thank you for your time. 
 
This research has been reviewed and approved by: 
- The Research Ethics Board, Office of the Chief Scientist, Health Canada, 
Government of Canada; Approval #2006-0033 
- The Southwest Multi-centre Research Ethics Committee, National Health 
Service, United Kingdom; Approval #06/MRE06/67 
- The Access to Information & Privacy Division, Corporate Services Branch, 
Health Canada 
- The Public Opinion Research & Evaluation Division, Communications, 
Marketing & Consultations Directorate, Health Canada 
 
 
 
NOTE: Review by the above does NOT indicate their endorsement of the research 
  
I consent to participating in this research 
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A.6. DATA STORAGE AND HANDLING POLICIES 
Survey participants were informed of the policies around the storage and handling of 
their information and responses through a Web-page integrated in the survey. The text 
on this page appeared as follows: 
 
Data Storage and Handling Policies 
 
All responses received from the survey will be stored on a secure, password-protected 
drive within the Public Health Agency of Canada. This drive sits on a secure Agency 
server, and can only be accessed through the Agency‟s secure intranet by the principal 
investigator, and authorised IT personnel of the Public Health Agency of Canada, 
should the need arise. Since the data will be stored on a Public Health Agency of 
Canada computer, all personal information will be protected according to the Access to 
Information Act, as well as the Privacy Act of Canada.  
 
Identifiable data will also be shared with the PhD supervisors in the United Kingdom. 
This will be done via data postings on the Public Health Agency of Canada‟s secure 
Public Health Portal. This site can only be accessed via a user name and password, 
and the data will be shared through a secure folder accessible only to the supervisors, 
the principal investigator, and administrators of the portal. 
 
The survey will be administered for a total of three to four months, ending on January 
31, 2007 (the duration of administration depends on when it can be commenced, and is 
dependant on ethics approval timelines). All data will be retained by the Government of 
Canada, and archived upon completion of the research (expected April 1, 2011 or 
sooner). 
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A.7. GLOSSARY 
 
The following terms were defined and included as part of the Web survey‟s business 
specifications. 
 
Aggregate Data 
These are data that have been “combined and summarised” such that no individual 
cases can be identified; usually this is the result of manipulated and/or analysed data. 
This is the opposite of “granular data”. 
 
Epidemiological Triad 
This triad consists of person, time and place, and forms the fundamental elements of 
an epidemiological study 
 
Granular Data 
These are data on an individual, case-by-case level; usually the original data in their 
raw form, and contain personally identifiable data (defined below). This is the opposite 
of “aggregate data”.  
 
Personally Identifiable Data (PID)       
  
CANADA: This refers to any information that can be used to identify an individual, and 
is the focus of this research. Canada‟s Personal Information Protection and Electronic 
Documents Act (PIPEDA) defines “personal information” as any information about an 
identifiable individual – or, more simply stated, any information that can be used to 
identify an individual. 
 
UK: This refers to any information that can be used to identify an individual, and is the 
focus of this research. In the UK, Chapter 20, Part I, Section I(I) of The Data Protection 
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Act, 1998, defines "personal data" as data which relate to a living individual who can be 
identified either from those data alone, or in combination with other information that is 
or may come into the possession of the data controller. The Manual for Caldicott 
Guardians was used to identify such data in this survey.  
 
Public Health Practice 
The term “Public Health Practice” is used throughout this research to capture the range 
of activities required for effective provision of health services and the resulting 
improvement of the population‟s health. These activities include surveillance, research 
and analysis, strategic decision-making, program implementation, etc. 
 
Relational Integrity 
This refers to the relationships between the components of the epidemiological triad: 
person (within the health data; e.g. where one case is relative to another); place 
(between the health data and their location; e.g. where cases are relative to a school or 
environmental feature); and time (between the health data and time; e.g. what season 
or time of year a case occurred in). 
 
Software Agent 
This is an application (software) with built-in artificial intelligence, which would perform 
analyses on personally identifiable data and return only the aggregated, and therefore 
anonymised, results. In this scenario, you would never see the actual data, but would 
be able to perform analyses on them through these automated applications. 
 
Transformation 
In the context of this research, the term “transformation” is used in its mathematical 
sense to refer to a geometric or spatial alteration of the original data – in this case, to 
anonymise patient or case identity. Standard geometric transformations include 
rotation, translation, reflection, etc. 
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A.8. APPLICATION SCREENSHOTS 
Figure A.8.1: Login screen for the Web-based survey 
 
Figure A.8.2: Screenshot of the consent screen 
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Figure A.8.3: Example screen from Web-based survey showing the first question 
 
 
Figure A.8.4: Administrator screen 
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B. Survey Questionnaires 
B.1. PUBLIC HEALTH PROFESSIONAL QUESTIONNAIRE 
CANADA 
 
 
ESTIMATED TIME TO COMPLETE THIS QUESTIONNAIRE IS 20 TO 30 MINUTES 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for taking the time to complete this questionnaire 
– your contribution is highly valued and critical to the 
research. 
This questionnaire is divided into eight short sections to 
better categorize and organize the type of information being 
captured. You may skip any question(s) you would rather not 
answer, however please keep in mind that this compromises 
the quality of the research. Please also note that, unless you 
choose to complete section VIII of the questionnaire, your 
responses will remain anonymous and cannot be linked back 
to you. Therefore, please ensure that all responses are 
clearly marked. 
Please note that your responses will vest in, and remain the 
property of Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, and 
as such, may also be made available to and used by the 
Public Health Agency of Canada to improve their operations 
and service provision to the public health community. As an 
Office of Public Health Practice, Public Health Agency of 
Canada survey, all data collected, including your personal 
information, will be protected according to the Access to 
Information Act and the Privacy Act in Canada. 
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SECTION I – A little about you… (~ 5 minutes) 
 
I-1 What would you say is the scope of the bulk of your involvement in public health? 
(If more than one, please select only your main involvement) 
 
 International  
N. 
American 
 National  
Provincial/ 
Territorial 
 Regional/ 
Local 
 
I-2 With which public health organization are you currently employed / affiliated?  
(If more than one, please select only your main organization) 
 
 Public Health Agency of Canada 
 Health Canada 
 Other Federal Government Agency 
 Provincial Government (e.g. Ministry of Health) 
 Regional / Local Health Authority or Unit 
 Canadian Public Health Association 
 Other Non-Government Association (e.g. provincial epidemiological, diabetes, 
cancer, etc.) 
 University / Acadaemia 
 Other 
         Please specify: ____________________________________________ 
 
I-3. Please indicate your current specific area(s) of expertise: (Check as many as apply)  
 
 Aboriginal Health  Food & Nutrition 
 Chronic Diseases (cancer, diabetes, 
etc.) 
 Genetics 
 Child / Paediatric Public Health  
Health Services (needs, delivery, 
etc.) 
 Communicable / Infectious Diseases  Injuries / Disability 
 Dental Public Health  Mental Health & Substance Misuse  
 Emergency Preparedness & 
Response 
 Occupational Health 
 Environment (pollution, climate, 
water & food safety, etc.) 
 
Social Determinants of Health (e.g. 
poverty, education, social exclusion, 
etc.) 
 
Ethics, Public Health Law, Privacy, 
etc. 
 Surveillance 
 Other 
         Please specify: ____________________________________________ 
 
I-4.  Which of the following best describe your roles or functions as a public health 
professional? (If more than one, please select only your main roles) 
 
 Strategic decision / policy maker  Research and Analysis 
 Manager or Coordinator  Front-line responder / patient care / 
clinical 
 Consultant   
 Other   
         Please specify: ____________________________________________ 
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I-5. Thinking of your regular activities, how much of your time (roughly, as a percentage) 
would you typically spend doing each of the following? 
 
 Strategic decision / policy making     % 
 Management / Coordination      % 
 Consultation        % 
 Research / Analysis       % 
 Front-line response / patient care / clinical    % 
 Other (as specified in I-4)      % 
 
I-6. In which of the roles you identified above are you most likely to use or require the use of 
personally identifiable data?  
 Strategic decision / policy maker  Research and Analysis 
 Manager or Coordinator  Front-line responder / patient care / 
clinical 
 Consultant   
 Other   
         Please specify: ____________________________________________ 
 
I-7 Do you have or foresee a need for including geographic location of health data in your 
roles or organization? 
     YES     NO 
 
I-8 Geographic Information Systems (GIS) are tools that allow you to visualise and analyse 
your data spatially – that is, using their geographical location on earth. In which of the 
roles you identified above would GIS be useful? 
 Strategic decision / policy maker  Research and Analysis 
 Manager or Coordinator  
Front-line responder / patient care / 
clinical 
 Consultant   
 Other   
         Please specify: ____________________________________________ 
 
I-9 What GIS application(s) do you currently use, or have you used in the past? 
 
 Public Health Map Generator (PHMG) 
 Other Web-based: specify        
 
Desktop GIS products: 
   ESRI ArcGIS products 
   MapInfo 
   AutoDesk products 
   PCI Geomatics products 
   Intergraph products 
   Other 
         Please specify: ____________________________________________ 
 
 I have never used any GIS applications, and have no use for them 
 I have never used any GIS applications, but am interested in learning more 
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I-10 At what level(s) of geography do you visualise your data and/or conduct spatial analyses 
for each product you use? 
 
 PHMG Other Web-Based Desktop GIS 
Latitude and Longitude    
Street address     
Dissemination area     
Postal Code     
Census Subdivision     
Census Division     
Forward Sortation Area    
Urban – Rural    
Provincial    
Other 
         Please specify: ____________________________________________ 
 
 
I-11 Are you or have you been restricted in your use of GIS for any public health activity 
because of privacy concerns (i.e. map or data might identify an individual or community)? 
 
 YES  Please explain   No  Please explain 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I-12 Setting privacy issues aside and in light of your response to the previous question, at 
what level(s) of geography would you ideally like to visualise your data and/or conduct 
spatial analyses for each product you use? 
 
 PHMG Other Web-Based Desktop GIS 
Latitude and Longitude    
Street address     
Dissemination area     
Postal Code     
Urban – Rural    
Other 
         Please specify: ____________________________________________ 
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SECTION II – Current access to data (~ 4 minutes) 
 
The questions in this section all pertain to the role you identified in question I-6 in Section I. If 
you do not have access to any of the Personally Identifiable Data (PID) listed in question II-1, 
please mark the last option in question II-1 and skip to Section III – No current access to data. 
Otherwise, please complete this section, and then skip to Section IV – Privacy Issues. 
 
NOTE: The term “access” as used in this survey implies the ability to actually 
acquire individual level data so you can work with it directly. 
 
II-1. What PID do you currently have access to? (Check as many as apply) 
 
 First Name  Street Address 
 Last Name  Postal Code 
 Initials  Community Name 
 Sex  City / Town / Village 
 Date of Birth / Age  Region / Geographic Area 
 Date of Death  Latitude & Longitude 
 Provincial Health Insurance Plan Number   
 Hospital ID   
 Registered GP / Family Physician   
    
 Other 
         Please specify: ________________________________________________ 
    
 I do NOT currently have access to any of the above (please skip to Section III) 
 
The following questions all pertain to the PID you have access to, as identified in the previous 
question. 
 
II-2 From a privacy and organisational bureaucracy perspective, how easy would you say it is 
for you to access this PID when you need it? 
Please circle the appropriate number, 1 being “Extremely difficult”, and 10 being “Very 
easy” 
 
  Extremely difficult  Very easy 
 Don‟t  
Know 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
First Name            
Last Name            
Initials            
Sex            
Date of Birth / Age            
Date of death            
Provincial Health 
Insurance Plan 
Number 
           
Hospital ID            
Registered GP / 
Family Physician 
           
Street Address            
Postal Code            
Community Name            
City / Town / 
Village 
           
Region / 
Geographic Area 
           
Latitude / Longitude            
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II-3. On average, how often do you access the PID you identified above?  
 
  Rarely  All the time 
 Not 
Applicable 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
First Name            
Last Name            
Initials            
Sex            
Date of Birth / Age            
Date of death            
Provincial Health 
Insurance Plan 
Number 
           
Hospital ID            
Registered GP / 
Family Physician 
           
Street Address            
Postal Code            
Community Name            
City / Town / 
Village 
           
Region / 
Geographic Area 
           
Latitude / Longitude            
 
II-4. How useful / important is this PID to you and your roles and responsibilities? 
 Please circle the appropriate number, with 1 being “Not at all useful”, and 10 being 
“Critical to my roles and responsibilities” 
 
  Not at all useful  Critical 
 Not 
Applicable 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
First Name            
Last Name            
Initials            
Sex            
Date of Birth / Age            
Date of death            
Provincial Health 
Insurance Plan 
Number 
           
Hospital ID            
Registered GP / 
Family Physician 
           
Street Address            
Postal Code            
Community Name            
City / Town / 
Village 
           
Region / 
Geographic Area 
           
Latitude / Longitude            
 
 
 23 
 
II-5. What impact would removal of your access to this PID have on the quality of your work 
and resulting public health decisions? 
 Please circle the appropriate number, with 1 being “No impact – quality would not suffer”, 
and 10 being “Severe Impact - results and decisions would be severely compromised” 
 
  No Impact  Severe Impact 
 Not 
Applicable 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
First Name            
Last Name            
Initials            
Sex            
Date of Birth / Age            
Date of death            
Provincial Health 
Insurance Plan 
Number 
           
Hospital ID            
Registered GP / 
Family Physician 
           
Street Address            
Postal Code            
Community Name            
City / Town / 
Village 
           
Region / 
Geographic Area 
           
Latitude / Longitude            
 
 
 
 
II-6. What PID do you currently NOT have access to, but believe would be beneficial to you 
to further enhance your work and resulting public health decisions?  
(Check as many as apply) 
 
 First Name  Street Address 
 Last Name  Postal Code 
 Initials  Community Name 
 Sex  City / Town / Village 
 Date of Birth / Age  Region / Geographic Area 
 Date of Death  Latitude & Longitude 
 Provincial Health Insurance Plan Number   
 Hospital ID   
 Registered GP / Family Physician   
    
 Other 
         Please specify: _________________________________________________ 
    
 None   
 
Please skip to Section IV – Privacy Issues 
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SECTION III – No current access to data (~ 2 minutes) 
If you have access to Personally Identifiable Data (PID) and completed Section II 
above, then please skip to Section IV – Privacy Issues. 
 
NOTE: The term “access” as used in this survey implies the ability to actually acquire 
individual level data so you can work with it directly. 
 
III-1. Having access to which of the following PID would facilitate your roles and responsibilities, 
or enhance your work and improve resulting public health decisions? (Check as many as 
apply) 
 
 First Name  Street Address 
 Last Name  Postal Code 
 Initials  Community Name 
 Sex  City / Town / Village 
 Date of Birth / Age  Region / Geographic Area 
 Date of Death  Latitude & Longitude 
 Provincial Health Insurance Plan Number   
 Hospital ID   
 Registered GP / Family Physician   
    
 Other 
         Please specify: _________________________________________________ 
    
 None   
 
III-2. How useful to you and your roles and responsibilities (as identified in Section I) would 
access to the PID you identified above be? 
Please circle the appropriate number, with 1 being “Not at all useful”, and 10 being “Very 
useful – would greatly enhance by roles and responsibilities” 
  Not at all useful  Very useful 
 Don‟t  
Know 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
First Name            
Last Name            
Initials            
Sex            
Date of Birth / Age            
Date of death            
Provincial Health 
Insurance Plan 
Number 
           
Hospital ID            
Registered GP / 
Family Physician 
           
Street Address            
Postal Code            
Community Name            
City / Town / 
Village 
           
Region / 
Geographic Area 
           
Latitude / Longitude            
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III-3 How easy would it be for you to access the PID you identified above, if you were to need 
it? 
Please circle the appropriate number, with 1 being “Impossible”, and 10 being “Very easy” 
  Impossible  Very easy 
 Don‟t  
Know 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
First Name            
Last Name            
Initials            
Sex            
Date of Birth / Age            
Date of death            
Provincial Health 
Insurance Plan 
Number 
           
Hospital ID            
Registered GP / 
Family Physician 
           
Street Address            
Postal Code            
Community Name            
City / Town / 
Village 
           
Region / 
Geographic Area 
           
Latitude / Longitude            
 
 
III-4. What impact has your lack of access to this PID had on the quality of your work and 
resulting public health decisions? 
 Please circle the appropriate number, with 1 being “No impact – quality has not suffered”, 
and 10 being “Severe Impact - results and decisions have been severely compromised” 
 
  No impact  Severe Impact 
 Don‟t  
Know 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
First Name            
Last Name            
Initials            
Sex            
Date of Birth / Age            
Date of death            
Provincial Health 
Insurance Plan 
Number 
           
Hospital ID            
Registered GP / 
Family Physician 
           
Street Address            
Postal Code            
Community Name            
City / Town / 
Village 
           
Region / 
Geographic Area 
           
Latitude / Longitude            
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SECTION IV – Privacy Issues (~ 3 minutes) 
 
This section pertains to the field of public health in general, and uses the term “public health 
practice” to refer to its various activities, including research, surveillance, health service delivery, 
strategic policy and decision making, etc. The goal is to get your opinion, as a public health 
professional, on the overall impact of restricted access to PID on public health practice in 
Canada. These questions ask for your opinion; if you‟re not sure how to answer a question in 
this section, please just hazard a guess! 
 
NOTE: The term “access” as used in this survey implies the ability to actually 
acquire individual level data so you can work with it directly. 
 
IV-1. In your opinion, do current restrictions on access to PID pose an obstacle to any aspects 
of public health practice (e.g. research, surveillance, etc.)? 
 Please circle the appropriate number, with 1 being “Not an obstacle at all”, and 10 being 
“Yes, they pose a serious threat to accurate public health practice” 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not an issue  Serious Threat 
 
IV-2. How amenable would you be to other professionals in the public health field having 
access to your PID for public health research and analyses (e.g. your address, date of 
birth, etc.) to improve public health delivery, service, etc.?  
 
 Sure, go ahead    No Way   Not Sure  Please Explain 
 
 
 
 
IV-3a. In your opinion, what proportion of the public is aware of the impact of restricted access to 
PID on public health practice? (Please just guess!) 
 Please circle the approximate proportion 
 
10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
No one  Everyone 
 
IV-3b. How do you think we could increase this proportion? 
 
 
 
 
IV-4a. In your opinion, what proportion of the public would allow the use of PID for public health 
practice if they were asked and educated on the usefulness of such data to public health 
practice? (Please just guess!) - Please circle the approximate proportion 
 
 
10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
No one  Everyone 
 
IV-4b. How do you think we could increase this proportion? 
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SECTION V – Current data holdings and provision to others… (~ 2 minutes) 
 
This section gathers information on the sharing of PID within and between organizations.  
 
V-1. What would you say is the one most critical obstacle in the sharing or acquisition of PID 
linked to health data? (Please select only one; give your opinion!) 
 
 National legislation  Public disapproval  
Organizational 
bureaucracy 
 Lack of knowledge  Public Paranoia  Practitioner Paranoia 
  
 Other (please specify): _______________________________________________ 
 
V-2. Do you or your organization currently collect individual-level health data for any purpose 
(e.g. research, surveillance, service delivery, etc.), or act as the custodian of such data? 
 
 YES  Continue    NO  Go to Section VI 
 
V-3. For what specific purpose(s) is this data collected? (check as many as apply) 
 
  Research   Surveillance   Service Delivery 
  Other 
        Please specify: ___________________________________________________ 
 
V-4. What data is collected? 
 
 First Name  Street Address 
 Last Name  Postal Code 
 Initials  Community Name 
 Sex  City / Town / Village 
 Date of Birth / Age  Region / Geographic Area 
 Date of Death  Latitude & Longitude 
 Provincial Health Insurance Plan Number   
 Hospital ID   
 Registered GP / Family Physician   
    
 Other 
         Please specify: _________________________________________________ 
 
 
V-5. How difficult is it for other public health professionals such as yourself to acquire access 
to your PID and linked health data holdings if they are outside your immediate working 
team, but within… 
  Impossible  Very Easy 
 D/K 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Your organisation?            
The Federal Government?            
Your Provincial 
Government? 
           
A Provincial Government 
other than your own? 
           
A regional or public health 
authority? 
           
A University or Research 
Facility 
           
Another national government 
(e.g. CDC in the US, NHS in 
the UK, etc.) 
           
The World Health 
Organization 
           
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SECTION VI – Solutions and Research (~ 7 minutes) 
 
The proposed research will seek to apply a method (called a transformation) to public health 
data such that important relationships within and between the data are preserved, but the actual 
identity of the individual is anonymized. So, for example, if you were looking at an infectious 
outbreak in children, you might be interested in where the infected children are relative to one 
another, as well as where the schools are, arenas, community centres, etc. You would then 
preserve the relationship between these points of interest, and change everything else, so that 
the original points can no longer be identified back to their original owners. In this way, you have 
transformed the data so that you‟re still looking at individual-level data, but can‟t determine who 
it belongs to (i.e., it has become anonymous). Assuming the data custodians allow the data 
derived from such a transformation to be made available to the public health professional 
community: 
 
For all scales, circle „0‟ if you “Don‟t know” 
VI-1. How useful would such a transformation be to you in your current role? 
Please circle the appropriate number, with 1 being “Not at all useful”, and 10 being “Very 
useful” 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 Not useful  Very useful 
 
VI-2. How useful do you think such a transformation would be to the field of public health in 
general? 
Please circle the appropriate number, with 1 being “Not at all useful”, and 10 being “Very 
useful” 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 Not useful  Very useful 
 
 
VI-3. Imagine you are a data custodian, and that a method has been developed to take your 
individual level data and mask it or change it somehow, while still keeping it at an 
individual-by-individual level. Would you allow such a method to be conducted on your 
data so that it can be shared with other public health professionals for public health 
research and practice?  
 
 YES   NO  Please explain why not  MAYBE  Please explain 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A specific disease or health condition will be used to test and evaluate the developed method(s). 
This condition must have a known aetiology, with well-known patterns and relationships, to 
serve as a starting point for the research. It must also be a disease of interest to the public 
health community. 
 
VI-4. What diseases, health conditions, or databases most immediately come to mind as 
potential subjects for this research?  
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VI-5. Based on your knowledge of the condition you identified in the previous question, what 
relationships to the physical environment would a transformation as defined in the 
opening paragraph of this section have to retain in order for the data to be meaningful 
and useful to you (e.g. where patients or cases are relative to each other, to schools, to 
restaurants, etc; where schools are relative to a type of industry; etc…)?  
 
  
 
 
 
Another proposed solution to the issue at hand is to build what are called automated software 
agents. You can think of these as applications that would go into a dataset wherever it is 
housed (i.e. at the custodian‟s location), perform the analyses for you (on the personally 
identifiable data) and return only the aggregated, and therefore anonymised, results. In other 
words, you would never see the actual data, but would have this “agent” do the analyses for you, 
directly on the PID; you simply get the results of the analyses, as long as, of course, they don‟t 
compromise privacy. As a simple analogy, it would be like you giving me an equation or function 
to perform on my data, and I giving you back the result of that function without you ever needing 
to see my actual data. Assuming the data custodians allow such a software agent to analyse 
their data and make the results available to the public health professional community: 
 
VI-6. How useful do you think such a software agent would be to you in your current role? 
Please circle the appropriate number, with 1 being “Not at all useful”, and 10 being “Very 
useful” 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 Not useful  Very useful 
 
VI-7. How useful do you think such a software agent would be to the field of public health in 
general? 
Please circle the appropriate number, with 1 being “Not at all useful”, and 10 being “Very 
useful” 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 Not useful  Very useful 
 
 
VI-8. If you were (or are) a data custodian, would you allow such a software agent to access 
your data, conduct the analyses, and return the results to the public health professional 
community for research and analysis?  
 
 YES   NO  Please explain why not  MAYBE  Please explain 
 
 
 
 
 
VI-9. To summarise, if a solution is found such that privacy is no longer an issue, which of the 
following would you prefer? (Please select only one) 
 
 I would prefer to be able to work directly with the raw data, so I can access 
information on a case-by-case basis. 
 
 I have no need to see the raw data, and would prefer to access information and 
results on an aggregate basis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 30 
 
SECTION VII – Qualitative Component (~ 5 minutes) 
 
VII-1. How knowledgeable do you consider yourself on privacy and confidentiality issues / 
legislation? 
Please circle the appropriate number, 1 being “Not at all knowledgeable”, and 10 being 
“Expert” 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not Knowledgeable  Expert 
 
 
VII-2. How do you feel about the impact of privacy and confidentiality legislation – in particular 
the restrictions on access to personally identifiable data (e.g. The Privacy Act, The 
Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, etc.) – on public health? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VII-3. What do you think of the proposed research (development of a transformation)? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VII-4. What do you think of the “software agent” idea? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VII-5. Do you have any other thoughts or comments regarding this issue, the proposed 
research, or this questionnaire that you would like to share? 
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SECTION VIII – Further Participation and Contact 
 
Please indicate your desired level of anonymity and interest in further participation; you may 
check multiple boxes as applicable. Please note that leaving this section empty will default your 
response to “absolute anonymity”, rendering you answers on this questionnaire personally 
unidentifiable and removing yourself from any further contact or participation. 
 
 You may link my identity to my responses on this questionnaire for clarifications and follow-
up 
 Please send me a summary of the findings of this questionnaire, once completed 
 Please send me periodic updates on the progress of this research by email to the address 
given below 
 I am interested in piloting the results of this research 
 
If you checked any of the above boxes, please complete your details below. Your personal 
information will be stored in a password-protected directory within the Public Health Agency of 
Canada, and will be protected according to the Access to Information Act and the Privacy Act.  
 
Name:  _____________________________________________________________ 
 
Title:  _____________________________________________________________ 
 
Organization: _____________________________________________________________ 
 
Address: _____________________________________________________________ 
 
 _____________________________________________________________ 
 
E-Mail: _____________________________________________________________ 
 
Phone: _____________________________________________________________ 
 
Preferred Method of Contact:  Phone  Fax   E-Mail  Mail 
 
Are you in possession of any personally identifiable data that you can use for testing and 
evaluation of the developed transformation? 
 
  YES    NO 
 
Dear Public Health Professional,  
 
Thank you so much for taking the time to complete this questionnaire; your responses will help 
assess the impact of privacy and confidentiality legislation on public health research, and will be 
used to investigate and develop a disease-specific solution, which will, in turn, enhance 
strategic decisions and research in public health.  
 
Once again, many thanks for your time, and I look forward to enhancing public health practice 
by exploring this issue, and its solution, further with you. Should you have any comments, 
questions or concerns, please feel free to send me an email or give me a ring.  
 
Best wishes, 
 
Philip AbdelMalik 
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B.2. L’IMPACT DE LA PROTECTION DES RENSEIGNEMENTS 
PERSONNELS SUR LA PRATIQUE EN SANTÉ PUBLIQUE 
CANADA 
 
 
 
 
 
TEMPS REQUIS ESTIMÉ POUR RÉPONDRE À CE QUESTIONNAIRE : 20 À 30 MINUTES 
 
 
 
 
 
Merci de prendre le temps de remplir ce questionnaire - votre 
contribution est bien appréciée et critique à la recherche. 
 
Ce questionnaire est divisé en huit courtes sections  pour mieux classer 
par catégorie et organiser les types d'information. Vous pouvez sauter 
pardessus n'importe quel question. Notez toutefois que chaque saut 
compromet la qualité de la recherche. Veuillez noter également que, à 
moins que vous choisissiez d'accomplir la section VIII du questionnaire, 
vos réponses demeureront anonymes. Assurez-vous svp que toutes vos 
réponses sont inscrites clairement. 
 
Veuillez noter que vos réponses deviendront la propriété du 
gouvernement Canada, et comme tels, peuvent également être rendues 
disponibles pour être employées par l'agence de santé publique du 
Canada pour améliorer ses opérations et pour assurer des services à la 
communauté de santé publique. Ce questionnaire est mené par le 
bureau de la pratique en santé publique de l‟agence de la santé 
publique du Canada. Donc, toutes les données rassemblées, y compris 
votre information personnelle, seront protégées selon la loi d'accès à 
l'information et la loi de protection des renseignements personnels du 
Canada. Notez également que, à moins que vous choisissiez 
d'accomplir la section VIII du questionnaire, vos réponses demeureront 
anonymes. Par conséquent, assurez-vous svp que toutes les réponses 
sont clairement marquées. 
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SECTION I – Un apeçu à votre sujet (~ 5 minutes) 
 
I-1 A quel niveau se situe la portée de l’essentiel de vos activités en santé publique ? 
(Si plus d‟un choix s‟applique, veuillez ne cocher que la case correspondant au niveau 
principal de vos activités) 
 
 International  
Amérique 
du 
Nor
d 
 National  
Provincial/ 
Terr
itori
al 
 
Régional/ 
Local 
 
I-2 Auprès de quel type d‟organisation de santé publique travaillez-vous ou êtes-vous affilié?  
(Si plus d‟un choix s‟applique, veuillez ne cocher que la case correspondant au type 
d‟organisation principal de vos activités) 
 
 Agence de santé publique du Canada 
 Santé Canada 
 Autre agence gouvernementale fédérale 
 Gouvernement provincial (ministère de la santé, etc.)  
 Autorité ou régie régionale ou locale 
 Association Canadienne de santé publique 
 Autre organisme non gouvernemental (provincial, épidémiologie, diabète, cancer, 
etc.) 
 Université ou établissement d‟enseignement  
 Autre 
         (préciser svp) ________________________________________________ 
 
I-3. Veuillez préciser le ou les domaine(s) d‟expertise dans lesquels vous exercez 
présentement : (Cocher toutes les mentions pertinentes) 
 
 Santé des Autochtones  Aliments et nutrition 
 Maladies chroniques (cancer, diabète, 
etc.) 
 Génétique 
 Santé publique des enfants / 
pédiatrique  
 Services et soins de santé (besoins, 
prestation des services, etc.) 
 Maladies transmissibles / infectieuses   Préjudices corporels / Invalidité 
 Santé publique dentaire  Santé mentale et toxicomanies  
 Protection civile / mesures d‟urgence   Santé en milieu de travail  
 
Environnement (pollution, climat, 
sécurité de l‟eau et des 
aliments, etc.) 
 
Déterminants sociaux de la santé 
(pauvreté, éducation, 
exclusion sociale, etc.) 
 
Éthique, droit de la santé publique, 
protection des renseignements 
personnels, etc. 
 Surveillance 
 Autre 
         (préciser svp) ________________________________________________ 
 
I-4.  Quelle attribution, parmi celles mentionnées ci-après, décrit le mieux votre rôle ou vos 
fonctions à titre de professionnel de la santé publique ?  
(Si plus d‟un choix s‟applique, veuillez ne cocher que la case correspondant a votre rôle 
ou vos fonctions principales) 
 Décideur / concepteur de politiques 
stratégiques 
 Recherche et analyse 
 Gestionnaire ou coordonnateur   
Intervenant de première ligne / soins 
aux patients / services 
cliniques  
 Consultant   
 Autre   
         (préciser svp) _________________________________________________ 
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I-5. Dans le cadre de vos activités régulières, combien de temps consacrez-vous 
(approximativement, en pourcentage) ordinairement à l‟accomplissent de chacune des 
tâches suivantes ? 
 
 Décideur / concepteur de politiques stratégiques     % 
 Gestionnaire ou coordonnateur       % 
 Consultant         % 
 Recherche et analyse        % 
 Intervenant de première ligne / soins aux patients / services cliniques  % 
 Autre (comme indiqué dedans I-4)      % 
 
I-6. Dans l‟accomplissement de quelle(s) tâche(s) mentionnées ci-dessus est-il le plus 
probable que vous utilisiez ou auriez besoin d‟utiliser des renseignements nominatifs 
(permettant d‟identifier un individu) ?   
 
 Décideur / concepteur de politiques 
stratégiques 
 Recherche et analyse 
 Gestionnaire ou coordonnateur   
Intervenant de première ligne / 
soins aux patients / services 
cliniques  
 Consultant   
 Autre   
         (préciser svp) _________________________________________________ 
 
I-7 Avez-vous besoin ou prévoyez-vous le besoin d‟inclure des données sur la zone 
géographique des données recueillies en matière de santé, dans le cadre de vos activités 
ou de celles de votre organisation ? 
 
     OUI     NON 
 
I-8 Un système d‟information géographique (SIG) est un outil vous permettant de visualiser 
et d‟analyser vos données en y intégrant une composante spatiale, c‟est-à-dire en tenant 
compte de leur emplacement géographique sur la planète. Dans l‟accomplissement de 
quelle(s) tâche(s) le recours au SIG pourrait-il vous être utile ?   
  
 
Décideur / concepteur de politiques 
stratégiques 
 Recherche et analyse 
 Gestionnaire ou coordonnateur   
Intervenant de première ligne / 
soins aux patients / services 
cliniques  
 Consultant   
 Autre   
         (préciser svp) _________________________________________________ 
 
I-9 Quelle(s) application(s) de SIG utilisez-vous présentement ou avez-vous utilisées par le  
passé ? 
 
 Générateur de cartes en santé publique (GCSP) 
 Autre (disponibles sur le web; svp indiquez)      
 
Produits SIG utilisés en bureautique : 
   ESRI (ArcGIS)  
   MapInfo 
   AutoDesk  
   PCI Geomatics 
   Intergraph  
   Autre 
         (préciser svp) _________________________________________________ 
 
 Je n‟ai jamais utilisé des applications de SIG, et je n‟y vois aucune utilité dans 
mes activités 
 Je n‟ai jamais utilisé des applications de SIG, mais je souhaite en apprendre 
davantage à ce sujet 
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I-10 À quel niveau de géographie est-ce que vous visualisez vos données ou en faites une 
analyse spatiale pour chacun des produits que vous utilisez, le cas échéant ? 
 
 GCSP Autres niveaux 
disponibles sur le 
web 
Produits SIG 
utilisés en 
bureautique 
Latitude et Longitude    
Adresse civique    
Aire de diffusion     
Code postal     
Subdivision de recensement     
Division de recensement     
Région de tri 
d‟acheminement 
   
Urbain – Rural    
Provincial    
Autre 
 (préciser svp) ___________________________________________________ 
 
 
I-11 Êtes-vous restreint dans l‟utilisation de SIG ou devez-vous restreindre votre utilisation de 
SIG pour accomplir quelque activité de santé publique en raison de préoccupations au 
niveau de la protection des renseignements personnels (par exemple, de crainte que la 
carte ou les données soient susceptibles de permettre l‟identification d‟un individu ou 
d‟une communauté) ? 
 
 
 OUI  svp expliquez   NON  svp expliquez  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I-12 En faisant abstraction pour l‟instant de vos préoccupations au niveau de la protection des 
renseignements personnels et selon votre réponse à la question précédente, à quel 
niveau de géographie est-ce que vous souhaiteriez idéalement pouvoir visualiser vos 
données ou en faire une analyse spatiale pour chacun des produits que vous utilisez, le 
cas échéant ? 
 
 GCSP Autres niveaux 
disponibles sur le 
web 
Produits SIG 
utilisés en 
bureautique 
Latitude et Longitude    
Adresse civique    
Aire de diffusion     
Code postal     
Urbain – Rural    
Autre 
 (préciser svp) ___________________________________________________ 
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SECTION II – Accès actuel aux données (~ 4 minutes) 
 
Toutes les questions dans cette section concernent le rôle que vous avez identifié à la question 
I-6 dans la section I. Si vous n'avez pas accès à des données personnellement identifiables 
(PID) énumérées à la question II-1, cochez svp la dernière option à la question II-1 et sautez à 
la section III - Aucun accès courant aux données. Sinon, remplissez svp cette section, et 
passez ensuite à la section IV sur la protection des renseignements personnels. 
 
REMARQUE : Dans ce questionnaire, le terme accès se rapporte à votre capacité 
d’acquérir effectivement des renseignements nominatifs de manière à 
pouvoir travailler directement avec ces données. 
 
II-1. En tenant compte des tâches dans lesquelles vous êtes le plus susceptible d‟avoir besoin 
d‟utiliser des données nominatives, à quels renseignements nominatifs avez-vous 
présentement accès ? (Cocher toutes les mentions pertinentes) 
 
 Prénom  Adresse civique 
 Nom  Code postal 
 Initiales  Nom de la communauté 
 Sexe  Ville / Municipalité / Village 
 Date de naissance/ Age  Région / Zone géographique 
 Date de décès  Latitude et Longitude 
 Numéro d‟assurance-maladie   
 Numéro d‟identification d‟une carte 
d‟hôpital 
 
 
 Médecin généraliste ou en médecine 
familiale 
 
 
    
 Autre 
         (préciser svp) _______________________________________________ 
    
 
Je n’ai PAS accès présentement à l’un ou l’autre de ces éléments (svp 
sautez à la Section III) 
 
Les questions qui suivent se rapportent toutes aux renseignements nominatifs auxquels vous 
avez accès, tel que vous l‟avez indiqué à la question précédente à ce sujet.  
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II-2 Dans une perspective de protection des renseignements personnels et organisationnels, 
comment jugez-vous le degré de facilité avec lequel vous avez accès à des 
renseignements nominatifs lorsque vous en avez besoin ? 
Encercler le chiffre correspondant à votre réponse, 1 = « Extrêmement difficile » et 10 = « 
Très facile » 
 
  Extrêmement difficile  Très facile 
 Ne sais pas 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Prénom            
Nom            
Initiales            
Sexe            
Date de naissance/ 
Age 
           
Date de décès            
Numéro 
d‟assurance-
maladie 
           
Numéro 
d‟identification 
d‟une carte 
d‟hôpital 
           
Médecin 
généraliste ou en 
médecine familiale 
           
Adresse civique            
Code postal            
Nom de la 
communauté 
           
Ville / Municipalité / 
Village 
           
Région / Zone 
géographique 
           
Latitude / Longitude            
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II-3. En général, combien de fois accédez-vous aux renseignements nominatifs que vous avez  
mentionnés ci-dessus ? 
Encercler le chiffre correspondant à votre réponse, 1 = « rarement » et 10 = « Tout le 
temps » 
 
  Rarement  Tout le temps 
 Non 
applicable 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Prénom            
Nom            
Initiales            
Sexe            
Date de naissance/ 
Age 
           
Date de décès            
Numéro 
d‟assurance-
maladie 
           
Numéro 
d‟identification 
d‟une carte 
d‟hôpital 
           
Médecin 
généraliste ou en 
médecine familiale 
           
Adresse civique            
Code postal            
Nom de la 
communauté 
           
Ville / Municipalité / 
Village 
           
Région / Zone 
géographique 
           
Latitude / Longitude            
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II-4. Dans quelle mesure ces renseignements nominatifs vous sont-ils utiles ou utiles dans 
l‟accomplissement des rôles et responsabilités qui vous incombent ? 
Encercler le chiffre correspondant à votre réponse, 1 = « Pas du tout utiles » et 10 = « 
Essentiels à l‟accomplissement des rôles et responsabilités qui m‟incombent » 
 
  Pas du tout utiles  Essentiels 
 Ne sais pas 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Prénom            
Nom            
Initiales            
Sexe            
Date de naissance/ 
Age 
           
Date de décès            
Numéro 
d‟assurance-
maladie 
           
Numéro 
d‟identification 
d‟une carte 
d‟hôpital 
           
Médecin 
généraliste ou en 
médecine familiale 
           
Adresse civique            
Code postal            
Nom de la 
communauté 
           
Ville / Municipalité / 
Village 
           
Région / Zone 
géographique 
           
Latitude / Longitude            
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II-5. Quel impact aurait le fait de perdre votre accès à ces renseignements nominatifs sur la 
qualité de votre travail et les décisions en matière de santé publique qui en résultent ? 
Encercler le chiffre correspondant à votre réponse, 1 = « Aucun impact – aucune 
incidence sur la qualité » et 10 = « Impact sérieux – les résultats et les décisions en 
seraient gravement compromis » 
 
  Aucun impact  Impact sérieux 
 Ne sais pas 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Prénom            
Nom            
Initiales            
Sexe            
Date de naissance/ 
Age 
           
Date de décès            
Numéro 
d‟assurance-
maladie 
           
Numéro 
d‟identification 
d‟une carte 
d‟hôpital 
           
Médecin 
généraliste ou en 
médecine familiale 
           
Adresse civique            
Code postal            
Nom de la 
communauté 
           
Ville / Municipalité / 
Village 
           
Région / Zone 
géographique 
           
Latitude / Longitude            
 
II-6. À quels renseignements nominatifs n‟avez-vous PAS présentement accès, mais dont 
l‟accès vous serait bénéfique à votre avis à  fin d‟améliorer votre travail et les décisions 
en matière de santé publique qui en résultent ? (Cocher toutes les mentions 
pertinentes) 
 
 Prénom  Adresse civique 
 Nom  Code postal 
 Initiales  Nom de la communauté 
 Sexe  Ville / Municipalité / Village 
 Date de naissance/ Age  Région / Zone géographique 
 Date de décès  Latitude et Longitude 
 Numéro d‟assurance-maladie   
 Numéro d‟identification d‟une carte 
d‟hôpital 
 
 
 Médecin généraliste ou en médecine 
familiale 
 
 
    
 Autre 
         (préciser svp) _______________________________________________ 
    
 Aucun   
 
PERSON SHOULD NOW BE TAKEN TO SECTION IV – PRIVACY ISSUES 
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SECTION III – Absence d’accès aux données (~ 2 minutes) 
 
If the person completed Section II above, then skip to Section IV – Privacy Issues. 
 
REMARQUE : Dans ce questionnaire, le terme accès se rapporte à votre capacité 
d’acquérir effectivement des renseignements nominatifs de manière à 
pouvoir travailler directement avec ces données. 
 
III-1. L‟accès à quels renseignements nominatifs, parmi la liste suivante, vous serait bénéfique 
à votre avis à  fin d‟améliorer votre travail et les décisions en matière de santé publique 
qui en résultent ?  
  (Cocher toutes les mentions pertinentes) 
 
 Prénom  Adresse civique 
 Nom  Code postal 
 Initiales  Nom de la communauté 
 Sexe  Ville / Municipalité / Village 
 Date de naissance/ Age  Région / Zone géographique 
 Date de décès  Latitude et Longitude 
 Numéro d‟assurance-maladie   
 Numéro d‟identification d‟une carte 
d‟hôpital 
 
 
 Médecin généraliste ou en médecine 
familiale 
 
 
    
 Autre 
         (préciser svp) _______________________________________________ 
    
 Aucun   
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III-2. Dans quelle mesure l‟accès aux renseignements nominatifs que vous avez indiqués ci-
dessus serait-il utile à l‟accomplissement des rôles et responsabilités qui vous incombent 
(que vous avez indiqués en réponse à la Section I) ? 
Encercler le chiffre correspondant à votre réponse, 1 = « Pas du tout utile » et 10 = « 
Très utile – aideraient grandement les rôles et responsabilités qui m‟incombent » 
 
  Pas du tout utile  Très utile 
 Ne sais pas 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Prénom            
Nom            
Initiales            
Sexe            
Date de naissance/ 
Age 
           
Date de décès            
Numéro 
d‟assurance-
maladie 
           
Numéro 
d‟identification 
d‟une carte 
d‟hôpital 
           
Médecin 
généraliste ou en 
médecine familiale 
           
Adresse civique            
Code postal            
Nom de la 
communauté 
           
Ville / Municipalité / 
Village 
           
Région / Zone 
géographique 
           
Latitude / Longitude            
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III-3 Dans quelle mesure cela serait-il facile pour vous d‟accéder aux renseignements 
nominatifs que 
vous avez identifiés ci-dessus, si vous deviez en avoir besoin ? 
Encercler le chiffre correspondant à votre réponse, 1 = « Impossible » et 10 = « Très 
facile » 
 
  Impossible  Très facile 
 Ne sais pas 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Prénom            
Nom            
Initiales            
Sexe            
Date de naissance/ 
Age 
           
Date de décès            
Numéro 
d‟assurance-
maladie 
           
Numéro 
d‟identification 
d‟une carte 
d‟hôpital 
           
Médecin 
généraliste ou en 
médecine familiale 
           
Adresse civique            
Code postal            
Nom de la 
communauté 
           
Ville / Municipalité / 
Village 
           
Région / Zone 
géographique 
           
Latitude / Longitude            
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III-4. Quel impact le fait de ne pas avoir accès à ces renseignements nominatifs a-t-il sur la 
qualité de votre travail et les décisions en matière de santé publique qui en résultent ? 
Encercler le chiffre correspondant à votre réponse, 1 = « Aucun impact – aucune 
incidence sur la qualité » et 10 = « Impact sérieux – les résultats et les décisions ont été 
gravement compromis » 
 
  Aucun impact  Impact sérieux 
 Ne sais pas 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Prénom            
Nom            
Initiales            
Sexe            
Date de naissance/ 
Age 
           
Date de décès            
Numéro 
d‟assurance-
maladie 
           
Numéro 
d‟identification 
d‟une carte 
d‟hôpital 
           
Médecin 
généraliste ou en 
médecine familiale 
           
Adresse civique            
Code postal            
Nom de la 
communauté 
           
Ville / Municipalité / 
Village 
           
Région / Zone 
géographique 
           
Latitude / Longitude            
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SECTION IV – Protection des reneseignements personnels (~ 3 minutes) 
 
Cette section a trait au domaine de la santé publique dans son ensemble; l‟emploi de 
l‟expression « pratique en santé publique » vise les diverses activités réalisées dans ce 
domaine : recherche, surveillance de la santé, prestation des services de santé, élaboration des 
politiques et prise de décisions stratégiques, etc. L‟objectif est d‟obtenir votre opinion, en tant 
que professionnel de la santé publique, au sujet de l‟impact global de la restriction de l‟accès à 
des renseignements nominatifs sur la pratique en santé publique au Canada. Ces questions ont 
pour objet de recueillir votre opinion à ce sujet; si vous n‟êtes pas certain de la réponse à 
donner à une question donnée dans cette section, veuillez quand même donner une réponse 
selon votre bon jugement. 
 
REMARQUE : Dans ce questionnaire, le terme accès se rapporte à votre capacité 
d’acquérir effectivement des renseignements nominatifs de manière à 
pouvoir travailler directement avec ces données. 
 
 
IV-1. À votre avis, les restrictions actuelles sur l‟accès aux renseignements nominatifs 
constituent-elles un obstacle à quelque volet de la pratique en santé publique (recherche, 
surveillance, etc.) ? 
Encercler le chiffre correspondant à votre réponse, 1=«Pas du tout un obstacle» et 
10=«Elles constituent une grave menace à l‟exercice efficace et convenable de la 
pratique en santé publique» 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Pas du tout un 
obstacle 
 
Une grave menace 
 
 
IV-2. Dans quelle mesure seriez-vous disposé à ce que d‟autres professionnels du domaine 
de la santé publique aient accès à des renseignements nominatifs vous concernant aux 
fins de recherche et d‟analyse en santé publique (votre adresse, date de naissance, etc.) 
à  fin d‟améliorer la prestation des services en matière de santé publique, etc. ? 
 
 D‟accord, pas de problème  Aucunement  Pas certain  Préciser pourquoi : 
 
 
 
 
 
IV-3a. À votre avis, dans quelle proportion le grand public est-il au courant de l‟impact de l‟accès 
restreint aux renseignements nominatifs sur la pratique en santé publique ?  
Svp encercler la proportion approximative 
 
 
10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
Personne  Tout le monde 
 
 
IV-3b. De quelle manière croyez-vous que l‟on pourrait augmenter cette proportion ? 
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IV-4a. À votre avis, quelle proportion du grand public permettrait que l‟on utilise les 
renseignements nominatifs des individus aux fins de la pratique en santé publique si on 
interrogeait les gens et les sensibilisait au sujet de l‟utilité de tels renseignements aux 
fins de la pratique en santé publique ?  
Svp encercler la proportion approximative 
 
 
10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
Personne  Tout le monde 
 
 
 
IV-4b. Comment pourrait-on augmenter cette proportion ? 
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SECTION V – Donnès actuelles et dispositions pour l’obtention 
d’autres renseignements… 
(~ 2 minutes) 
 
Cette section vise à recueillir des informations au sujet du partage des renseignements 
nominatifs au sein de votre organisation et entre des organisations.  
 
Dans l‟échelle des choix de réponse, encercler « 0 » si votre réponse est « Ne sais pas ». 
 
V-1. À votre avis, quel serait le principal obstacle au partage ou à l‟acquisition de 
renseignements nominatifs liés à des informations sur la santé des individus ?  
(Veuillez ne cocher qu‟un seul choix – il s‟agit de faire valoir votre opinion !) 
 
 Les lois nationales  La réprobation du 
public 
 La bureaucratie 
 
L‟absence de 
connaissances  
 
La paranoïa du 
public 
 
La paranoïa des 
praticiens  
  
 Autre (préciser svp) ___________________________________________ 
 
V-2. Est-ce que vous ou votre organisation recueillez à l‟heure actuelle des renseignements 
nominatifs en matière de santé à quelque fin que ce soit (recherche, surveillance, 
prestation des services, etc.), ou agissez à titre de dépositaire de tels renseignements ? 
 
 OUI    NON   (Go to Section VI) 
 
V-3. À quelles fins spécifiques ces renseignements sont-ils recueillis ?  
(Cocher toutes les mentions pertinentes) 
 
  Recherche   Surveillance 
  Prestation des 
services 
  Autre 
        (préciser svp) ________________________________________________ 
 
V-4. Quels renseignements sont recueillis ? 
 
 Prénom  Adresse civique 
 Nom  Code postal 
 Initiales  Nom de la communauté 
 Sexe  Ville / Municipalité / Village 
 Date de naissance/ Age  Région / Zone géographique 
 Date de décès  Latitude et Longitude 
 Numéro d‟assurance-maladie   
 
Numéro d‟identification d‟une carte 
d‟hôpital 
 
 
 Médecin généraliste ou en médecine 
familiale 
 
 
    
 Autre 
         (préciser svp) _______________________________________________ 
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V-5. Dans quelle mesure est-ce difficile pour les professionnels de la santé publique, dont 
vous-même,  d‟avoir accès aux renseignements nominatifs dont vous disposez et 
autres données sur la santé qui y sont liées lorsque ces renseignements ou données 
sont situées à l‟extérieur du périmètre immédiat de votre équipe de travail, mais à 
l‟intérieur … 
 
  Impossible  Très facile 
 Ne 
sais 
pas 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
De votre organisation ?            
Du gouvernement fédéral            
De votre gouvernement 
provincial 
           
D‟un gouvernement 
provincial autre que le vôtre? 
           
D‟une régie régionale ou 
autre autorité chargée de la 
santé publique ? 
           
D‟une université ou 
établissement de recherche? 
           
De l‟administration d‟un 
gouvernement étranger (p. 
ex. le CDC aux États-Unis, le 
NHS au Royaume-Uni, etc.) 
           
De l‟organisation de santé 
mondiale 
           
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SECTION VI – Solutions et recherche (~ 7 minutes) 
 
La recherche proposée s‟intéressera à l‟application d‟une méthode (que l‟on appelle 
transformation) à des données relatives à la santé publique de manière à ce que les liens 
importants entre les données et parmi celles-ci soient préservés, tout en rendant anonyme 
l‟identité de l‟individu. Par exemple, si l‟on étudie le phénomène d‟une éclosion d‟une maladie 
infectieuse chez les enfants, vous vous intéresseriez à savoir où sont situés les enfants infectés 
les uns par rapport aux autres, ainsi qu‟où sont situés les écoles, arénas, centres 
communautaires, etc.. Vous pourriez alors préserver les liens entre ces points d‟intérêt et 
changer tous les autres éléments, de manière à ce que les points d‟intérêt ainsi ciblés ne 
puissent être retracés vers l‟identité des individus en jeu. Ainsi, vous avez réussi à transformer 
les données de telle sorte que les données soumises à l‟analyse soient visibles au niveau 
individuel comme tel, mais sans pouvoir établir précisément à quelle personne elles se 
rapportent (les renseignements deviennent alors anonymes). Ceci suppose que les dépositaires 
des renseignements et des données permettent que les données issues de cette transformation 
soient mises à la disposition des professionnels de la santé publique . 
 
Dans l‟échelle des choix de réponse, encercler « 0 » si votre réponse est « Ne sais pas ». 
 
VI-1. Dans quelle mesure une telle transformation vous serait-elle utile dans vos fonctions 
actuelles ? 
Encercler le chiffre correspondant à votre réponse, 1 = « Pas du tout utile » et 10 = « 
Très utile – aideraient grandement les rôles et responsabilités qui m‟incombent » 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 Pas du tout utile  Très utile 
 
 
VI-2. Dans quelle mesure estimez-vous qu‟une telle transformation pourrait être utile au 
domaine de la santé publique en général ? 
Encercler le chiffre correspondant à votre réponse, 1 = « Pas du tout utile » et 10 = « 
Très utile – aideraient grandement les rôles et responsabilités qui m‟incombent » 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 Pas du tout utile  Très utile 
 
 
VI-3. Imaginez que vous êtes un dépositaire de données et qu‟une méthode a été mise au 
point pour récupérer les renseignements nominatifs, les « masquer » ou les modifier 
d‟une certaine façon, tout en les préservant au niveau individuel, individu par individu. 
Est-ce que vous autoriseriez que l‟on utilise une telle méthode sur vos données, pour que 
le résultat puisse être partagé avec d‟autres professionnels de la santé publique aux fins 
de la recherche et de la pratique en santé publique ? 
 
 OUI   NON  Préciser pourquoi :  Peut-être  Préciser pourquoi : 
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Une maladie ou un état de santé spécifique serviront à mettre à l‟essai et à évaluer la ou les 
méthodes élaborées. La maladie ou l‟état de santé choisi devra posséder une étiologie connue, 
avec des modèles et des liens bien connus, à  fin de servir comme point de départ à la 
recherche. La maladie ou l‟état de santé choisi devra également être d‟un intérêt certain pour la 
communauté de la santé publique.  
 
VI-4. Quelle maladie, quel état de santé, ou quelle base de données vous viennent 
spontanément à l‟esprit à titre de sujets potentiels aux fins de cette recherche ?  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
VI-5. Suivant vos connaissances au sujet de l‟état de santé ou de la maladie que vous avez 
signalés dans votre réponse à la question précédente,  quels liens à l‟environnement 
physique une transformation (telle que définie au paragraphe introductif de la présente 
section) devra-t-elle conserver à  fin que les données demeurent pertinentes et utiles à 
vos fins. Par exemple : Où se trouvent les patients ou les cas les uns par rapport aux 
autres, par rapport aux écoles, restaurants, etc.; où les écoles se trouvent par rapport à 
un type  d‟industrie, etc. ? 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Une autre solution proposée à la problématique consiste à construire ce que l‟on appelle des 
agents logiciels automatisés. Il s‟agit d‟applications qui s‟insèrent dans l‟ensemble de données 
visé, là où il est hébergé (i.e., à l‟établissement du dépositaire des données), exécutent les 
analyses pour vous (sur les renseignements nominatifs) et vous retournent uniquement les 
résultats agrégés, lesquels sont ainsi rendus anonymes. En d‟autres termes, vous ne verrez 
jamais les données comme tel, mais « l‟agent » effectuera les analyses pour vous, directement 
sur les renseignements nominatifs, et vous obtenez uniquement les résultats de l‟analyse, dans 
la mesure où ils ne compromettent pas la protection des renseignements personnels. Par 
analogie, c‟est comme si vous me donniez une équation ou une fonction à exécuter avec les 
données que je possède, et que je vous remettrais ensuite le résultat de cette fonction sans que 
vous ayez besoin de voir mes données. En supposant que les dépositaires de données 
permettent qu‟un tel agent logiciel  analyse leurs données et rendent disponibles les résultats 
de l‟analyse à la communauté des professionnels de la santé publique ...  
 
VI-6. Dans quelle mesure un tel agent logiciel vous serait-il utile dans vos fonctions actuelles ? 
Encercler le chiffre correspondant à votre réponse, 1 = « Pas du tout utile » et 10 = « 
Très utile – aideraient grandement les rôles et responsabilités qui m‟incombent » 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 Pas du tout utile  Très utile 
 
 
VI-7. Dans quelle mesure estimez-vous qu‟une tel agent logiciel pourrait être utile au domaine 
de la santé publique en général ? 
Encercler le chiffre correspondant à votre réponse, 1 = « Pas du tout utile » et 10 = « 
Très utile – aideraient grandement les rôles et responsabilités qui m‟incombent » 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 Pas du tout utile  Très utile 
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VI-8. Si vous étiez (ou êtes) un dépositaire de données, est-ce que vous autoriseriez un tel 
agent logiciel à accéder à vos données, à procéder à leur analyse, et à en remettre les 
résultats à la communauté des professionnels de la santé publique à des fins d‟analyse 
et de recherche ?  
 
 OUI   NON  Préciser pourquoi :  Peut-être  Préciser pourquoi : 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VI-9. En résumé, si une solution était trouvée de telle sorte que la protection des 
renseignements personnels ne serait plus problématique, quelle méthode est-ce que 
vous préféreriez utiliser ? 
 
(Veuillez ne cocher qu‟un seul choix) 
 
 Je préfèrerais pouvoir travailler directement avec les données brutes, à  fin de 
pouvoir accéder aux renseignements au cas par cas. 
 
 Je n‟ai pas besoin de voir les données brutes, et je préfèrerais alors avoir accès 
aux informations et aux résultats en leur forme agrégée. 
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SECTION VII – Aspects qualitatifs (~ 5 minutes) 
 
VII-1. Comment considérez-vous l‟état de vos connaissances sur les questions et les lois se 
rapportant à la protection et la confidentialité des renseignements personnels ? 
Encercler le chiffre correspondant à votre réponse, 1 = « Aucune connaissance 
particulière à ce sujet » et 10 = « Expert » 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Aucune connaissance  Expert 
 
VII-2. Que pensez-vous de l‟impact des lois en matière de protection des renseignements 
personnels et de confidentialité sur la santé publique – en particulier en ce qui concerne 
les restrictions à l‟accès aux renseignements nominatifs (Loi sur la protection des 
renseignements personnels, Loi sur la protection des renseignements personnels et les 
documents électroniques, etc.) ? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VII-3. Que pensez-vous de la recherche proposée (mise au point d‟une méthode de 
transformation) ? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VII-4. Que pensez-vous de l‟idée de l‟agent logiciel ? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VII-5. Avez-vous des idées ou des commentaires à formuler au sujet de cette problématique, 
de la recherche proposée ou de ce questionnaire ? 
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SECTION VIII – Participation future et communications 
 
Veuillez indiquer ici le degré d‟anonymat que vous souhaitez et votre intérêt à participer à la 
présente initiative. Vous pouvez cocher plusieurs cases au besoin. Veuillez noter qu‟en laissant 
la présente section en blanc, votre réponse sera considérée par défaut comme étant « 
anonymat absolu », rendant vos réponses au présent questionnaire non identifiables au plan 
individuel et vous soustrayant à toute communication ou participation future à ce sujet. 
 
 Vous pouvez lier mon identité à mes réponses au présent questionnaire aux fins de 
clarification et de suivi 
 Veuillez me transmettre un sommaire des résultats du présent questionnaire une fois 
l‟analyse achevée 
 Veuillez me transmettre des suivis périodiques sur la progression de cette recherche, par 
courriel à l‟adresse électronique indiquée ci-dessous 
 Je suis intéressé (e) à participer aux essais pilote des résultats de cette recherche 
 
Veuillez indiquer vos coordonnées à l‟endroit prévu ci-après. Vos renseignements personnels 
seront conservés dans un répertoire protégé par mot de passe au sein de l‟Agence de santé 
publique du Canada, et seront protégés conformément aux dispositions de la Loi sur l’accès à 
l’information et de la Loi sur la protection des renseignements personnels.  
 
Nom:  _____________________________________________________________ 
 
Titre:  _____________________________________________________________ 
 
Organisation: _____________________________________________________________ 
 
Adresse: _____________________________________________________________ 
 
 _____________________________________________________________ 
 
Courriel: _____________________________________________________________ 
 
Téléphone: _____________________________________________________________ 
 
Méthode de communication préférée :  
 Téléphone   Télécopieur     Courriel   Par la poste 
 
Êtes-vous en possession de renseignements nominatifs que vous pourriez utiliser aux fins des 
essais et de l‟évaluation de la méthode de transformation mise au point dans le cadre de ce 
projet ? 
 
  OUI    NON 
 
Cher(e) professionnel(le) de santé publique, 
 
Grand merci d‟avoir pris le temps de remplir ce questionnaire. Vos réponses aideront à évaluer 
l'impact de la législation de protection de renseignements personnels et de confidentialité sur la 
recherche en santé publique, et seront employées pour étudier et développer des solutions 
spécifiques à des maladies précises. En bout de ligne, vous nous aidez à augmenter la qualité 
des décisions stratégiques et de la recherche en la santé publique. 
 
Encore une fois, je tiens à vous remercier et j‟anticipe d‟avoir l‟occasion dans le futur d‟explorer 
à fond ces questions avec vous et d‟ainsi améliorer la pratique de la santé publique. N‟hésitez 
pas à m‟appeler ou à m‟envoyer un courriel, pour toute question ou commentaire. 
 
Bien à vous, 
 
Philip AbdelMalik 
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B.3. PUBLIC HEALTH PROFESSIONAL QUESTIONNAIRE 
UNITED KINGDOM 
 
 
 
 
ESTIMATED TIME TO COMPLETE THIS QUESTIONNAIRE IS 20 TO 30 MINUTES 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for taking the time to complete this questionnaire – your 
contribution is highly valued and critical to the research. 
 
This questionnaire is divided into eight short sections to better 
categorize and organize the type of information being captured. You 
may skip any question(s) you would rather not answer, however 
please keep in mind that this compromises the quality of the research. 
Please also note that, unless you choose to complete section VIII of 
the questionnaire, your responses will remain anonymous and cannot 
be linked back to you. Therefore, please ensure that all responses are 
clearly marked. 
 
Please note that your responses will vest in, and remain the property 
of Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, and as such, may also 
be made available to and used by the Public Health Agency of Canada 
to improve their operations and service provision to the public health 
community. As an Office of Public Health Practice, Public Health 
Agency of Canada survey, all data collected, including your personal 
information, will be protected according to the Access to Information 
Act and the Privacy Act in Canada. 
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SECTION I – A little about you… (~ 5 minutes) 
 
I-1 What would you say is the scope of the bulk of your involvement in public health? 
(If more than one, please select only your main involvement) 
 
 International  European  National  Regional  Local 
 
I-2 With which public health organization are you currently employed / affiliated?  
(If more than one, please select only your main organization) 
 
 Department of Health 
 Health Protection Agency 
 National Health Service [NHS; include Strategic Health Authorities (SHA) and 
other regional or central organizations] 
 NHS Trust (including Care Trust, Hospital Trust, Mental Health Trust, etc.) 
 
        
 Please specify: ___________________________________________________ 
 Special Health Authority 
 Association of Public Health Observatories (APHO) 
 Public Health Observatory (please specify): 
  EMPHO  LHO  ScotPHO  WCH 
  ERPHO  NEPHO  SEPHO  WMPHO 
  INIsPHO  NWPHO  SWPHO  YHPHO 
 Public Health Faculty 
 University / Acadaemia 
 Other 
         Please specify: ________________________________________________ 
 
I-3. Please indicate your current specific area(s) of expertise: (Check as many as apply) 
 
 
Chronic Diseases (cancer, diabetes, 
etc.) 
 Genetics 
 Child / Paediatric Public Health  
Health Services (needs, delivery, 
etc.) 
 Communicable Diseases  Injuries / Disability 
 Dental Public Health  Mental Health & Substance Misuse  
 
Emergency Preparedness & 
Response 
 Occupational Health 
 Environment (pollution, climate, 
water & food safety, etc.) 
 
Social Determinants of Health (e.g. 
poverty, education, social exclusion, 
etc.) 
 
Ethics, Public Health Law, Privacy, 
etc 
 Surveillance 
 Food & Nutrition   
 Other 
         Please specify: ________________________________________________ 
 
I-4.  Which of the following best describe your roles or functions as a public health 
professional? (If more than one, please select only your main roles) 
 
 Strategic decision / policy maker  Research and Analysis 
 Manager or Coordinator  Front-line responder / patient care / 
clinical 
 Consultant   
 Other   
         Please specify: ________________________________________________ 
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I-5. Thinking of your regular activities, how much of your time (roughly, as a percentage) 
would you typically spend doing each of the following? 
 
 Strategic decision / policy making     % 
 Management / Coordination     % 
 Consultation       % 
 Research / Analysis      % 
 Front-line response / patient care / clinical    % 
 Other (as specified in I-4)      % 
 
I-6. In which of the roles you identified above are you most likely to use or require the use of 
personally identifiable data?  
 
 Strategic decision / policy maker  Research and Analysis 
 Manager or Coordinator  Front-line responder / patient care / 
clinical 
 Consultant   
 Other   
         Please specify: ________________________________________________ 
 
I-7 Do you have or foresee a need for including geographic location of health data in your 
roles or organization? 
 
     YES     NO 
 
I-8 Geographic Information Systems (GIS) are tools that allow you to visualise and analyse 
your data spatially – that is, using their geographical location on earth. In which of the 
roles you identified above would GIS be useful? 
  
 Strategic decision / policy maker  Research and Analysis 
 Manager or Coordinator  Front-line responder / patient care / 
clinical 
 Consultant   
 Other   
         Please specify: ________________________________________________ 
 
I-9 What GIS application(s) do you currently use, or have you used in the past? 
 
 Web-based: specify        
 
Desktop GIS products: 
   ESRI ArcGIS products 
   MapInfo 
   AutoDesk products 
   PCI Geomatics products 
   Intergraph products 
   Other 
         Please specify: _________________________________________________ 
 
 I have never used any GIS applications, and have no use for them 
 I have never used any GIS applications, but am interested in learning more 
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I-10 At what level(s) of geography do you visualise your data and/or conduct spatial analyses 
for each product you use? 
 
 Web-Based Desktop GIS 
Latitude and Longitude   
Street address    
Postcode    
Community Name   
City / Town / Village   
Region / Geographic Area   
Urban – Rural   
Other 
 Please specify: ___________________________________________________ 
 
 
I-11 Are you or have you been restricted in your use of GIS for any public health activity 
because of privacy concerns (i.e. map or data might identify an individual or community)? 
 
 YES  Please explain   No  Please explain 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I-12 Setting privacy issues aside and in light of your response to the previous question, at 
what level(s) of geography would you ideally like to visualise your data and/or conduct 
spatial analyses for each product you use? 
 
 Web-Based Desktop GIS 
Latitude and Longitude   
Street address    
Postcode    
Urban – Rural   
Other 
 Please specify: ___________________________________________________ 
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SECTION II – Current access to data (~ 4 minutes) 
 
The questions in this section all pertain to the role you identified in question I-6 in Section I. If 
you do not have access to any of the Personally Identifiable Data (PID) listed in question II-1, 
please mark the last option in question II-1 and skip to Section III – No current access to data. 
Otherwise, please complete this section, and then skip to Section IV – Privacy Issues. 
 
NOTE: The term “access” as used in this survey implies the ability to actually 
acquire individual level data so you can work with it directly. 
 
II-1. What PID do you currently have access to? (Check as many as apply) 
 
 Forename(s)  Street Address 
 Surname  Postcode 
 Initials  Community Name 
 Sex  City / Town / Village 
 Date of Birth / Age  Region / Geographic Area 
 Date of Death  Latitude & Longitude 
 NHS Number (OLD)   
 NHS Number (NEW)   
 Registered GP / Family Physician   
    
 Other 
 
        Please specify: 
___________________________________________________ 
    
 
I do NOT currently have access to any of the above (please skip to Section 
III) 
 
The following questions all pertain to the PID you have access to, as identified in the previous 
question. For all scales, circle „0‟ if you “Don‟t know” 
 
II-2 From a privacy and organisational bureaucracy perspective, how easy would you say it is 
for you to access this PID when you need it? 
Please circle the appropriate number, 1 being “Extremely difficult”, and 10 being “Very 
easy” 
 
  Extremely difficult  Very easy 
 Don‟t  
Know 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Forename(s)            
Surname            
Initials            
Sex            
Date of Birth / Age            
Date of death            
NHS Number- Old            
NHS Number- New            
Registered GP / 
Family Physician 
           
Street Address            
Post Code            
Community Name            
City / Town / 
Village 
           
Region / 
Geographic Area 
           
Latitude / Longitude            
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II-3. On average, how often do you access the PID you identified above?  
 
  Rarely  All the time 
 Not 
Applicable 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Forename(s)            
Surname            
Initials            
Sex            
Date of Birth / Age            
Date of death            
NHS Number- Old            
NHS Number- New            
Registered GP / 
Family Physician 
           
Street Address            
Post Code            
Community Name            
City / Town / 
Village 
           
Region / 
Geographic Area 
           
Latitude / Longitude            
 
 
II-4. How useful / important is this PID to you and your roles and responsibilities? 
Please circle the appropriate number, with 1 being “Not at all useful”, and 10 being 
“Critical to my roles and responsibilities” 
 
  Not useful  Critical 
 Don‟t  
Know 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Forename(s)            
Surname            
Initials            
Sex            
Date of Birth / Age            
Date of death            
NHS Number- Old            
NHS Number- New            
Registered GP / 
Family Physician 
           
Street Address            
Post Code            
Community Name            
City / Town / 
Village 
           
Region / 
Geographic Area 
           
Latitude / Longitude            
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II-5. What impact would removal of your access to this PID have on the quality of your work 
and resulting public health decisions? 
Please circle the appropriate number, with 1 being “No impact – quality would not suffer”, 
and 10 being “Severe Impact - results and decisions would be severely compromised” 
 
  No impact  Severe impact 
 Don‟t  
Know 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Forename(s)            
Surname            
Initials            
Sex            
Date of Birth / Age            
Date of death            
NHS Number- Old            
NHS Number- New            
Registered GP / 
Family Physician 
           
Street Address            
Post Code            
Community Name            
City / Town / 
Village 
           
Region / 
Geographic Area 
           
Latitude / Longitude            
 
 
II-6. What PID do you currently NOT have access to, but believe would be beneficial to you to 
further enhance your work and resulting public health decisions?  
(Check as many as apply) 
 
 Forename(s)  Street Address 
 Surname  Postcode 
 Initials  Community Name 
 Sex  City / Town / Village 
 Date of Birth / Age  Region / Geographic Area 
 Date of Death  Latitude & Longitude 
 NHS Number (OLD)   
 NHS Number (NEW)   
 Registered GP / Family Physician   
    
 Other 
 
        Please specify: 
___________________________________________________ 
    
 None   
 
 
Please skip to Section IV – Privacy Issues 
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SECTION III – No current access to data (~ 2 minutes) 
 
If you have access to Personally Identifiable Data (PID) and completed Section II above, then 
please skip to Section IV – Privacy Issues. 
 
NOTE: The term “access” as used in this survey implies the ability to actually 
acquire individual level data so you can work with it directly. 
 
III-1. Having access to which of the following PID would facilitate your roles and responsibilities, 
or enhance your work and improve resulting public health decisions? (Check as many as 
apply) 
 
 Forename(s)  Street Address 
 Surname  Postcode 
 Initials  Community Name 
 Sex  City / Town / Village 
 Date of Birth / Age  Region / Geographic Area 
 Date of Death  Latitude & Longitude 
 NHS Number (OLD)   
 NHS Number (NEW)   
 Registered GP / Family Physician   
    
 Other 
 
        Please specify: 
___________________________________________________ 
    
 None   
 
 
III-2. How useful to you and your roles and responsibilities (as identified in Section I) would 
access to the PID you identified above be? 
Please circle the appropriate number, with 1 being “Not at all useful”, and 10 being “Very 
useful – would greatly enhance by roles and responsibilities” 
 
  Not useful  Very useful 
 Don‟t  
Know 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Forename(s)            
Surname            
Initials            
Sex            
Date of Birth / Age            
Date of death            
NHS Number- Old            
NHS Number- New            
Registered GP / 
Family Physician 
           
Street Address            
Post Code            
Community Name            
City / Town / 
Village 
           
Region / 
Geographic Area 
           
Latitude / Longitude            
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III-3 How easy would it be for you to access the PID you identified above, if you were to need 
it? 
Please circle the appropriate number, with 1 being “Impossible”, and 10 being “Very easy” 
 
  Impossible  Very easy 
 Don‟t  
Know 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Forename(s)            
Surname            
Initials            
Sex            
Date of Birth / Age            
Date of death            
NHS Number- Old            
NHS Number- New            
Registered GP / 
Family Physician 
           
Street Address            
Post Code            
Community Name            
City / Town / 
Village 
           
Region / 
Geographic Area 
           
Latitude / Longitude            
 
 
III-4. What impact has your lack of access to this PID had on the quality of your work and 
resulting public health decisions? 
Please circle the appropriate number, with 1 being “No impact – quality has not suffered”, 
and 10 being “Severe Impact - results and decisions have been severely compromised” 
 
  No impact  Severe impact 
 Don‟t  
Know 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Forename(s)            
Surname            
Initials            
Sex            
Date of Birth / Age            
Date of death            
NHS Number- Old            
NHS Number- New            
Registered GP / 
Family Physician 
           
Street Address            
Post Code            
Community Name            
City / Town / 
Village 
           
Region / 
Geographic Area 
           
Latitude / Longitude            
 
  
 63 
 
SECTION IV – Privacy Issues (~ 3 minutes) 
 
This section pertains to the field of public health in general, and uses the term “public health 
practice” to refer to its various activities, including research, surveillance, health service delivery, 
strategic policy and decision making, etc. The goal is to get your opinion, as a public health 
professional, on the overall impact of restricted access to PID on public health practice in the 
United Kingdom. These questions ask for your opinion; if you‟re not sure how to answer a 
question in this section, please just hazard a guess! 
 
NOTE: The term “access” as used in this survey implies the ability to actually 
acquire individual level data so you can work with it directly. 
 
IV-1. In your opinion, do current restrictions on access to PID pose an obstacle to any aspects 
of public health practice (e.g. research, surveillance, etc.)? 
 Please circle the appropriate number, with 1 being “Not an obstacle at all”, and 10 being 
“Yes, they pose a serious threat to accurate public health practice” 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not an issue  Serious Threat 
 
IV-2. How amenable would you be to other professionals in the public health field having 
access to your PID for public health research and analyses (e.g. your address, date of 
birth, etc.) to improve public health delivery, service, etc?  
 
 Sure, go ahead    No Way   Not Sure  Please Explain 
 
 
 
 
IV-3a. In your opinion, what proportion of the public is aware of the impact of restricted access to 
PID on public health practice? (Please just guess!) 
 Please circle the approximate proportion 
 
10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
No one  Everyone 
 
IV-3b. How do you think we could increase this proportion? 
 
 
 
 
IV-4a. In your opinion, what proportion of the public would allow the use of PID for public health 
practice if they were asked and educated on the usefulness of such data to public health 
practice? (Please just guess!) - Please circle the approximate proportion 
 
 
10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
No one  Everyone 
 
IV-4b. How do you think we could increase this proportion? 
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SECTION V – Current data holdings and provision to others… (~ 2 minutes) 
 
This section gathers information on the sharing of PID within and between organizations.  
 
V-1. What would you say is the one most critical obstacle in the sharing or acquisition of PID 
linked to health data? (Please select only one; give your opinion!) 
 
 National legislation  Public disapproval  
Organizational 
bureaucracy 
 Lack of knowledge  Public Paranoia  Practitioner Paranoia 
  
 Other (please specify): _______________________________________________ 
 
V-2. Do you or your organization currently collect individual-level health data for any purpose 
(e.g. research, surveillance, service delivery, etc.), or act as the custodian of such data? 
 
 YES  Continue    NO  Go to Section VI 
 
V-3. For what specific purpose(s) is this data collected? (check as many as apply) 
 
  Research   Surveillance   Service Delivery 
  Other 
        Please specify: ___________________________________________________ 
 
V-4. What data is collected? 
 
 Forename(s)  Street Address 
 Surname  Postcode 
 Initials  Community Name 
 Sex  City / Town / Village 
 Date of Birth / Age  Region / Geographic Area 
 Date of Death  Latitude & Longitude 
 NHS Number (OLD)   
 NHS Number (NEW)   
 Registered GP / Family Physician   
    
 Other 
 
        Please specify: 
___________________________________________________ 
 
V-5. How difficult is it for other public health professionals such as yourself to acquire access 
to your PID and linked health data holdings if they are outside your immediate working 
team, but… 
 
  Impossible  Very Easy 
 D/K 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Within your organisation?            
Within the NHS or 
Department of Health? 
           
Within the UK but outside of 
the NHS or Dept. of Health? 
           
Within the European Union 
outside the UK? 
           
Outside the European 
Union? 
           
Within the World Health 
Organization? 
           
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SECTION VI – Solutions and Research (~ 7 minutes) 
 
The proposed research will seek to apply a method (called a transformation) to public health 
data such that important relationships within and between the data are preserved, but the actual 
identity of the individual is anonymized. So, for example, if you were looking at an infectious 
outbreak in children, you might be interested in where the infected children are relative to one 
another, as well as where the schools are, arenas, community centres, etc. You would then 
preserve the relationship between these points of interest, and change everything else, so that 
the original points can no longer be identified back to their original owners. In this way, you have 
transformed the data so that you‟re still looking at individual-level data, but can‟t determine who 
it belongs to (i.e., it has become anonymous). Assuming the data custodians allow the data 
derived from such a transformation to be made available to the public health professional 
community: 
 
For all scales, circle „0‟ if you “Don‟t know” 
 
VI-1. How useful would such a transformation be to you in your current role? 
Please circle the appropriate number, with 1 being “Not at all useful”, and 10 being “Very 
useful” 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 Not useful  Very useful 
 
VI-2. How useful do you think such a transformation would be to the field of public health in 
general? 
Please circle the appropriate number, with 1 being “Not at all useful”, and 10 being “Very 
useful” 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 Not useful  Very useful 
 
 
VI-3. Imagine you are a data custodian, and that a method has been developed to take your 
individual level data and mask it or change it somehow, while still keeping it at an 
individual-by-individual level. Would you allow such a method to be conducted on your 
data so that it can be shared with other public health professionals for public health 
research and practice?  
 
 YES   NO  Please explain why not  MAYBE  Please explain 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A specific disease or health condition will be used to test and evaluate the developed method(s). 
This condition must have a known aetiology, with well-known patterns and relationships, to 
serve as a starting point for the research. It must also be a disease of interest to the public 
health community. 
 
VI-4. What diseases, health conditions, or databases most immediately come to mind as 
potential subjects for this research?  
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VI-5. Based on your knowledge of the condition you identified in the previous question, what 
relationships to the physical environment would a transformation as defined in the 
opening paragraph of this section have to retain in order for the data to be meaningful 
and useful to you (e.g. where patients or cases are relative to each other, to schools, to 
restaurants, etc; where schools are relative to a type of industry; etc…)?  
 
  
 
 
 
Another proposed solution to the issue at hand is to build what are called automated software 
agents. You can think of these as applications that would go into a dataset wherever it is 
housed (i.e. at the custodian‟s location), perform the analyses for you (on the personally 
identifiable data) and return only the aggregated, and therefore anonymised, results. In other 
words, you would never see the actual data, but would have this “agent” do the analyses for you, 
directly on the PID; you simply get the results of the analyses, as long as, of course, they don‟t 
compromise privacy. As a simple analogy, it would be like you giving me an equation or function 
to perform on my data, and I giving you back the result of that function without you ever needing 
to see my actual data. Assuming the data custodians allow such a software agent to analyse 
their data and make the results available to the public health professional community: 
 
VI-6. How useful do you think such a software agent would be to you in your current role? 
Please circle the appropriate number, with 1 being “Not at all useful”, and 10 being “Very 
useful” 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 Not useful  Very useful 
 
VI-7. How useful do you think such a software agent would be to the field of public health in 
general? 
Please circle the appropriate number, with 1 being “Not at all useful”, and 10 being “Very 
useful” 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 Not useful  Very useful 
 
VI-8. If you were (or are) a data custodian, would you allow such a software agent to access 
your data, conduct the analyses, and return the results to the public health professional 
community for research and analysis?  
 
 YES   NO  Please explain why not  MAYBE  Please explain 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VI-9. To summarise, if a solution is found such that privacy is no longer an issue, which of the 
following would you prefer? (Please select only one) 
 
 I would prefer to be able to work directly with the raw data, so I can access 
information on a case-by-case basis. 
 
 I have no need to see the raw data, and would prefer to access information and 
results on an aggregate basis. 
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SECTION VII – Qualitative Component (~ 5 minutes) 
 
VII-1. How knowledgeable do you consider yourself on privacy and confidentiality issues / 
legislation? 
Please circle the appropriate number, 1 being “Not at all knowledgeable”, and 10 being 
“Expert” 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not Knowledgeable  Expert 
 
 
VII-2. How do you feel about the impact of privacy and confidentiality legislation – in particular 
the restrictions on access to personally identifiable data (e.g. The Data Protection Act, 
The Caldicott Guidelines) – on public health? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VII-3. What do you think of the proposed research (development of a transformation)? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VII-4. What do you think of the “software agent” idea? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VII-5. Do you have any other thoughts or comments regarding this issue, the proposed 
research, or this questionnaire that you would like to share? 
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SECTION VIII – Further Participation and Contact 
 
Please indicate your desired level of anonymity and interest in further participation; you may 
check multiple boxes as applicable. Please note that leaving this section empty will default your 
response to “absolute anonymity”, rendering you answers on this questionnaire personally 
unidentifiable and removing yourself from any further contact or participation. 
 
 You may link my identity to my responses on this questionnaire for clarifications and follow-
up 
 Please send me a summary of the findings of this questionnaire, once completed 
 Please send me periodic updates on the progress of this research by email to the address 
given below 
 I am interested in piloting the results of this research 
 
If you checked any of the above boxes, please complete your details below. Your personal 
information will be stored in a password-protected directory within the Public Health Agency of 
Canada, and will be protected according to the Access to Information Act and the Privacy Act.  
 
Name:  _____________________________________________________________ 
 
Title:  _____________________________________________________________ 
 
Organization: _____________________________________________________________ 
 
Address: _____________________________________________________________ 
 
 _____________________________________________________________ 
 
E-Mail: _____________________________________________________________ 
 
Phone: _____________________________________________________________ 
 
Preferred Method of Contact:  Phone  Fax   E-Mail  Mail 
 
Are you in possession of any personally identifiable data that you can use for testing and 
evaluation of the developed transformation? 
 
  YES    NO 
 
 
 
Dear Public Health Professional,  
 
Thank you so much for taking the time to complete this questionnaire; your responses will help 
assess the impact of privacy and confidentiality legislation on public health research, and will be 
used to investigate and develop a disease-specific solution, which will, in turn, enhance 
strategic decisions and research in public health.  
 
Once again, many thanks for your time, and I look forward to enhancing public health practice 
by exploring this issue, and its solution, further with you. Should you have any comments, 
questions or concerns, please feel free to send me an email or give me a ring.  
 
Best wishes, 
 
Philip AbdelMalik 
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C. Full survey findings 
SECTION I – A little about you…  
 
I-1  What would you say is the scope of the bulk of your involvement in public health?  
(If more than one, please select only your main involvement) 
CANADA 
Scope Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Frequency 
Cumulative 
Percent 
National 19 28.79 19 28.79 
North American 2 3.03 21 31.82 
Provincial / Territorial 16 24.24 37 56.06 
Regional / Local 29 43.94 66 100.00 
 
UK 
Scope Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Frequency 
Cumulative 
Percent 
European 1 3.57 1 3.57 
Local 7 25.00 8 28.57 
National 2 7.14 10 35.71 
Regional 17 60.71 27 96.43 
Skip 1 3.57 28 100.00 
 
 
I-2  With which public health organization are you currently employed / affiliated? 
(If more than one, please select only your main organization) 
CANADA 
Organisation Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Frequency 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Health Canada 1 1.52 1 1.52 
Independent planning 
consultant 
1 1.52 2 3.03 
Newfoundland & Labrador 
Centre for Health 
Information 
1 1.52 3 4.55 
Other federal government 
agency 
1 1.52 4 6.06 
Other non-government 
association 
5 7.25 9 13.64 
Primary care networks & a 
regional health authority 
contract 
1 1.52 10 15.15 
Private consultant 1 1.52 11 16.67 
Provincial government 10 15.15 21 31.82 
Public Health Agency of 
Canada 
15 22.73 36 54.55 
Regional / local health 
authority 
27 40.91 63 95.45 
University / Academia 3 4.55 66 100.00 
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UK (a) 
Organisation Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Frequency 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Association of Public 
Health Observatories 
2 7.14 2 7.14 
Department of Health 1 3.57 3 10.71 
Health Board 1 3.57 4 14.29 
NHS 2 7.14 6 21.43 
PCT 5 17.86 11 39.29 
Public Health 
Observatory* 
13 46.43 24 85.71 
Special Health Authority 1 3.57 25 89.29 
University / Academia 3 10.71 28 100.00 
*UK (b) 
Observatory Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Frequency 
Cumulative 
Percent 
ERPHO 3 23.08 3 23.08 
NEPHO 1 7.69 4 30.77 
NWPHO 1 7.69 5 38.46 
SEPHO 2 15.38 7 53.85 
SWPHO 5 38.46 12 92.31 
YHPHO 1 7.69 13 100.00 
 
 
I-3  Please indicate your current specific area(s) of expertise: (Check as many as apply) 
CANADA  UK 
Area of Expertise Freq % (n=64)  Area of Expertise Freq % (n=27) 
Aboriginal Health 10 15.63  Aboriginal Health 0 0.00 
Chronic Diseases 18 28.13  Chronic Diseases 6 22.22 
Child / Paediatric Public 
Health 
14 21.88  Child / Paediatric Public 
Health 
5 18.52 
Communicable / 
Infectious  
30 46.88  Communicable / 
Infectious  
2 7.41 
Dental Public Health 3 4.69  Dental Public Health 2 7.41 
Emergency Prep & 
Response 
12 18.75  Emergency Prep & 
Response 
1 3.70 
Environment  18 28.13  Environment  4 14.81 
Ethics, PH Law, Privacy, 
etc 
2 3.13  Ethics, PH Law, Privacy, 
etc 
1 3.70 
Food & Nutrition 3 4.69  Food & Nutrition 2 7.41 
Genetics 0 0.00  Genetics 0 0.00 
Health Services  16 25.00  Health Services  4 14.81 
Injuries / Disability 6 9.38  Injuries / Disability 1 3.70 
Mental Health & Sub 
Misuse  
4 6.25  Mental Health & Sub 
Misuse  
3 11.11 
Occupational Health 0 0.00  Occupational Health 0 0.00 
Social Determinants of 
Health  
15 23.44  Social Determinants of 
Health  
12 44.44 
Surveillance 29 45.31  Surveillance 4 14.81 
Other 11 17.19  Other 13 48.15 
Not Specified 2 3.13  Not Specified 1 3.70 
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I-4  Which of the following best describe your roles or functions as a public health 
professional?  
(If more than one, please select only your main roles) 
CANADA 
Main Role Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Frequency 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Consultant 5 7.58 5 7.58 
Educator 1 1.52 6 9.09 
Front Line 2 3.03 8 12.12 
Health Protection 1 1.52 9 13.64 
Manager or Coordinator 16 24.24 25 37.88 
Public Educator, GIS 
Project Manager, Health 
Researcher 
1 1.52 26 39.39 
Research & Analysis 32 48.48 58 87.88 
Senior Epidemiologist 1 1.52 59 89.39 
Strategic Decision / Policy 
Maker 
6 9.09 65 98.48 
Surveillance & Content 
Expert Advisor 
1 1.52 66 100.00 
 
UK 
Main Role Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Frequency 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Consultant 2 7.14 2 7.14 
Manager or Coordinator 2 7.14 4 14.29 
Research & Analysis 18 64.29 22 78.57 
Specialist in Public Health 
Intelligence 
1 3.57 23 82.14 
Strategic Decision / Policy 
Maker 
5 17.86 28 100.00 
 
I-5  Thinking of your regular activities, how much of your time (roughly, as a percentage) 
would you typically spend doing each of the following? 
CANADA 
Main Role 
N, Mean, (STD) & Range percentage of time spent on activity 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 – Strategic Decision / 
Policy Maker  
6 
44.17 
(29.23) 
15 – 100 
5 
41.00 
(13.42) 
30 – 60 
5 
16.80 
(4.60) 
10 – 20 
5 
8.00 
(4.47) 
5 – 15 
2 
3.00 
(2.83) 
1 – 5 
0 
2 – Manager / 
Coordinator 
15 
18.67 
(12.60) 
10 – 55 
16 
51.25 
(17.84) 
20 – 90 
12 
18.00 
(14.10) 
1 – 50 
10 
19.00 
(13.70) 
5 – 50  
6 
5.33 
(4.03) 
1 – 10 
2 
10.50 
(13.44) 
1 – 20 
3 – Consultant  2 
17.50 
(10.61) 
10 – 25  
2 
32.50 
(24.75) 
15 – 50  
5 
47.00 
(25.40) 
10 – 80  
5 
31.00 
(16.73) 
10 – 50  
1 
10.00 
0 
4 – Research & Analysis 16 
7.63 
(3.10) 
5 – 15  
16 
20.06 
(12.94) 
1 – 50  
24 
17.83 
(8.55) 
5 – 33  
32 
68.22 
(22.05) 
33 – 100  
4 
6.50 
(4.36) 
1 – 10  
6 
14.17 
(15.83) 
1 – 35  
5 – Front-Line 1 
5.00 
 
 
2 
22.50 
(17.68) 
10 – 35  
2 
15.00 
(7.07) 
10 – 20  
2 
15.00 
(0) 
 
2 
30.00 
(0) 
 
1 
30.00 
6 – Other  4 
10.00 
(4.08) 
5 – 15  
3 
30.00 
(17.32) 
20 – 50  
4 
15.00 
(7.07) 
10 – 25  
4 
18.75 
(6.29) 
10 – 25  
2 
12.50 
(10.61) 
5 – 20  
4 
48.75 
(27.20) 
20 – 85  
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UK 
Main Role 
N, Mean, (STD) & Range percentage of time spent on activity 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 – Strategic Decision / 
Policy Maker  
5 
56.00 
(5.48) 
50 – 60  
5 
28.00 
(8.37) 
20 – 40  
3 
10.00 
(0) 
 
4 
10.00 
(0) 
1 
10.00 
 
0 
 
2 – Manager / 
Coordinator 
2 
17.50 
(17.68) 
5 – 30  
2 
55.00 
(21.21) 
40 – 70  
2 
15.00 
(7.07) 
10 – 20  
2 
10.00 
(0) 
 
1 
5.00 
 
0 
 
3 – Consultant  2 
30.00 
(14.14) 
20 – 40  
2 
25.00 
(7.07) 
20 – 30  
2 
20.00 
(14.14) 
10 – 30  
2 
15.00 
(7.07) 
10 – 20  
1 
10.00 
1 
10.00 
4 – Research & Analysis 5 
22.00 
(11.51) 
10 – 40  
11 
23.64 
(14.85) 
5 - 50 
5 
6.00 
(2.24) 
5 – 10  
17 
66.18 
(29.61) 
10 – 100  
1 
5.00 
 
2 
22.50 
(17.68) 
10 – 35  
5 – Front-Line 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6 – Other  1 
0.00 
1 
10.00 
1 
20.00 
1 
30.00 
0 1 
40.00 
 
 
I-6  In which of the roles you identified above are you most likely to use or require the use 
of personally identifiable data? 
CANADA 
Main Role 
Role in which most likely to use PID (n, %) 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 99 
1 – Strategic Decision / Policy 
Maker  
 2 
33.33 
 1 
16.67 
2 
33.33 
1 
16.67 
  
2 – Manager / Coordinator  1 
6.25 
3 
18.75 
2 
12.50 
6 
37.50 
2 
12.50 
 2 
12.50 
3 – Consultant     3 
60.00 
2 
40.00 
   
4 – Research & Analysis 1 
3.13 
   27 
84.38 
1 
3.13 
 3 
9.38 
5 – Front-Line     1 
50.00 
1 
50.00 
  
6 – Other      4 
80.00 
 1 
20.00 
 
TOTALS 
1 
1.52 
3 
4.55 
3 
4.55 
6 
9.09 
42 
63.64 
5 
7.58 
1 
1.52 
5 
7.58 
 
UK 
Main Role 
Role in which most likely to use PID (n, %) 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 77 
1 – Strategic Decision / Policy 
Maker  
 2 
40.00 
  3 
60.00 
   
2 – Manager / Coordinator   1 
50.00 
 1 
50.00 
   
3 – Consultant      1 
50.00 
1 
50.00 
  
4 – Research & Analysis     16 
88.89 
 1 
5.56 
1 
5.56 
5 – Front-Line         
6 – Other      1 
100.00 
   
TOTALS 
 2 
7.14 
1 
3.57 
 22 
78.57 
1 
3.57 
1 
3.57 
1 
3.57 
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I-7  Do you have or foresee a need for including geographic location of health data in your 
roles or organization? 
CANADA 
Response Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Frequency 
Cumulative 
Percent 
YES 66 100.00 66 100.00 
NO 0 0.00 0 0.00 
 
UK 
Response Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Frequency 
Cumulative 
Percent 
YES 27 96.43 27 96.43 
NO 0 0 27 96.73 
No Response 1 3.57 28 100.00 
 
I-8  Geographic Information Systems (GIS) are tools that allow you to visualise and analyse 
your data spatially – that is, using their geographical location on earth. In which of the 
roles you identified above would GIS be useful? 
CANADA UK 
Role N  Role N 
1 – Strategic Decision / Policy Maker  35  1 – Strategic Decision / Policy Maker  16 
2 – Manager / Coordinator 19  2 – Manager / Coordinator 5 
3 – Consultant  26  3 – Consultant  3 
4 – Research & Analysis 55  4 – Research & Analysis 24 
5 – Front-Line 17  5 – Front-Line 3 
6 – Other  5  6 – Other  2 
 
I-9  What GIS application(s) do you currently use, or have you used in the past? 
CANADA UK 
GIS Application N  GIS Application N 
PHMG 17  PHMG 0 
ESRI 25  ESRI 10 
MapInfo 19  MapInfo 18 
Other 14  Other 8 
No GIS 15  No GIS 6 
 
I-10  At what level(s) of geography do you visualise your data and/or conduct spatial 
analyses for each product you use? 
CANADA 
Level PHMG Other Web-based Desktop GIS 
Latitude & Longitude 5 10 12 
Street Address 7 8 12 
Dissemination Area 9 7 14 
Postal Code 14 14 19 
Census Subdivision 12 7 16 
Census Division 11 10 14 
Forward Sortation Area 7 5 12 
Urban – Rural 8 6 13 
Provincial 6 11 12 
Don‟t Use 4 1 2 
Skipped / Did not respond 37 27 26 
 
UK 
Level Other Web-based Desktop GIS 
Latitude & Longitude 3 4 
Street Address 2 3 
Post Code 14 11 
Community Name 7 5 
City / Town / Village 5 7 
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Region / Geographic Area 12 11 
Urban – Rural 7 9 
Skipped / Did not respond 6 7 
 
Other identified geographies used: 
CANADA UK 
- Nursing Districts 
- Location/Public Health Units 
- Emergency Locator Numbers 
- Census Tracts 
- Locally defined / custom 
neighbourhoods and regions 
- International geographies 
- Municipalities 
- Watershed 
- Local Authorities 
- Counties 
- Output Areas 
- Primary Care Trusts 
- Wards 
- Census Areas 
- British National Grid 
- Other administrative boundaries 
 
I-11  Are you or have you been restricted in your use of GIS for any public health activity 
because of privacy concerns (i.e. map or data might identify an individual or 
community)? 
CANADA 
Main Role 
Restricted in GIS use because of privacy? (n, %) 
NO YES Not Specified 
1 – Strategic Decision / Policy 
Maker  
1 
16.67 
3 
50.00 
2 
33.33 
2 – Manager / Coordinator 1 
6.25 
6 
37.50 
9 
56.25 
3 – Consultant  0 
0.00 
 
3 
60.00 
2 
40.00 
4 – Research & Analysis 5 
15.63 
18 
56.25 
9 
28.13 
5 – Front-Line 2 
100.00 
0 
0.00 
0 
0.00 
6 – Other  1 
20.00 
4 
80.00 
0 
0.00 
TOTALS 
10 
15.15 
34 
51.52 
22 
33.33 
TOTALS (of those responding 
only) 
10 
22.73 
34 
77.27 
 
 
UK 
Main Role 
Restricted in GIS use because of privacy? (n, %) 
NO YES Not Specified 
1 – Strategic Decision / Policy 
Maker  
0 
0.00 
3 
60.00 
2 
40.00 
2 – Manager / Coordinator 1 
50.00 
0 
0.00 
1 
50.00 
3 – Consultant  0 
0.00 
1 
50.00 
1 
50.00 
4 – Research & Analysis 2 
11.11 
10 
55.56 
6 
33.33 
5 – Front-Line 0 
0.00 
0 
0.00 
0 
0.00 
6 – Other  0 
0.00 
1 
100.00 
0 
0.00 
TOTALS 
3 
10.71 
15 
53.57 
10 
35.71 
TOTALS (of those responding 
only) 
3 
16.67 
15 
83.33 
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I-12  Setting privacy issues aside and in light of your response to the previous question, at 
what level(s) of geography would you ideally like to visualise your data and/or conduct 
spatial analyses for each product you use? 
 
CANADA 
Minimum granularity Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Frequency 
Cumulative 
Percent 
BLANK 16 24.24 16 24.24 
CSD 1 1.52 17 25.76 
CT 1 1.52 18 27.27 
Cadastre 1 1.52 19 28.79 
Custom 1 1.52 20 30.30 
DA 5 7.58 25 37.88 
DEPENDS 1 1.52 26 39.39 
ELN 1 1.52 27 40.91 
LatLong 21 31.82 48 72.73 
Municipality 1 1.52 49 74.24 
PC 3 4.55 52 78.79 
PHU 1 1.52 53 80.30 
SKIP 3 4.55 56 84.85 
Street 9 13.64 65 98.48 
SubRegion 1 1.52 66 100.00 
 
LatLong or Street or ELN 31 46.97 
Of those responding only (n=47): 
LatLong or Street or ELN 31 65.96 
 
UK 
Minimum granularity Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Frequency 
Cumulative 
Percent 
BLANK 4 14.29 4 14.29 
DEPENDS 1 3.57 5 17.86 
Household 1 3.57 6 21.43 
LatLong 3 10.71 9 32.14 
OTHER 4 14.29 13 46.43 
PC 11 39.29 24 85.71 
SKIP 1 3.57 25 89.29 
Street 13 10.71 28 100.00 
 
LatLong or Street or 
Household 
17 60.71 
Of those responding only (n=23): 
LatLong or Street or 
Household 
17 73.91 
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SECTIONS II & III – Access to data  
 
NOTE: The term “access” as used in this survey implies the ability to actually 
acquire individual level data so you can work with it directly. 
 
II-1  Do you currently have access to PID?  
CANADA 
Response Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Frequency 
Cumulative 
Percent 
NO 15 22.73 15 22.73 
YES 48 72.72 63 95.45 
No Response 3 4.55 66 100.00 
 
UK 
Response Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Frequency 
Cumulative 
Percent 
NO 4 14.29 4 14.29 
YES 23 82.14 27 96.43 
No Response 1 3.57 28 100.00 
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The following results show, where applicable, responses of both, those with access to PID and 
those without.  
 
II-2  From a privacy and organisational bureaucracy perspective, how easy would you say it 
is for you to access this PID when you need it? 
Please circle the appropriate number, 1 being “Extremely difficult”, and 10 being “Very 
easy” 
 
III-3  How easy would it be for you to access the PID you identified above, if you were to 
need it? 
Please circle the appropriate number, with 1 being “Impossible”, and 10 being “Very 
easy” 
 
CANADA 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 77  99 
First Name 3 19 6 3 3 2 1 4 4 4 5 0 12 
Last Name 3 19 7 2 3 2 1 4 2 3 8 0 12 
Initials 10 14 4 5 2 2 2 2 2 2 6 0 15 
Sex 5 1 1 1 0 3 0 9 8 8 21 0 9 
Date of Birth / Age 4 4 2 3 0 6 1 9 8 5 15 0 9 
Date of death 6 6 3 1 4 8 1 8 6 3 9 0 11 
Provincial Health 
Insurance Plan 
Number 
9 20 3 2 1 5 1 5 3 3 2 0 12 
Hospital ID 9 11 7 2 2 7 1 5 2 1 7 1 11 
Registered GP / 
Family Physician 
3 2 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 47 10 
Street Address 0 3 1 1 1 2 0 0 1 0 1 47 9 
Postal Code 0 1 0 0 1 4 0 2 2 1 1 47 7 
Community Name 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 2 3 47 7 
City / Town / Village 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 2 3 4 47 7 
Region / 
Geographic Area 
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 1 2 6 47 7 
Latitude / Longitude 3 1 3 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 1 47 8 
 
UK 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 77 99 
Forename(s) 2 8 4 2 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 8 
Surname 2 8 5 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 8 
Initials 2 7 4 2 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 8 
Sex 0 1 1 2 0 1 0 1 3 1 12 0 6 
Date of Birth / Age 0 1 2 2 0 2 0 3 3 1 8 0 6 
Date of death 0 1 2 1 0 3 0 1 2 0 12 0 6 
NHS Number (OLD) 5 7 2 1 0 4 0 1 1 0 10 0 6 
NHS Number (NEW) 2 5 1 2 1 5 0 0 2 0 3 0 7 
Registered GP / 
Family Physician 
0 0 0 2 0 3 0 0 0 0 1 16 6 
Street Address 1 3 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 16 6 
Postcode 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 16 6 
Community Name 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 16 7 
City / Town / Village 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 1 16 6 
Region / Geographic 
Area 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 2 16 6 
Latitude / Longitude 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 16 6 
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II-3  On average, how often do you access the PID you identified above?  
Please circle the appropriate number, 1 being “Rarely”, and 10 being “All the time” 
CANADA 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 77 88 99 
First Name 14 10 6 2 2 1 3 1 0 1 4 0 17 5 
Last Name 14 8 6 3 2 2 3 1 0 1 4 0 17 5 
Initials 20 5 5 3 1 1 0 1 1 1 2 0 17 9 
Sex 3 1 0 1 1 5 4 6 3 5 16 0 17 4 
Date of Birth / Age 4 2 0 2 1 6 3 6 5 6 10 0 17 4 
Date of death 8 5 1 5 1 6 1 5 1 4 8 0 17 4 
Provincial Health 
Insurance Plan 
Number 
22 7 2 2 1 6 2 1 1 0 1 0 17 4 
Hospital ID 14 10 2 3 2 2 3 1 2 0 5 0 17 5 
Registered GP / 
Family Physician 
5 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 36 17 4 
Street Address 3 0 1 0 0 2 1 1 0 0 1 36 17 4 
Postal Code 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 2 1 1 2 36 17 4 
Community Name 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 1 1 1 3 36 17 4 
City / Town / 
Village 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 3 3 36 17 4 
Region / 
Geographic Area 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 5 36 17 4 
Latitude / 
Longitude 
3 2 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 36 17 4 
 
UK 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 77 88 99 
Forename(s) 10 4 4 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 4 4 
Surname 10 4 3 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 4 4 
Initials 9 6 2 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 4 4 
Sex 1 2 2 0 0 0 1 3 0 3 8 0 4 4 
Date of Birth / Age 1 2 2 1 0 0 1 5 1 3 4 0 4 4 
Date of death 1 2 2 1 1 3 0 3 0 2 5 0 4 4 
NHS Number (OLD) 7 6 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 4 4 
NHS Number (NEW) 5 3 3 2 1 3 0 1 1 0 0 0 4 5 
Registered GP / 
Family Physician 
0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 15 4 4 
Street Address 0 3 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 15 4 4 
Postcode 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 3 15 4 4 
Community Name 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 15 4 5 
City / Town / Village 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 15 4 4 
Region / Geographic 
Area 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 1 15 4 4 
Latitude / Longitude 2 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 4 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 79 
 
II-4  How useful / important is this PID to you and your roles and responsibilities? 
Please circle the appropriate number, with 1 being “Not at all useful”, and 10 being 
“Critical to my roles and responsibilities” 
 
III-2  How useful to you and your roles and responsibilities (as identified in Section I) would 
access to the PID you identified above be? 
Please circle the appropriate number, with 1 being “Not at all useful”, and 10 being 
“Very useful – would greatly enhance by roles and responsibilities” 
 
CANADA 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 77 99 
First Name 6 15 6 7 1 4 2 3 3 2 3 0 14 
Last Name 6 15 4 5 2 4 1 3 4 3 5 0 14 
Initials 9 15 5 4 2 6 2 0 1 1 3 0 18 
Sex 1 2 2 1 1 3 1 5 10 5 24 0 11 
Date of Birth / Age 1 2 1 1 0 1 4 4 10 8 24 0 10 
Date of death 3 2 1 3 0 6 4 3 6 8 18 0 12 
Provincial Health 
Insurance Plan 
Number 
11 12 6 3 2 4 2 4 3 2 7 0 10 
Hospital ID 6 12 8 2 2 5 4 1 2 2 7 0 15 
Registered GP / 
Family Physician 
1 5 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 47 9 
Street Address 1 2 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 2 1 47 9 
Postal Code 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 2 3 47 10 
Community Name 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 1 2 3 47 9 
City / Town / Village 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 2 4 47 9 
Region / 
Geographic Area 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 2 4 47 9 
Latitude / Longitude 1 1 2 0 0 1 1 0 1 2 1 47 9 
 
UK 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 77 99 
Forename(s) 2 11 3 3 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 6 
Surname 2 11 3 3 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 6 
Initials 3 13 1 3 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 6 
Sex 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 13 0 6 
Date of Birth / Age 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 4 4 10 0 6 
Date of death 0 1 0 2 0 3 0 4 2 1 9 0 6 
NHS Number (OLD) 3 8 2 2 1 3 2 1 0 0 0 0 6 
NHS Number (NEW) 1 2 0 2 1 5 3 2 2 0 3 0 7 
Registered GP / 
Family Physician 
0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 16 7 
Street Address 0 2 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 16 6 
Postcode 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 5 16 6 
Community Name 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 16 7 
City / Town / Village 0 1 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 16 6 
Region / Geographic 
Area 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 3 16 6 
Latitude / Longitude 0 4 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 16 6 
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II-5  What impact would removal of your access to this PID have on the quality of your work 
and resulting public health decisions? 
Please circle the appropriate number, with 1 being “No impact – quality would not 
suffer”, and 10 being “Severe Impact - results and decisions would be severely 
compromised” 
 
III-4  What impact has your lack of access to this PID had on the quality of your work and 
resulting public health decisions? 
Please circle the appropriate number, with 1 being “No impact – quality has not 
suffered”, and 10 being “Severe Impact - results and decisions have been severely 
compromised” 
 
CANADA 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 77 99 
First Name 4 19 2 5 3 3 4 3 3 1 5 0 14 
Last Name 4 19 2 4 3 3 3 2 3 3 6 0 14 
Initials 6 19 3 4 6 2 2 3 1 1 2 0 17 
Sex 2 4 1 1 0 3 4 3 4 9 24 0 11 
Date of Birth / Age 2 4 1 1 1 3 1 4 6 8 24 0 11 
Date of death 3 5 0 2 5 2 3 4 5 6 18 0 13 
Provincial Health 
Insurance Plan 
Number 
5 18 5 5 1 4 1 3 4 1 5 0 14 
Hospital ID 4 14 10 3 1 4 1 2 4 1 6 0 16 
Registered GP / 
Family Physician 
1 5 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 44 12 
Street Address 1 2 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 2 44 12 
Postal Code 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 2 3 44 12 
Community Name 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 2 1 4 44 11 
City / Town / Village 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 1 4 44 12 
Region / 
Geographic Area 
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 0 6 44 11 
Latitude / Longitude 1 4 1 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 44 12 
 
UK 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 77 99 
Forename(s) 4 11 1 3 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 6 
Surname 4 10 2 2 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 6 
Initials 4 10 2 3 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 6 
Sex 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 4 4 12 0 5 
Date of Birth / Age 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 1 3 2 14 0 5 
Date of death 0 2 0 2 0 0 1 5 2 2 9 0 5 
NHS Number (OLD) 3 11 4 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 6 
NHS Number (NEW) 3 4 1 1 2 2 0 1 4 1 3 0 6 
Registered GP / 
Family Physician 
1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 18 5 
Street Address 0 1 0 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 18 5 
Postcode 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 18 5 
Community Name 0 2 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 18 6 
City / Town / Village 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 18 5 
Region / Geographic 
Area 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 3 18 5 
Latitude / Longitude 0 3 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 18 5 
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II-6  What PID do you currently NOT have access to, but believe would be beneficial to you 
to further enhance your work and resulting public health decisions? (Check as many 
as apply) 
 
III-1  Having access to which of the following PID would facilitate your roles and 
responsibilities, or enhance your work and improve resulting public health decisions? 
(Check as many as apply) 
 
CANADA 
 NO YES 88 99 Missing 
First Name 6 3 17 10 30 
Last Name 6 4 17 10 29 
Initials 6 1 17 10 32 
Sex 6 1 17 10 32 
Date of Birth / Age 6 2 17 10 31 
Date of death 6 5 17 10 28 
Provincial Health 
Insurance Plan 
Number 
6 8 17 10 25 
Hospital ID 6 6 17 10 27 
Registered GP / 
Family Physician 
6 16 17 10 17 
Street Address 6 9 17 10 24 
Postal Code 6 8 17 10 25 
Community Name 6 5 17 10 28 
City / Town / Village 6 5 17 10 28 
Region / Geographic 
Area 
6 3 17 10 30 
Latitude / Longitude 6 10 17 10 23 
 
UK 
 NO YES 88 99 Missing 
Forename(s) 5 0 4 7 12 
Surname 5 1 4 8 10 
Initials 5 1 4 8 10 
Sex 5 0 4 8 11 
Date of Birth / Age 5 0 4 8 11 
Date of death 5 0 4 8 11 
NHS Number (OLD) 5 3 4 8 8 
NHS Number (NEW) 5 3 4 8 8 
Registered GP / 
Family Physician 
5 5 4 8 6 
Street Address 5 2 4 8 9 
Postcode 5 2 4 8 9 
Community Name 5 0 4 8 11 
City / Town / Village 5 0 4 8 11 
Region / Geographic 
Area 
5 0 4 8 11 
Latitude / Longitude 5 0 4 8 11 
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SECTION IV – Privacy Issues  
 
This section pertains to the field of public health in general, and uses the term “public health 
practice” to refer to its various activities, including research, surveillance, health service delivery, 
strategic policy and decision making, etc. The goal is to get your opinion, as a public health 
professional, on the overall impact of restricted access to PID on public health practice in 
Canada. These questions ask for your opinion; if you‟re not sure how to answer a question in 
this section, please just hazard a guess! 
 
NOTE: The term “access” as used in this survey implies the ability to actually 
acquire individual level data so you can work with it directly. 
 
IV-1  In your opinion, do current restrictions on access to PID pose an obstacle to any 
aspects of public health practice (e.g. research, surveillance, etc.)? 
Please circle the appropriate number, with 1 being “Not an obstacle at all”, and 10 
being “Yes, they pose a serious threat to accurate public health practice” 
CANADA 
Restriction Score Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Frequency 
Cumulative 
Percent 
0 5 7.69 5 7.69 
1 1 1.54 6 9.23 
2 6 9.23 12 18.46 
3 2 3.08 14 21.54 
4 2 3.08 16 24.62 
5 7 10.77 23 35.38 
6 9 13.85 32 49.23 
7 11 16.92 43 66.15 
8 10 15.38 53 81.54 
9 3 4.62 56 86.15 
10 6 9.23 62 95.38 
99 3 4.62 65 100.00 
Missing 1  66  
 
UK 
Restriction Score Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Frequency 
Cumulative 
Percent 
0 0 0.00 0 0.00 
1 2 7.41 2 7.41 
2 1 3.70 3 11.11 
3 0 0.00 3 11.11 
4 0 0.00 3 11.11 
5 3 11.11 6 22.22 
6 3 11.11 9 33.33 
7 4 14.81 13 48.15 
8 6 22.22 19 70.37 
9 3 11.11 22 81.48 
10 4 14.81 26 96.30 
99 1 3.70 27 100.00 
Missing 1  28  
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IV-2  How amenable would you be to other professionals in the public health field having 
access to your PID for public health research and analyses (e.g. your address, date of 
birth, etc.) to improve public health delivery, service, etc? 
 
CANADA 
 NO YES Maybe Skip Missing 
Frequency 3 40 19 3 1 
Percent 4.62 61.54 29.23 4.62 - 
 
RESPONSES 
Reputable public health professionals would not share the data with outside agencies, right? If it 
would be used only for the purpose of improving public health - by all means 'go ahead' 
Depends on what else goes with the PID 
Really depends on issue and level. For many things just need unique identifier so that various 
information sources can be linked. Can do anonymously. Sometimes large clusters are 
adequate. Other situations specifically need to know individual for contact tracing etc. Generally 
for research purposes only need to know that counting once, and depending on issue, to be 
able to identify geographical aggregation or demographics etc. 
I would need to have some information about how the data was going to be used and what data 
elements were required. 
Except for some conditions, I'd be OK with this 
Depends - age, sex, clinical info, postal code okay. 
NOT first/last name, address. 
It would be no problem as long as the information did not include name, address for example 
but could include sex, date of birth , region or postal code 
I think that each case has to be weighed up on its individual merits. If the data were misused, it 
could have severe negative ramifications for everyone. The policy in PH practice should be to 
use the minimum amount of private information as possible. Some researchers may feel a 
pressure to publish and forego this rule. Hence I think checks have to be put in place. 
It depends on what conditions are set, what training they have, and what their needs are for the 
data. 
Yes with the understanding that the information was secure and used only for stated purpose 
I would want to know the purpose from a research perspective, from a surveillance or disease 
control I would be less averse 
I would share my information but would like to have an opportunity to consent based on the type 
or purpose of study/research rather than just a blanket/implied consent. I would be comfortable 
with Public Health Organizations accessing data, less comfortable with academic curiosity-
driven research and not at all comfortable for commercial companies to have access unless I 
gave explicit consent. 
I would also like to know that an ethical review of research has been done prior to any release 
of information to the researcher. 
These questions are very context specific. In the case of an outbreak and response - I think PID 
should be available to officials. In terms of research - it depends on who is doing the research 
and why...thus let an ethics committee have the ability to make this decision. If handled as such, 
I would have no problems with allowing for the use of my address and date of birth. 
Would require the researcher to submit a research proposal to determine consistent use of data 
and measures to protect privacy and confidentiality 
This is an awkward question because I keep picturing colleagues being able to identify me!! I 
think if it were still kept somewhat "unidentifiable" i.e. year of birth rather than full date, name 
removed, postal code, etc. that it would be completely fine. 
If confidentiality of this information can be respected , I would be fine with it. 
Yes, as long as results from the research were published without providing public access to raw 
data - i.e. give my PID to public health researchers to conduct research, but use it for 
aggregating results in published reports. Also - PID should be tracked - i.e. distribution of PID 
should be subject to appropriate data licenses. 
I think we need to strike a balance. A great deal of solid work can be accomplished with nominal 
data that has a unique identifier attached but no personal identifier attached. It is important to be 
able to accurately attest that the nominal data are "unique". It is far less important to attach a 
personal identifier. 
Depends on who is using the info how it is being used. 
  
 84 
 
IV-2  How amenable would you be to other professionals in the public health field having 
access to your PID for public health research and analyses (e.g. your address, 
date of birth, etc.) to improve public health delivery, service, etc? 
 
UK 
 NO YES Maybe Skip Missing 
Frequency 0 18 9 0 1 
Percent 0.00 66.67 33.33 0.00 - 
 
RESPONSES 
Only if appropriate confidentiality agreements and secure access arrangements were in place 
No problem as long as it was explicit that it was to be used either for my benefit of that of others. 
I would only need to be assured there were processes in place to monitor and regulate the 
governance of the organisations and processes. 
It would depend on the situation 
Only for information that is ESSENTIAL – e.g. I would not be happy for my name to be used and 
don't believe that address (except postcode) is required. 
There is always a concern about one's personal details being given out because of identity theft, 
credit card fraud etc. I'd be happy as long as they didn't have my name.  
I would only be happy if the security of the info was ensured and that the data was being used 
for proper public health analysis! 
It depends on what assurances there are regarding the use to which the information will be put 
and whether specific individuals (or organisations) will be held responsible for how data is to be 
used. 
Best practice would be to use NHS number plus DOB, sex, postcode and names of individuals 
should not be accessed 
Depends on the system, function and purpose. GP registration data - no problem; clinical data 
should not need names; surveillance data may need address - need to know basis only. Date of  
birth no problem 
We have very little PID. (My assumption at an earlier stage of this questionnaire was that any 
PID was being referred to even that of community clients and co-workers in other partner 
organisations... this is obviously not the case.) 
 
 
IV-3a  In your opinion, what proportion of the public is aware of the impact of restricted access 
to PID on public health practice?  
(Please just guess!) Please circle the approximate proportion 
CANADA 
 Percentage of public aware of impact   
 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% NS . 
Frequency 36 10 8 3 4 2 0 0 1 0 1 1 
Percent 55.38 15.38 12.31 4.62 6.15 3.08 0.00 0.00 1.54 0.00 1.54 - 
 
UK 
 Percentage of public aware of impact   
 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% NS . 
Frequency 18 6 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Percent 66.67 22.22 3.70 0.00 0.00 3.70 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.70 - 
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IV-3b  How do you think we could increase this proportion? 
CANADA 
Television ads already reach such a broad range of the public 
Demonstration of value through reports that are meaningful to decision makers and presented in 
a way that the average person (OK maybe "less than average") can understand. PLUS 
Demonstration of where in the preparation of the report that the PID were removed, along with 
controls in place to ensure protection of privacy. 
Not sure it's a public issue as much as it is a public policy issue. As a principle the most 
anonymous least intrusive measures are what we utilize necessary to get info for the protection 
of public or individuals. Fundamental ethical principles, and true need, rather than investigator 
curiosity are what should drive it 
We need to show the public what we do with data in general and then what we would do with 
confidential data in particular. Most members of the public haven't a clue as to what public 
health professionals do (not easily visible like doctors or other health care professionals), and 
it's too easy to lump us all as "big brother" government types. 
This is not easy. Opponents to science are given every opportunity to publicize their position 
and they often do. Potential supporters of science [e.g., senior government officials, politicians, 
public health practitioners] never do. Why not? We have to answer that question first. 
Case studies, what if stories 
Public education about times that populations health is put at risk due to lack of information 
being made available that already exists. Instead of asking permission for every use of the data, 
ask people if they are aware that the data is not allowed to be used by these medical 
professionals who need it to protect their health and the health of the community! 
When individual seeks health services, they are notified, in writing of the restrictions 
Better education of the public on how this type of data is being used and why it‟s beneficial. 
By putting in place rules that would protect the individuals but at the same time enable public 
health professionals to have meaningful access to this information. 
Publicizing specific problems that arise because of lack of access - and letting people know who 
to contact and what to ask for. Need to make sure first that safeguards are well in place, as 
protection of personal info is very much an issue. Use of consent forms and information forms 
with individual contact e.g. with public health professionals and with other health system 
workers? (i.e. explaining uses of info for public health purposes as well as specifics of protecting 
privacy etc.) Might be interesting to find out about the proportion using omnibus surveys etc. 
Better communication, understanding and education 
Advertisements, informing front-line health practitioners. 
There are two sides to this ... is the public aware of the restriction & do they agree in an 
increase ... I would only agree to a strategy to increase access if there was a better 
understanding of what was trying to be accessed. I find that this is not clear to me ... preceding 
questions have been very generic & all encompassing 
I do not know the percentage so I feel that I have no useful opinion here. 
Communicate importance of this information for health research and planning purposes. 
Education of health care providers (all levels) who are responsible for the collection of the data - 
so they can accurately explain the need for the information.  
Education of politicians and policy-makers about the impact of limiting access. 
Education and awareness-building of general public about how the information can be used to 
improve their health care. 
Education of data users about need for privacy, confidentiality, and the use of small numbers - 
and how to report them accurately for the public. 
Educate on purposes of health promotion- clearly explain what the data is used for- alleviate 
concerns around reporting, e.g. reported data is aggregated 
Through education and awareness. Demonstrate to the public how access to PID information 
can further research and analyses, and ultimately improve public health and the delivery of 
services. 
media campaign to promote public health benefits to access to PID for research/analysis 
I am not sure why this question is being asked. 
Increasing public awareness of regarding the impact of restricted access to PID on Public 
Health Practice will not necessarily lead to increased access to PID for public health activities. 
Commercial media is probably the best avenue, provide information at points of contact but 
unless there is some kind of "event" or crisis I suspect it will be very difficult and even if 
informed once it will probably not be retained in memory. 
Provide examples of the benefits of providing PID 
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Education. Stress the need for access under certain conditions and that it is 'for the greater 
good'. AND ensure that people know that these data are not generally available and are 
maintained in a secure environment. 
Public education. The general public does not understand how their information can be valuable 
in research and public health practice. Connections need to be made and this can only be 
achieved through education. 
Some kind of comparative study comparing the health and public health practices of a 
community that restricted the release of PID versus a community that did not. 
media 
government lobbying 
pamphlets at doctors' offices, PH clinics 
on government websites 
lay public "scientific" journals (e.g. Canadian Parent) 
Increasing awareness. I just think individuals don‟t understand why it is important. 
Reports such as that will likely follow this survey. 
Encrypted personal ID and determine as small as possible geographic areas of which the sum 
of personal information will protect the privacy issues. 
Public education during admission to hospital; media campaign 
Highlight in media research produced as a result of PID. 
Including rational for the reasoning behind data-sharing authorization forms that the public signs 
for integrated health information systems to work properly. These explanations of the purpose 
and usefulness may create the level of understanding in the public and their subsequent buy in 
to the integrated systems and sharing of the personal health information. 
some type of marketing / advertising 
Publicise studies that are based on confidential data and stress the importance of how the 
information could not have been obtained without this individual level data 
I'm not sure that it is necessary to increase the proportion. I think most people already assume 
that we share information within the health care system. I think the bigger problem is with the 
constant emphasis on active consent. For example, our screening program for speech, motor 
skills, etc. deficits only reaches about half of kids b/c getting formal, active, positive consent is 
so difficult. There are plenty of other examples which I'm sure I'll be able to share as the survey 
continues. 
Good question!  Demonstrate use of PID for research that benefits public - in terms of new 
policies, programs, drug coverage plans, or resources that target health issues impacting 
communities / health regions across Canada. Results of research could be published in reports 
and using web mapping services in support of decision-making. Public education in doctors‟ 
offices / hospitals and of public health professionals may be needed in order to show patients 
the benefit of controlled PID usage (i.e. through appropriate licenses / safeguards) to Canadian 
health in general. The less people get sick - the less it costs our tax payer. 
Put blogs on health reports about such 
Offer information through primary health care provider i.e. family physician, media campaigns 
Promote the importance of research in public health and the benefits of prevention. 
Demonstrate the impact of a lack of data 
Information during Census data gathering 
 
UK 
Better information about how personally identifiable data is used for research. Better 
reassurance that such data will only be used for research and not for other purposes 
Better media understanding of the problem and support 
By alerting people to the INDIVIDUAL benefit they might accrue (e.g. good health service 
planning, not being asked your name 10 times when being admitted to hospital. Not being 
asked you personal details by 10 different government departments (and all of them being 
slightly wrong. I.e. demonstrate tangible benefit to user). 
Need to better inform patients about the legitimate uses for their data with good examples of 
decisions or knowledge that are of benefit them that couldn't have been made without their data. 
We also need to explain how data is secured, how they can exercise their rights un article 8 of 
the Human Rights Act. All of this falls under various sections of the Data Protection Act. 
We also need more research on public attitudes to sharing - who can/should access; what trade 
offs people are prepared to make and so forth. 
By better dissemination of Public Health information and intelligence directly to the public 
Media interesting in this topic is only covered in the health journals - needs a wider coverage as 
the implications are huge 
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Use examples of research where the public is directly benefiting from the researchers having 
had accessed to PID. Seeing is believing.  
Be clear about the safety precautions we all take when using PID, but also be upfront about why 
we need it. 
Clarity, honesty and visible benefits. 
Media coverage? 
Education 
I read the question as meaning what proportion are aware that personal details could be used in 
a useful way for analysis and in targeting initiatives etc. People, often stirred by the media, are 
generally reluctant to have their details 'out there'. There would have to be many examples of 
how better data-sharing had changed things positively in order to win the hearts and minds of 
the public. 
At the present, there appears to be an air of negativity around why personal data SHOULDN'T 
be used. Maybe there needs to be an emphasis on the benefits that this could bring, perhaps 
through describing specific cases where there would be an advantage. 
Clear examples of what valuable analysis might be undertaken if record linkage was possible 
Not sure we need to 
Why would we want to 
Raising awareness when the public interact with the NHS, probably at primary care level. But 
first the GPs have to be aware! 
By explaining at every opportunity the importance of this kind of  data  usage 
 
IV-3a  In your opinion, what proportion of the public would allow the use of PID for public 
health practice if they were asked and educated on the usefulness of such data to 
public health practice? (Please just guess!) - Please circle the approximate proportion 
CANADA 
 Percentage of public aware of impact  
 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% NS 
Frequency 2 4 8 6 10 3 7 15 7 0 3 
Percent 3.08 6.15 12.31 9.23 15.38 4.62 10.77 23.08 10.77 0.00 4.62 
 
UK 
 Percentage of public aware of impact  
 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% NS 
Frequency 1 0 4 0 5 5 4 4 3 0 1 
Percent 3.70 0.00 14.81 0.00 18.52 18.52 14.81 14.81 11.11 0.00 3.70 
 
 
IV-4b  How do you think we could increase this proportion? 
CANADA 
Guarantee security of information being held by one independent agency only 
In general, people are quite happy to talk about their own health if they perceive a benefit. We 
need to demonstrate the benefits to population health and what that means to each individual 
(in terms of access to services, individual health benefit, etc.) 
Hard to answer as kind of all or none like questions. Public and policy makers as well as 
practitioners need to engage in discussion of principles and purpose that respects both, the 
scientific need, public goods and personal protection and privacy. 
Since these estimated percentages were wild guesses, it is difficult to postulate a method to 
further increase an increase in a hypothetical number! 
Preparation of scenarios that demonstrate the utility of: - linked data for research, anonymous / 
encrypted data that are still considered personal health information and are used for 
surveillance and epidemiology purposes. 
Make it clear to the public what they will NOT GET if they refuse access to data. The BC 
Pharmacare opt-out option experience is a good example. 
Case studies, what if models 
I think it would be important to distinguish between research and other aspects of Public health 
such as surveillance. I think that there is a lot of personal information needed for Public Health 
to do its job - including follow-up of communicable diseases and surveillance and monitoring. If 
a researcher from outside of Public Health wanted access to PID, that, I think would require 
additional consent. 
Simply asking the question and making the privacy personnel aware of the wishes of the public 
so as to allow policy to match public opinion. 
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Need to demonstrate the value added in them providing access to the information as well as 
demonstrating how the data will be kept confidential (only available on a need to know basis - 
limited access) 
I think this was probably an upper end guess - although again, educating people, explaining the 
uses, showing that there is adequate protection in place for protecting personal info. Putting real 
limits on uses except where they are truly necessary (e.g. if I don‟t need to know name, then I 
shouldn't have it. If I don't need postal code, only FSA, then I should only have FSA.) 
Education programs, pieces on TV programs such as "Discovery Canada", "Quirks and 
Quarks", public workshops and town-hall meetings. 
By making it clear how the data could be used, the security ensures in place to prevent 
exposure/loss of confidentiality; clearly state the kinds of information that would/would not be 
used; assure public that data will not be passed on to another party and that use will be based 
on anonymized records. 
I think that having a review panel for scrutinizing all applications would go a long way to 
improving confidence. As well, the benefits of the access must be clearly defined and risks 
minimized. 
You can't get everyone because they are somewhat paranoid about privacy issues and will 
never understand how the data is anonymized and protected. 
Show examples of how information has been used successfully- improve access to reported 
data 
Through successful initiates that used PID information...some need to see it to believe it! Also, 
people tend to understand the issues better if it directly affects them or a loved one. 
Address fears that public have regarding reasons for collecting data and security of data 
I don't think you can increase this proportion, and if so, not by very much unfortunately. 
My opinion is that the risk perception regarding the implications of disclosure of personal 
information in the general public is very high. The majority of the public will always be reluctant 
to enable access to their personal information unless they themselves/close family/friends are 
involved in a situation where the benefits of access to PID are very evident. 
I think there will always be reluctance by some again information at point of contact, case 
studies demonstrating importance an relevance to public health might be useful 
When the public were asked to let their PID be used in the Walkerton study 95 % said yes. I 
think that is about as good as we will ever get. 
Again - simply through education and illustration of how these data might be used. 
Regular and consistent public education, including how the information will be used and how it 
will be safeguarded. 
See 4.3B - Note the results of this study should be made available to the public through various 
types of media 
Same as 4.3b 
Awareness 
Showing some evidences that personal information can be used for public health practices but 
at the same time can be protected to be available without control. 
Explain how it is used and why. Give examples of research and policy that have been 
advantaged by the use of PID. State explicitly how id is protected 
Highlight case stories in which research using PID has helped identify information pertinent to 
managing /preventing disease. 
One on one personalized requests with the more determined individuals. This level of 
personalized request may be required for some people, perhaps when they were to request 
health services. Also during this discussion they could be informed of the percentage of people 
that HAVE already agreed to this, some might find security in knowing that the majority of their 
community has done this already. 
Put into law that their PID would be only used for research 
This is an interesting question. I guess it would depend on the procedure. Existing consent 
procedures indicate that about 85% of new mothers give consent in hospital to a follow-up 
telephone call from public health. I suspect that the other 15% aren't trying to hide their personal 
health information; they simply do not want the follow-up service. Perhaps a small proportion 
doesn‟t trust public health b/c they may know someone who had a run-in with CAS that was 
precipitated by a public health home visit. In such cases, the needs of the child have to be 
weighed against the privacy rights of the parents. 
1. Public Education 
2. Signed Release Forms (nightmare in terms of paperwork) 
3. Through Data License Agreements protecting PID during research - held by Privacy 
Commissioner. 
4. Through Canadian Privacy Legislation 
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It will take a concerted effort especially if the data involves highly sensitive information such as 
sexually transmitted diseases and other such information. Public health will also have to 
demonstrate very tangible benefits of having access to such data and those "benefits" will have 
to mean something to the average lay person, not just the public health professionals. 
Offer information through primary caregiver, media campaigns 
Prove that information will remain confidential 
* Info during Census data gathering 
* address this question directly on government web site 
* Info at hospital during event 
 
UK 
Better education/information about the consequences of not doing so 
If they were given practical examples of how it might benefit them and their families. (e.g. 
vaccination recall, better access to targeted population health care interventions such as 
screening) 
It should be a condition of treatment that data maybe used for research/ public health and 
implied or opt-out consent should be the default. 
By better communication of the benefits and guarantees of the privacy of information not 
required - e.g. name 
Clearly outline the importance of PIDs to tackling morbidity and mortality - 
Not sure you could convince everybody… 
Provide public with more information regarding how the data are used, what for and potential 
benefits of providing the data and negative impact of missing data for research and public 
health improvement 
Popular media coverage 
Get media backing of the way that this has helped public health practice and also publicise how 
not sharing PID can lead to tragedies and missed opportunities - I'm thinking of the examples of 
Holly and Jessica in the Soham murder case where information about the risk of offending 
posed by Ian Huntley was not shared between the relevant authorities and he was therefore 
able to take a post at the school. 
Employ Jamie Oliver to promote the idea 
OR 
Generate a major media scare story about how the absence of data leads to ineffective 
treatment or health promotion. 
Or, more moderately, some intelligent media coverage of studies such as the research done 
looking at the wide public acceptance of use of data in cancer registries when people had the 
purpose of holding/using such personal data explained to them. 
In terms of publicity, the 'infringement of privacy' lobby definitely has the upper hand at the 
moment when it comes to getting a message across. It's unlikely that health professionals or 
public health professionals can come anywhere near to the impact of mass media scare stories 
about 'big brother'. 
By providing assurances around how the data will be used as well as demonstrating a means of 
ensuring that malpractice can be dealt with. 
However, I suspect that even if this were provided, people would still be a bit twitchy about 
personal information being used by others. 
Demonstrate need 
By tackling the loss of trust in public institutions 
Better publicity, when it is clearly in the public interest and not too tenuous as in some research 
work 
Not aware of the need to do this 
I don‟t think it could go any higher. 
Creating summaries that take away the most identifiable data (forename, surname) 
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SECTION V – Current data holdings and provision to others…  
 
This section gathers information on the sharing of PID within and between organizations.  
For all scales, circle „0‟ if you “Don‟t know” 
 
V-1  What would you say is the one most critical obstacle in the sharing or acquisition of 
PID linked to health data? (Please select only one; give your opinion!) 
CANADA 
Obstacle Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Frequency 
Cumulative 
Percent 
1 18 27.27 18 27.27 
2 11 16.67 29 43.94 
3 22 33.33 51 77.27 
4 4 6.06 55 83.33 
5 2 3.03 57 86.36 
6 4 6.06 61 92.42 
7 1 1.52 62 93.94 
77 1 1.52 63 95.45 
99 3 4.55 66 100.00 
 
UK 
Obstacle Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Frequency 
Cumulative 
Percent 
1 5 17.86 5 17.86 
2 3 10.71 8 28.57 
3 9 32.14 17 60.71 
4 2 7.14 19 67.86 
5 5 17.86 24 85.71 
6 0 0.00 25 85.71 
7 1 3.57 25 89.29 
77 1 3.57 26 92.86 
99 2 7.14 28 100.00 
 
V-2  Do you or your organization currently collect individual-level health data for any 
purpose (e.g. research, surveillance, service delivery, etc.), or act as the custodian of 
such data? 
CANADA 
 NO YES 77 99 
Frequency 8 52 1 5 
Percent 12.12 78.79 1.52 7.58 
UK 
 NO YES 77 99 
Frequency 3 23 1 1 
Percent 10.71 82.14 3.57 3.57 
 
V-3  For what specific purpose(s) is this data collected? (check as many as apply) 
CANADA 
 NO YES 77 88 99 Missing 
Research  27 1 8 5 25 
Surveillance  37 1 8 5 15 
Services  24 1 8 5 28 
Other  8 1 8 5 44 
 
Other (responses) 
Outbreak investigations in collaboration with organizations that have mandate to act and to 
identify individuals 
Outbreak assistance (so we don't own the data but we have access to it) 
We do not collect, but we use PHI for the above purposes and for program planning and 
evaluation 
Planning 
Planning programs and services 
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Utilization studies, audits, quality reviews and projects 
Outbreak investigations 
Identification of environmental and health hazards 
UK 
 NO YES 77 88 99 Missing 
Research  16 1 3 1 7 
Surveillance  15 1 3 1 8 
Services  11 1 3 1 12 
Other  5 1 3 1 18 
 
Other (responses) 
Performance 
Epidemiological Analysis 
Information provision to stakeholders 
Epidemiology 
Performance management 
 
V-4  What data is collected? 
CANADA 
 NO YES 77 88 99 Missing 
First Name 18 31 1 8 7 1 
Last Name 17 32 1 8 7 1 
Initials 31 18 1 8 7 1 
Sex 9 40 1 8 7 1 
Date of Birth / Age 8 41 1 8 7 1 
Date of death 21 28 1 8 7 1 
Provincial Health 
Insurance Plan 
Number 
28 21 1 8 7 1 
Hospital ID 36 13 1 8 7 1 
Registered GP / 
Family Physician 
36 13 1 8 7 1 
Street Address 18 31 1 8 7 1 
Postal Code 14 35 1 8 7 1 
Community Name 26 23 1 8 7 1 
City / Town / Village 19 30 1 8 7 1 
Region / Geographic 
Area 
28 21 1 8 7 1 
Latitude / Longitude 46 3 1 8 7 1 
UK 
 NO YES 77 88 99 Missing 
Forename(s) 15 6 1 3 3 0 
Surname 14 7 1 3 3 0 
Initials 12 9 1 3 3 0 
Sex 2 19 1 3 3 0 
Date of Birth / Age 2 19 1 3 3 0 
Date of death 7 14 1 3 3 0 
NHS Number (OLD) 17 4 1 3 3 0 
NHS Number (NEW) 11 10 1 3 3 0 
Registered GP / 
Family Physician 
9 12 1 3 3 0 
Street Address 16 5 1 3 3 0 
Postcode 6 15 1 3 3 0 
Community Name 17 4 1 3 3 0 
City / Town / Village 11 10 1 3 3 0 
Region / Geographic 
Area 
9 12 1 3 3 0 
Latitude / Longitude 18 3 1 3 3 0 
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V-5  How difficult is it for other public health professionals such as yourself to acquire 
access to your PID and linked health data holdings if they are outside your immediate 
working team, but within… 
Please circle the appropriate number, with 1 being “Impossible”, and 10 being “Very 
easy” 
CANADA         
  Difficulty Score    
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 77 88 99 
Your own organisation? 3 4 6 5 4 5 5 5 6 2 3 1 8 9 
The Federal Government? 13 10 10 7 0 2 2 1 0 1 1 1 8 10 
Your Provincial Government? 10 6 3 6 5 2 3 3 3 3 3 1 8 10 
A Provincial Government other 
than your own? 
20 11 6 4 0 1 2 1 1 0 0 1 8 11 
A regional or public health 
authority? 
11 7 3 5 3 9 2 3 1 1 0 1 8 12 
A University or Research Facility 12 9 8 6 2 3 2 3 1 0 0 1 8 11 
Another national government (e.g. 
CDC in the US, NHS in the UK, 
etc.) 
18 10 9 1 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 8 15 
The World Health Organization 21 9 6 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 8 17 
 
UK 
  Difficulty Score    
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 77 88 99 
Within your own organisation? 0 1 1 0 0 4 0 4 4 2 3 1 3 5 
Within the NHS or Department of 
Health? 
1 4 2 3 2 2 0 1 1 2 1 1 3 5 
Within the UK, but outside of the 
NHS or Dept. of Health? 
2 7 5 2 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 1 3 5 
Within the European Union, but 
outside the UK? 
8 7 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 7 
Outside the European Union? 9 7 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 7 
Within the World Health 
Organization* 
9 6 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 7 
*Missing n=1 
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SECTION VI– Solutions & Research  
 
The proposed research will seek to apply a method (called a transformation) to public health 
data such that important relationships within and between the data are preserved, but the actual 
identity of the individual is anonymised. So, for example, if you were looking at an infectious 
outbreak in children, you might be interested in where the infected children are relative to one 
another, as well as where the schools are, arenas, community centres, etc. You would then 
preserve the relationship between these points of interest, and change everything else, so that 
the original points can no longer be identified back to their original owners. In this way, you have 
transformed the data so that you‟re still looking at individual-level data, but can‟t determine who 
it belongs to (i.e., it has become anonymous). Assuming the data custodians allow the data 
derived from such a transformation to be made available to the public health professional 
community: 
 
For all scales, circle „0‟ if you “Don‟t know” 
 
VI-1  How useful would such a transformation be to you in your current role? 
Please circle the appropriate number, with 1 being “Not at all useful”, and 10 being 
“Very useful” 
CANADA 
  Usefulness Score  
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 99 
Frequency 6 2 3 5 1 6 0 4 4 8 21 6 
Percent 9.09 3.03 4.55 7.58 1.52 9.09 0.00 6.06 6.06 12.12 31.82 9.1 
 
UK 
  Usefulness Score  
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 99 
Frequenc
y 
1 2 0 0 1 5 1 3 6 0 7 2 
Percent 3.5
7 
7.1
4 
0.0
0 
0.0
0 
3.5
7 
17.8
6 
3.5
7 
10.7
1 
21.4
3 
0.0
0 
25.0
0 
7.1
4 
 
 
VI-2  How useful do you think such a transformation would be to the field of public health in 
general? 
Please circle the appropriate number, with 1 being “Not at all useful”, and 10 being 
“Very useful” 
CANADA 
  Usefulness Score  
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 99 
Frequenc
y 
5 0 0 0 4 1 3 10 6 13 19 5 
Percent 7.5
8 
0.0
0 
0.0
0 
0.0
0 
6.0
6 
1.5
2 
4.5
5 
15.1
5 
9.0
9 
19.7
0 
28.7
9 
10.5
8 
 
UK 
  Usefulness Score  
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 99 
Frequenc
y 
2 0 0 1 0 7 1 5 4 1 5 2 
Percent 7.1
4 
0.0
0 
0.0
0 
3.5
7 
0.0
0 
25.0
0 
3.5
7 
17.8
6 
14.2
9 
3.5
7 
17.8
6 
7.1
4 
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VI-3  
Imagine you are a data custodian, and that a method has been developed to take your 
individual level data and mask it or change it somehow, while still keeping it at an 
individual-by-individual level. Would you allow such a method to be conducted on your 
data so that it can be shared with other public health professionals for public health 
research and practice? 
CANADA 
 NO YES Maybe 77 99 
Frequency 0 42 18 1 5 
Percent 0.00 63.64 27.27 1.52 7.58 
 
RESPONSES 
Depends on use. The key will be to understand the planned dissemination of DATA and 
DERIVED DATA beyond the requestor. 
Transformation is essentially a variation on aggregate data - changing the parameters to hide 
the individual while conveying the context. The difficulty with that in my field of public health is 
that outbreak investigation depends on the risk factors of the individuals who are sick... 
changing the context could well change the exposure and therefore change the perception of 
risk. Solving a difficult outbreak is all about going beyond the usual and probing why THESE 
individuals got sick at this time in this place... change any of those variables even subtly and 
you've got a different outbreak. 
If I understood how it worked, maybe. For question 6.1, I do not understand how 
transformations to make the data anonymous will address the fact that the data would still be 
considered personal health information, i.e., even if the transformation removes names or 
addresses. We ONLY work with data that has no names, phone numbers, initials, street 
addresses (I believe that is what is meant by anonymous, right?). Health card number data are 
encrypted in the files to which we have access. Hospital numbers may also be encrypted. 
Would require formal assurances such as a privacy impact analysis to validate appropriateness 
I think it would depend on the use of the data. Transforming the data and keeping it on an 
individual level could be useful for some research projects. The process for transformation 
would need to consider all possible relevant relationships before the transformation was done. 
I would still need to know how the data was going to be used and exactly what data elements 
were required. 
This is no an easy question to respond yes or no to. Although this may be able to be arranged, 
given legislation a lot of work would need to be completed to determine if this was even 
possible. 
The necessary safeguards to prevent identification of individuals still need to be considered - 
e.g. release of small numbers or exact longitudes and latitudes. 
It depends on the purpose or publication. I'm not in a position to authorize such use. 
Again, all of these questions are very context specific. In certain circumstances (regular 
surveillance data) I think transformed data would be excellent and would allow for sharing of 
data.  In unusual situations, or highly volatile/political (e.g. SARS) situations - I can imagine that 
this would be a problem during the outbreak (but perhaps not for follow up research afterwards).  
The problem is, once you have sex, gender and PC - you can determine who the person is even 
if the ID is masked. Not sure how to get around this. 
Provided key elements are not masked. Age and sex for example 
The users would need to understand the purpose and caveats of the data. the audience would 
also have to be informed on what is actually presented 
People may see the identification of an individual in a highly precise and accurate GIS 
environment as no different than an identification of the individual themselves. 
It would be important for individuals to understand that sharing as described above, with 
professionals and researchers, does not mean making the information public 
There is still the difficulty of sharing such a novel dataset! However, after a certain period of 
time, it would greatly facilitate expanded investigation of a particular dataset from different 
angles, etc... if confidentiality issues could be resolved. 
If the process was approved and I had faith that the masking process was done well. 
Depends how much the transformation changes the data. If you have a set of addresses of 
clients with cancer and you wanted to see if there was clustering based on similar age groups 
and this age field has been 'transformed' then what use would this be to the researcher or 
analyst? 
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For some diseases it might make sense. For infectious disease investigations it wouldn't be 
particularly helpful because we already have nominal data on infectious disease cases. In this 
case, researchers should work with local health units to pursue specific lines of inquiry. For 
other diseases like asthma, say in relation to smokestack plumes, there might be some utility. 
Need for the appropriate authority's approval 
 
UK 
 NO YES Maybe Skip Missing 
Frequency 0 14 9 1 4 
Percent 0.00 50.00 32.14 3.57 14.29 
 
RESPONSES 
Subject to clear understanding and appropriate protocols being in place 
In practice this is what we do and pseudonymsation is definitely a way forward. Two issues that 
are essential to consider is who, for what reason and with what outputs; and the issue of 
disclosure from statistical outputs 
Sharing of research data would undermine our own activities and result in a loss of business 
It depends how else the data are published for example because of geographical boundary 
issues, data published at local authority level and primary care trust level may potentially be 
disclosive because of disclosure by differencing. 
 
For most research, individual counts are not required but aggregated counts are (e.g. by age 
band and sex). Even if data are anonymised you might still be able to identify someone if their 
record had clinical information combined with geographical information such as postal code. 
I am custodian of ONS birth and mortality data only.  These data are available to public health 
professionals direct from ONS according to need, so I would leave it to them to modify their data 
 
What we need is to be able to link health records via NHS number or some consistently 
pseudonamised code. 
There are some rare conditions, treatments or circumstances where geographic and 
demographic information would still leave a 'data point' as a uniquely identifiable person. As the 
custodian of the data I might still have concerns that I was releasing information that could be 
used inappropriately and violated the privacy of the individual. 
Depending on the reason(s) for this work being conducted. 
Only if approved by current data security, confidentiality & Caldicott guidance 
If reassured that data protection was preserved 
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A specific disease or health condition will be used to test and evaluate the developed method(s). 
This condition must have a known aetiology, with well-known patterns and relationships, to 
serve as a starting point for the research. It must also be a disease of interest to the public 
health community. 
 
VI-4  What diseases, health conditions, or databases most immediately come to mind as 
potential subjects for this research? 
& 
VI-5  Based on your knowledge of the condition you identified in the previous question, what 
relationships to the physical environment would a transformation as defined in the 
opening paragraph of this section have to retain in order for the data to be meaningful 
and useful to you (e.g. where patients or cases are relative to each other, to schools, to 
restaurants, etc; where schools are relative to a type of industry; etc…)? 
CANADA 
VI-4 VI-5 
Chronic disease surveillance Clinics, hospitals, industry, schools, recreation 
centres, public libraries, 
roadways/transportation lines 
Immunization & vaccine-preventable disease 
in children 
School or day care setting (without knowing 
where the school is even) 
Age-specific population density (e.g. within 
CSD) 
Could choose from a range of infectious or 
chronic conditions with multiple level of 
associations. e.g. Diabetes 
Building on existing surveillance with physician 
pharmacy and other data bases. 
Heart disease (MI, CVA). Its natural history, 
risk factors (host and environmental) are well 
described in the literature and although the 
overall incidence is declining, with the aging 
baby boomers we will see a rise in the 
absolute numbers in the next few years 
(further obscuring the identity of the 
individual). 
As heart disease is associated with some 
environmental factors (e.g., hard water) and 
SES factors (e.g., smoking, which is 
associated with SES), these must be 
preserved. The advantage of heart disease is 
that we know the important variables and 
confounders, so when performing the 
transformation you can control for them. The 
lessons learned here could then be applied to 
other chronic diseases. 
TB or an STI "Geographic", Time, Person to person 
Infectious / communicable diseases 
Injuries such as motor vehicle collisions. 
infectious / communicable - relationship to 
schools 
 
injury - where the collision occurred and the 
characteristics (e.g., age, sex, blood alcohol 
level) of the people involved (as drivers or 
passengers) 
Tuberculosis Everything. And over a long period of time. 
Diabetes, Heart Disease, cancer Skip 
HIV, chlamydia, diabetes, suicide attempts Where they are relative to one another, and 
relative to contacts, where they socialize, 
where they visit health services, 
Communicable diseases - ones that are more 
common - could be enterics (IPHIS) - wouldn't 
want something so common that would cause 
challenges (such as heart disease) 
if it were enteric, could be restaurants, 
locations of special events, schools, etc. 
STIs Where STI cases are exposed to multiple 
partners/contacts 
HIV or any STIs in general Skip 
Ischemic Heart Disease 
Diabetes 
Skip 
Cancer incidence data 
Some sort of communicable disease data, 
e.g. ?? 
Don't know 
Diabetes, heart conditions, infectious diseases Skip 
Lung cancer Skip 
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Various cancers, heart conditions, diabetes, 
infectious diseases such as Avian Flu, SARS, 
'flu 
schools, restaurants, industry proximity to 
schools, water supplies, age demographics 
Gastro enteritis Where patient lives relative to restaurants 
West Nile Virus Proximity to water bodies, parks, woodlots. 
Climate and land cover data would have to be 
retained. 
communicable diseases Geographic location, relativity to other 
populations, 
Cancer registry 
Cardiovascular disease 
Diabetes 
Asthma 
Skip 
Infectious diseases such as influenza - using 
iPHIS 
You can't change them and keep the integrity 
of the data. Sorry. 
HIV, STDs, Hepatitis C Where cases are relative to each other 
Type of community e.g., high risk 
Food borne, waterborne and disease 
outbreaks 
Delivery of health services (inpatient, 
ambulatory): 
Cancer therapies 
Surgeries 
Diagnostic imaging 
Where cases were exposed relative to each 
other in outbreak situations 
Where individuals are receiving treatment and 
care relative to others in their community 
Invasive meningococcal disease Where cases and/or contacts of cases live in 
relation to each other, schools, restaurants, 
sports teams other gatherings (e.g. church) 
Chronic disease such as CVD with links to 
built environments, access to services etc., 
cancers with environmental exposure links, 
waterborne diseases 
How cases relate to recreation sources, 
walking trails, fast food outlets, secondary 
treatment facilities, rehab programs. For 
cancers industrial exposure or contaminated 
sites, for waterborne types of water supplies, 
known chemical contaminants 
Most chronic diseases, injuries,  infectious 
disease 
Sex, age, incident and prevalent disease, 
large industry (nuclear power plants?) drinking 
water source, 
E.g. diabetes, heart disease All relationships to the physical environment 
are potential contributors to the condition of 
interest 
Infectious illnesses - enteric and respiratory 
(Influenza) 
Heart Disease 
Breast Cancer 
Infectious GI 
-where cases live relative to each other, to 
work, to school, 
TB, Sexually Transmitted Diseases Skip 
Enteric diseases (e.g. salmonella) 
Influenza 
HIV 
HPV/cervical cancer 
For Salmonella, I would need to know where 
cases lived/ate/visited, by date and by 
subtype. 
TB, HEPC Location of case, sex and age 
Outbreak investigations, trace backs 
Case control or spatial studies 
determining/assessing risks to health 
A large number of ethnic/family, spatial, 
environmental, diet, nutritional, age, sex, 
behavioural and other variables 
Enteric outbreaks, pollution from 
environmental sources 
where patients or cases are relative to each 
other and to nearby point sources 
Communicable diseases (influenza) and 
chronic diseases (diabetes, adverse medical 
events) 
Very important. 
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Injury, trauma. Other conditions can at least 
be linked to current location at least in a broad 
sense, i.e., Postal Code. Trauma often 
happens outside of home/work (which itself is 
rarely collected) so without precise locational 
information, there is no way to link to 
environment/circumstances. E.g. motor 
vehicle accident with road condition. 
For my work none, but I would imagine in the 
case I stated above, link with home and place 
of work/school, known location of incident (if 
accident), activity space (shopping, dining out) 
Obesity Where obese and non-obese children are 
relative to parks, public transportation, grocery 
stores, fast food restaurants, etc. 
AIDS Where the cases are in relation to each other. 
Asthma, copd, cardiac Residence, school or place of work of the 
individual, maybe using lat/long. Need to 
assign proper exposure (ie. to air pollution for 
each individual) 
Giardiasis, Campylobacter Where cases are in relation to each other, 
food stores and water sources 
As I said in the previous question, I don't see 
any benefit to local public health agencies in 
anonymizing infectious disease data b/c we 
already have a mandate to collect the nominal 
information. However, an infectious disease, 
like a food-borne outbreak, would probably be 
a good model for your system. 
The problem with any general framework for 
transforming infectious disease outbreaks is 
that each outbreak is unique. For a food borne 
outbreak, you might choose to preserve the 
relationships between cases and schools, 
restaurants, community centres, and 
churches. But, if the outbreak was from a 
butcher shop, you'd miss it. You can't think of 
every single possible source of outbreaks and 
then try to maintain all of the possible 
relationships. Rather, I can see a 
transformation routine being useful for 
obfuscation purposes. That is, I would use 
such a transformation if I wanted to make a 
map of an outbreak available to the public, but 
I don't want to identify particular case 
addresses. 
Respiratory Health (Asthma, Chronic 
Obstructive Pulmonary Disease, Emphysema, 
Lung Cancer) 
Relationship would need to be maintained in 
terms of: 
direct exposures to point-source pollution  
(industry, transportation - such as busy 
intersections) 
 
Relationship could be aggregated to a 
geographic area for: 
direct exposures to atmospheric air pollution 
and SMOG 
indoor air quality / smoking 
other environmental determinants 
 
Relationship to each other could be 
aggregated to a geographic area. (i.e. # of 
cases in given area). It is still important to 
have specific location information in order to 
geospatially reference health data into 
geographic layers (dissemination areas, health 
regions, provinces, etc.) 
Reportable infectious diseases Postal code assignments 
Diabetes 2 Social determinants of health, where patients 
live in terms of SES, industry, transportation, 
education, smoking by-laws 
Cancer Skip 
AMI community-level 
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Avian influenza Where the patients or the cases are relative to 
others, relative to schools, restaurants, etc; 
where the schools are relative to a type of 
industry; the origin of the disease, in which 
country, the geographical movement of the 
disease in the world, etc. 
Reportable enteric diseases such as E. coli, 
Campylobacteriosis ... 
Relative position of cases one to other 
Relative position and access to municipal 
services (water, sewage) 
Relative position to agriculture 
 
UK 
Lung cancer 
Childhood cancers 
Different datasets would probably need to be 
created depending on the type of exposures of 
interest. Relative position of cases to each 
other, to schools, where schools and homes 
are in relation to roads, airports and other 
major sources of pollution. Also need to attach 
information about socioeconomic variables to 
individual records (e.g. area deprivation 
scores) 
You would be best to select a disease which is 
relatively rare rather than a common disease. 
Your choice! 
Geographical location in relation to other 
determinants of deprivation such as those 
used in the Index of Multiple deprivation 
Coronary heart disease. 
Some cancers. 
Some infectious diseases 
Skip 
The most obvious are cancer, but heart 
disease may be a better option 
Skip 
Infectious disease surveillance systems - e.g. 
tuberculosis 
Locality, family relationships, age, contact with 
other cases 
Diseases:  cancers, chd, mortality, hospital 
episodes 
Where cases are relative to one another or 
sources of exposure 
CHD, cancers, injuries, Skip 
Obesity amongst others Where a child lives, (is the area deprived), 
what is the local infrastructure? Is their home 
close to parks, busy roads, community centres 
etc? 
Physical or sensory impairment Skip 
Mesothelioma Skip 
Diabetes; HIV; hepatitis C; Need to handle linkage - so individual 
interactions with health service, social services 
etc. can be identified as relating  to the same 
person 
Circulatory Disease or Obesity Street, neighbourhood community. Socio 
economic status, housing conditions, 
Coronary heart disease Deprivation  level, age and gender 
Stroke, admission data Skip 
STIs Postcode of residence and/or 
school/workplace 
Diabetes Where patients are relative to health centres 
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Another proposed solution to the issue at hand is to build what are called automated software 
agents. You can think of these as applications that would go into a dataset wherever it is 
housed (i.e. at the custodian‟s location), perform the analyses for you (on the personally 
identifiable data) and return only the aggregated, and therefore anonymised, results. In other 
words, you would never see the actual data, but would have this “agent” do the analyses for you, 
directly on the PID; you simply get the results of the analyses, as long as, of course, they don‟t 
compromise privacy. As a simple analogy, it would be like you giving me an equation or function 
to perform on my data, and I giving you back the result of that function without you ever needing 
to see my actual data. Assuming the data custodians allow such a software agent to analyse 
their data and make the results available to the public health professional community: 
 
VI-6  How useful do you think such a software agent would be to you in your current role? 
Please circle the appropriate number, with 1 being “Not at all useful”, and 10 being 
“Very useful” 
CANADA 
  Usefulness Score    
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 77 99 . 
Frequency 3 5 3 6 3 7 4 4 7 4 12 1 5 2 
Percent 4.69 7.81 4.69 9.38 4.69 10.94 6.25 6.25 10.94 6.25 18.75 1.56 7.81 - 
 
UK 
  Usefulness Score    
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 77 99 . 
Frequenc
y 
0 1 3 3 0 1 2 3 5 1 2 1 6 0 
Percent 0.0
0 
3.5
7 
10.7
1 
10.7
1 
0.0
0 
3.5
7 
7.1
4 
10.7
1 
17.8
6 
3.5
7 
7.1
4 
3.5
7 
21.4
3 
0.0
0 
 
 
VI-7  How useful do you think such a software agent would be to the field of public health in 
general? 
Please circle the appropriate number, with 1 being “Not at all useful”, and 10 being 
“Very useful” 
CANADA 
  Usefulness Score    
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 77 99 . 
Frequency 5 1 0 6 2 5 5 5 9 8 13 1 5 1 
Percent 7.69 1.54 0.00 9.23 3.08 7.69 7.69 7.69 13.85 12.31 20.00 1.54 7.69 - 
 
UK 
  Usefulness Score    
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 77 99 . 
Frequency 0 1 1 1 1 2 3 4 3 3 3 1 5 0 
Percent 0.00 3.57 3.57 3.57 3.57 7.14 10.71 14.29 10.71 10.71 10.71 3.57 17.86 - 
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VI-8  If you were (or are) a data custodian, would you allow such a software agent to access 
your data, conduct the analyses, and return the results to the public health professional 
community for research and analysis? 
CANADA 
 NO YES Maybe 77 99 Missing 
Frequency 0 27 31 1 5 2 
Percent 0.00 42.19 48.44 1.56 7.81 - 
 
RESPONSES 
With some involvement in the process of interpretation, or I suppose I would have to know for 
what purpose the data  was being used in order to ensure all variables are accurately reported - 
would also depend on the dissemination of the outcomes, who are the results going to? 
If I designed and controlled the agent in some way. 
Need to be satisfied of not only the privacy protection but the accuracy, and relevant 
applicability of what is extracted. 
Want to avoid the classical bad associations of fishing expeditions. 
This technique has been used by Stats Can and Cancer Care Ontario forever... essentially they 
give you aggregate data on request and if the number in the cell is less than five (or something 
similar), they suppress that result in the name of privacy. Whether you have them do it or a 
software package, the result is the same. 
If I had oversight of its operation on the data and a look at the results being provided back to the 
requestor 
We would like to develop a collaboration within the Ontario government to do report generation 
using SAS and our PHPDB. 
Would require confidence in the reliability of the application to meet conditions for sharing 
information. 
I think the first concern would be to have confidence that the 'software agent' was able to do the 
analysis correctly and appropriately. I think it would be hard to analyze data without having 
access to the data. Therefore the issue of trust is on both sides - that of the researcher as well 
as the custodian of the data. 
Would depend on the disease - 
Don't have the time to be running analyses for others and trouble-shooting errors or figuring out 
how to do it for them. 
I would have some concerns about quality assurance issues with people not being able to see 
what's going on. 
Provided there was sufficient opportunity to test the application and fully understand its potential 
privacy and confidentiality impact 
As long as the license belonged to the specific jurisdiction in order to control appropriate access 
& running of the software against data holdings 
I would need to assure myself that the system does indeed work and I would want to see the 
final reports before they are released. 
We would want to ensure what is returned is done accurately although we would still want to 
see the record-level data as a check on the work done. 
Unable to verify data analysis 
As long as limitations of the data are understood and accounted for/reported in the analysis 
Depends entirely on the expertise of the software and if I had confidence in it to give me good 
analysis 
Context specific again - but in concept, yes. 
Provided privacy conditions were met. 
Would like to analyze myself, might see certain abnormalities that may be missed using the 
software agent 
Provincial/territorial partners would likely not go for this 
Depends on the geographic scale, time frame, disease type (enteric vs STD), where the 
software agent is located (onsite only) 
With consent of privacy issues 
Trusting the black box is difficult. It would require a great deal of validation testing to have 
confidence that the right formulae and even the correct data are accessed. Not sure how 
confident I would be in the results 
If I had faith in the process, and appropriate use of the data, and if it was a process approved by 
my superiors. 
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It would depend on contracting and the type of data they would have access to. Some data is 
easier to obtain than others 
In a sense we do a less sophisticated version of this already: we aggregate cases up to a higher 
level of geography, which effectively anonymizes the data. For example, in Ontario, the 
Population Health Planning Database includes, among other things, all hospital discharge 
abstracts. The records have names and addresses stripped, but they have some higher level 
geographic variables, like postal code. This allows us to look at local neighbourhood effects, but 
keeps the person's exact location secret. I'm not sure what your software agent would do that 
would be better than that. 
Would need legal to approve it first 
Would have to understand it better 
Need for the appropriate authority's approval 
 
UK 
 NO YES Maybe 77 99 Missing 
Frequency 0 15 7 2 4 0 
Percent 0.00 53.57 25.00 7.14 14.29 - 
 
RESPONSES 
Again depends on what this really means and appropriate approvals being in place 
We are more likely to provide the software agent function than provide the data to it but Yes, 
possibly we would also contribute some data as well 
It depends whether the Software Agent can be altered to exactly do what the researcher 
requires or whether it is just one standard one. In the latter case the information/data that comes 
back may not be useful and people may keep requesting the data "as is" anyway thus 
duplicating effort. 
I think that there is a danger of the Software Agent becoming a black box. Whilst it is important 
to formulate a priori hypotheses it is important to have access to the data in order to establish 
what the best methods of answering this question may be. 
Little control of the process 
As long as satisfied on data protection safeguards 
Provided the safeguards are in place 
 
VI-9  To summarise, if a solution is found such that privacy is no longer an issue, which of 
the following would you prefer? (Please select only one) 
CANADA 
Preference Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Frequency 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Transformation 39 59.09 39 59.09 
Software Agent 18 27.27 57 86.36 
Skip 8 12.12 65 98.48 
Blank 1 1.52 66 100.00 
Those responding to the question only: 
Preference Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Frequency 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Transformation 39 68.42 39 68.42 
Software Agent 18 31.58 57 100.00 
 
UK 
Preference Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Frequency 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Transformation 14 50.00 14 50.00 
Software Agent 9 32.14 23 82.14 
Skip 4 14.29 27 96.43 
Blank 1 3.57 28 100.00 
Those responding to the question only: 
Preference Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Frequency 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Transformation 14 60.87 14 60.87 
Software Agent 9 39.13 23 100.00 
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SECTION VII– Qualitative Component  
 
VII-1  How knowledgeable do you consider yourself on privacy and confidentiality issues / 
legislation? 
Please circle the appropriate number, 1 being “Not at all knowledgeable”, and 10 being 
“Expert” 
CANADA 
 Knowledge Score   
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 77 99 
Strategic Decision / Policy 
Maker 
     1 1 4     
Manager / Coordinator  2 1  1 1 3 2  2 1 3 
Consultant 1 1    1      2 
Research & Analysis 2  3 2 6 3 7 9     
Front-Line     1  1      
Other    1 2  1 1     
TOTALS 3 3 4 3 10 6 13 16  2 1 5 
Mean Scores 
 N Mean STD Min Max Median 
Strategic Decision / Policy 
Maker 
6 7.50 0.8367 6.00 8.00 8.00 
Manager / Coordinator 12 6.25 2.7675 2.00 10.00 7.00 
Consultant 3 3.00 2.6458 1.00 6.00 2.00 
Research & Analysis 32 5.88 2.0752 1.00 8.00 6.50 
Front-Line 2 6.00 1.4142 5.00 7.00 6.00 
Other 5 5.80 1.6432 4.00 8.00 5.00 
TOTALS 60 5.97 2.2168 1.00 10.00 7.00 
 
UK 
 Knowledge Score   
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 77 99 
Strategic Decision / Policy 
Maker 
   1 1 1 1   1   
Manager / Coordinator     1  1      
Consultant        1    1 
Research & Analysis 1  3  1 1 6 2   1 3 
Front-Line             
Other        1     
TOTALS 1  3 1 3 2 8 4  1   
Mean Scores 
 N Mean STD Min Max Median 
Strategic Decision / Policy 
Maker 
5 6.40 2.3022 4.00 10.00 6.00 
Manager / Coordinator 2 6.00 1.4142 5.00 7.00 6.00 
Consultant 1 8.00    8.00 
Research & Analysis 14 5.64 2.2398 1.00 8.00 7.00 
Front-Line       
Other 1 8.00    8.00 
TOTALS 23 6.04 2.1209 1.00 10.00 7.00 
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VII-2  How do you feel about the impact of privacy and confidentiality legislation – in 
particular the restrictions on access to personally identifiable data (e.g. The Privacy 
Act, The Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, etc.) – on 
public health? 
CANADA 
They are important to have in place to ensure ethical use of personal health information. 
Acts are too restrictive and do not take into account population health needs and modern 
approaches to data access/linkage and transformation. Organizations and individuals working in 
public health do not appreciate potential solutions and scope for data access (e.g. different rules 
for anonymous access, PID access, use, sharing, dissemination, reporting, aggregation) 
Mixed bag. 
Since not able to comment on last question, it's important to note that need for individual level 
vs. aggregate data really depends on the issue under study. Often need a mix of methods to 
ensure aggregate is valid, or that individual is relevant at population level. 
Privacy legislation has become increasingly restrictive over the 15 years that I have been 
practicing public health in Canada. It has adversely affected outbreak investigations that I have 
been involved in and also the placement of our Field Epis (e.g., the current unresolved debate is 
whether Field Epis as federal PHAC employees can access provincial data in Alberta since the 
Alberta legislation specifically prohibits all but provincial employees). 
I support such legislation and am hesitant to see these acts watered down. Identity theft is the 
fastest growing crimes today, so I feel Privacy Acts are increasingly important and outweigh 
other needs. 
They are serious, but my ministry is a health information custodian and so are our health units. 
The challenge is for our external researchers who would like access to the data. Also, we have 
trouble getting data from other agencies, e.g., Cancer Care Ontario. 
The legislation is based on incomplete, fuzzy thinking and does more harm than good. Privacy 
and confidentiality are legitimate concerns but aren't the only ones. Defaulting to the most 
restrictive interpretations is simple minded. 
A two edge sword, that is still being implemented. Still cases of over interpretation leading to 
delayed or reduced access through risk avoidance. 
In my position, I am able to access data for monitoring and surveillance so I am not specifically 
concerned about limitations in relation to privacy. 
I feel it has the potential to compromise the surveillance and response role of public health, and 
that in general, there is an overly restrictive interpretation of legislation in some cases, and a 
lack of understanding of the legislation by many data custodians leading to more restriction than 
is actually warranted. 
It is useful and necessary but can cause challenges with identifying patterns, particularly with 
occurrences which overlap geographical boundaries 
I think there are some substantial impacts that have not been adequately addressed - there 
have been limits placed on research and understanding of disease aetiology, and I'm not 
convinced that this is helping to protect public privacy, meanwhile there are areas where privacy 
breaches are still a real problem and these are not being addressed. I also think much of the 
problem relates to a lack of understanding of the legislation its application and its full impacts at 
all levels, from those who are drafting the legislation to those interpreting it as data guardians 
and through to those who want/need to use it. 
Too complicated and cumbersome and not enough flexibility and trust in our own judgements 
The legislation delays and restricts access 
Am in agreement with the intent of legislation but it does challenge us to look for the 
development of new tools & methods to effectively continue our work. 
I think the effects are not that great yet. I think we can get around the main concerns with 
appropriate sageguards. The main problem is in sharing data across agencies. 
As long as the data is does not include names I think it's fine. 
 
Data would need to be stored in a secure place (password and User ID protected. 
It has had little impact. Much of the impact has come through the MIS-understanding of the 
legislation by physicians and other health care custodians/professionals. 
It is important to find the correct balance between protecting personal information and 
supporting research & decision making in health care 
I am not sure about this question. We deal with the public at large inmost cases however there 
are PH programs that deal with individuals directly - so they may be impacted. 
I'm glad we have it...it ensures everyone is working on a level playing field. It hasn't been an 
obstacle for my work. 
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I think it is necessary to protect the rights of the public, but there should be some allowance (at 
least) in the case of disease surveillance and outbreak management for (at least) partial access 
to identifiable data to those who need it. 
I'm not really sure as some public health functions will be covered by public health legislation 
such as disease control, it could make planning functions more difficult 
It is important to have some PID available to public health so that the health of the public can be 
protected. Not every disease needs such access but some do. 
These are important - though should not necessarily be universally applied 
I think it is critical that we remain very aware of the need and right for privacy. However - under 
certain conditions (e.g. SARS) the appropriate official (e.g. CMOH) should have the 
discretionary ability to decide on whether these individual level data be available 
Not knowledgeable enough on the issue to comment. 
Don't see it as an obstacle, more of an obligation. 
In general, I find it a hindrance to my work and a hindrance to the improvement and efficiency of 
public health. 
I believe the impact has required a rethinking of why and how we use data. 
Disappointed 
It is a good thing but at times can be restrictive 
Too restricted. Should be flexible with appropriate technology that can protect the privacy 
It's a response to public concerns. Understandable as there have been stories in media about 
leaks/blunders - remember the banking data that was faxed to an American junk yard. 
It will need to accommodate the need for detailed multi-level analyses that require individual 
level data. 
These restrictions to personal data make public health activities challenging. 
In my case I need to assign air pollution exposures to individuals and it is very difficult when the 
smallest geographical code is a Census Subdivision (mortality dataset). So basically it's 
frustrating. 
I think it's important to protect privacy, but there do seem to be excessive restrictions to certain 
organizations. Health Authorities should be able to get data from the province that they supplied 
to them in the first place, without hassle!  I can see making it a little more difficult for universities, 
but it should still be something they should be able to access 
I do not have a particular problem with access to personally identifiable data. For infectious 
disease follow-up, we have PID already. For a lot of other data, we may need record-level data, 
but we don't need PID. This is easily accomplished at the database level by replacing the PID 
with a numerical unique identifier (needed for the purposes of eliminating duplicates, etc.). My 
greater concern is with issues of consent and use of data. In the provincial and municipal 
privacy acts there are some strange sections on how data can be used for "research". It almost 
becomes a game of semantics. In usual parlance, any systematic study could be called 
"research", but we find ourselves dancing around the word and instead calling our work 
"surveillance" or "program evaluation" so as to avoid the word research and the needless 
additional complications that introduces. Of course, most people believe, on principle, that they 
should have full control over their personal information. But that just isn't practical. We could 
never do any "research" if we had to constantly go back to get consent every time we want to go 
back and look at the data from another angle. Also, this isn't specifically related to legislation per 
se, but I have an issue with some of the blanket rules from agencies like Statistics Canada 
when it comes to residual disclosure. For example, we are supposed to suppress counts of less 
than 5 cases. This makes sense if you are cross-tabulating data. But this rule has somehow 
extended itself to cover simple univariate counts. Clearly, a univariate count in and of itself 
cannot have any residual disclosure. If we followed this blanket rule, in smaller population 
centres or with rare diseases, we'd have to suppress all of the data, despite the fact that there 
isn't any residual disclosure. 
Needs to be worked on - Legislation in Canada does not consider the many complexities 
involved in sharing health information among authorities, and to third party - especially for use in 
geographic information systems. 
For the time being, the legislation is appropriate as privacy remains paramount. Over time it 
may become evident that there is a need for some modifications if it can be demonstrated that 
public health has been endangered as a result of privacy legislation. 
Good 
I believe that it is important to regulate access to these data, but individuals in decision-making 
positions should have access to improve health care. 
Usually difficult to interpret - therefore manager are over 
protective 
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UK 
It is important to have such legislation, and difficult to achieve the appropriate balance between 
protection of the individual and provision of useful data for research. However, from a research 
perspective, it can be very frustrating, and waste an enormous amount of time in negotiating 
access to and obtaining confidential data. If such data were more easily accessible, I believe 
there is a lot of important new research in public health that could be carried out that is not 
currently being done. 
Reasonable concerns, though sometimes data protection is used inappropriately 
Very worried, as I think legislators are walking blindfold into an area due to public pressure and 
ignorance without thinking through some of the longer terms DISADVANTAGES to the public 
interest. 
It has increased the time taken to complete analysis and restricts our ability to make information 
available. 
Not properly understood - culture of leaning to individual privacy - confusion and conservatism 
There need to be guidelines and protection processes for restricted access in order to prevent 
misuse of the data. These processes make people collecting the data more aware of the exact 
need for all the information they intend to collect or use (much of it is not necessary for Public 
Health analysis) 
At a personal level I have been very frustrated that it took me 9 months to obtain Ethics and 
Governance approval for a project that only uses non-identifiable A&E records even though I 
work for the NHS.  
 
The reasons behind the DPA etc. are good but there should be exceptions made for research 
that will improve public health. Surely the greater good should override the Privacy principle 
especially if there is no intention of actually "investigating" any individuals but just the overall 
pattern of a "disease" or problem. 
It has led to a lot of confusion especially when freedom of information act is added to the 
equation. I feel worried that restrictions are over protective. 
 
Analysts locally are often not able to access data to the lowest level of geography which then 
enables analysis at any higher levels by aggregating the data up and are restricted to pre-
defined geographical analysis or are unable to access data beyond their local geographies so 
are unable to benchmark results. 
 
The secondary uses service (SUS) which will restrict access to PID by pseudonymising records 
is adding to this issue as often postcode is not released even with anonymised records. Even if 
area codes are added to data this is not always sufficient e.g. data may need to be analysed by 
neighbourhoods/sure start areas which do not conform to a standard geography and without 
postcode no needs assessments/geographical profiles/surveillance of health problems can be 
carried out. 
Limits potentially useful research projects, and therefore hinders knowledge 
I think that organisations often hide behind data protection legislation and use this as an excuse 
to not share data. the legislation has made people so fearful of sharing data that often 
organisations refuse to give out any data rather than engaging in coming to data-sharing 
agreements with other organisations. The legislation does seem to be ambiguous so that it is 
possible for organisations to refuse to share it but this is very frustrating when you want to use 
their data to do your job. 
Although I feel that the privacy & confidentiality requirements are restricting public health work I 
can appreciate why they are required and public concerns. Having worked in a PCT as well as a 
PHO I certainly prefer *not* to encounter data that identifies individuals when I only really 
require to be able to identify whether the records relate to someone who is the same as or 
different from other records being analysed. 
 
Personally, I would strongly favour solutions involving transformed data and methods of 
interrogating datasets to produce aggregated results that don't violate 'small numbers' rules. 
However, this is because I am not involved in research which involves tracing or follow-up with 
individuals or doing complex linkage between datasets. In these cases pseudonymised data 
may not provide all the answers. 
The general principles behind each of these guidelines is understandable. However, I suspect 
that they have not been developed with an integrated approach in mind.  
 
This silo type of approach can potentially obstruct legitimate studies being conducted. 
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It will severely limit the analysis and research that can be done locally in public health and will 
be extremely detrimental to understanding the needs to a local population. 
Important: the public needs to be aware that confidentiality is taken very seriously in the NHS 
and social services 
They exist for good reasons but are often misunderstood, and are interpreted too rigidly 
Data-sharing and use is not forbidden by these, these are simply excuses used by many 
practitioners, so as to not share data. 
DPA ok; Caldicott is sometimes used unnecessarily strictly, to protect paranoid practitioners 
who think they're being audited on the fly. 
Restrictions are required due to the ease thro IT of misuse of PID 
I think it is appropriate as long as there are methods to anonymise data or to gain consent 
I think that this type of legislation threatens to make access to routinely-collected national 
datasets increasingly difficult. 
I am worried that there will be serious implications on public health intelligence 
The legislation made us aware of the need to consider the individual behind the data and to only 
do relevant analysis.  We continue to analyse data 
 
VII-3  What do you think of the proposed research (development of a transformation)? 
CANADA 
Need more information about what it would look like to comment 
Sounds like a good idea, especially for doing accurate spatial analyses. 
I am sceptical that it can be successful in a real-world application and that anyone will accept it. 
Methods that facilitate Public Health practice, research and surveillance, while protecting 
appropriate privacy considerations can only be a good thing. 
For routine surveillance of communicable diseases it may protect privacy, but I'm not sure 
effective interventions could be designed to address the underlying risk factors in a timely 
fashion. For chronic diseases like heart disease, this may have more promise, but this disease 
tends to be less stigmatized and I'm not sure people care whether their privacy is 
"compromised" - unlike mental illness, HIV/AIDS. 
I see the utility, but feel that lessening the constraints imposed by privacy legislation can be 
dangerous. 
I'd like to know more about it. 
Well, this is already being done. I certainly support it. 
Worthwhile. Concerns with secondary use of information / results after transformation ... there is 
so much secondary use of data, the transformation may have unanticipated (and unrecognized) 
effects on the secondary use. 
Extremely important, and fits well with similar work we are doing in Saskatoon. 
Would be a valuable resource but still need to be flexible in that need to be able to access the 
raw data when necessary 
Excellent proposal 
I think it sounds like a great idea 
I think this is a great idea - depends on how it actually functions I guess, but the concept is 
excellent. 
Sounds like a worthwhile endeavour 
This would be extremely useful and should be pursued 
It sounds very promising. 
Great! Good luck! 
Not sure, would need time to think about it and explore implications to practice. 
It may have use for many health agencies across jurisdictional boundaries. 
It would be okay IF you can have unique identifiers to search out duplicates, repeat visits, etc. 
That, I think, is the biggest hurdle you face. 
I like it 
I like it 
Great idea, but many issues still need to be addressed! 
Sounds like a good idea - not sure what the buy in will be like from the public's perspective 
Great idea, I have seen the application of this in the use of previously collected research data 
which was anonymized to link to mortality data 
Interesting and could be really useful in chronic disease surveillance. 
Interesting 
I would very much support this. 
Deserves consideration. 
Think it may be useful, hard to say since the use of PID is not in my day to day activities. 
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Interesting and promising. However, there are still many of us in the field who need to have 
access to PID for case follow-up. 
For some applications. 
Good idea 
Has good potential but need to address the legislative hurdles (federal, provincial and 
organizational) 
Good idea! 
If it gives access to individual level data I think it's important and potentially very useful. The 
problem I see is as I stated before. Even when anonymizing the individual, when you render 
him/her in a GIS environment, the individual "de-anonymizes" identifies themselves. 
Useful if it manages to alter privacy legislation such that it maintains privacy and allows access 
to more individual level data, including geographic locations. 
I think it is an excellent concept. To be able to maintain individual level results and information 
yet masking the identifiable portion of the datasets that people are most concerned with. 
Sounds promising 
Great idea if it can be modified enough so that necessary data attributes are still intact 
As I said earlier, I think the proposed research might be useful for obfuscation. At this very 
moment, for example, I have 5 cases of blastomycosis that have a very interesting geographic 
distribution, but I don't want to publish the map b/c it would identify the affected households. I 
would love to have a method that re-positioned the data points but maintained all of the 
important relationships in the data. I'm not sure that a transformation is the way to go in this 
particular case; aggregation might be better. But it would be worth looking at. I can see how 
your proposed research might be useful to university researchers who don't have access to data 
the way I do. 
Excellent idea. Fortunately, technologies and standards exist that can be used to create web 
services that automatically transform data into aggregate statistical data. 
Daunting task but please continue your efforts 
Encouraging, I would like to see it succeed. 
Possible 
It is important and will help us to better target our public health activities 
Essential - Hopefully the start of ongoing research and discussion in public health and 
government arenas. 
 
UK 
Potentially useful, but it is difficult to see how it will be able to fully solve the problems, since 
each individual study will have particular variables (exposures and confounders) of interest that 
will need to be linked at an individual level. 
Good idea - but seems to me a bit like pseudonymisation 
Depends on how easily it can be sold to the press/public (as in pseuodnymisation) 
Sounds like a useful research project. 
Interesting but would have limited application since most Public Health analysis requires the 
researchers to have a detailed knowledge of the underlying data system. This research appears 
to assume that no Public Health professional would be able to access detailed datasets and get 
out meaningful analysis. 
Transformation if it is feasible sounds like something that the Public might agree to. Not sure 
why but it feels more of an option than the Software agent. 
Good idea but needs to be properly thought through in terms of whether it fulfills all the potential 
public health analytical needs. 
Solves the problems of small numbers in a sensitive area, but not that of record linkage 
I think it sounds like an excellent idea and definitely something that is needed to enable many 
datasets to be brought together in useful ways. 
I am definitely in favour of this sort of approach. 
A good starting point - but I think there may be some issues that might need some thought.  
 
Preserving relative information whilst anonymising specific cases is a good tack. However, one 
needs to guard against the possibility of a black box type approach of analysis.  
 
Further light on answering a research question might be gained through a consideration of 
specific information.  
 
Although spatial relationships may be preserved in an analysis we also need to bear in mind 
other factors which may not be distributed evenly through space - eg, pockets of deprivation. 
Can not see the usefulness to my practice 
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Sensible solution 
Worth exploring 
Not enough detail on how it  would work for me to comment sensibly 
Good luck 
Sounds like a useful idea 
I don't know, frankly. 
Good idea that's already done to some extent 
 
VII-4  What do you think of the “software agent” idea? 
CANADA 
Also a great idea for those that are able to what they want using the tools provided by the 
software agent. 
Brilliant, but depends on everyone agreeing on standards and agreeing to properly manage 
data at the local level. 
It will depend on how accurate, useful and verifiable 
Stats Can has been doing it forever and we've been paying big bucks for the privilege. 
Again, I see the utility and would prefer data at the aggregate level only. 
Sure. 
Fine. But it's only as good as the data it's working on and the sophistication of the algorithm. 
Lots of work needed yet. 
Same "envelope" as the "canned reports" approach to databases. For research, interesting 
questions are often detailed and unanticipated. Not sure that an agent could capture the full 
flexibility to perform a complex sequence of steps .. Much like a complicated "data" step in SAS 
followed by a series of PROCs which yield statistics which are themselves transformed through 
subsequent DATA and PROC type steps. How much of the research community/research 
community's needs could be coded into an agent? 
Same as previous answer - extremely important 
Valuable resource 
Transformation would be the priority for me and if that‟s not feasible then the software agent. 
I think this is also a good idea, and in many cases probably ideal. I do have some hesitation in 
terms of quality assurance - I know when I am analyzing data I tend to catch my mistakes by 
examining the data closely - at the same time, in the end I don't need to see the personal 
information and I just want the aggregated data... 
Great 
Sounds interesting, but may require quite a bit of 'selling' 
This could also be extremely useful and should be pursued. I don't see this as an "either/or" 
issue - why not have both? 
This sounds like an example of a tool which would facilitate the work required in this field 
It also sounds promising. I can see each having its own place 
Not sure - I would have to see it in practice. I don't like the idea of splitting up the data, 
research, and methodology. I wonder if it would increased opportunity for error and reduce rigor/ 
validation. 
Again, would need to think further about the implications to practice. 
A good idea 
Better than nothing but concerns with inability to verify data 
I like it 
Another great idea, but needs further development to address data limitations. 
This is how we currently access data from the province. Works quite well in most cases. 
Good idea 
Another good idea that may be more acceptable 
It depends on if the analysis is 'canned' to 'most users'. Then it becomes much less useful.  If 
the user can specify what they what analysed it would be great as long as the analysis is done 
well. 
Also interesting - I would like to test it out 
Support this, but more keen on transformation as I would prefer to have access to data at 
individual level for my analyses. 
Probably most useful to policy makers and planners. Researchers usually prefer to have raw 
data. 
See, 7.3 
We already use something similar and it is of use to unsophisticated users who do not need to 
manipulate the data but need to be aware of trends. 
For what we do in our area, this is not an ideal situation. 
Good idea 
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Good idea. Need to establish a common ground location. UBC CHSPR has a non-spatial 
version of this database linkage idea 
Not sure, but worth trying 
Sounds like a black box that I have little/no opportunity to validate. It would take regular 
data/program validation for me to have confidence that what comes out is a function of what 
went in and is correct. 
Similar to previous answer. May be more acceptable to some data custodians. 
I am not sure that I understood the concept fully. 
I'm not sure about this idea. There is always the possibility that a software agent could corrupt 
the data. 
Not as enthusiastic about this idea. What type of techniques would they use and how would 
they get there. Would like to see the raw data and be able to pick out anomalies. 
I am just trying to imagine a situation where it would be useful. I guess the researcher would 
have to tell you ahead of time what geographic relationships he was interested in, and then you 
would program those particular things into the software agent, and then it would sort through all 
of the data, identify all of the relevant cases, and then obfuscate their geographic location while 
retaining all of the a priori geographic relationships. I can see the abstract beauty of the idea. 
And I think it does mitigate the privacy problem. But as you well know, researchers tend to hunt 
for low p-values; I think you'll have to be so, so, so careful of identifying spurious relationships. 
You are putting a tremendously powerful tool for finding correlations into the hands of people 
who are disconnected from the actual local conditions and occurrence of disease. This is 
potentially dangerous because the data become decontextualized. 
Again, excellent idea. see last comment (7.3) 
Security would still be an issue to be explored 
Such a Software Agent could be deployed internally within a health organization, or externally 
such as in the Canadian Geospatial Data Infrastructure, or hosted on a web server by the Public 
Health Agency of Canada. Any organization with access to raw PID could set up a Software 
Agent for serving information to defined clients / purposes. 
A little "scary" at this point. Even the term "software agent" may have a negative connotation 
from the perspective that it may be perceived as "intrusive". 
I think it has potential 
Unsure 
Think it would be useful for about 75% of the work I do 
Brilliant, if it is possible! 
Conceptually great - think is not as simple as it sounds. 
The "Buy-in" might be not good. 
 
UK 
Again, potentially useful in situations where the analysis is relatively straightforward. However, 
for more complex analyses (e.g. multilevel modelling, inclusion of measurement error models, 
models to account for missing data etc.) it may be very difficult to achieve in practice. The 
analysis stage is often an interactive process of model building which it is difficult to fully 
prescribe in advance for a third party to carry out. 
See previous question 
Sounds useful for people who are not used to analysing or viewing data themselves 
This is a good idea but all the caveats about the need to understand the underlying data in 
detail still apply. 
Not so sure about this one. 
Fine so long as it is appropriately quality assured and stakeholders consulted to ensure the right 
types of aggregates are available 
I would want to have access to record level data for some purposes, but for most I already act 
as the Software Agent in supplying aggregate data to other people for further analysis 
If it can be produced as a tool which it is easy to use and/or training is available then I think it 
will be extremely valuable. In my own area of work I would rarely need to hold record level data 
*if* I can easily and quickly produce aggregated and cross-tabulated data.  However, I foresee 
that for many people they will always prefer to use their own tools (stats packages, databases, 
spreadsheet etc.) to perform the analysis. So I don't think that a Software Agent will necessarily 
provide a solution to people wanting to download large chunks of record-level data. 
A good starting point - but there may be some issues that might need some thought.  
 
Answering research questions appropriately will require an iterative approach to handling data. 
For instance, in applying diagnostic methods to ascertain whether proposed analyses are 
appropriate. 
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Completely disagree with it - access to the raw data is absolutely required 
Not good as there will be a lot of time wasted and expertise will be lost at local level 
Good idea but may be unnecessary given the work being done by the Information centre on 
pseudonymisation 
Not much 
Worth trialing as for Public Health policy planning etc. does not require identification of 
individuals 
Sounds interesting but I would need to know more about it 
I think that access to many types of databases is already organised in this way. 
Theory sounds good but I think it would be extremely hard to get working because of data 
quality and  format issues 
Good idea too 
 
VII-5  Do you have any other thoughts or comments regarding this issue, the proposed 
research, or this questionnaire that you would like to share? 
CANADA 
Good luck! 
Good luck with your research, Philip. I think the most important thing with your transformation 
idea is choosing one disease of public health interest that you can apply the technique to and 
make it work successfully. This would build confidence and make more people interested in the 
method. 
If privacy legislation is loosened in any manner it can open the door to increased identity thefts. 
Systems must be put in place to ensure private information is safeguarded. There is growing 
evidence that criminal organizations (such as the Hell's Angels) are highly active in identity theft 
- even bonded government agents and healthcare workers can cave to the pressures that 
criminal organizations will exert to get personal information. How can we ensure that personal 
information will remain private? 
This questionnaire was somewhat troublesome to use. 
 
Question 1.3 was cut off at the bottom so I don't know the option after Mental Health & 
Substance Misuse. 
 
Question 2.6 was cut off after Street Address 
 
I am not sure that I understand question 5.5. We are permitted to disclose our personal health 
information to health units, who are also health information custodians. 
 
For question 6.1, I do not understand how transformations to make the data anonymous will 
address the fact that the data would still be considered personal health information, i.e., even if 
the transformation removes names or addresses. We ONLY work with data that has no names, 
phone numbers, initials, street addresses (I believe that is what is meant by anonymous, right?). 
Health card number data are encrypted in the files to which we have access. Hospital numbers 
may also be encrypted. 
 
Re 6.6. We already have software for our Provincial Health Planning DataBase. But the issue is 
it's not customised to suppress small values. And sometimes we need to see those small values 
to review the data. 
 
I expect that if I knew more about transformation and PHMG, my responses could have been 
refined. 
With the proposed research, transforming and making the data anonymous or a software agent, 
do you anticipate that all research would go through an ethics review process? I hope so. 
 
I found it frustrating answering this survey online. I often went to the previous question in the 
midst of answering the current question and then my answer was not saved. I also like to see 
the layout of a questionnaire so I can organize my thoughts rather than going sequentially 
though the questions one at a time. 
Please connect with my CCIS team in Saskatoon to compare notes and share your results 
sounds like a valuable resource that could meet challenges we currently have in the field 
I found it a little difficult to answer some of the questions about my use of personal information, 
and particularly when it came to an organizational level, I really don't know how other parts of 
this very large organization work. 
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Collecting information that is already collected and available is ideal if the sharing info problems 
can be worked out. 
I have noted this in a couple of responses - but it is hard to answer a lot of these questions 
'generally' as my concerns and opinions on privacy very much depend on the situation.  
 
Privacy is critical - but equally, if we have to aggregate our data too much for the sake of it, the 
results and information that come out of this are not always very useful, and in many cases do 
not give us a very accurate picture of what is really happening. 
Great initiative. Long overdue. Best of luck. 
Challenging issues, but a very worthy topic of concern ...privacy. 
 
Very well done web based survey and quite user friendly. I also like that my privacy as a 
participant has been respected.  
 
Good luck on these endeavours! 
In my research, I don't need to know the individual. I just need to know the different groups of 
individuals that live in the same geographical location (whether by postal code, FSA, DA etc.). 
Data that is very useful to our organization also includes: 
Most Responsible Diagnosis / ICD 9-10 codes 
Admission and Discharge data 
Length of Stay data 
 
Great research project! 
 
UK 
This questionnaire has been quite lengthy and not terribly easy to use 
I think it sounds like an excellent idea and I wish you the best of luck with the research. I am 
interested to know more. 
I'm not clear how this research links with the work that is being done on providing 
pseudonymised data through SUS, or to what extent proposed systems will already provide 
some of these concepts of 'transformed' data and a 'software agent' for performing analysis. 
This research is important but this questionnaire tool is quite frustrating to use 
Many questions were hard to answer as my policy role related to PID but I personally don't work 
with it. 
The notion of pseudonymisation is a more promising prospect - where individuals are 
anonymised but there is a way of getting back to the detail if needed. 
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D. Multidimensional Point Transform algorithm: SAS code 
 
/*********************************************************************************************/ 
/*    MIDAS TRANSFORM    */ 
/*       NEW YORK, US    */ 
/*********************************************************************************************/ 
/*      CREATED BY PHILIP ABDELMALIK FOR popDATA DATASET  */ 
/*                    SEPTEMBER 08, 2010    */ 
/*     ADAPTED FOR NEW YORK DATA OCTOBER 14, 2010  */ 
/*********************************************************************************************/ 
/* REVISIONS:  08092010; 10092010; 13092010 (added age categorisation) */ 
/*  15092010; 29092010 (AUS); 03102010; 12102010; 13102010 */ 
/*  21102010; 22102010; 25102010; 26102010; 27102010;   */ 
/*  28102010; 23112010; 11122010     */ 
/*  (modified to allow setting of "k" anonymity level   */ 
/*********************************************************************************************/ 
 
/*********************************************************************************************/ 
/* The following code generates simulated patient "lists" from the base synthetic  */ 
/* population, and then calculates the great-circle distance between each "patient"*/ 
/* and all other individuals in the specified population who match on age and sex */ 
/* The code first converts the lat-long coordinates to radians, and then uses the */ 
/* quadratic mean radius of the earth and spherical trigonometry to calculate the  */ 
/* distance.                   */ 
/*          */ 
/* Note the error associated with this calculation:     */ 
/*      i. It assumes that the earth is spherical, which it is not                   */ 
/*      ii. Because the earth is a geoid, not a sphere, the radius will vary   */ 
/* depending on where it is measured to. The quadratic mean radius was  */ 
/* used as the best estimate.           */ 
/*********************************************************************************************/ 
 
PROC PRINTTO LOG = "C:\RESEARCH\NY\NewYork_LOG100b"; 
RUN; 
 
%PUT BEGIN...; 
*SASFILE MIDAS.popDATA CLOSE;     
/* CLEAR POPULATION DATA FROM RAM IN CASE PRIOR EARLY TERMINATION */ 
 
 
/*********************************************************************************************/ 
/*                          HOUSEKEEPING                            */ 
/*                                                                    */ 
/*                    CLEAR TEMP WORK LIBRARY                    */ 
/*                         CLEAR ALL MACROS                          */ 
/*                       CLEAR ALL MACRO VARIABLES                  */ 
/*                                                                   */ 
/*            ADAPTED FROM PAPER 082-2009 BY CHUCK BININGER  */ 
/*                      RETRIEVED FROM THE SAS WEBSITE   */ 
/*********************************************************************************************/ 
 
%MACRO HOUSEKEEPING; 
 
    PROC DATASETS 
        LIBRARY = work 
        KILL; 
    QUIT; 
 
    %LET syscc = 0;         /* Operating environment condition code     */ 
 114 
 
    %LET sysrc = 0;         /* Operating system condition code          */ 
    %LET syslibrc = 0;      /* Libname statement condition code         */ 
    %LET sysfilrc = 0;      /* Filename statement condition code        */ 
    %LET syslckrc = 0;      /* SAS Shre lock statement condition code   */ 
    %LET syslast = ;        /* Contains last created dataset            */ 
 
  
    OPTIONS NONOTES;        /* Requests whether or not notes are output to the log  */ 
    OPTIONS obs = max;      /* Resets the number of observations to process         */ 
 OPTIONS THREADS=YES; 
 
%MEND HOUSEKEEPING; 
 
%MACRO FORMATTING; 
    /***************************************************************/ 
    /*                      DEFINE FORMATTING             */ 
    /***************************************************************/ 
 
 /* FORMATTING FOR THE VARIOUS AGE GROUPS */ 
 
 PROC FORMAT; 
  VALUE secondAG 1="0-1"  2="2-3" 3="4-5" 4="6-7" 5="8-9" 6="10-11"
    7="12-13"  8="14-15"  9="16-17" 10="18-19" 
   11="20-21" 12="22-23" 13="24-25" 14="26-27" 
   15="28-29" 16="30-31" 17="32-33" 18="34-35" 
   19="36-37" 20="38-39" 21="40-41" 22="42-43" 
   23="44-45" 24="46-47" 25="48-49" 26="50-51" 
   27="52-53" 28="54-55" 29="56-57" 30="58-59" 
   31="60-61" 32="62-63" 33="64-65" 34="66-67" 
   35="68-69" 36="70-71" 37="72-73" 38="74-75" 
   39="76-77" 40="78-79" 41="80-81" 42="82-83" 
   43="84-85" 44="86-87" 45="88-89" 46="90-91" 
   47="92-93" 48="94-95" 49="96-97" 50="98-99" 
   51="100-101" 52="102-103" 53="104-105" 54="106-107" 
   55="108-109" 56="110-111" 57="112-113" 
   58="114-115" 59="116-117" 60="118-119" 61="120-121"; 
     
  VALUE thirdAG  1="0-2"  2="3-5" 3="6-8" 4="9-11"  5="12-14"
    6="15-17"  7="18-20"  8="21-23"  9="24-26" 
   10="27-29" 11="30-32" 12="33-35" 13="36-38" 
   14="39-41" 15="42-44" 16="45-47" 17="48-50" 
   18="51-53" 19="54-56" 20="57-59" 21="60-62" 
   22="63-65" 23="66-68" 24="69-71" 25="72-74" 
   26="75-77" 27="78-80" 28="81-83" 29="84-86" 
   30="87-89" 31="90-92" 32="93-95" 33="96-98" 
   34="99-101" 35="102-104" 36="105-107" 37="108-110" 
   38="111-113" 39="114-116" 40="117-119" 41="120-122"; 
 
VALUE fourthAG  1="0-3"  2="4-7" 3="8-11"  4="12-15"  
5="16-19"  6="20-23"  7="24-27"  8="28-31"  
9="32-35" 10="36-39" 11="40-43" 12="44-47" 
13="48-51" 14="52-55" 15="56-49" 16="60-63" 
17="64-67" 18="68-71" 19="72-75" 20="76-79" 
   21="80-83" 22="84-87" 23="88-91" 24="92-95" 
   25="96-99" 26="100-103" 27="104-107" 28="108-111" 
   29="112-115" 30="116-119" 31="120-123"; 
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VALUE fifthAG  1="0-4"  2="5-9" 3="10-14"  4="15-19"  
5="20-24"  6="25-29"  7="30-34"  8="35-39"  
9="40-44" 10="45-49" 11="50-54" 12="55-59 
13="60-64" 14="65-69" 15="70-74" 16="75-79" 
17="80-84" 18="85-89" 19="90-94" 20="95-99" 
   21="100-104" 22="105-109" 23="110-114" 24="115-119" 
   25="120-124"; 
 
  VALUE  newAGE 1.1="1"  2.1="2"  3.1="3"  
   4.1="4"  5.1="5"  6.1="6"  7.1="7"  
   8.1="8"  9.1="9"  10.1="10" 11.1="11" 
   12.1="12" 13.1="13" 14.1="14" 15.1="15" 
   16.1="16" 17.1="17" 18.1="18" 19.1="19" 
   20.1="20" 21.1="21" 22.1="22" 23.1="23" 
   24.1="24" 25.1="25" 26.1="26" 27.1="27" 
   28.1="28" 29.1="29" 30.1="30" 31.1="31" 
   32.1="32" 33.1="33" 34.1="34" 35.1="35" 
   36.1="36" 37.1="37" 38.1="38" 39.1="39" 
   40.1="40" 41.1="41" 42.1="42" 43.1="43" 
   44.1="44" 45.1="45" 46.1="46" 47.1="47" 
   48.1="48" 49.1="49" 50.1="50" 51.1="51" 
   52.1="52" 53.1="53" 54.1="54" 55.1="55" 
   56.1="56" 57.1="57" 58.1="58" 59.1="59" 
   60.1="60" 61.1="61" 62.1="62" 63.1="63" 
   64.1="64" 65.1="65" 66.1="66" 67.1="67" 
   68.1="68" 69.1="69" 70.1="70" 71.1="71" 
   72.1="72" 73.1="73" 74.1="74" 75.1="75" 
   76.1="76" 77.1="77" 78.1="78" 79.1="79" 
   80.1="80" 81.1="81" 82.1="82" 83.1="83" 
   84.1="84" 85.1="85" 86.1="86" 87.1="87" 
   88.1="88" 89.1="89" 90.1="90" 91.1="91" 
   92.1="92" 93.1="93" 94.1="94" 95.1="95" 
   96.1="96" 97.1="97" 98.1="98" 99.1="99" 
   100.1="100" 101.1="101" 102.1="102" 103.1="103" 
   104.1="104" 105.1="105" 106.1="106" 107.1="107" 
   108.1="108" 109.1="109" 110.1="110" 111.1="111" 
   112.1="112" 113.1="113" 114.1="114" 115.1="115" 
   116.1="116" 117.1="117" 118.1="118" 119.1="119" 
   120.1="120" 121.1="121" 122.1="122" 123.1="123" 
   124.1="124" 125.1="125" 
 
   1.2="0-1" 2.2="2-3" 3.2="4-5" 4.2="6-7" 
   5.2="8-9" 6.2="10-11" 7.2="12-13" 8.2="14-15" 
   9.2="16-17" 10.2="18-19" 11.2="20-21" 12.2="22-23" 
   13.2="24-25" 14.2="26-27" 15.2="28-29" 16.2="30-31" 
   17.2="32-33" 18.2="34-35" 19.2="36-37" 20.2="38-39" 
   21.2="40-41" 22.2="42-43" 23.2="44-45" 24.2="46-47" 
   25.2="48-49" 26.2="50-51" 27.2="52-53" 28.2="54-55" 
   29.2="56-57" 30.2="58-59" 31.2="60-61" 32.2="62-63" 
   33.2="64-65" 34.2="66-67" 35.2="68-69" 36.2="70-71" 
   37.2="72-73" 38.2="74-75" 39.2="76-77" 40.2="78-79" 
   41.2="80-81" 42.2="82-83" 43.2="84-85" 44.2="86-87" 
   45.2="88-89" 46.2="90-91" 47.2="92-93" 48.2="94-95" 
   49.2="96-97" 50.2="98-99" 51.2="100-101" 52.2="102-103" 
   53.2="104-105" 54.2="106-107" 55.2="108-109" 56.2="110-111" 
   57.2="112-113" 58.2="114-115" 59.2="116-117" 60.2="118-119" 
   61.2="120-121" 
 
   1.3="0-2" 2.3="3-5" 3.3="6-8" 4.3="9-11"  
   5.3="12-14" 6.3="15-17" 7.3="18-20"  8.3="21-23"  
   9.3="24-26" 10.3="27-29" 11.3="30-32" 12.3="33-35" 
   13.3="36-38" 14.3="39-41" 15.3="42-44" 16.3="45-47" 
   17.3="48-50" 18.3="51-53" 19.3="54-56" 20.3="57-59" 
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   21.3="60-62" 22.3="63-65" 23.3="66-68" 24.3="69-71" 
   25.3="72-74" 26.3="75-77" 27.3="78-80" 28.3="81-83" 
   29.3="84-86" 30.3="87-89" 31.3="90-92" 32.3="93-95" 
   33.3="96-98" 34.3="99-101" 35.3="102-104" 36.3="105-107" 
   37.3="108-110" 38.3="111-113" 39.3="114-116" 40.3="117-119" 
   41.3="120-122"  
 
1.4="0-3" 2.4="4-7" 3.4="8-11" 4.4="12-15"  
 5.4="16-19" 6.4="20-23" 7.4="24-27" 8.4="28-31"  
 9.4="32-35" 10.4="36-39" 11.4="40-43" 12.4="44-47"
 13.4="48-51" 14.4="52-55" 15.4="56-49" 16.4="60-63"
 17.4="64-67" 18.4="68-71" 19.4="72-75" 20.4="76-79" 
   21.4="80-83" 22.4="84-87" 23.4="88-91" 24.4="92-95" 
   25.4="96-99" 26.4="100-103" 27.4="104-107" 28.4="108-111" 
   29.4="112-115" 30.4="116-119" 31.4="120-123"  
 
1.5="0-4"  2.5="5-9"  3.5="10-14"  4.5="15-19"  
5.5="20-24"  6.5="25-29"  7.5="30-34"  8.5="35-39"  
9.5="40-44" 10.5="45-49" 11.5="50-54" 12.5="55-59" 
13.5="60-64" 14.5="65-69" 15.5="70-74" 16.5="75-79" 
17.5="80-84" 18.5="85-89" 19.5="90-94" 20.5="95-99" 
   21.5="100-104" 22.5="105-109" 23.5="110-114" 24.5="115-119" 
   25.5="120-124"; 
 
 RUN; 
 
 
%MEND FORMATTING; 
 
 
/* IMPORT RAW CSV DATA AND SAVE TO MIDAS LIBRARY, DROPPING UNWANTED 
FIELDS  */ 
/* ONLY NEED TO RUN THIS THE VERY FIRST TIME WHEN IMPORT IS REQUIRED */ 
 
 
%MACRO IMPORT;    /* ONLY NEED TO RUN THIS ONCE */ 
 PROC IMPORT OUT= WORK.MIDAS_NY  
             DATAFILE= "C:\Research\EpiSim\MIDAS\NY\synth_people.csv"  
             DBMS=CSV REPLACE; 
      GETNAMES=YES; 
      DATAROW=2;  
 RUN; 
 
 DATA MIDAS.NY_full; 
     SET MIDAS_NY; 
  DROP pub_trans_id pnum st_serialno; 
 RUN; 
%MEND IMPORT; 
 
 
%MACRO SET_LIBRARIES; 
 
/* VM LIBRARY SET */ 
/* NOTE: TO SET THE WORK LIBRARY TO THE RAM DISK, CLOSE SAS, RIGHT 
CLICK THE SAS ICON, GOTO THE SHORTCUT TAB, AND ADD   */ 
/* -work "V:\WORK" at the end of the entry in "TARGET", so that it reads as follows: */ 
/* "C:\Program Files\SAS\SAS 9.1\sas.exe" -CONFIG "C:\Program Files\SAS\SAS 
9.1\nls\en\SASV9.CFG" -work "V:\WORK"     */ 
  
  
/* LOCAL LIBRARY SET */ 
/* LIBNAME MIDAS "C:\Research\MODELS\US\NewYork"; 
RUN; 
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   LIBNAME MIDAS '\\10.159.2.146\SASMain$\SASUSERS\PABDELMA\Transform\NewYork'; 
 RUN; 
*/ 
 
LIBNAME MIDAS "V:\RESEARCH\NY"; 
 
%MEND SET_LIBRARIES; 
 
 
%MACRO PREP_DATA;   /* ONLY NEED TO RUN THIS ONCE */ 
 
/* CONVERT LATITUDE AND LONGITUDE FROM DEGREES TO RADIANS */ 
 
DATA MIDAS.popDATA; 
  SET MIDAS.NY_full;       
  /* ASSIGN popDATA DATASET TO THE POPULATION BEING USED HERE*/ 
 
latRad  = lat/57.295779513082320876798154814105;             
/* Latitude in Radians (i.e. divide by (180/pi)) */ 
 
longRad = long/57.295779513082320876798154814105;            
/* Longitude in Radians (i.e. divide by (180/pi))*/ 
 
  RECORDNUM = _n_; 
  DROP hh_id school_id work_id; 
 RUN; 
 
 PROC SORT DATA=MIDAS.popDATA; 
  BY person_id; 
 RUN; 
  
/*CREATE AN EMPTY DATASET TEMPLATE TO BE USED BY VARIOUS OTHER 
PROCEDURES */ 
 
 DATA MIDAS.emptyDATASET; 
  SET MIDAS.popDATA; 
  WHERE RECORDNUM = 1; 
  KEEP RECORDNUM; 
 RUN; 
 
 DATA MIDAS.prepTRANSFORMED; 
  SET MIDAS.emptyDATASET; 
 RUN; 
 
 DATA MIDAS.popDATA; 
  SET MIDAS.popDATA; 
  DROP RECORDNUM; 
 RUN; 
 
/* DATASETS THAT WILL BE USED REPEATEDLY ARE WRITTEN TO A 
PERMANENT LIBRARY (MIDAS) IN ORDER TO ALLOW LOOP PURGING OF THE 
WORK DIRECTORY */ 
 /* TO SAVE SPACE EACH TIME THE LOOPS ARE RUN */ 
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%MEND PREP_DATA; 
 
/* THE FOLLOWING MACRO WILL ADD FIVE AGEGROUPS TO EVERY RECORD */ 
/* THE FIRST AGEGROUP IS THE AGE, INCREMENTING IN ONE YEAR INTERVALS */ 
/* THE SECOND AGEGROUP INCREMENTS IN TWO-YEAR INTERVALS  */ 
/* THE THIRD AGEGROUP INCREMENTS IN THREE-YEAR INTERVALS, etc.  */ 
 
%MACRO CATEGORISE_AGE;  /* ONLY NEED TO RUN THIS ONCE */ 
 
 PROC SORT DATA=MIDAS.popDATA; 
  BY AGE; 
 RUN; 
 DATA MIDAS.popDATA; 
  SET MIDAS.popDATA; 
  CALL SYMPUT ('MAXAGE',age); 
 RUN; 
 
 %DO i = 1 %TO 5; 
 
  DATA MIDAS.popDATA; 
   SET MIDAS.popDATA; 
   IF AGE < 1 THEN tempAGE = 1; 
   ELSE tempAGE = AGE; 
 
   DO agegroup = 1 TO &MAXAGE; 
    IF &i = 1 THEN AGEGROUP1 = AGE; 
    ELSE DO; 
     max = (&i * agegroup)-1; 
     min = max - (&i-1); 
IF tempAGE LE max AND tempAGE GE min THEN 
AGEGROUP&i = agegroup; 
    END; 
   END; 
   DROP min max agegroup tempAGE; 
 
/*FORMAT AGEGROUP2 secondAG. AGEGROUP3 thirdAG. 
AGEGROUP4 fourthAG. AGEGROUP5 fifthAG.;*/ 
  RUN; 
 
 %END; 
 
 PROC SORT DATA=MIDAS.popDATA; 
  BY person_id; 
 RUN; 
 
%MEND CATEGORISE_AGE; 
 
 
%MACRO CHOOSE_CASES(PATIENTNUM); 
 
  /* PATIENTNUM IS THE NUMBER OF PATIENTS TO SIMULATE */ 
 
SASFILE MIDAS.popDATA LOAD;      
/* LOAD POPULATION DATA INTO RAM TO SPEED UP SAMPLE 
SELECTION */ 
 
  PROC SURVEYSELECT  DATA=MIDAS.popDATA 
       OUT=Cases 
       METHOD=SRS 
       N=&PATIENTNUM 
       NOPRINT 
       ; 
  RUN; 
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  DATA Cases; 
   SET Cases; 
   RECORDNUM = _n_; 
   patient_LatRad  = latRad; 
   patient_LongRad = longRad; 
   patient_lat = lat; 
   patient_long = long; 
   patientID = person_ID; 
   patientAGE = AGE; 
   patientSEX = SEX; 
  RUN; 
 
/* REMOVE ALL THE CASES FROM THE BASE POPULATION TO PREVENT 
TRANSFORMING ONE CASE WITH ANOTHER CASE */ 
 
  PROC SQL NOPRINT; 
   CREATE TABLE POP_noCASES AS 
    SELECT pop.*, Cases.patientID 
     FROM MIDAS.popDATA pop LEFT JOIN Cases 
      ON pop.person_ID = Cases.patientID; 
  QUIT; 
 
  DATA POP_noCASES; 
   SET POP_noCASES; 
   IF patientID NE "" THEN DELETE; 
   FLAG = 0; 
  RUN; 
 
SASFILE MIDAS.popDATA CLOSE;     
/* CLEAR POPULATION DATA FROM RAM */ 
 
%MEND CHOOSE_CASES; 
 
%MACRO LIMIT_EXTENT; 
 
 %LET d = 1;         
 /* DISTANCE THRESHOLD; HERE, 1KM */ 
 
%LET nd = &d/(SQRT((3*6378.137**2 + 6356.9**2)/4));   
/* NORMALISE LINEAR DISTANCE TO EARTH‟S QUADRATIC RADIUS TO 
FACILTIATE WORING IN RADIANS */ 
 
 PROC SQL NOPRINT; 
SELECT 
ARSIN((SIN(MIN(patient_LatRad))*COS(&nd))+(COS(MIN(patient_LatRad))*SI
N(&nd)*COS(constant('pi'))))  
   INTO : MIN_LatRad  
   FROM Cases; 
SELECT 
ARSIN((SIN(MAX(patient_LatRad))*COS(&nd))+(COS(MAX(patient_LatRad))*
SIN(&nd)*COS(0)))  
   INTO : MAX_LatRad  
   FROM Cases; 
SELECT MIN(patient_LongRad) + 
ATAN2((SIN((270*(constant('pi')))/180)*SIN(&nd)*COS(MIN(patient_LatRad))),(
COS(&nd)-SIN(MIN(patient_LatRad))*SIN(MIN(patient_LatRad)))) 
   INTO : MIN_LongRad 
   FROM Cases; 
SELECT MAX(patient_LongRad) + 
ATAN2((SIN((90*(constant('pi')))/180)*SIN(&nd)*COS(MAX(patient_LatRad))),(
COS(&nd)-SIN(MAX(patient_LatRad))*SIN(MAX(patient_LatRad)))) 
   INTO : MAX_LongRad 
   FROM Cases; 
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 QUIT; 
 
 DATA POP_noCASES; 
  SET POP_noCASES; 
IF LatRad < &MIN_LatRad OR LatRad > &MAX_LatRad OR LongRad < 
&MIN_LongRad OR LongRad > &MAX_LongRad THEN DELETE; 
  DROP patientID; 
 RUN; 
 
%MEND LIMIT_EXTENT; 
 
 
%MACRO TRANSFORM_CASES; 
 
 %LET k=5; /* SET THE DESIRED K-ANONYMITY LEVEL */ 
 
 PROC SQL NOPRINT; 
  CREATE TABLE POP_useME AS 
   SELECT * 
    FROM POP_noCASES; 
 
  SELECT COUNT(*)  
   INTO : RECNUMS 
    FROM Cases; 
 QUIT; 
 
/* AT THE BEGINNING OF THIS MACRO, prepTRANSFORMED IS AN EMPTY 
DATASET */ 
 
 DATA TRANSFORMED; 
  SET prepTRANSFORMED; 
 RUN; 
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/* BEGIN LOOP FOR EACH PATIENT RECORD */ 
 
 /*********************************************************************************************/ 
 /*    LOGIC FOR EACH PATIENT RECORD:  */ 
/*          */ 
/*    1.  SELECT BASE POPULATION WITH ANY ALREADY CHOSEN POINTS */ 
/* REMOVED        */ 
/*    2.  SELECT ALL RECORDS FROM BASE POP. MATCHING CASE ON  */ 
/* AGE AND SEX        */ 
 /*    3.  COUNT NUMBER OF MATCHES     */ 
/*    4.  IF FEWER THAN "k-1" MATCHES (I.E. COUNT INCLUDING CASE  */ 
/* LESS THAN "k") THEN        */ 
/*  NEW AGE BECOMES CATEGORISED AGE AND REPEAT  */ 
/*  FROM STEP 2 ON, UNTIL AT LEAST "k-1" MATCHES, OR  */ 
/*  MAXIMUM AGE CATEGORISATION REACHED  */ 
/*    5. CALCULATE DISTANCE BETWEEN ALL MATCHES AND CASE,  */ 
/* INCLUDING CASE (d=0)      */ 
/*    6. TAKE CLOSEST "k", AND CHECK TO SEE MAXIMUM IS WITHIN */ 
/* THRESHOLD.         */ 
/* IF NOT, GOTO STEP 4. AS LONG AS MAXIMUM AGE    */ 
/* CATEGORISATION NOT REACHED     */ 
 /* IF DISTANCE THRESHOLD REQUIREMENT MET, PROCEED  */ 
 /*    7. STORE MAXIMUM DISTANCE AS PERTURBATION RADIUS  */ 
 /*    8. SET EXTENT FOR SELECTION BASED ON SQUARE FORMED BY */ 
/* PERTURBATION RADIUS      */ 
 /*    9.  SELECT ALL RECORDS FROM (1.) WITHIN EXTENT   */ 
 /*  10. CALCULATE DISTANCE BETWEEN RECORDS AND CASE  */ 
 /*  11. SELECT ALL RECORDS WHERE DISTANCE LESS THAN OR EQUAL  */ 
/* TO PERTURBATION RADIUS PLUS A RANDOMLY DEFINED BUFFER */ 
/* BETWEEN 1 AND 10 METRES      */ 
 /*  12. STORE COUNT, MEAN (X,Y), STD (X,Y), MEDIAN (X,Y)  */  
 /*  13. RANDOMLY SELECT ONE RECORD; THIS IS THE TRANSFORMED  */ 
 /* RECORD        */ 
 /*********************************************************************************************/ 
 
 %DO DCALC = 1 %TO &RECNUMS; 
 
 /*********************************************************************************************/ 
 /*    1. SELECT BASE POPULATION WITH ANY ALREADY CHOSEN POINTS */  
/* REMOVED        */ 
 /*********************************************************************************************/ 
 
  DATA POP_useME; 
   SET POP_useME; 
WHERE FLAG = 0;    
/* FLAG IS USED TO PREVENT RE-SELECTION OF ANY GIVEN 
RECORD */ 
KEEP person_id age sex lat long latRad longRad AGEGROUP1 
AGEGROUP2 AGEGROUP3 AGEGROUP4 AGEGROUP5 FLAG; 
  RUN; 
 
  DATA selectedCase; 
   SET Cases; 
   WHERE RECORDNUM = &DCALC; 
   CALL SYMPUT ('patientSEX',SEX); 
   CALL SYMPUT ('patientAGE',patientAGE); 
   CALL SYMPUT ('patient_Lat',patient_Lat); 
   CALL SYMPUT ('patient_Long',patient_Long); 
   CALL SYMPUT ('patient_LatRad',patient_LatRad); 
   CALL SYMPUT ('patient_LongRad',patient_LongRad); 
   CALL SYMPUT ('patientID', patientID); 
  RUN; 
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/* THIS LOOP ALLOWS TRANSFORMATION OF THE AGE DIMENSION 
WHEN THE SPATIAL DIMENSION ALONE IS INSUFFICIENT TO ACHIEVE 
DESIRED ANONYMISATION */ 
 
  %DO AGEDIM = 1 %TO 5; 
 
   PROC SQL NOPRINT; 
SELECT AGEGROUP&AGEDIM INTO: pAGEGROUP FROM 
selectedCase; 
   QUIT; 
 
   
 /*********************************************************************************************/ 
 /*    2.  SELECT ALL RECORDS FROM BASE POP. MATCHING CASE ON  */ 
/* AGE AND SEX        */ 
 /*********************************************************************************************/ 
  
   DATA matchingPOP; 
    SET POP_useME selectedCase; 
WHERE SEX = &patientSEX AND AGEGROUP&AGEDIM = 
&pAGEGROUP; 
   RUN; 
 
  
 /*********************************************************************************************/ 
 /*    3.  COUNT NUMBER OF MATCHES     */ 
 /*********************************************************************************************/ 
 
/* CHECK TO MAKE SURE THAT THERE ARE AT LEAST "k" RECORDS IN TOTAL 
THAT MATCH ON AGE AND SEX */ 
 
   PROC SQL NOPRINT; 
    SELECT COUNT(*) INTO : MATCHES1 FROM matchingPOP; 
   QUIT; 
 
   %IF &MATCHES1 GE &k %THEN %LET THRESHOLD1 = PASS; 
   %ELSE %LET THRESHOLD1 = FAIL; 
    
   
 /*********************************************************************************************/ 
 /*    4.  IF FEWER THAN "k-1" MATCHES (I.E. COUNT INCLUDING CASE  */ 
/*  LESS THAN "k") THEN        */ 
 /*  NEW AGE BECOMES CATEGORISED AGE AND REPEAT  */ 
/*  FROM STEP 2 ON, UNTIL AT LEAST "k-1" MATCHES, OR */
 /*  MAXIMUM AGE CATEGORISATION REACHED  */ 
 /*********************************************************************************************/ 
 
%IF &THRESHOLD1 = FAIL AND &AGEDIM NE 5 %THEN %GOTO 
NEXT_AGEGROUP; 
    
%ELSE %DO; 
 
/* IF PASS (I.E. AT LEAST "k" RECORDS IN TOTAL THAT MATCH 
ON AGE AND SEX) THEN CALCULATE DISTANCES  */ 
/* NOTE THAT BY APPENDING THE PATIENT RECORD, WE 
ALLOW IT TO BE SELECTED AS WELL AS THE "TRANSFORMED" 
DATA POINT  */ 
 
  
 /*********************************************************************************************/ 
 /*    5. CALCULATE DISTANCE BETWEEN ALL MATCHES AND CASE,  */ 
/* INCLUDING CASE (d=0)      */ 
 /*********************************************************************************************/ 
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    DATA Distance_Calc; 
     SET matchingPOP;  
 
     IF patient_Lat = . THEN patient_Lat = &patient_lat; 
IF patient_Long = . THEN patient_Long = 
&patient_Long; 
     IF patientID = "" THEN patientID = "&patientID"; 
     IF patientAGE = . THEN  patientAGE = &patientAGE; 
     IF patientSEX = . THEN patientSEX = &patientSEX; 
IF patient_LatRad = . THEN patient_LatRad = 
&patient_LatRad; 
IF patient_LongRad = . THEN patient_LongRad = 
&patient_LongRad; 
 
      
     PolarRadius = 6356.9; 
     EquatorialRadius = 6378.137;             
/*Geod ref. sys. 1980 */ 
     MeanRadius = 6378.01;                    
/*NASA: http://ssd.jpl.nasa.gov/phys_props_earth.html; 
+/-0.02Kms */ 
QuadraticRadius = SQRT((3*EquatorialRadius**2 + 
PolarRadius**2)/4); 
 
     A = SIN(LatRad); 
     B = COS(LatRad); 
 
     C = SIN(patient_LatRad); 
     D = COS(patient_LatRad); 
 
     E = COS(LongRad - patient_LongRad); 
 
     F = A*C; 
     G = B*D*E; 
 
     H = F+G; 
      
 
IF LatRad = patient_LatRad AND LongRad = 
patient_LongRad THEN I = 0; 
      
ELSE I = ARCOS(H); 
 
     distance = QuadraticRadius*I; 
 
DROP A B C D E F G H I PolarRadius 
EquatorialRadius MeanRadius QuadraticRadius; 
    RUN; 
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 /*********************************************************************************************/ 
 /*    6. TAKE CLOSEST "k", AND CHECK TO SEE MAXIMUM IS WITHIN */ 
/* THRESHOLD.         */ 
 /* IF NOT, GOTO STEP 4. AS LONG AS MAXIMUM AGE    */ 
/* CATEGORISATION NOT REACHED     */ 
 /* IF DISTANCE THRESHOLD REQUIREMENT MET, PROCEED  */ 
 /*********************************************************************************************/ 
 
/* ASSESS WHETHER OR NOT AT LEAST "k" TOTAL MATCHING CASES WITHIN 
SPECIFIED DISTANCE THRESHOLD */ 
 
    PROC SQL NOPRINT; 
CREATE TABLE WITHIN_D AS SELECT * FROM 
Distance_Calc WHERE distance <= 1; 
SELECT COUNT(*) INTO : nWITHINDIST FROM 
WITHIN_D; 
    QUIT; 
 
%IF &nWITHINDIST GE &k %THEN %LET THRESHOLD2 = 
PASS; 
    %ELSE %LET THRESHOLD2 = FAIL; 
 
%IF &THRESHOLD2 = FAIL AND &AGEDIM NE 
5 %THEN %GOTO NEXT_AGEGROUP; 
    %ELSE %DO; 
 
    
 /*********************************************************************************************/ 
 /*    7. STORE MAXIMUM DISTANCE AS PERTURBATION RADIUS  */ 
 /*********************************************************************************************/ 
 
 /* IF ALL THRESHOLDS MAINTAINED, OR IF ON LAST AGE GROUP, THEN  */ 
 /* SELECT THE CLOSEST (i.e. FIRST) FIVE TO THE PATIENT   */ 
 
     PROC SQL NOPRINT OUTOBS = &k; 
CREATE TABLE TOP&k AS SELECT * FROM 
Distance_Calc ORDER BY distance; 
SELECT MAX(distance) INTO : pertRADIUS 
FROM TOP&k;     
/* Maximum radius for perturbation */ 
     QUIT; 
 
    
 /*********************************************************************************************/ 
 /*    8. SET EXTENT FOR SELECTION BASED ON SQUARE FORMED BY */ 
/*  PERTURBATION RADIUS PLUS A RANDOM BUFFER SIZE WITHIN  */
 /* PREDEFINED THRESHOLD (E.G. 1 TO 10 METRES)   */ 
 /*********************************************************************************************/ 
 
 
%LET dbuff = &pertRADIUS + 
(((RANUNI(0)*9)+1)/1000);  
 
/* PERTURBATION RADIUS WITH AN ADDED RANDOM BUFFER BETWEEN 1 & 10 
METRES*/ 
 
/* THIS ALSO MAKES RE-IDENTIFICATION MORE DIFFICULT */ 
 
 /*  SET EXTENT COORDINATES FOR SELECTION FOR ACTIVE SELECTED CASE
 */ 
/*  VARIANT: Can be altered based on dimension priorities; for example, can refine distance 
within an age loop instead of age within the distance loop if minimum age distortion is prioritised 
over distance */ 
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     %LET d = &dbuff; 
%LET nd = &d /(SQRT((3*6378.137**2 + 
6356.9**2)/4)); /* NORMALISED DISTANCE */ 
 
     PROC SQL NOPRINT; 
SELECT 
ARSIN((SIN(patient_LatRad)*COS(&nd))+(CO
S(patient_LatRad)*SIN(&nd)*COS(constant('pi'
))))  
       INTO : MIN_LatRad  
        FROM selectedCase; 
       
SELECT 
ARSIN((SIN(patient_LatRad)*COS(&nd))+(CO
S(patient_LatRad)*SIN(&nd)*COS(0)))  
       INTO : MAX_LatRad  
        FROM SelectedCase; 
 
SELECT patient_LongRad + 
ATAN2((SIN((270*(constant('pi')))/180)*SIN(&n
d)*COS(patient_LatRad)),(COS(&nd)-
SIN(patient_LatRad)*SIN(patient_LatRad))) 
       INTO : MIN_LongRad 
        FROM SelectedCase; 
       
SELECT patient_LongRad + 
ATAN2((SIN((90*(constant('pi')))/180)*SIN(&nd
)*COS(patient_LatRad)),(COS(&nd)-
SIN(patient_LatRad)*SIN(patient_LatRad))) 
       INTO : MAX_LongRad 
        FROM selectedCase; 
 
     QUIT; 
    
 /*********************************************************************************************/ 
 /*    9.  SELECT ALL RECORDS FROM (1.) WITHIN EXTENT   */ 
 /*********************************************************************************************/ 
 
     DATA limited_POP_useME; 
      SET POP_useME selectedCase; 
 
IF LatRad < &MIN_LatRad OR LatRad > 
&MAX_LatRad OR LongRad < 
&MIN_LongRad OR LongRad > 
&MAX_LongRad THEN DELETE; 
 
      RUN; 
  
     PROC SQL NOPRINT; 
SELECT COUNT(*) INTO : 
LIMITED_squareCOUNT FROM 
limited_POP_useME; 
     QUIT; 
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 /*********************************************************************************************/ 
 /*    10. CALCULATE DISTANCE BETWEEN LIMITED EXTENT RECORDS  */ 
/* AND CASE        */ 
 /*********************************************************************************************/ 
 
     DATA limited_POP_useME; 
      SET limited_POP_useME;  
 
IF patient_Lat = . THEN patient_Lat = 
&patient_lat; 
 
IF patient_Long = . THEN patient_Long = 
&patient_Long; 
   
IF patientID = "" THEN patientID = 
"&patientID"; 
       
IF patientAGE = . THEN  patientAGE = 
&patientAGE; 
       
IF patientSEX = . THEN patientSEX = 
&patientSEX; 
       
IF patient_LatRad = . THEN patient_LatRad = 
&patient_LatRad; 
       
IF patient_LongRad = . THEN 
patient_LongRad = &patient_LongRad; 
 
       
      PolarRadius = 6356.9; 
   EquatorialRadius = 6378.137;             
/*Geod ref. sys. 1980 */ 
MeanRadius = 6378.01;                    
/*NASA: 
http://ssd.jpl.nasa.gov/phys_props_earth.html; 
+/-0.02Kms */ 
QuadraticRadius = 
SQRT((3*EquatorialRadius**2 + 
PolarRadius**2)/4); 
 
      A = SIN(LatRad); 
      B = COS(LatRad); 
 
      C = SIN(patient_LatRad); 
      D = COS(patient_LatRad); 
 
      E = COS(LongRad - patient_LongRad); 
 
      F = A*C; 
      G = B*D*E; 
 
      H = F+G; 
       
 
IF LatRad = patient_LatRad AND LongRad = 
patient_LongRad THEN I = 0; 
       
ELSE I = ARCOS(H); 
 
      distance = QuadraticRadius*I; 
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DROP A B C D E F G H I PolarRadius 
EquatorialRadius MeanRadius 
QuadraticRadius; 
 
     RUN; 
    
 /*********************************************************************************************/ 
 /*    11. SELECT ALL RECORDS WHERE DISTANCE LESS THAN OR EQUAL  */ 
/* TO PERTURBATION RADIUS PLUS A RANDOMLY DEFINED BUFFER */ 
/* BETWEEN 1 AND 10 METRES      */ 
 /*********************************************************************************************/ 
 
     DATA limited_POP_useME; 
      SET limited_POP_useME; 
      WHERE distance LE &dbuff; 
     RUN; 
  
 /*********************************************************************************************/ 
 /*    12. STORE COUNT, MEAN (X,Y), STD (X,Y)     */  
 /*********************************************************************************************/ 
 
     PROC SQL NOPRINT; 
SELECT COUNT(*) INTO : radiusCOUNT 
FROM limited_POP_useME; 
 
SELECT MEAN(Lat) INTO : radiusMEANLAT 
FROM limited_POP_useME; 
  
SELECT MEAN(Long) INTO : 
radiusMEANLONG FROM 
limited_POP_useME; 
       
SELECT STD(Lat) INTO : radiusSTDLAT 
FROM limited_POP_useME; 
 
SELECT STD(Long) INTO : radiusSTDLONG 
FROM limited_POP_useME; 
 
SELECT MEAN(distance) INTO : 
radiusMEANDIST FROM limited_POP_useME; 
 
SELECT STD(distance) INTO : 
radiusSTDDIST FROM limited_POP_useME; 
 
SELECT COUNT(*) INTO : 
nMATCHESINpertR FROM 
limited_POP_useME 
WHERE SEX = &patientSEX AND 
AGEGROUP&AGEDIM = 
&pAGEGROUP; 
 
     QUIT; 
 
     
 
 
 
 128 
 
 /*********************************************************************************************/ 
 /*    13. RANDOMLY SELECT ONE RECORD; THIS IS THE TRANSFORMED  */ 
/* RECORD        */ 
 /*********************************************************************************************/ 
 
     PROC SURVEYSELECT    
      DATA=limited_POP_useME 
       OUT=TRANSFORMED_CASE 
       METHOD=SRS 
       N=1 
       NOPRINT 
       ; 
     RUN; 
 
     DATA TRANSFORMED_CASE; 
      SET TRANSFORMED_CASE; 
      THRESHOLD1 = "&THRESHOLD1"; 
      MATCHES1 = &MATCHES1; 
      THRESHOLD2 = "&THRESHOLD2"; 
      nWITHINDIST = &nWITHINDIST; 
      RECORDNUM = &DCALC; 
      AGEGROUP = &AGEDIM; 
      newAGE = &pAGEGROUP+(&AGEDIM/10); 
 
      IF &AGEDIM = 1 THEN DO; 
       maxAGE = patientAGE; 
       minAGE = patientAGE; 
       midAGE = patientAGE; 
      END; 
 
      ELSE DO; 
maxAGE = 
(&AGEDIM*&pAGEGROUP)-1; 
       minAGE = maxAGE-(&AGEDIM-1); 
       midAGE = (maxAGE+minAGE)/2; 
      END; 
 
      FLAG = 1; 
      FORMAT newAGE newAGE.; 
      pertR = &pertRADIUS; 
      buffR = &d; 
      nMATCHESINpertR = &nMATCHESINpertR; 
      radiusCOUNT = &radiusCOUNT; 
      radiusMEANLONG = &radiusMEANLONG; 
      radiusMEANLAT = &radiusMEANLAT; 
      radiusSTDLONG = &radiusSTDLONG; 
      radiusSTDLAT = &radiusSTDLAT; 
      radiusMEANDIST = &radiusMEANDIST; 
      radiusSTDDIST = &radiusSTDDIST; 
 
KEEP  RECORDNUM person_ID sex age 
patientAGE patientSEX patientID 
patient_Lat patient_Long Lat Long 
distance THRESHOLD1  MATCHES1 
THRESHOLD2  nWITHINDIST FLAG 
AGEGROUP1 AGEGROUP2 
AGEGROUP3 AGEGROUP4 
AGEGROUP5 AGEGROUP newAGE 
maxAGE minAGE midAGE pertR 
buffR nMATCHESINpertR 
radiusCOUNT radiusMEANLONG 
radiusMEANLAT radiusSTDLONG 
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radiusSTDLAT radiusMEANDIST 
radiusSTDDIST; 
     RUN; 
 
     DATA TRANSFORMED; 
SET TRANSFORMED 
TRANSFORMED_CASE; 
      IF patientID = "" THEN DELETE; 
     RUN; 
 
/* THIS BIT IS THE FOLLOW-UP THAT ALLOWS US TO PREVENT SELECTION OF OTHER 
PATIENTS IN THE LIST */ 
 
     DATA POP_useME; 
MERGE POP_useME 
TRANSFORMED_CASE; 
      BY person_ID; 
     RUN; 
     %GOTO NEXT_RECORD; 
    %END; 
   %END; 
   %NEXT_AGEGROUP: 
 
  %END; 
  %NEXT_RECORD: 
 %END; 
 
%MEND TRANSFORM_CASES; 
 
%MACRO OUTPUT_STATS; 
 
 DATA TRANSFORMED; 
  SET TRANSFORMED; 
 RUN; 
 
 /* CALCULATE DEMOGRAPHICS */ 
 
 PROC MEANS NOPRINT DATA=TRANSFORMED; 
  VAR patientAGE; 
  OUTPUT OUT  = CASES_AGE 
    N  =  CASES 
    MIN  = MinpAGE 
    MAX  = MaxpAGE 
    MEDIAN =  MedianpAGE 
    MEAN = MeanpAGE 
    STD  = stdpAGE; 
 RUN; 
 DATA CASES_AGE; 
  SET CASES_AGE; 
  RECORDNUM = _n_; 
 RUN; 
 
 PROC MEANS NOPRINT DATA=TRANSFORMED; 
  VAR midAGE; 
  OUTPUT OUT  = tCASES_AGE 
    MIN  = MintAGE 
    MAX  = MaxtAGE 
    MEDIAN =  MediantAGE 
    MEAN = MeantAGE 
    STD  = stdtAGE; 
 RUN; 
  
DATA tCASES_AGE; 
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  SET tCASES_AGE; 
  RECORDNUM = _n_; 
 RUN; 
 
 PROC MEANS NOPRINT DATA=TRANSFORMED; 
  VAR patientSEX; 
  WHERE patientSEX = 1; 
  OUTPUT OUT = oCASES_MALES 
    N = oMALES; 
 RUN; 
 DATA oCASES_MALES; 
  SET oCASES_MALES; 
  RECORDNUM = _n_; 
 RUN;  
 
 PROC MEANS NOPRINT DATA=TRANSFORMED; 
  VAR patientSEX; 
  WHERE patientSEX = 2; 
  OUTPUT OUT = oCASES_FEMALES 
    N = oFEMALES; 
 RUN; 
 DATA oCASES_FEMALES; 
  SET oCASES_FEMALES; 
  RECORDNUM = _n_; 
 RUN;  
 
 PROC MEANS NOPRINT DATA=TRANSFORMED; 
  VAR SEX; 
  WHERE SEX = 1; 
  OUTPUT OUT = tCASES_MALES 
    N = MALES; 
 RUN; 
 DATA tCASES_MALES; 
  SET tCASES_MALES; 
  RECORDNUM = _n_; 
 RUN;  
 
 PROC MEANS NOPRINT DATA=TRANSFORMED; 
  VAR SEX; 
  WHERE SEX = 2; 
  OUTPUT OUT = tCASES_FEMALES 
    N = FEMALES; 
 RUN; 
 DATA tCASES_FEMALES; 
  SET tCASES_FEMALES; 
  RECORDNUM = _n_; 
 RUN;  
 
 /* CALCULATE STATS FOR TRANSFORMED POINT DISTANCES */ 
 
 PROC MEANS NOPRINT DATA=TRANSFORMED; 
  VAR distance; 
  OUTPUT OUT  = tCASES_dStats 
    N  =  CASES 
    MIN  = MinDist 
    MAX  = MaxDist 
    MEDIAN =  MedianDist 
    MEAN = MeanDist 
    STD  = stdDist; 
 RUN; 
 DATA tCASES_dStats; 
  SET tCASES_dStats; 
  RECORDNUM = _n_; 
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 RUN; 
 
 /* CALCULATE STATS FOR ORIGINAL LATITUDE (Y) */ 
 
 PROC MEANS NOPRINT DATA=TRANSFORMED; 
  VAR patient_Lat; 
  OUTPUT OUT  =  tCASES_oyStats 
    MIN  = minOY 
    MAX  = maxOY 
    MEDIAN = medianOY 
    MEAN = meanOY 
    STD  = stdOY; 
 RUN; 
 DATA tCASES_oyStats; 
  SET tCASES_oyStats; 
  RECORDNUM = _n_; 
 RUN; 
 /* CALCULATE STATS FOR ORIGINAL LONGITUDE (X) */ 
 
 PROC MEANS NOPRINT DATA=TRANSFORMED; 
  VAR patient_Long; 
  OUTPUT OUT  =  tCASES_oxStats 
    MIN  = minOX 
    MAX  = maxOX 
    MEDIAN = medianOX 
    MEAN = meanOX 
    STD  = stdOX; 
 RUN; 
 DATA tCASES_oxStats; 
  SET tCASES_oxStats; 
  RECORDNUM = _n_; 
 RUN; 
 
 /* CALCULATE STATS FOR TRANSFORMED LATITUDE (Y) */ 
 
 PROC MEANS NOPRINT DATA=TRANSFORMED; 
  VAR lat; 
  OUTPUT OUT  =  tCASES_tyStats 
    MIN  = minTY 
    MAX  = maxTY 
    MEDIAN = medianTY 
    MEAN = meanTY 
    STD  = stdTY; 
 RUN; 
 DATA tCASES_tyStats; 
  SET tCASES_tyStats; 
  RECORDNUM = _n_; 
 RUN; 
 
 /* CALCULATE STATS FOR TRANSFORMED LONGITUDE (X) */ 
 
 PROC MEANS NOPRINT DATA=TRANSFORMED; 
  VAR long; 
  OUTPUT OUT  =  tCASES_txStats 
    MIN  = minTX 
    MAX  = maxTX 
    MEDIAN = medianTX 
    MEAN = meanTX 
    STD  = stdTX; 
 RUN; 
 DATA tCASES_txStats; 
  SET tCASES_txStats; 
  RECORDNUM = _n_; 
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 RUN; 
 
 /* ADD NUMBER OF FAILS */ 
 
 PROC MEANS NOPRINT DATA=TRANSFORMED; 
  VAR RECORDNUM; 
  WHERE THRESHOLD2 = "FAIL"; 
  OUTPUT OUT   = tCASES_FAILS 
    N   =  FAILS; 
 RUN; 
 DATA tCASES_FAILS; 
  SET tCASES_FAILS; 
  RECORDNUM = _n_; 
 RUN; 
 
 
 /* ADD MATCH NUMBER STATS */ 
 
 PROC MEANS NOPRINT DATA=TRANSFORMED; 
  VAR nWITHINDIST; 
  OUTPUT OUT  = tCASES_MATCHES 
    MIN  =  minMATCHES 
    MAX  = maxMATCHES 
    MEDIAN = medianMATCHES 
    MEAN = meanMATCHES 
    STD  = stdMATCHES; 
 RUN; 
 DATA tCASES_MATCHES; 
  SET tCASES_MATCHES; 
  RECORDNUM = _n_; 
 RUN; 
 
 PROC MEANS NOPRINT DATA=TRANSFORMED; 
  VAR nMATCHESINpertR; 
  OUTPUT OUT  = tCASES_MATCHESpertR 
    MIN  =  minMATCHESpertR 
    MAX  = maxMATCHESpertR 
    MEDIAN = medianMATCHESpertR 
    MEAN = meanMATCHESpertR 
    STD  = stdMATCHESpertR; 
 RUN; 
 DATA tCASES_MATCHESpertR; 
  SET tCASES_MATCHESpertR; 
  RECORDNUM = _n_; 
 RUN; 
 
 
 /* ADD NUMBER OF TIMES ORIGINAL LOCATION CHOSEN */ 
 
 PROC MEANS NOPRINT DATA=TRANSFORMED; 
  VAR RECORDNUM; 
  WHERE person_ID = patientID; 
  OUTPUT OUT  = tCASES_ORIGINAL 
    N  =  ORIGINAL; 
 RUN; 
 DATA tCASES_ORIGINAL; 
  SET tCASES_ORIGINAL; 
  RECORDNUM = _n_; 
 RUN; 
 
 /* PUT THEM ALL TOGETHER */ 
 
 DATA tSTATS; 
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MERGE  CASES_AGE tCASES_AGE oCASES_MALES 
oCASES_FEMALES tCASES_MALES tCASES_FEMALES 
tCASES_dStats tCASES_oySTATS tCASES_oxSTATS 
tCASES_tyStats tCASES_txStats  
tCASES_FAILS tCASES_MATCHES 
tCASES_MATCHESpertR tCASES_ORIGINAL; 
 
  BY RECORDNUM; 
  IF FAILS = . THEN FAILS = 0; 
  IF ORIGINAL = . THEN ORIGINAL = 0; 
  IF MALES = . THEN MALES = 0; 
  IF FEMALES = . THEN FEMALES = 0; 
  DROP _TYPE_ _FREQ_; 
 RUN; 
 
%MEND OUTPUT_STATS; 
 
%MACRO RUNIT; 
 
 %HOUSEKEEPING; 
 %FORMATTING; 
 %SET_LIBRARIES; 
 
 %PREP_DATA; 
 %CATEGORISE_AGE; 
 
 DATA _NULL_; 
  CALL SYMPUT ('currentTIME',PUT (TIME(),TIME.)); 
  CALL SYMPUT ('currentDATE',PUT (DATE(),DATE.)); 
 RUN; 
 %PUT BEGINNING ALGORITHM: &currentTIME ON &currentDATE; 
 
 /* NUMBER OF ITERATIONS FOR EACH PATIENT-LIST SIZE (SUGGEST 1,000)*/ 
 %LET ITERATIONS = 1000; 
 
/* NUMBER OF DIFFERENT PATIENT-LIST SIZES (CAN ADD MORE / MODIFY AS 
DESIRED */ 
 %DO ploop = 1 %TO 5; 
 
  %IF &ploop = 1 %THEN %LET SIZE = 25; 
  %ELSE %IF &ploop = 2 %THEN %LET SIZE = 50; 
  %ELSE %IF &ploop = 3 %THEN %LET SIZE = 100; 
  %ELSE %IF &ploop = 4 %THEN %LET SIZE = 200; 
  %ELSE %IF &ploop = 5 %THEN %LET SIZE = 400; 
 
  DATA emptyDATASET; 
   SET MIDAS.emptyDATASET; 
  RUN; 
 
DATA prepTRANSFORMED; 
   SET MIDAS.prepTRANSFORMED; 
  RUN; 
 
  DATA totalSTATS_&SIZE; 
   SET emptyDATASET; 
  RUN; 
 
  DATA ALL_tCASES_&SIZE; 
   SET emptyDATASET; 
  RUN; 
 
  %DO within = 1 %TO &ITERATIONS;  
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%PUT THIS IS RUN NUMBER &within IN SAMPLE GROUP SIZE 
&ploop; 
 
   %CHOOSE_CASES(&SIZE); 
   %LIMIT_EXTENT; 
   %TRANSFORM_CASES; 
   %OUTPUT_STATS; 
    
   DATA tCASES; 
    SAMPLENUM = &within; 
    SET TRANSFORMED; 
   RUN; 
    
   DATA tSTATS; 
    SAMPLENUM = &within; 
    SET tSTATS; 
   RUN; 
   DATA totalSTATS_&SIZE; 
    SET totalSTATS_&SIZE tSTATS; 
    IF CASES = . THEN DELETE; 
    DROP RECORDNUM; 
   RUN; 
 
   DATA ALL_tCASES_&SIZE; 
    SET ALL_tCASES_&SIZE tCASES; 
    IF patientID = "" THEN DELETE; 
   RUN; 
 
  %END; 
 
  DATA MIDAS.totalSTATS_&SIZE; 
   SET totalSTATS_&SIZE; 
  RUN; 
  DATA MIDAS.ALL_tCASES_&SIZE; 
   SET ALL_tCASES_&SIZE; 
  RUN; 
 
  DATA _NULL_; 
   CALL SYMPUT ('currentTIME',PUT (TIME(),TIME.)); 
   CALL SYMPUT ('currentDATE',PUT (DATE(),DATE.)); 
  RUN; 
  %PUT ALGORITHM COMPLETE: &currentTIME ON &currentDATE; 
   
  %HOUSEKEEPING; 
  %FORMATTING; 
   
 %END; 
 
%MEND RUNIT; 
%RUNIT; 
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E. Example Code Modification to Allow for Cluster Insertion 
 
To create a cluster within the patient dataset, make the following TWO 
modifications: 
 
1. Replace the “CHOOSE_CASES” MACRO in Appendix D with the one 
below 
 
%MACRO CHOOSE_CASES(PATIENTNUM, CLUSTERSIZE); 
 
/* PATIENTNUM IS THE NUMBER OF PATIENTS TO SIMULATE; CLUSTERSIZE IS THE 
SIZE OF THE CLUSTER TO BE CREATED */ 
 
 %LET NONCLUSTERSIZE =  %EVAL(&PATIENTNUM - &CLUSTERSIZE); 
 %LET CLUSTERSIZEb = %EVAL(&CLUSTERSIZE - 1); 
 
 SASFILE MIDAS.popDATA LOAD;      
/* LOAD POPULATION DATA INTO RAM TO SPEED UP SAMPLE SELECTION */ 
 
 %PUT SELECTING &PATIENTNUM CASES OF WHICH &CLUSTERSIZE ARE 
CLUSTERED AND &NONCLUSTERSIZE ARE NOT; 
   
/******************************************************************************************************/ 
/*          SELECT INDEX CASE FOR CLUSTER CREATION   */ 
/******************************************************************************************************/ 
 
  PROC SURVEYSELECT  DATA=MIDAS.popDATA 
       OUT=iCase 
       METHOD=SRS 
       N=1 
       NOPRINT 
       ; 
  RUN; 
 
  DATA iCase; 
   SET iCase; 
   patient_LatRad  = latRad; 
      patient_LongRad = longRad; 
   patient_Lat = Lat; 
   patient_Long = Long; 
   patientID = person_ID; 
   CALL SYMPUT ("iPATIENT",patientID); 
   CALL SYMPUT ("patient_Lat", patient_Lat); 
   CALL SYMPUT ("patient_Long", patient_Long); 
   CALL SYMPUT ("patient_LatRad", patient_LatRad); 
   CALL SYMPUT ("patient_LongRad", patient_LongRad); 
  RUN; 
 
  DATA _NULL_; 
   CALL SYMPUT ('currentTIME',PUT (TIME(),TIME.)); 
  RUN; 
  %PUT INDEX CASE SELECTED: &currentTIME; 
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/******************************************************************************************************/ 
/* REMOVE INDEX CASE FROM BASE POPULATION TO PREP FOR CLUSTER  */ 
/* CREATION          */ 
/******************************************************************************************************/ 
 
  PROC SQL NOPRINT; 
   CREATE TABLE POP_noCASES AS 
    SELECT * 
     FROM MIDAS.popDATA 
      WHERE person_ID NE "&iPATIENT"; 
  QUIT; 
 
/******************************************************************************************************/ 
/* SELECT "CLUSTERSIZE" CASES WITHIN CLUSTER DISTANCE OF INDEX CASE */ 
/******************************************************************************************************/ 
 
  DATA _NULL_; 
   CALL SYMPUT ('currentTIME',PUT (TIME(),TIME.)); 
  RUN; 
%PUT BEGINNING CLUSTER EXTENT DEFINITION AND SELECTION: 
&currentTIME; 
 
 
/* DEFINE RECTANGULAR EXTENT FOR SELECTION BASED ON CLUSTER DISTANCE 
THRESHOLD */ 
 
  %LET d = 1;         
 
/* CLUSTERING DISTANCE THRESHOLD; HERE, 1KM */ 
 
  %LET nd = &d/(SQRT((3*6378.137**2 + 6356.9**2)/4));   
/* NORMALISE DISTANCE    */ 
 
  PROC SQL NOPRINT; 
SELECT 
ARSIN((SIN(MIN(patient_LatRad))*COS(&nd))+(COS(MIN(patient_Lat
Rad))*SIN(&nd)*COS(constant('pi'))))  
    INTO : MIN_LatRad  
     FROM iCase; 
 
SELECT 
ARSIN((SIN(MAX(patient_LatRad))*COS(&nd))+(COS(MAX(patient_La
tRad))*SIN(&nd)*COS(0)))  
    INTO : MAX_LatRad  
     FROM iCase; 
 
SELECT MIN(patient_LongRad) + 
ATAN2((SIN((270*(constant('pi')))/180)*SIN(&nd)*COS(MIN(patient_Lat
Rad))),(COS(&nd)-
SIN(MIN(patient_LatRad))*SIN(MIN(patient_LatRad)))) 
    INTO : MIN_LongRad 
     FROM iCase; 
 
SELECT MAX(patient_LongRad) + 
ATAN2((SIN((90*(constant('pi')))/180)*SIN(&nd)*COS(MAX(patient_Lat
Rad))),(COS(&nd)-
SIN(MAX(patient_LatRad))*SIN(MAX(patient_LatRad)))) 
    INTO : MAX_LongRad 
     FROM iCase; 
  QUIT; 
 
/* FILTER OUT THOSE OUTSIDE OF THE RECTANGULAR EXTENT AND APPEND THE 
INDEX CASE */ 
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  DATA clusterEXTENT; 
   SET POP_noCASES iCase; 
IF LatRad < &MIN_LatRad OR LatRad > &MAX_LatRad OR LongRad 
< &MIN_LongRad OR LongRad > &MAX_LongRad THEN DELETE; 
  RUN; 
 
/* CALCULATE DISTANCE BETWEEN EACH RECORD IN THE EXTENT AND THE INDEX 
CASE */ 
 
  DATA clusterEXTENT; 
   SET clusterEXTENT ;  
 
   IF patient_Lat = . THEN patient_Lat = &patient_lat; 
   IF patient_Long = . THEN patient_Long = &patient_Long; 
   IF patientID = "" THEN patientID = "&iPATIENT"; 
   IF patient_LatRad = . THEN patient_LatRad = &patient_LatRad; 
   IF patient_LongRad = . THEN patient_LongRad = &patient_LongRad; 
     
   PolarRadius = 6356.9; 
   EquatorialRadius = 6378.137;            /*Geod ref. sys. 1980 */ 
MeanRadius = 6378.01;                   /*NASA: 
http://ssd.jpl.nasa.gov/phys_props_earth.html; +/-0.02Kms */ 
   QuadraticRadius = SQRT((3*EquatorialRadius**2 + PolarRadius**2)/4); 
 
   A = SIN(LatRad); 
   B = COS(LatRad); 
 
   C = SIN(patient_LatRad); 
   D = COS(patient_LatRad); 
 
   E = COS(LongRad - patient_LongRad); 
 
   F = A*C; 
   G = B*D*E; 
 
   H = F+G; 
      
IF LatRad = patient_LatRad AND LongRad = patient_LongRad THEN I 
= 0; 
   ELSE I = ARCOS(H); 
 
   distance = QuadraticRadius*I; 
 
DROP A B C D E F G H I PolarRadius EquatorialRadius MeanRadius 
QuadraticRadius; 
  RUN; 
 
/* REMOVE THE INDEX CASE TO PREVENT RE-SELECTION AND ALL RECORDS 
OUTSIDE THE CLUSTER DISTANCE THRESHOLD */ 
 
  DATA clusterEXTENT; 
   SET clusterEXTENT; 
   WHERE distance LE 1 AND person_ID NE patientID; 
  RUN; 
 
/* RANDOMLY SELECT CLUSTER RECORDS BASED ON THE CLUSTER SIZE STRING 
PASSED TO THIS MACRO ("CLUSTERSIZE") */ 
 
  PROC SURVEYSELECT  DATA=clusterEXTENT 
       OUT=clusterCases 
       METHOD=SRS 
       N=&CLUSTERSIZEb 
       NOPRINT 
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  RUN; 
 
 
  DATA _NULL_; 
   CALL SYMPUT ('currentTIME',PUT (TIME(),TIME.)); 
  RUN; 
%PUT CLUSTER EXTENT DEFINITION AND SELECTION COMPLETED: 
&currentTIME; 
 
/******************************************************************************************************/ 
/* REMOVE ALL CLUSTER EXTENT CASES FROM THE BASE POPULATION FOR  */ 
/* SELECTION OF NON-CLUSTERED CASES      */ 
/******************************************************************************************************/ 
 
  DATA cluster; 
   SET clusterEXTENT iCase; 
   clusterFLAG = 1; 
   clusterID = person_ID; 
   KEEP clusterID clusterFLAG; 
  RUN; 
 
  PROC SQL NOPRINT; 
   CREATE TABLE nonCLUSTER AS 
    SELECT * 
     FROM MIDAS.popDATA pop LEFT JOIN cluster 
      ON pop.person_ID = cluster.clusterID; 
  QUIT; 
 
  DATA nonCLUSTER; 
   SET nonCLUSTER; 
   WHERE clusterFLAG NE 1; 
  RUN; 
 
/******************************************************************************************************/ 
/* SELECT REMAINDER OF CASES       */ 
/******************************************************************************************************/ 
 
  DATA _NULL_; 
   CALL SYMPUT ('currentTIME',PUT (TIME(),TIME.)); 
  RUN; 
  %PUT BEGINNING NON-CLUSTER SELECTION: &currentTIME; 
 
 
  PROC SURVEYSELECT  DATA=nonCLUSTER 
       OUT=nonclusterCases 
       METHOD=SRS 
       N=&NONCLUSTERSIZE 
       NOPRINT 
       ; 
  RUN; 
 
  DATA _NULL_; 
   CALL SYMPUT ('currentTIME',PUT (TIME(),TIME.)); 
  RUN; 
  %PUT NON-CLUSTER SELECTION COMPLETE: &currentTIME; 
 
/******************************************************************************************************/ 
/* CREATE FINAL CASES DATASET       */ 
/******************************************************************************************************/ 
 
  DATA Cases; 
   RECORDNUM = _n_; 
   SET iCase clusterCASES nonclusterCASES; 
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   patientAGE = AGE; 
   patientSEX = SEX; 
   patient_LatRad  = latRad; 
   patient_LongRad = longRad; 
   patient_lat = lat; 
   patient_long = long; 
   patientID = person_ID; 
   DROP distance clusterID clusterFLAG; 
  RUN; 
 
/******************************************************************************************************/ 
/* REMOVE ALL THE CASES FROM THE BASE POPULATION TO PREVENT  */ 
/* TRANSFORMING ONE CASE WITH ANOTHER CASE     */ 
/******************************************************************************************************/ 
 
  PROC SQL NOPRINT; 
   CREATE TABLE POP_noCASES AS 
    SELECT pop.*, Cases.patientID 
     FROM MIDAS.popDATA pop LEFT JOIN Cases 
      ON pop.person_ID = Cases.patientID; 
  QUIT; 
 
  DATA POP_noCASES; 
   SET POP_noCASES; 
   IF patientID NE "" THEN DELETE; 
   FLAG = 0; 
  RUN; 
 
 SASFILE MIDAS.popDATA CLOSE;     
/* CLEAR POPULATION DATA FROM RAM  */ 
 
%MEND CHOOSE_CASES; 
 
2. Make the following TWO changes to the “RUNIT” MACRO in Appendix 
D: 
After specifying the number of iterations, specify the desired cluster size by 
adding the following lines: 
 
   /* SET DESIRED CLUSTER SIZE (e.g. 10) */ 
   %LET CLUSTER = 10; 
When calling the CHOOSE_CASES macro, pass it the cluster size as 
follows: 
   %CHOOSE_CASES(&SIZE, &CLUSTER); 
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F.  (Partial) Synthetic Population Generation: SAS code 
 
/******************************************************************************************************/ 
/*      EPISIM 2010     */ 
/*    Created by Philip AbdelMalik    */ 
/*   RAMDISK VERSION - RAM DRIVE SET TO "V"   */ 
/*    RUN START: SEPT 19, 2010    */ 
/******************************************************************************************************/ 
 
%PUT BEGIN...; 
 
PROC PRINTTO LOG = "V:\RESEARCH\EPISIM\LOGS\YOW_popLOG"; 
RUN; 
 
/************************************************************************************/ 
/*                          SET LIBRARIES   */ 
/************************************************************************************/ 
%PUT SET LIBRARIES MACRO...; 
 
%MACRO SET_LIBRARIES; 
/* SETTING LIBNAMES FOR WORKING DIRECTORIES IN RAM DISK SPACE (i.e. ALL 
TEMP) */ 
 
/* THIS DIRECTORY CONTAINS CLEANED CANADA 2006 CENSUS SIMULATION DATA */ 
 
 LIBNAME SIM 'V:\Research\EPISIM\CAN_CLEAN'; 
 RUN; 
 
 /* THIS DIRECTORY CONTAINS OTTAWA-SPECIFIC DATA */ 
 LIBNAME YOW 'V:\Research\EPISIM\YOW'; 
 RUN; 
 
 /* THIS DIRECTORY PROVIDES A "PLAYGROUND" FOR DATA */ 
 LIBNAME PLAY 'V:\Research\EPISIM\PLAYGROUND'; 
 RUN; 
 
 /* SETTING LIBNAME FOR FINAL PERMANENT FILES */ 
 LIBNAME FINALS 'C:\Research\EPISIM\FINALS'; 
 RUN; 
 
%MEND SET_LIBRARIES; 
 
/* REMEMBER TO REMOVE PUT STATEMENTS WHERE APPROPRIATE WHEN WRITING 
TO LOG */ 
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/************************************************************************************/ 
/*                          HOUSEKEEPING                           */ 
/************************************************************************************/ 
%PUT HOUSKEEPING MACRO...; 
/************************************************************************************/ 
/*                          HOUSEKEEPING                           */ 
/*                                                                   */ 
/*                     CLEAR TEMP WORK LIBRARY                   */ 
/*                              CLEAR ALL MACROS                         */ 
/*                    CLEAR ALL MACRO VARIABLES                 */ 
/*                                                                   */ 
/*           TAKEN FROM PAPER 082-2009 BY CHUCK BININGER          */ 
/*               RETRIEVED FROM THE SAS WEBSITE                   */ 
/************************************************************************************/ 
 
%MACRO HOUSEKEEPING; 
 
    PROC DATASETS 
        LIBRARY = work 
        KILL; 
    QUIT; 
 
    %LET syscc = 0;         /* Operating environment condition code     */ 
    %LET sysrc = 0;         /* Operating system condition code          */ 
    %LET syslibrc = 0;      /* Libname statement condition code         */ 
    %LET sysfilrc = 0;      /* Filename statement condition code        */ 
    %LET syslckrc = 0;      /* SAS Shre lock statement condition code   */ 
    %LET syslast = ;        /* Contains last created dataset            */ 
 
    OPTIONS NONOTES;        /* Requests whether or not notes are output to the log  */ 
    OPTIONS obs = max;      /* Resets the number of observations to process         */ 
 
/************************************************************************************/ 
/*                        DEFINE FORMATTING                         */ 
/************************************************************************************/ 
 
    PROC FORMAT; 
        VALUE AGEGROUP  1 = "0-4 years" 
                        2 = "5-9 years" 
                        3 = "10-14 years" 
                        4 = "15-19 years" 
                        5 = "20-24 years" 
                        6 = "25-29 years" 
                        7 = "30-34 years" 
                        8 = "35-39 years" 
                        9 = "40-44 years" 
                        10 = "45-49 years" 
                        11 = "50-54 years" 
                        12 = "55-59 years" 
                        13 = "60-64 years" 
                        14 = "65-69 years" 
                        15 = "70-74 years" 
                        16 = "75-79 years" 
                        17 = "80-84 years" 
                        18 = "85-89 years" 
                        19 = "90-94 years" 
                        20 = "95-99 years" 
                        21 = "100+ years"; 
    RUN; 
 
%MEND HOUSEKEEPING; 
/************************************************************************************/ 
/*  ESTIMATE POPULATION COUNTS   */ 
 142 
 
/************************************************************************************/ 
%PUT ESTIMATE POPULATION COUNTS MACROS...; 
 
/************************************************************************************/ 
/*          BEGIN POPULATION ESTIMATION AND OPTIMISATION         */ 
/************************************************************************************/ 
 
%MACRO ePOP; 
 
/************************************************************************************/ 
/*                        SET GLOBAL VARIABLES                      */ 
/************************************************************************************/ 
 
    %LET SEED = 0;                   
/* FOR RANDOM NUMBER GENERATION - ENSURES DIFFERENT WITH EACH RUN */ 
    %LET RANGE = 8;                  
/* SET TO ERROR RANGE IN COUNTS DUE TO PRIVACY RULES - STATSCAN = 4 EACH 
WAY, SO RANGE IS 8 */ 
    %LET MIN = 4;                    
/* ERROR SIZE = 4 */ 
 
    %LET OPTIMISE = 1000000;         
/* MAXIMUM NUMBER OF RUNS FOR OPTIMISATION ATTEMPT */ 
 
/************************************************************************************/ 
/*                        PREPARE THE DATASET                       */ 
/************************************************************************************/ 
 
    DATA temp_ePopulation; 
        SET SIM.POPULATION; 
WHERE GEOGRAPHY > "35060000" AND GEOGRAPHY < "35070000" AND 
population100 NE .; 
 
/* NOTE: 93 records in Canada have no population information in the 2006 Census Profile */ 
/* NOTE: 6 records in Ottawa have no population and were therefore excluded through this 
condition */ 
 
        S_RECORDNUM = _n_; 
        CALL SYMPUT ('NUMDAS',_n_); 
    RUN; 
 
    PROC SORT DATA=temp_ePopulation; 
        BY GEOGRAPHY; 
    RUN; 
 
/************************************************************************************/ 
/*          BEGIN WITH THOSE AGED 15 YEARS AND OVER              */ 
/* (A ROUNDED COUNT FOR THIS GROUP IS GIVEN IN THE CENSUS*/ 
/************************************************************************************/ 
 
        DATA ePOP15OVER; 
 
            SET temp_ePopulation; 
KEEP GEOGRAPHY  eM15_19 eM20_24 eM25_29 eM30_34 eM35_39 
eM40_44 eM45_49 eM50_54 eM55_59 eM60_64 eM65_69 eM70_74 eM75_79 
eM80_84 eM85  
eF15_19 eF20_24 eF25_29 eF30_34 eF35_39 eF40_44 eF45_49 eF50_54 
eF55_59 eF60_64 eF65_69 eF70_74 eF75_79 eF80_84 eF85 
                          mPop15Over fPop15Over ePop15Over Pop15Over LeaveFlag1 ARUNS; 
 
            /****************************************/ 
            /*      SET LOCAL VARIABLES     */ 
            /****************************************/         
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mPop15Over=0; fPop15Over=0; ePop15Over=0; ARUNS = 0; 
 
            /****************************************/ 
            /*           DEFINE ARRAYS             */ 
            /****************************************/ 
 
ARRAY totMALES{*}       M15_19  M20_24  M25_29  M30_34  M35_39  M40_44  
M45_49  M50_54  M55_59  M60_64  M65_69  M70_74  M75_79  M80_84  M85; 
             
ARRAY estMALES{*}       eM15_19 eM20_24 eM25_29 eM30_34 eM35_39 eM40_44 
eM45_49 eM50_54 eM55_59 eM60_64 eM65_69 eM70_74 eM75_79 eM80_84 eM85; 
 
ARRAY totFEMALES{*}     F15_19  F20_24  F25_29  F30_34  F35_39  F40_44  F45_49  
F50_54  F55_59  F60_64  F65_69  F70_74  F75_79  F80_84  F85; 
             
ARRAY estFEMALES{*}     eF15_19 eF20_24 eF25_29 eF30_34 eF35_39 eF40_44 
eF45_49 eF50_54 eF55_59 eF60_64 eF65_69 eF70_74 eF75_79 eF80_84 eF85; 
 
            /************************************************************/ 
            /*    PSEUDO-RANDOM NUMBER GENERATION   */ 
            /************************************************************/ 
 
            DO UNTIL (ARUNS = &OPTIMISE OR LeaveFlag1 = 1); 
 
                mPop15Over=0; fPop15Over=0; ePop15Over=0; 
 
                /* LOOP TO ESTIMATE MALE COUNTS */ 
                DO m = 1 TO 15; 
IF totMales(m) > 0 THEN estMales(m) = INT(RANUNI(&SEED)* &RANGE + 
(totMales(m)-&MIN)); 
ELSE estMales(m) = INT(RANUNI(&SEED)*&MIN); 
mPop15Over = mPop15Over+estMales(m); 
                END; 
 
                /* LOOP TO ESTIMATE FEMALE COUNTS */ 
                DO f = 1 TO 15; 
IF totFemales(f) > 0 THEN estFemales(f) = INT(RANUNI(&SEED)* &RANGE 
+(totFemales(f)-&MIN)); 
ELSE estFemales(f) = INT(RANUNI(&SEED)*&MIN); 
fPop15Over = fPop15Over+estFemales(f); 
                END; 
 
                /****************************************/ 
                /*          CALCULATE TOTALS       */ 
                /****************************************/ 
 
                ePop15Over = mPop15Over + fPop15Over; 
 
                /****************************************/ 
                /*   RUN COUNT VERIFICATION  */ 
                /****************************************/ 
 
                IF  ePop15Over < Pop15Over+4 AND ePop15Over > Pop15Over-4 THEN DO; 
                    LeaveFlag1 = 1; 
                END; 
                ELSE DO; 
                    LeaveFlag1 = 0; 
                END; 
 
                ARUNS = ARUNS + 1; 
 
            END; 
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        RUN; 
 
        PROC FREQ DATA=ePop15Over NOPRINT; 
            TABLES LeaveFlag1 / OUT=ePOP1CHECK; 
        RUN; 
 
        DATA TEMP_popCHECK1; 
            SET ePOP1CHECK; 
            WHERE LeaveFlag1 = 1; 
            IF COUNT NE &NUMDAS THEN Check1 = "FAIL"; 
            ELSE Check1 = "PASS"; 
        RUN; 
 
        /*************************************************************************************************/ 
        /*      MERGE TO THE ORIGINAL POPULATION DATASET TO ALLOW FOR    */ 
        /*  CALCULATION OF DESIRED NUMBER OF THOSE AGED UNDER 15 YEARS */ 
        /*  SINCE WE HAVE THE EXACT 100% POPULATION COUNT IN THE CENSUS */ 
        /*************************************************************************************************/ 
 
        PROC SORT DATA=ePOP15Over; 
            BY GEOGRAPHY; 
        RUN; 
        DATA interimPOP; 
            MERGE temp_ePopulation ePOP15Over; 
        RUN; 
 
        /*************************************************************************************************/ 
        /*   ESTIMATE POPULATION COUNTS FOR THOSE AGED UNDER 15 YEARS    */ 
        /*************************************************************************************************/ 
        DATA ePOPUNDER15; 
            SET interimPOP; 
            KEEP GEOGRAPHY Population100 TotalMale TotalFemale 
eM0_4 eM5_9 eM10_14 eF0_4 eF5_9 eF10_14 mPopUnder15 fPopUnder15 
ePopUnder15 Target_ePopUnder15 CRUNS LeaveFlag2; 
 
            /****************************************/ 
            /*      SET LOCAL VARIABLES      */ 
            /****************************************/ 
            mPopUnder15=0; fPopUnder15=0; ePopUnder15=0; CRUNS=0; 
            Target_ePopUnder15 = Population100-ePop15Over; 
 
            /****************************************/ 
            /*              DEFINE ARRAYS           */ 
            /****************************************/ 
 
            ARRAY totMALES{*}       M0_4    M5_9    M10_14  ; 
            ARRAY estMALES{*}       eM0_4   eM5_9   eM10_14 ; 
 
            ARRAY totFEMALES{*}     F0_4    F5_9    F10_14  ; 
            ARRAY estFEMALES{*}     eF0_4   eF5_9   eF10_14 ; 
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/************************************************************/ 
             /*    PSEUDO-RANDOM NUMBER GENERATION   */ 
             /************************************************************/ 
 
            DO UNTIL (CRUNS = &OPTIMISE OR LeaveFlag2 = 1); 
 
                mPopUnder15=0; fPopUnder15=0; ePopUnder15=0; 
 
                /* LOOP TO ESTIMATE MALE COUNTS */ 
                DO m = 1 TO 3; 
IF totMales(m) > 0 THEN estMales(m) = INT(RANUNI(&SEED)* &RANGE + 
(totMales(m)-&MIN)); 
ELSE estMales(m) = INT(RANUNI(&SEED)*&MIN); 
mPopUnder15 = mPopUnder15+estMales(m); 
                END; 
 
                /* LOOP TO ESTIMATE FEMALE COUNTS */ 
                DO f = 1 TO 3; 
IF totFemales(f) > 0 THEN estFemales(f) = INT(RANUNI(&SEED)* &RANGE 
+(totFemales(f)-&MIN)); 
ELSE estFemales(f) = INT(RANUNI(&SEED)*&MIN); 
fPopUnder15 = fPopUnder15+estFemales(f); 
                END; 
 
                /****************************************/ 
                /*        CALCULATE TOTALS         */ 
                /****************************************/ 
 
                ePopUnder15 = mPopUnder15 + fPopUnder15; 
 
                /****************************************/ 
                /*   RUN COUNT VERIFICATION  */ 
                /****************************************/ 
 
                IF  ePopUnder15 = Target_ePopUnder15 THEN DO; 
                    LeaveFlag2 = 1; 
                END; 
                ELSE DO; 
                    LeaveFlag2 = 0; 
                END; 
 
                CRUNS = CRUNS + 1; 
 
            END; 
 
        RUN; 
 
        PROC FREQ DATA=ePopUnder15 NOPRINT; 
            TABLES LeaveFlag2 / OUT=ePOP2CHECK; 
        RUN; 
 
        DATA TEMP_popCHECK2; 
            SET ePOP2CHECK; 
            WHERE LeaveFlag2 = 1; 
            IF COUNT NE &NUMDAS THEN Check2 = "FAIL"; 
            ELSE Check2 = "PASS"; 
        RUN; 
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%MEND ePOP; 
 
/*********************************************************************************************/ 
/*  LOOP THROUGH UNTIL ALL NUMBERS MATCH, OR 1,000,000 RUNS */ 
/*********************************************************************************************/ 
 
%MACRO ePOP_RUN; 
 
    %LET OPTIMISE = 1000000;         
/* MAXIMUM NUMBER OF RUNS FOR OPTIMISATION ATTEMPT */ 
 
    %DO ePOPr = 1 %TO &OPTIMISE; 
        %ePOP; 
        DATA _NULL_; 
            SET TEMP_popCHECK1; 
            CALL SYMPUT ('CHECK1',CHECK1); 
        RUN; 
        DATA _NULL_; 
            SET TEMP_popCHECK2; 
            CALL SYMPUT ('CHECK2',CHECK2); 
        RUN; 
 
        %IF "&CHECK1" = "PASS" AND "&CHECK2" = "PASS" %THEN %GOTO 
EXIT_ePOP_RUN; 
    %END; 
    %EXIT_ePOP_RUN: 
 
    DATA PLAY.YOW_ePopulation_v2; 
        MERGE ePopUnder15 ePOP15Over; 
        BY GEOGRAPHY; 
    RUN; 
%MEND ePOP_RUN; 
 
/*********************************************************************************************/ 
/*                           iGENESIS    */ 
/*********************************************************************************************/ 
 
%PUT iGENESIS MACROS...; 
/*****************************************************************/ 
/*                          BEGIN GENESIS                        */ 
/*****************************************************************/ 
 
%MACRO iGENESIS; 
 
        /************************************************************/ 
        /*                       SET VARIABLES                     */ 
        /************************************************************/ 
 
        %LET SEED = 0;           
/* FOR RANDOM NUMBER GENERATION - ENSURES DIFFERENT WITH EACH 
RUN */ 
 
        /* PLEASE DEFINE THE FOLLOWING: */ 
        %LET tpM85_89 = 0.34;               /* TARGET PROPORTION OF THOSE AGED 85 TO 89 
YEARS WHO ARE MALES     */ 
        %LET tpM90_94 = 0.28;               /* TARGET PROPORTION OF THOSE AGED 90 TO 94 
YEARS WHO ARE MALES     */ 
        %LET tpM95_99 = 0.22;               /* TARGET PROPORTION OF THOSE AGED 95 TO 99 
YEARS WHO ARE MALES     */ 
        %LET tpM100   = 0.18;               /* TARGET PROPORTION OF THOSE AGED 100 
YEARS PLUS WHO ARE MALES     */ 
        %LET tmCENTENARIANS = 20;           /* TARGET NUMBER (APPROXIMATE) OF MALE 
CENTENARIANS                 */ 
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        %LET tfCENTENARIANS = 91;           /* TARGET NUMBER (APPROXIMATE) OF 
FEMALE CENTENARIANS               */ 
 
        /*************************************************************************************************/ 
        /*                        PREPARE THE DATASET                        */ 
        /* IN THE PROCESS, ALSO STORE THE FIRST AND LAST DAs (EXTENT) */ 
        /*************************************************************************************************/ 
 
        DATA iGENESIS_PREP; 
            SET PLAY.YOW_ePopulation_v2; 
            RECNUM = _n_; 
        RUN; 
        PROC SORT DATA=iGENESIS_PREP; 
            BY DESCENDING GEOGRAPHY; 
        RUN; 
        DATA iGENESIS_PREP; 
            SET iGENESIS_PREP; 
            CALL SYMPUT ('FIRST_DA',GEOGRAPHY);      
/* SINCE CALL SYMPUT WILL STORE THE LAST RECORD'S VALUE */ 
        RUN; 
        PROC SORT DATA=iGENESIS_PREP; 
            BY GEOGRAPHY; 
        RUN; 
        DATA iGENESIS_PREP; 
            SET iGENESIS_PREP; 
            CALL SYMPUT ('LAST_DA',GEOGRAPHY); 
        RUN; 
        DATA SENIOR_CHECK; 
            SET iGENESIS_PREP; 
            WHERE RECNUM = 1; 
            KEEP GEOGRAPHY; 
        RUN; 
        DATA SENIOR_CHECK; 
            SET SENIOR_CHECK; 
            FIRSTDA = &FIRST_DA; LASTDA = &LAST_DA; 
            DROP GEOGRAPHY; 
        RUN; 
 
/* NOTE: SENIOR CHECK IS USED TO CHECK THE PROPORTIONS OF MALES AND 
FEMALES IN THE 85+ AGE GROUPS */ 
 
/* CALCULATE DESIRED PROPORTIONS BASED ON STATISTICS CANADA FOR 
AGES 85 PLUS */ 
        PROC MEANS DATA=PLAY.YOW_ePopulation_v2 NOPRINT; 
            VAR eM85; 
            OUTPUT  OUT = MALES85plus 
                    SUM = m85plus; 
        RUN; 
        PROC MEANS DATA=PLAY.YOW_ePopulation_v2 NOPRINT; 
            VAR eF85; 
            OUTPUT  OUT = FEMALES85plus 
                    SUM = f85plus; 
        RUN; 
        DATA SENIOR_SUMS; 
            MERGE MALES85plus FEMALES85plus; 
            KEEP m85plus f85plus; 
        RUN; 
        DATA targetSENIOR_PROPORTIONS; 
            SET SENIOR_SUMS; 
 
            fTOm85_89 = (1-&tpM85_89)/&tpM85_89; 
            fTOm90_94 = (1-&tpM90_94)/&tpM90_94; 
            fTOm95_99 = (1-&tpM95_99)/&tpM95_99; 
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            tM85_99 = m85plus - &tmCENTENARIANS; 
            tF85_99 = f85plus - &tfCENTENARIANS; 
 
/* LET  a = NUMBER OF MALES AGED 85 to 89;      b = NUMBER OF MALES AGED 
90 to 94;      c = NUMBER OF MALES AGED 95 to 99   */ 
/*      d = NUMBER OF FEMALES AGED 85 to 89;    e = NUMBER OF FEMALES 
AGED 90 to 94;    f = NUMBER OF FEMALES AGED 95 to 99 */ 
             /* THEREFORE a+b+c = tM85_99;   d+e+f = tF85_99            */ 
/* WITH SOME MANIPULATION, GET THAT a = xc + k where x is a coefficient and k is 
a constant                                 */ 
             /* NEED TO CALCULATE x and k */ 
 
            xCOEFF = (1/(fTOm90_94-fTOm85_89)); 
            kCONST = -1*((tF85_99 - (fTOm90_94*tM85_99))/(fTOm90_94-fTOm85_89)); 
 
            /* FIND MAXIMUM C BY ASSUMING THAT a>b>c AND b=c+1 */ 
            maxM95_99 = (tM85_99 - kCONST - 1)/(2+xCOEFF); 
 
/* ASSUME IN REALITY HAVE 80% OF THE MAXIMUM NUMBER OF MALES AGED 
95 TO 99                                                  */ 
            tM95_99 = ROUND(maxM95_99*0.80); 
 
            /* CALCULATE THE REST AND THEIR RESPECTIVE PROPORTIONS */ 
            tM85_89 = ROUND((xCOEFF*tM95_99) + kCONST); 
            tM90_94 = tM85_99 - tM85_89 - tM95_99; 
 
            tF85_89 = ROUND(fTOm85_89 * tM85_89); 
            tF90_94 = ROUND(fTOm90_94 * tM90_94); 
            tF95_99 = ROUND(fTOm95_99 * tM95_99); 
 
ptM85_89=tM85_89/m85plus; ptM90_94=tM90_94/m85plus; 
ptM95_99=tM95_99/m85plus; 
            ptF85_89=tF85_89/f85plus; ptF90_94=tF90_94/f85plus; ptF95_99=tF95_99/f85plus; 
 
 IF ptM85_89 >= ((m85plus-60)/m85plus) THEN DO;   
/* IN CASE RESULTS IN TOO MANY MALES RELATIVE TO FEMALES */ 
 
  CALL SYMPUT ('MP1',0.9860); 
             CALL SYMPUT ('MP2',0.9933); 
             CALL SYMPUT ('MP3',0.9959); 
             CALL SYMPUT ('FP1',0.9767); 
             CALL SYMPUT ('FP2',0.9863); 
             CALL SYMPUT ('FP3',0.9911); 
 END; 
 ELSE DO;      
             CALL SYMPUT ('MP1',ptM85_89); 
             CALL SYMPUT ('MP2',ptM85_89 + ptM90_94); 
             CALL SYMPUT ('MP3',ptM85_89 + ptM90_94 + ptM95_99); 
             CALL SYMPUT ('FP1',ptF85_89); 
             CALL SYMPUT ('FP2',ptF85_89 + ptF90_94); 
             CALL SYMPUT ('FP3',ptF85_89 + ptF90_94 + ptF95_99); 
 END; 
        RUN; 
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        /********************************/ 
        /*               BEGIN               */ 
        /********************************/ 
 
        DATA YOW_iGENESIS; 
             SET iGENESIS_PREP; 
KEEP GEOGRAPHY POPULATION100 SEX tAGE AGE ADULT UID sRANDOM 
AGEGROUP; 
 
iSTRATIFIED = 0;    /* Counter to allow as many records to be created as age and sex 
stratified population size for each DA */ 
             UIDCount = 0;       /* Counter for appending to DA to create UID for each individual */ 
LENGTH UID $14; 
 
ARRAY iSET (*)  eM0_4 eM5_9 eM10_14 eM15_19 eM20_24 eM25_29 eM30_34 
eM35_39 eM40_44 eM45_49 eM50_54 eM55_59 eM60_64 eM65_69 eM70_74 
eM75_79 eM80_84 eM85 
eF0_4 eF5_9 eF10_14 eF15_19 eF20_24 eF25_29 eF30_34 eF35_39 eF40_44 
eF45_49 eF50_54 eF55_59 eF60_64 eF65_69 eF70_74 eF75_79 eF80_84 eF85; 
 
            DO n = 1 TO 36; 
 
                iSTRATIFIED = 0; 
                IF iSET(n) > 0 THEN DO; 
 
                    DO UNTIL (iSTRATIFIED = iSET(n)); 
 
                        iSTRATIFIED = iSTRATIFIED + 1; 
 
                        /* ASSIGN AGE GROUP */ 
                        IF n <= 18 THEN AGEGROUP = n; 
                        ELSE AGEGROUP = n-18; 
 
                        /* ASSIGN A RANDOM NUMBER TO USE FOR GENERATING AGES 85+ */ 
                        sRANDOM = RANUNI(&SEED); 
 
                        /* SET GENDER */ 
                        IF n < 19 THEN SEX = "M"; 
                        ELSE SEX = "F"; 
 
                        /* ASSIGN AGE */ 
IF n < 18 THEN tAGE = (RANUNI(&SEED)*5 + ((5*n)-5));                         
/* RANDOM MALE AGE ASSIGNMENT BASED ON AGE RANGE    */ 
ELSE IF n = 18 THEN DO; 
                            IF sRANDOM <= &MP1 THEN tAGE = (RANUNI(&SEED)*5 + 85); 
                            ELSE IF sRANDOM > &MP1 AND sRANDOM <= &MP2 THEN DO; 
tAGE = (RANUNI(&SEED)*5 + 90); 
AGEGROUP = 19; 
                            END; 
                            ELSE IF sRANDOM > &MP2 AND sRANDOM <= &MP3 THEN DO; 
tAGE = (RANUNI(&SEED)*5 + 95); 
AGEGROUP = 20; 
                            END; 
                            ELSE DO; 
tAGE = (RANUNI(&SEED)*7 + 100);                                      
/* ASSUMES OLDEST MALE IN OTTAWA CAN BE 107 */ 
AGEGROUP = 21; 
                            END; 
                        END; 
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ELSE IF n > 18 AND n < 36 THEN tAGE = (RANUNI(&SEED)*5 + ((5*(n-18))-5));    
/* RANDOM FEMALE AGE ASSIGNMENT BASED ON AGE RANGE */ 
                        ELSE IF n = 36 THEN DO; 
                            IF sRANDOM <= &FP1 THEN tAGE = (RANUNI(&SEED)*5 + 85); 
                            ELSE IF sRANDOM > &FP1 AND sRANDOM <= &FP2 THEN DO; 
tAGE = (RANUNI(&SEED)*5 + 90); 
AGEGROUP = 19; 
                            END; 
                            ELSE IF sRANDOM > &FP2 AND sRANDOM <= &FP3 THEN DO; 
tAGE = (RANUNI(&SEED)*5 + 95); 
AGEGROUP = 20; 
                            END; 
                            ELSE DO; 
tAGE = (RANUNI(&SEED)*12 + 100);                                     
/* ASSUMES OLDEST FEMALE IN OTTAWA CAN BE 112 */ 
AGEGROUP = 21; 
                            END; 
                        END; 
 
                        /* ROUND AGE UNLESS LESS THAN ONE YEAR OLD */ 
IF tAGE < 0.08 THEN tAGE = 0.08;                                             
/* MINIMUM AGE IS 1 MONTH */ 
IF tAGE < 1 THEN AGE = ROUND(tAGE,.2); 
ELSE AGE = INT(tAGE); 
 
/* SET ADULT FLAG FOR WHETHER OR NOT INDIVIDUAL IS AN ADULT */ 
IF AGE < 18 THEN ADULT = 0; 
ELSE ADULT = 1; 
 
/* UPDATE COUNTER AND ASSIGN INDIVIDUAL UNIQUE IDENTIFIER */ 
UIDCount = UIDCount + 1; 
UIDCounter = COMPRESS(PUT(UIDCount, 5.)); 
UID = GEOGRAPHY ||"."||UIDCounter; 
 
OUTPUT; 
                    END; 
                END; 
 
            END; 
 
            FORMAT AGEGROUP AGEGROUP.; 
        RUN; 
 
%MEND iGENESIS; 
 
%MACRO NUM_CHECK; 
 
    /* OUTPUT NUMBER OF MALES AND FEMALES FOR EACH AGE GROUP */ 
    PROC MEANS NOPRINT DATA=YOW_iGENESIS; 
            VAR AGEGROUP; 
            CLASS AGEGROUP; 
            WHERE SEX = "M"; 
            OUTPUT  OUT = MAGEGROUP_NUMS 
                    N = MCOUNT; 
    RUN; 
    DATA MAGEGROUP_NUMS; 
        SET MAGEGROUP_NUMS; 
        WHERE AGEGROUP NE .; 
        DROP _FREQ_; 
    RUN; 
    PROC SORT DATA=MAGEGROUP_NUMS; 
        BY AGEGROUP; 
    RUN; 
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    PROC MEANS NOPRINT DATA=YOW_iGENESIS; 
            VAR AGEGROUP; 
            CLASS AGEGROUP; 
            WHERE SEX = "F"; 
            OUTPUT  OUT = FAGEGROUP_NUMS 
                    N = FCOUNT; 
    RUN; 
    DATA FAGEGROUP_NUMS; 
        SET FAGEGROUP_NUMS; 
        WHERE AGEGROUP NE .; 
        DROP _FREQ_; 
    RUN; 
    PROC SORT DATA=FAGEGROUP_NUMS; 
        BY AGEGROUP; 
    RUN; 
 
    /* COMBINE MALES AND FEMALES AND CALCULATE GENDER PROPORTIONS FOR 
EACH AGE GROUP */ 
    DATA AGEGROUP_NUMS; 
        MERGE MAGEGROUP_NUMS FAGEGROUP_NUMS; 
        BY AGEGROUP; 
        MPROP = MCOUNT/(MCOUNT+FCOUNT); 
        FPROP = 1-MPROP; 
    RUN; 
 
    /* SET ALL PROPORTIONS IN SENIOR_CHECK TO 0 */ 
    DATA SENIOR_CHECK; 
        SET SENIOR_CHECK; 
        ARRAY mprops (*) pM0_4   pM5_9   pM10_14    pM15_19 pM20_24 pM25_29 pM30_34 
pM35_39 pM40_44 pM45_49 pM50_54 pM55_59 
                         pM60_64 pM54_69 pM70_74    pM75_79 pM80_84 pM85_89 pM90_94 
pM95_99 pM100; 
        DO p = 1 TO 21; 
            mprops(p) = 0; 
        END; 
        RUN; 
 
    /* POPULATE SENIOR_CHECK WITH THE MALE PROPORTIONS FOR EACH AGE 
GROUP */ 
 
    %DO sRUN = 1 %TO 21; 
        DATA _NULL_; 
            SET AGEGROUP_NUMS; 
            WHERE AGEGROUP = &sRUN; 
            CALL SYMPUT ('PASS_mPROP',MPROP); 
        RUN; 
        DATA SENIOR_CHECK; 
            SET SENIOR_CHECK; 
            ARRAY mprops (*) pM0_4   pM5_9   pM10_14    pM15_19 pM20_24 pM25_29 
pM30_34 pM35_39 pM40_44 pM45_49 pM50_54 pM55_59 
                             pM60_64 pM54_69 pM70_74    pM75_79 pM80_84 pM85_89 pM90_94 
pM95_99 pM100; 
 
            mprops(&sRUN) = &PASS_mPROP; 
        RUN; 
    %END; 
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/* CHECK TO SEE IF PROPORTIONS LIE WITHIN DESIRED RANGES */ 
 
    DATA SENIOR_CHECK; 
        SET SENIOR_CHECK; 
 
        /* SETTING S_FLAG, WITH PLUS OR MINUS 2% LENIENCY */ 
        IF  pM85_89 < 0.36 AND pM85_89 > 0.32 AND 
            pM90_94 < 0.30 AND pM90_94 > 0.26 AND 
            pM95_99 < 0.24 AND pM95_99 > 0.20 AND 
            pM100 < 0.20 AND pM100 > 0.16 THEN S_FLAG=1; 
        ELSE S_FLAG=0; 
 
    RUN; 
 
%MEND NUM_CHECK; 
 
/****************************************************************/ 
/*                          GENESIS                           */ 
/****************************************************************/ 
 
%MACRO GENESIS; 
 
%DO SENIORS_LOOP = 1 %TO 1000;                   
/* LOOP TO TRY TO ACHIEVE DESIRED SENIORS POPULATION PROPORTIONS */ 
 
            %iGENESIS; 
            %NUM_CHECK; 
 
 
            DATA SENIOR_CHECK; 
                SET SENIOR_CHECK; 
                CALL SYMPUT ('S_FLAG',S_FLAG); 
            RUN; 
 
            %IF &S_FLAG = 1 %THEN %GOTO SENIORS_COMPLETE; 
        %END; 
 
        %SENIORS_COMPLETE: 
 
    DATA PLAY.YOW_iGENESIS_v2; 
        SET YOW_iGENESIS; 
    RUN; 
 
%MEND GENESIS; 
 
/*****************************************************************/ 
/*       RECONCILE FAMILY COUNTS  */ 
/*****************************************************************/ 
%PUT RECONCILE FAMILY COUNTS...; 
 
/*****************************************************************/ 
/*                       PREPARE FAMILY DATA                     */ 
/*****************************************************************/ 
 
%MACRO PREP_FAM_DATA; 
 
    DATA YOW_iGENESIS; 
        SET PLAY.YOW_iGENESIS_v2; 
    RUN; 
    PROC MEANS N DATA=YOW_iGENESIS NOPRINT; 
        WHERE ADULT = 1; 
        BY GEOGRAPHY; 
        VAR ADULT; 
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        OUTPUT  OUT = YOW_aPOP 
                N = aPOP; 
    RUN; 
    DATA YOW_aPOP; 
        SET YOW_aPOP; 
        KEEP GEOGRAPHY aPOP; 
    RUN; 
 
 PROC MEANS DATA=YOW_iGENESIS NOPRINT; 
  VAR AGE; 
  BY GEOGRAPHY; 
  WHERE AGE > 17 AND SEX = "M"; 
  OUTPUT N = iMADULTS 
    OUT = MADULTS; 
 RUN; 
 PROC SORT DATA=MADULTS; 
  BY GEOGRAPHY; 
 RUN; 
 
 PROC MEANS DATA=YOW_iGENESIS NOPRINT; 
  VAR AGE; 
  BY GEOGRAPHY; 
  WHERE AGE > 17 AND SEX = "F"; 
  OUTPUT N = iFADULTS 
    OUT = FADULTS; 
 RUN; 
 PROC SORT DATA=FADULTS; 
  BY GEOGRAPHY; 
 RUN; 
 
    PROC MEANS N DATA=YOW_iGENESIS NOPRINT; 
        WHERE AGE < 6; 
        BY GEOGRAPHY; 
        VAR ADULT; 
        OUTPUT  OUT = YOW_cPOP1 
                N = epopUNDER6; 
    RUN; 
    PROC MEANS N DATA=YOW_iGENESIS NOPRINT; 
        WHERE AGE > 5 AND AGE < 15; 
        BY GEOGRAPHY; 
        VAR ADULT; 
        OUTPUT  OUT = YOW_cPOP2 
                N = epop6TO14; 
    RUN; 
    PROC MEANS N DATA=YOW_iGENESIS NOPRINT; 
        WHERE AGE >14 AND AGE < 18; 
        BY GEOGRAPHY; 
        VAR ADULT; 
        OUTPUT  OUT = YOW_cPOP3 
                N = epop15TO17; 
    RUN; 
    DATA YOW_cPOP; 
        MERGE YOW_cPOP1 YOW_cPOP2 YOW_cPOP3; 
        BY GEOGRAPHY; 
        KEEP GEOGRAPHY epopUNDER6 epop6TO14 epop15TO17 cPOP; 
        IF epopUNDER6 = . THEN epopUNDER6 = 0; 
        IF epop6TO14 = . THEN epop6TO14 = 0; 
        IF epop15TO17 = . THEN epop15TO17 = 0; 
        cPOP = epopUNDER6 + epop6TO14 + epop15TO17; 
    RUN; 
    PROC SORT DATA=YOW_cPOP; 
        BY GEOGRAPHY; 
    RUN; 
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    DATA YOW_acPOP; 
        MERGE YOW_cPOP YOW_aPOP PLAY.YOW_ePOPULATION_v2 MADULTS FADULTS; 
        BY GEOGRAPHY; 
        totPOP = cPOP + aPOP; 
        KEEP GEOGRAPHY epopUNDER6 epop6TO14 epop15TO17 cPOP aPOP totPOP 
population100 iMADULTS iFADULTS; 
    RUN; 
 
    PROC SORT DATA=YOW_acPOP; 
        BY GEOGRAPHY; 
    RUN; 
 
    DATA INTERIM_YOW_FAMILIES; 
        SET SIM.FAMILIES; 
        WHERE Geography > "35060000" AND Geography < "35070000"; 
    RUN; 
    PROC SORT; 
        BY GEOGRAPHY; 
    RUN; 
    DATA interimFAMILIES; 
        MERGE YOW_acPOP INTERIM_YOW_FAMILIES; 
        BY GEOGRAPHY; 
        IF totPOP not> 0 THEN DELETE; 
        SINGLES = 0;                /* VARIABLE TO HOLD THE CALCULATED NUMBER OF 
SINGLES */ 
    RUN; 
    DATA interimFAMILIES; 
        SET interimFAMILIES; 
        FAM_RECORDNUM = _n_;        /* ASSIGN EACH RECORD ITS RECORD NUMBER 
FOR FUTURE ITERATIONS */ 
    RUN; 
 
    DATA CHILDPOPCHECK; 
        SET interimFAMILIES; 
        KEEP    GEOGRAPHY epopUNDER6 epop6TO14 epop15TO17 HomeKidsUnder6 
HomeKids6to14 HomeKids15to17 
                diffUNDER6 diff6to14 diff15to17 flagUNDER6 flag6to14 flag15to17 diffcTOTAL; 
 
        IF HomeKidsUnder6 = . THEN HomeKidsUnder6 = 0; /* NOTE: SOME DAs SEEM TO 
HAVE CONFLICTING DATA (e.g. 35060253) */ 
        IF HomeKids6to14 = . THEN HomeKids6to14 = 0; 
        IF HomeKids15to17 = . THEN HomeKids15to17 = 0; 
 
        diffUNDER6 = ABS(epopUNDER6-HomeKidsUnder6); 
        diff6to14 = ABS(epop6TO14-HomeKids6to14); 
        diff15to17 = ABS(epop15TO17-HomeKids15to17); 
 
        IF diffUNDER6 <= 4 THEN flagUNDER6 = "PASS"; 
        ELSE flagUNDER6 = "FAIL"; 
        IF diff6to14 <= 4 THEN flag6to14 = "PASS"; 
        ELSE flag6to14 = "FAIL"; 
        IF diff15to17 <= 4 THEN flag15to17 = "PASS"; 
        ELSE flag15to17 = "FAIL"; 
 
        diffcTOTAL = diffUNDER6 + diff6to14 + diff15to17; 
 
    RUN; 
    PROC MEANS NOPRINT DATA=CHILDPOPCHECK; 
        WHERE flagUNDER6 = "FAIL"; 
        VAR diffUNDER6; 
        OUTPUT  OUT = FAIL_UNDER6 
                N = cUNDER6_FAILS; 
    RUN; 
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    PROC MEANS NOPRINT DATA=CHILDPOPCHECK; 
        WHERE flag6to14 = "FAIL"; 
        VAR diff6to14; 
        OUTPUT  OUT = FAIL_6to14 
                N = c6to14_FAILS; 
    RUN; 
    PROC MEANS NOPRINT DATA=CHILDPOPCHECK; 
        WHERE flag15to17 = "FAIL"; 
        VAR diff15to17; 
        OUTPUT  OUT = FAIL_15to17 
                N = c15to17_FAILS; 
    RUN; 
    DATA PLAY.childTOTALFAILS; 
        MERGE FAIL_UNDER6 FAIL_6to14 FAIL_15to17; 
        TOTALFAILS = cUNDER6_FAILS + c6to14_FAILS + c15to17_FAILS; 
    RUN; 
 
%MEND PREP_FAM_DATA; 
 
/******************************************************************************************************/ 
/* THIS MACRO RUNS THROUGH AND ASSIGNS ESTIMATED NUMBERS TO EACH */  
/* FAMILY TYPE                */ 
/* MULTIPLE ITERATIONS UNTIL THE RESULTING TOTAL NUMBER OF ESTIMATED */ 
/* FAMILY ADULTS EQUALS THE POPULATION-ESTIMATED NUMBER OF ADULTS */ 
/******************************************************************************************************/ 
 
%MACRO ADULT_FAMNUMS; 
 
    /****************************************************************/ 
    /*                      SET GLOBAL VARIABLES                     */ 
    /****************************************************************/ 
 
    %LET SEED = 0;                  /* FOR RANDOM NUMBER GENERATION - ENSURES 
DIFFERENT WITH EACH RUN */ 
    %LET RANGE = 8;                 /* SET TO ERROR RANGE IN COUNTS DUE TO PRIVACY 
RULES - STATSCAN = 4 EACH WAY, SO RANGE IS 8 */ 
    %LET MIN = 4;                   /* ERROR SIZE = 4 */ 
 
    DATA _NULL_; 
        SET interimFAMILIES; 
        CALL SYMPUT ('NUMDAS',_n_); 
    RUN; 
 
    %DO A_FAMLOOP = 1 %TO &NUMDAS; 
 
        /* SET STARTING NUMBER OF MISMATCHES FOR OPTIMISATION */ 
        %LET ATEMPPOPNOMATCH = 999; 
        %LET ATEMPPOPNOMATCHC = 999;        /* ALLOWS COMPARISON WITH 
ATEMPPOPNOMATCH TO EVALUATE ARUNSTOQUIT */ 
        %LET ARUNSTOQUIT = 100000;          /* COUNTER FOR NUMBER OF RUNS TO 
ALLOW WITH SAME OR WORSE RESULT BEFORE QUITTING */ 
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%DO A_FAMOPTIMISER = 1 %TO 1000000; 
 
            DATA temp_FAMRECORD; 
                SET interimFAMILIES; 
                WHERE FAM_RECORDNUM = &A_FAMLOOP; 
 
                CALL SYMPUT ('A_DAUID',GEOGRAPHY); 
                CALL SYMPUT ('A_MCKNONE',MARRIEDNOHOMEKIDS); 
 
ARRAY CensusFamilies (*)    MarriedNoHomeKids Married1Kid Married2Kids 
Married3KidsPLUS 
                                       CLNoHomeKids CL1Kid CL2Kids CL3KidsPlus 
                                       FP1Kid FP2Kids FP3KidsPLUS 
                                       MP1Kid MP2Kids MP3KidsPLUS 
HomeKidsUnder6 HomeKids6to14 HomeKids15to17 HomeKids18to24 
HomeKids25PLUS; 
 
                ARRAY cCF (*) MCK0 MCK1 MCK2 MCK3plus 
                                       CLK0 CLK1 CLK2 CLK3plus 
                                        FPK1 FPK2 FPK3plus 
MPK1 MPK2 MPK3plus 
HK6MINUS HK6to14 HK15to17 HK18to24 HK25PLUS; 
 
                DO f = 1 to 19; 
 
                    IF &A_FAMOPTIMISER < 10000 THEN DO; 
                        IF CensusFamilies(f) > 0 THEN cCF(f) = INT(RANUNI(&SEED)* &RANGE + 
(CensusFamilies(f)-&MIN));       /* Attempt convergence as usual with a maximum of 10,000 
attempts */ 
                        ELSE cCF(f) = INT(RANUNI(&SEED)*&MIN); 
                    END; 
                    ELSE IF &A_FAMOPTIMISER >= 10000 AND &A_FAMOPTIMISER < 100000 
THEN DO; 
                        IF CensusFamilies(f) > 0 THEN cCF(f) = INT(RANUNI(&SEED)* &RANGE + 
(CensusFamilies(f)-&MIN));       /* If no convergence after 10,000 runs, then */ 
                        ELSE cCF(f) = 0;                                                                                    /* Set 
records with 0 counts to 0 */ 
                    END; 
                    ELSE IF &A_FAMOPTIMISER >= 100000 AND &A_FAMOPTIMISER < 250000 
THEN DO; 
                        IF CensusFamilies(f) > 0 THEN cCF(f) = INT(RANUNI(&SEED)* (&RANGE-4) + 
(CensusFamilies(f)-&MIN));   /* If still no convergence after 100,000 runs, then reduce range by 
4 */ 
                        ELSE cCF(f) = 0;                                                                                /* And set 
records with 0 counts to 0 */ 
                    END; 
                    ELSE IF &A_FAMOPTIMISER >= 250000 AND &A_FAMOPTIMISER < 500000 
THEN DO; 
                        IF CensusFamilies(f) > 0 THEN cCF(f) = INT(RANUNI(&SEED)* (&RANGE-5) + 
(CensusFamilies(f)-&MIN));   /* If still no convergence after 250,000 runs, then reduce range by 
5 */ 
                        ELSE cCF(f) = 0;                                                                                /* And set 
records with 0 counts to 0 */ 
                    END; 
                    ELSE IF &A_FAMOPTIMISER >= 500000 AND &A_FAMOPTIMISER < 750000 
THEN DO; 
                        IF CensusFamilies(f) > 0 THEN cCF(f) = INT(RANUNI(&SEED)* (&RANGE-6) + 
(CensusFamilies(f)-&MIN));   /* If still no convergence after 500,000 runs, then reduce range by 
6*/ 
                        ELSE cCF(f) = 0;                                                                                /* And set 
records with 0 counts to 0 */ 
                    END; 
                    ELSE DO; 
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                        IF CensusFamilies(f) > 0 THEN cCF(f) = INT(RANUNI(&SEED)* (&RANGE-7) + 
(CensusFamilies(f)-&MIN));   /* If still no convergence after 750,000 runs, then reduce range by 
7 */ 
                        ELSE cCF(f) = 0;                                                                                /* And set 
records with 0 counts to 0 */ 
                    END; 
 
                END; 
 
                min_childHOMEKIDS = (HomeKidsUnder6 + HomeKids6to14 + HomeKids15to17)-12; 
                max_childHOMEKIDS = (HomeKidsUnder6 + HomeKids6to14 + 
HomeKids15to17)+12; 
 
                childHOMEKIDS = HK6MINUS + HK6to14 + HK15to17; 
                adultHOMEKIDS = HK18to24 + HK25PLUS; 
 
                temp_aPOP = ((2*(MCK0 + MCK1 + MCK2 + MCK3plus + CLK0 + CLK1 + CLK2 + 
CLK3plus)) + FPK1 + FPK2 + FPK3plus + MPK1 + MPK2 + MPK3plus + adultHOMEKIDS); 
 
    TMC = MCK0 + MCK1 + MCK2 + MCK3plus;                    /* 
Total number of married couples */ 
          TCL = CLK0 + CLK1 + CLK2 + CLK3plus;                    /* Total number of 
common-law couples */ 
          TFP = FPK1 + FPK2 + FPK3plus;                           /* Total number of single 
female parent families */ 
          TMP = MPK1 + MPK2 + MPK3plus;                           /* Total number of single 
male parent families */ 
          TKH = childHOMEKIDS + adultHOMEKIDS;                    /* Total number of kids 
and adult offspring at home */ 
         
    minMADULTS = TMC + TCL + TMP;   
    /* NUMBER OF MALE ADULTS BASED ON FAMILY STATUS 
(MARRIED, COMMON LAW, OR SINGLE PARENT  */ 
    minFADULTS = TMC + TCL + TMP;   
    /* NUMBER OF FEMALE ADULTS BASED ON FAMILY 
STATUS (MARRIED, COMMON LAW, OR SINGLE PARENT */ 
 
                IF temp_aPOP < aPOP AND iMADULTS >= minMADULTS AND iFADULTS >= 
minFADULTS THEN DO; 
                    SINGLES = aPOP - temp_aPOP; 
     AFLAG = 1; 
                END; 
                ELSE IF temp_aPOP = aPOP AND iMADULTS >= minMADULTS AND iFADULTS >= 
minFADULTS THEN DO; 
                    AFLAG = 1; 
                END; 
                ELSE DO; 
                    AFLAG = 0; 
                END; 
    FAMOPTIMISER = &A_FAMOPTIMISER; 
 
    CALL SYMPUT ('AFLAG',AFLAG); 
 
                new_aPOP = temp_aPOP + SINGLES; 
                aPOP_DIFF = abs(new_aPOP-aPOP); 
 
                CALL SYMPUT ('apopdiff',aPOP_DIFF); 
/* 
    %PUT CURRENT DA IS: &A_DAUID 
 CURRENT RUN IS: &A_FAMOPTIMISER  ADULT FLAG IS:
 &AFLAG  ADULT POP DIFFERENCE IS: &apopdiff; 
*/ 
            RUN; 
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            %IF &aPOPDIFF < &ATEMPPOPNOMATCH OR &AFLAG = 1 %THEN %DO; 
                %LET ATEMPPOPNOMATCH = &aPOPDIFF; 
                DATA OPTIMISED_FAM_RECORD; 
                    SET temp_FAMRECORD; 
                RUN; 
            %END; 
 
            %IF &ATEMPPOPNOMATCHC NE &ATEMPPOPNOMATCH %THEN %DO; 
                %LET ARUNSTOQUIT = 100000; 
                %LET ATEMPPOPNOMATCHC = &ATEMPPOPNOMATCH; 
            %END; 
            %ELSE %DO; 
                %LET ARUNSTOQUIT = %EVAL(&ARUNSTOQUIT - 1); 
            %END; 
/* 
   %PUT CURRENT DA IS: &A_DAUID  CURRENT 
RUN IS: &A_FAMOPTIMISER  REDUNDANT RUNS TO QUIT:
 &ARUNSTOQUIT CURRENT OPTIMUM MISMATCH: &ATEMPPOPNOMATCH; 
*/ 
            %IF &ARUNSTOQUIT = 0 %THEN %GOTO EXIT_aCHECK;               /* IF NO 
CHANGE IN MATCHING DIFFERENCE FOR 100,000 RUNS THEN EXIT */ 
            %IF &AFLAG = 1 AND &apopdiff = 0 %THEN %GOTO EXIT_aCHECK;   /* IF ADULT 
FLAG=1 THEN apopdiff SHOULD BE 0 */ 
        %END; 
 
        %EXIT_aCHECK: 
        DATA interimFAMILIES; 
            MERGE interimFAMILIES OPTIMISED_FAM_RECORD; 
            BY GEOGRAPHY; 
        RUN; 
    %END; 
 
    DATA YOW_FAMILIES; 
        SET interimFAMILIES; 
        /* THIS SIMULATION ASSUMES THAT ALL CHILDREN AGES 0 TO 17 LIVE AT HOME */ 
            new_cPOP = cPOP; 
 
            IF new_cPOP <= max_childHOMEKIDS AND new_cPOP >= min_childHOMEKIDS 
THEN CHILDPASS = 1; 
            ELSE CHILDPASS = 0; 
 
        new_totPOP = new_aPOP + new_cPOP; 
 
        KEEP    GEOGRAPHY Population100 cPOP aPOP totPOP SINGLES MCK0 MCK1 MCK2 
MCK3plus CLK0 CLK1 CLK2 CLK3plus 
                FPK1 FPK2 FPK3plus MPK1 MPK2 MPK3plus HK6MINUS HK6to14 HK15to17 
HK18to24 HK25PLUS childHOMEKIDS adultHOMEKIDS 
                TMC TCL TFP TMP new_aPOP new_cPOP new_totPOP min_childHOMEKIDS 
max_childHOMEKIDS minMADULTS minFADULTS iMADULTS iFADULTS CHILDPASS 
AFLAG FAMOPTIMISER; 
 
    RUN; 
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DATA PLAY.YOW_FAMILIES_v2; 
        SET YOW_FAMILIES; 
    RUN; 
 
%MEND ADULT_FAMNUMS; 
 
%MACRO HEREGOES; 
 
    %LET tempCHILD_FAILS = 9999999;     /* USED TO MINIMISE TOTAL DIFFERENCE OF 
CHILD COUNTS */ 
 
    %DO child_diffloop = 1 %TO 1000; 
 
        %PUT THIS IS THE OVERALL LOOP RUN NUMBER &child_diffloop; 
  %DO popmatchloop = 1 %TO 1000; 
   /*%PUT POPULATION MATCHING LOOP NUMBER 
&popmatchloop;*/ 
         %HOUSEKEEPING; 
         %ePOP_RUN; 
         %HOUSEKEEPING; 
         %GENESIS; 
         %HOUSEKEEPING; 
         %PREP_FAM_DATA; 
         %ADULT_FAMNUMS; 
 
   DATA AFLAGCHECK; 
    SET PLAY.YOW_FAMILIES_v2; 
    KEEP GEOGRAPHY AFLAG; 
   RUN; 
   PROC SORT DATA = AFLAGCHECK; 
    BY DESCENDING AFLAG; 
   RUN; 
   DATA AFLAGCHECK; 
    SET AFLAGCHECK; 
    CALL SYMPUT ('LASTAFLAG',AFLAG); 
   RUN; 
   %IF &LASTAFLAG = 1 %THEN %GOTO EXIT_popmatchloop; 
  %END; 
  %EXIT_popmatchloop: 
 
        DATA PLAY.childTOTALFAILS; 
            SET PLAY.childTOTALFAILS; 
            CALL SYMPUT ('CHILDFAILS',TOTALFAILS); 
        RUN; 
 
        %IF &CHILDFAILS < &tempCHILD_FAILS %THEN %DO; 
            %LET tempCHILD_FAILS = &CHILDFAILS; 
            DATA YOW.YOW_ePOPULATION; 
                SET PLAY.YOW_ePOPULATION_v2; 
            RUN; 
            DATA YOW.YOW_iGENESIS; 
                SET PLAY.YOW_iGENESIS_v2; 
            RUN; 
            DATA YOW.YOW_FAMILIES; 
                SET PLAY.YOW_FAMILIES_v2; 
            RUN; 
   DATA YOW.childTOTALFAILS; 
                SET PLAY.childTOTALFAILS; 
            RUN; 
   /* 
         DATA TEMPPRINT; 
    SET PLAY.childTOTALFAILS; 
    RUN = &child_diffloop; 
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    KEEP TOTALFAILS RUN; 
   RUN; 
 
   PROC PRINT N NOOBS DATA=TEMPPRINT; 
   RUN; 
   */ 
  %END; 
   
  %PUT CURRENT NUMBER OF CHILD FAILS IS &CHILDFAILS; 
  %PUT OPTIMISED NUMBER OF CHILD FAILS IS &tempCHILD_FAILS; 
 
        %IF &CHILDFAILS = 0 %THEN %GOTO PARTone_COMPLETE; 
 
    %END; 
    %PARTone_COMPLETE: 
 
%MEND HEREGOES; 
 
%SET_LIBRARIES; 
%HEREGOES; 
%HOUSEKEEPING; 
 
/************************************************************************************/ 
/*  IMMORTALISE (WRITE TO HARD DISK)  */ 
/************************************************************************************/ 
 
DATA FINALS.YOW_ePOPULATION_RAM; 
 SET YOW.YOW_ePOPULATION; 
RUN; 
DATA FINALS.YOW_iGENESIS_RAM; 
 SET YOW.YOW_iGENESIS; 
RUN; 
DATA FINALS.YOW_FAMILIES_RAM; 
 SET YOW.YOW_FAMILIES; 
RUN; 
DATA FINALS.childTOTALFAILS; 
 SET YOW.childTOTALFAILS; 
RUN; 
 
PROC PRINT N NOOBS DATA=FINALS.YOW_FAMILIES_RAM; 
 WHERE AFLAG = 0; 
RUN; 
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/******************************************************************************************************/ 
/*      EPISIM 2010     */ 
/******************************************************************************************************/ 
/*      "ARRANGING MARRIAGES"    */ 
/*           */ 
/* The following program assigns a female spouse to every male spouse that has been  */ 
/* randomly selected as such from those assigned a relationship status of "couples" */ 
/* This includes all those who are either married or common law.    */ 
/*           */ 
/* Previously run code generated this list from the list of simulated males ("YOWMales") */ 
/* and stored it in a file called "M_Spouses".      */ 
/* Now need to select females from the list of simulated females ("YOWFemales") to */ 
/* match appropriately to the males in "M_Spouses" based on a series of rules:  */ 
/*            */ 
/*  It is assumed that, for the city of Ottawa:      */ 
/* - Minimum age for spousal selection is 18 years     */ 
/* - For 50% of the couples, the male is as old as or older than the female by a */ 
/*   maximum of 5 years        */ 
/* - For 24% of the couples, the males is older than the female by at least 6  */ 
/*    but no more than 12 years       */ 
/*  - For 26% of the couples, the female is older than the male by a maximumm of */ 
/*   10 years         */ 
/* - The likelihood of selection diminishes as the age difference increases  */ 
/*           */ 
/* The general steps taken are as follows:      */ 
/* - For a given Dissemination Area:      */ 
/*  1. Extract from M_Spouses all males within that DA to create  */ 
/*   DA_M_Spouses      */ 
/*  2.  Create a list of Eligible_Spouses from YOWFemales for that DA */ 
/*  3.  For each male in DA_M_Spouses:    */ 
/*   a. Create a list of Eligible_Spouses based on assigned age */ 
/*   difference status, assigning the inverse of this as a weight  */ 
/*   b. Randomly select one female from the list   */ 
/*   OPTION: based on weight for probabilistic selection  */ 
/*   and assign same family UID to create couple   */ 
/*   c.  Write out result to a YOWCouples file   */ 
/*  4. Once complete for all males in that DA, check the number of  */ 
/*   males not assigned a match ("orphaned male spouses")  */ 
/*  5.  Iterate steps 1 to 4, retaining only optimal solution each time */ 
/*           */ 
/* - Repeat for next Dissemination Area, until all Dissemination Areas have been */ 
/*   completed.         */ 
/******************************************************************************************************/ 
/* REVISIONS: multiple!; 15092010; 16092010; 19092010    */ 
/******************************************************************************************************/ 
 
/******************************************************************************************************/ 
/*    SET GLOBAL VARIABLES    */ 
/*     (MODEL PARAMETERS)    */ 
/******************************************************************************************************/ 
 
PROC PRINTTO LOG = "V:\RESEARCH\EPISIM\YOW\YOW_spouseLOG"; 
RUN; 
 
 
%PUT BEGIN ARRANGED MARRIAGES / COUPLING...; 
PROC SQL NOPRINT; 
 SELECT name INTO :mymacrovars SEPARATED BY ' ' 
    FROM dictionary.macros 
    WHERE SCOPE = 'GLOBAL'; 
QUIT; 
%SYMDEL &mymacrovars mymacrovars; 
PROC DATASETS 
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 LIBRARY = play 
 KILL; 
QUIT; 
 
%MACRO HOUSEKEEPING; 
 
    PROC DATASETS 
        LIBRARY = work 
        KILL; 
    QUIT; 
 
    %LET syscc = 0;         /* Operating environment condition code     */ 
    %LET sysrc = 0;         /* Operating system condition code          */ 
    %LET syslibrc = 0;      /* Libname statement condition code         */ 
    %LET sysfilrc = 0;      /* Filename statement condition code        */ 
    %LET syslckrc = 0;      /* SAS Shre lock statement condition code   */ 
    %LET syslast = ;        /* Contains last created dataset            */ 
 
    OPTIONS NONOTES;        /* Requests whether or not notes are output to the log  */ 
    OPTIONS obs = max;      /* Resets the number of observations to process         */ 
 
    /***************************************************************/ 
    /*                      DEFINE FORMATTING                       */ 
    /***************************************************************/ 
 
    PROC FORMAT; 
        VALUE AGEGROUP  1 = "0-4 years" 
                        2 = "5-9 years" 
                        3 = "10-14 years" 
                        4 = "15-19 years" 
                        5 = "20-24 years" 
                        6 = "25-29 years" 
                        7 = "30-34 years" 
                        8 = "35-39 years" 
                        9 = "40-44 years" 
                        10 = "45-49 years" 
                        11 = "50-54 years" 
                        12 = "55-59 years" 
                        13 = "60-64 years" 
                        14 = "65-69 years" 
                        15 = "70-74 years" 
                        16 = "75-79 years" 
                        17 = "80-84 years" 
                        18 = "85-89 years" 
                        19 = "90-94 years" 
                        20 = "95-99 years" 
                        21 = "100+ years"; 
    RUN; 
 
%MEND HOUSEKEEPING; 
 
 
/******************************************************************************************************/ 
/*       PREPARE THE DATASETS     */ 
/* ONLY NEED TO RUN THIS MACRO AT THE BEGINNING OF A SESSION  */ 
/******************************************************************************************************/ 
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%MACRO Prep_FAMDataSets; 
  
/* ADD A "COUPLES" VARIABLE, RENAME THE SINGLE PARENT VARIABLES AND ADD 
NUMERIC VERSION OF THE GEOGRAPHY CODE */ 
 DATA SUM_FAM; 
  SET YOW.YOW_families; 
/* CALCULATE TOTALS IN EACH "MARITAL STATUS" CATEGORY AS 
GIVEN BELOW */ 
  COUPLES = TMC + TCL; 
COUPLES = MCK0 + MCK1 + MCK2 + MCK3plus + CLK0 + CLK1 + CLK2 + 
CLK3plus; 
  RENAME TFP=FPARENT TMP=MPARENT; 
  GEONUM = INPUT(GEOGRAPHY,8.);   
/* NUMERIC VERSION OF THE GEOGRAPHY FIELD (DAUID) */ 
 RUN; 
  
/* ADD SOME FIELDS TO PREP THE iGENESIS DATASET AND BREAK UP INTO 
MALES AND FEMALES      */ 
 DATA iGENESIS; 
  SET YOW.YOW_iGENESIS; 
  LENGTH FSTATUS $8;      
/* TO HOLD FAMILY STATUS (SINGLE, COUPLE, SINGLE PARENT, CHILD) 
*/ 
LENGTH UFAMID $20;      
/* TO HOLD A UNIQUE FAMILY IDENTIFIER SO WE CAN MATCH SPOUSES 
AND KIDS */ 
COUPLETYPE = .;       
/* TO HOLD COUPLE TYPE (SPOUSAL AGE RELATIONSHIP */ 
RUN = 0;        
/* RUN ALLOWS US TO EVENTUALLY KNOW WHAT NUMBER KID ONE IS 
FOR MULTIPLE KID FAMILIES */ 
FLAG = 0;        
/* TO ENSURE A RECORD IS ONLY RANDOMLY SELECTED ONCE FOR 
ASSIGNMENT TO A "FAMILY"  */ 
 
GEONUM = INPUT(GEOGRAPHY,8.);   
/* NUMERIC VERSION OF THE GEOGRAPHY FIELD (DAUID)   
        */ 
 RUN; 
 
 
 DATA YOWMales; 
  SET iGENESIS; 
  WHERE SEX = "M"; 
 RUN; 
 PROC SORT DATA=YOWMales; 
  BY UID; 
 RUN; 
 
 DATA YOWFemales; 
  SET iGENESIS; 
  WHERE SEX = "F"; 
 RUN; 
 PROC SORT DATA=YOWFemales; 
  BY UID; 
 RUN; 
 
%MEND Prep_FAMDataSets; 
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/******************************************************************************************************/ 
/* MACRO TO ASSIGN MALES TO A FAMILY STRUCTURE TYPE (COUPLE, SINGLE  */ 
/* MALE PARENT...)         */ 
/******************************************************************************************************/ 
 
%MACRO SetMaleSPOUSES; 
 
  %LET STRUCT = COUPLES; 
  /*%PUT CURRENT FAMILY STRUCTURE IS: &STRUCT;*/ 
  
  DATA SAMPLESIZE; 
   SET SUM_FAM; 
   WHERE &STRUCT NE 0; 
   _NSIZE_ = &STRUCT; 
KEEP GEOGRAPHY &STRUCT _NSIZE_;  
/* _NSIZE_ IS A SAS-RESERVED FIELD TO BE USED LATER IN 
THE RANDOM SAMPLING PROC SURVEYSELECT  
  */ 
  RUN; 
 
  DATA M_SELECTION; 
   SET YOWMales; 
   WHERE AGE > 17 AND FLAG = 0; 
  RUN; 
 
  PROC SURVEYSELECT DATA=M_SELECTION NOPRINT 
   SAMPSIZE = SAMPLESIZE 
   METHOD = SRS 
   SEED = 0 
   OUT=M_SAMPLEDDATA; 
   STRATA GEOGRAPHY; 
  RUN; 
 
  DATA M_SAMPLEDDATA; 
   SET M_SAMPLEDDATA; 
   DROP SelectionProb SamplingWeight; 
   FSTATUS = "COUPLE"; 
   UFAMID = COMPRESS(GEOGRAPHY||".FAM."||_n_);  
   /* UNIQUE ID FOR COUPLE FAMILIES */ 
RUN = 1;  
/* SINCE NONE ARE CHILDREN, ALL ASSIGNED RUN AS NUMBER 
1 */ 
   FLAG = 1;       
   /* TO PREVENT RE-SELECTION */ 
  RUN; 
 
  DATA YOWMales; 
   MERGE YOWMales M_SAMPLEDDATA; 
   BY UID; 
  RUN; 
 
%MEND SetMaleSPOUSES; 
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/******************************************************************************************************/ 
/* PREP MACRO FOR ASSIGNING AGE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SPOUSES (FOR */ 
/* COUPLES ONLY)         */ 
/*           */ 
/*  ASSUMPTIONS:        */ 
/* - 50% of couples where the male is up to 5 years older than the female  */ 
/* - 24% of couples where the male is more than 5 years older than the female */ 
/*  - 26% of couples where the female is older than the male  */ 
/*           */ 
/* SOURCES:         */ 
/*  - BBC NEWS http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/uk_news/3312377.stm */ 
/*  - Statistics Canada: Till death do us part?     */ 
/*     The risk of first and second marriage dissolution by Warren Clark and  */ 
/*     Susan Crompton. Catalogue No/11-008 Summer 2006   */ 
/******************************************************************************************************/ 
 
%MACRO PREP_MATCHMAKING; 
 
 DATA M_SPOUSES; 
  SET YOWMales; 
  WHERE FSTATUS = "COUPLE"; 
  M_UID = UID; 
  M_AGE = AGE; 
KEEP GEOGRAPHY GEONUM M_UID M_AGE FSTATUS UFAMID 
COUPLETYPE; 
 RUN; 
 
 DATA YOWCOUPLES; 
     SET M_SPOUSES; 
 RUN; 
 PROC SORT DATA=YOWCOUPLES; 
  BY UFAMID; 
 RUN; 
   
 DATA YOWFemales; 
  SET YOWFemales; 
  RECORDNUM = _n_; 
 RUN; 
 
 PROC FREQ DATA=M_SPOUSES NOPRINT; 
  TABLES GEOGRAPHY*GEONUM / OUT=DA_M_SPOUSE_COUNTS; 
 RUN; 
 DATA DA_M_SPOUSE_COUNTS; 
  SET DA_M_SPOUSE_COUNTS; 
 RUN;  
 
%MEND PREP_MATCHMAKING; 
 
/************************************************************************************/  
/*   MATCHING MACRO    */ 
/************************************************************************************/  
 
%MACRO MatchMaker; 
 
 %LET OPTIMUMNUM = 1000;      
/* SET THE NUMBER OF ITERATIONS TO ACHIEVE MAXIMUM MATCHING */ 
 
 DATA SELECTED_DA_M_SPOUSECOUNTS; 
  SET DA_M_SPOUSE_COUNTS; 
  S_RECORDNUM = _n_; 
  CALL SYMPUT ('NUMDAS',_n_); 
 RUN; 
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 %DO DAITERATION = 1 %TO &NUMDAs; 
 
  /* SET STARTING NUMBER OF MISMATCHES FOR OPTIMISATION */ 
  %LET TEMPNOMATCH = 999; 
 
  /* SET CURRENT DA OF FOCUS AND NUMBER OF MALES TO SELECT */ 
  DATA _NULL_; 
   SET SELECTED_DA_M_SPOUSECOUNTS; 
   WHERE S_RECORDNUM = &DAITERATION; 
   CALL SYMPUT ('DAUID',GEOGRAPHY); 
   CALL SYMPUT ('MCOUNT',COUNT); 
  RUN; 
 
  /* %PUT CURRENT DA IS &DAUID WITH &MCOUNT MALES; */ 
 
  /* SELECT MCOUNT NUMBER OF MALES IN CURRENT DA */ 
  DATA SELECTED_M_SPOUSES; 
   SET M_SPOUSES; 
   WHERE GEOGRAPHY = "&DAUID"; 
   RECORDNUM = _n_; 
  RUN; 
   
/* SELECT ALL ELIGIBLE FEMEALS (i.e. AGE 18 YEARS AND OVER) IN 
CURRENT DA */ 
  DATA SELECTED_DA_FEMALES; 
   SET YOWFemales; 
   WHERE GEOGRAPHY = "&DAUID" AND AGE >= 18; 
   RECORDNUM = _n_; 
  RUN; 
 
  /* BEGIN SELECTION AND OPTIMISATION ROUTINE */ 
  %DO OPTIMISING = 1 %TO &OPTIMUMNUM; 
    
/* RESET AGE RELATIONSHIP ASSIGNED TO EACH MALE IN AN 
ATTEMPT TO OPTIMISE MATCHING */ 
   DATA SELECTED_M_SPOUSES; 
    SET SELECTED_M_SPOUSES; 
    COUPLETYPE = .; 
   RUN; 
 
   %DO COUPLETYPELOOP = 1 %TO 3; 
     
    DATA TEMP_M_SPOUSES; 
     SET SELECTED_M_SPOUSES; 
     WHERE COUPLETYPE = .; 
     IF &COUPLETYPELOOP = 1 THEN DO; 
      CALL SYMPUT ('CTYPERATIO',0.5); 
      IF M_AGE < 19 THEN DELETE; 
/* ASSUMES NO COUPLED MALES 
AGED 18; ALLOWS COUPLED 
FEMALE TO BE 18 THOUGH */ 
     END; 
 
     ELSE IF &COUPLETYPELOOP = 2 THEN DO; 
      CALL SYMPUT ('CTYPERATIO',0.48); 
      IF M_AGE < 24 THEN DELETE; 
/* ALLOWS MINIMUM AGE 
DIFFERENCE TO BE 6 YEARS, 
OLDER MALE */ 
     END; 
     ELSE CALL SYMPUT ('CTYPERATIO',1); 
    RUN; 
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PROC SURVEYSELECT DATA=TEMP_M_SPOUSES  
     NOPRINT 
     RATE=&CTYPERATIO 
     METHOD = SRS 
     OUT = SELECTED_CTYPE; 
    RUN; 
 
    DATA SELECTED_CTYPE; 
     SET SELECTED_CTYPE; 
     COUPLETYPE = &COUPLETYPELOOP; 
    RUN; 
 
    PROC SORT DATA=SELECTED_M_SPOUSES; 
     BY M_UID; 
    RUN; 
    PROC SORT DATA=SELECTED_CTYPE; 
     BY M_UID; 
    RUN; 
    DATA SELECTED_M_SPOUSES; 
MERGE SELECTED_M_SPOUSES 
SELECTED_CTYPE; 
     BY M_UID; 
    RUN; 
 
   %END; 
 
   /* SELECTING AN APPROPRIATE SPOUSE FOR EACH MALE */ 
   DATA SELECTED_DA_FEMALES; 
    SET SELECTED_DA_FEMALES; 
    FLAG = 0; 
   RUN; 
 
 
   %DO SPOUSEITERATION = 1 %TO &MCOUNT; 
 
    DATA _NULL_; 
     SET SELECTED_M_SPOUSES; 
     WHERE RECORDNUM = &SPOUSEITERATION; 
     CALL SYMPUT ('PASS_UFAMID',UFAMID); 
CALL SYMPUT 
('PASS_COUPLETYPE',COUPLETYPE); 
     CALL SYMPUT ('PASS_MAGE',M_AGE); 
     CALL SYMPUT ('PASS_MUID',M_UID); 
    RUN; 
 
    DATA ELIGIBLE_SPOUSES; 
     SET SELECTED_DA_FEMALES; 
     WHERE FLAG = 0; 
     IF &PASS_COUPLETYPE = 1 THEN DO; 
IF AGE > &PASS_MAGE OR AGE 
< %EVAL(&PASS_MAGE-5) THEN DELETE; 
     END; 
     ELSE IF &PASS_COUPLETYPE = 2 THEN DO; 
IF AGE >= %EVAL(&PASS_MAGE-5) OR 
AGE < %EVAL(&PASS_MAGE-12) THEN 
DELETE; 
     END; 
     ELSE IF &PASS_COUPLETYPE = 3 THEN DO; 
IF AGE <= &PASS_MAGE OR AGE 
> %EVAL(&PASS_MAGE+10) THEN 
DELETE; 
     END; 
    RUN; 
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    DATA ELIGIBLE_SPOUSES; 
     LENGTH UFAMID $24; 
     SET ELIGIBLE_SPOUSES NOBS=N; 
     AGEDIFF = ABS(&PASS_MAGE-AGE); 
     WEIGHTING = (1/(AGEDIFF+1)); 
     UFAMID = "&PASS_UFAMID"; 
    RUN; 
 
/* THIS BIT PREVENTS ATTEMPT TO SELECT FROM AN 
EMPTY SET, IF NO ELIGIBLE SPOUSES FOUND */ 
    DATA DUMMYSPOUSE; 
     SET YOWFemales; 
     WHERE RECORDNUM = 1; 
UID="DUMMY"; SEX="DUMMY"; tAGE=.; AGE=.; 
ADULT=.; UFAMID="DUMMY"; RUN=1; FLAG=1; 
GEONUM=.; 
    RUN; 
    DATA NOMATCHSPOUSE; 
     SET ELIGIBLE_SPOUSES DUMMYSPOUSE; 
     DROP RECORDNUM; 
    RUN; 
    DATA _NULL_; 
     SET NOMATCHSPOUSE NOBS=X; 
     CALL SYMPUT('NOMATCHSPOUSE',X); 
    RUN; 
     
/* IF ELIGIBLE SPOUSE SET IS NOT EMPTY, THEN THE 
FOLLOWING BIT WILL RUN */ 
     
%IF &NOMATCHSPOUSE > 1 %THEN %DO; 
PROC SURVEYSELECT 
DATA=ELIGIBLE_SPOUSES NOPRINT 
      n=1 
      METHOD = PPS 
      OUT = SELECTED_F_SPOUSE; 
      SIZE WEIGHTING; 
     RUN; 
 
     DATA SELECTED_F_SPOUSE; 
      SET SELECTED_F_SPOUSE; 
      FLAG = 1; 
      RUN = 1; 
KEEP GEOGRAPHY UID UFAMID RUN 
FLAG; 
     RUN; 
 
     DATA SELECTED_DA_FEMALES; 
MERGE SELECTED_DA_FEMALES 
SELECTED_F_SPOUSE; 
      BY UID; 
     RUN; 
    %END; 
   %END; 
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DATA SELECTED_F_SPOUSES; 
    SET SELECTED_DA_FEMALES; 
    WHERE FLAG = 1; 
    F_UID = UID; 
    F_AGE = AGE; 
    KEEP F_UID F_AGE UFAMID; 
   RUN; 
 
   PROC SORT DATA=SELECTED_M_SPOUSES; 
    BY UFAMID; 
   RUN; 
   PROC SORT DATA=SELECTED_F_SPOUSES; 
    BY UFAMID; 
   RUN; 
 
   DATA COUPLESET; 
MERGE SELECTED_M_SPOUSES 
SELECTED_F_SPOUSES; 
    BY UFAMID; 
    RECORDNUM = _n_; 
   RUN; 
 
   DATA DUMMYDATA; 
    SET COUPLESET; 
    WHERE RECORDNUM = 1; 
GEOGRAPHY ="DUMDUM"; FSTATUS="DUMMY"; 
UFAMID=""; COUPLETYPE=.; GEONUM=.; M_UID=""; 
M_AGE=.; F_UID=""; F_AGE=.; 
   RUN; 
   DATA NOMATCHSET; 
    SET COUPLESET DUMMYDATA; 
    WHERE F_AGE = .; 
    DROP RECORDNUM; 
   RUN; 
   DATA _NULL_; 
    SET NOMATCHSET NOBS=X; 
    CALL SYMPUT('NOMATCH',X); 
   RUN; 
 
   /* OPTIMISATION CHECK AND REPLACE IF APPROPRIATE */ 
    
/* %PUT NUMBER OF FORMER OPTIMISED MISMATCHES 
WAS %EVAL(&TEMPNOMATCH-1);*/ 
/* %PUT NUMBER OF CURRENT MISMATCHES 
IS %EVAL(&NOMATCH-1);*/ 
   %IF &NOMATCH < &TEMPNOMATCH %THEN %DO; 
    %LET TEMPNOMATCH = &NOMATCH; 
    DATA OPTIMISED_COUPLES; 
     SET COUPLESET; 
     DROP RECORDNUM; 
    RUN; 
   %END; 
    
/* %PUT NUMBER OF CURRENT OPTIMISED MISMATCHES 
IS %EVAL(&TEMPNOMATCH-1); */ 
   %IF &TEMPNOMATCH = 1 %THEN %GOTO EXIT; 
   /* %PUT THIS LOOP HAS BEEN RUN &OPTIMISING TIMES;*/ 
  %END; 
  %EXIT: 
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DATA YOWCOUPLES; 
   MERGE YOWCOUPLES OPTIMISED_COUPLES; 
   BY UFAMID; 
  RUN; 
 
  PROC PRINT N NOOBS; 
      WHERE F_AGE NE . AND COUPLETYPE = 1 AND (F_AGE > M_AGE OR 
F_AGE < (M_AGE-5)); 
  RUN; 
  PROC PRINT N NOOBS; 
      WHERE F_AGE NE . AND COUPLETYPE = 2 AND (F_AGE > M_AGE OR 
F_AGE > (M_AGE-5) OR F_AGE < (M_AGE-12)); 
  RUN; 
  PROC PRINT N NOOBS; 
      WHERE F_AGE NE . AND COUPLETYPE = 3 AND F_AGE <= M_AGE; 
  RUN; 
  /* 
  PROC FREQ DATA=YOWCOUPLES; 
   TABLES GEOGRAPHY*COUPLETYPE; 
   WHERE F_AGE NE . AND GEOGRAPHY = "&DAUID"; 
  RUN; 
  */ 
  PROC FREQ NOPRINT DATA=YOWCOUPLES; 
   TABLES UFAMID / OUT = DUPLICATECHECK; 
   WHERE F_AGE NE .; 
  RUN; 
  PROC PRINT N NOOBS DATA = DUPLICATECHECK; 
   WHERE COUNT > 1; 
   VAR UFAMID COUNT; 
  RUN; 
 
 
  DATA YOW.FINALYOWCOUPLES; 
   SET YOWCOUPLES; 
  RUN; 
   
 %END; 
 
%MEND MatchMaker; 
 
%PUT BEGIN...; 
 
%HOUSEKEEPING; 
%Prep_FAMDataSets; 
%SetMaleSPOUSES; 
%PREP_MATCHMAKING; 
%MatchMaker; 
 
DATA FINALS.FINALYOWCOUPLES; 
 SET YOW.FINALYOWCOUPLES; 
RUN; 
 
%PUT DONE :); 
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%MACRO TESTS; 
OPTIONS NOTES; 
PROC MEANS DATA=iGENESIS NOPRINT; 
 VAR AGE; 
 BY GEOGRAPHY; 
 WHERE AGE > 17 AND SEX = "M"; 
 OUTPUT N = aMALES 
   OUT = aMALES; 
RUN; 
DATA aMALES; 
 MERGE aMALES SUM_FAM; 
 BY GEOGRAPHY; 
 EaMALES = COUPLES + MPARENT; 
 KEEP GEOGRAPHY aMALES SINGLES COUPLES MPARENT EaMALES; 
RUN; 
PROC PRINT N NOOBS; 
 WHERE aMALES <= EaMALES; 
RUN; 
 
 
PROC PRINT N NOOBS DATA=YOWCOUPLES; 
    WHERE F_AGE NE . AND COUPLETYPE = 1 AND (F_AGE > M_AGE OR F_AGE < 
(M_AGE-5)); 
RUN; 
PROC PRINT N NOOBS DATA=YOWCOUPLES; 
    WHERE F_AGE NE . AND COUPLETYPE = 2 AND (F_AGE > M_AGE OR F_AGE > 
(M_AGE-5) OR F_AGE < (M_AGE-12)); 
RUN; 
PROC PRINT N NOOBS DATA=YOWCOUPLES; 
    WHERE F_AGE NE . AND COUPLETYPE = 3 AND F_AGE <= M_AGE; 
RUN; 
PROC FREQ DATA=YOWCOUPLES; 
 TABLES GEOGRAPHY*COUPLETYPE; 
 WHERE F_AGE NE .; 
RUN; 
PROC FREQ NOPRINT DATA=YOWCOUPLES; 
 TABLES UFAMID / OUT = DUPLICATECHECK; 
 WHERE F_AGE NE .; 
RUN; 
PROC PRINT N NOOBS DATA=DUPLICATECHECK; 
 WHERE COUNT > 1; 
 VAR UFAMID COUNT; 
RUN; 
 
 
%MEND TESTS;  
 
 
/* Statistics Canada's Website at http://www40.statcan.ca/l01/cst01/agrc41a-eng.htm gives 
proportion of total census families that are made up of 5 persons (11.4%), 6 persons (3.7%), 
and 7 persons and over (1.7%)   */ 
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Summary 
Background: With increases in spatial infor-
mation and enabling technologies, location-
privacy concerns have been on the rise. A com-
monly proposed solution in public health in-
volves random perturbation, however con-
sideration for individual dimensions (at-
tributes) has been weak.  
Objectives: The current study proposes a 
multidimensional point transform (MPT) that 
integrates the spatial dimension with other 
dimensions of interest to comprehensively 
 anonymise data.  
Methods: The MPT relies on the availability of 
a base population, a subset patient dataset, 
and shared dimensions of interest. Perturba -
tion distance and anonymity thresholds are 
defined, as are allowable dimensional pertur-
bations. A preliminary implementation is pre -
sented using sex, age and location as the 
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three dimensions of interest, with a maximum 
perturbation distance of 1 kilometre and an 
anonymity threshold of 20%. A synthesised 
New York county population is used for test-
ing with 1000 iterations for each of 25, 50, 
100, 200 and 400 patient dataset sizes.  
Results: The MPT consistently yielded a mean 
perturbation distance of 46 metres with no 
sex or age perturbation required. Displace-
ment of the spatial mean decreased with pa-
tient dataset size and averaged 5.6 metres 
overall.  
Conclusions: The MPT presents a flexible, 
customisable and adaptive algorithm for per-
turbing datasets for public health, allowing 
tweaking and optimisation of the trade-offs 
for different datasets and purposes. It is not, 
however, a substitute for secure and ethical 
conduct, and a public health framework for 
the appropriate disclosure, use and dissemi-
nation of data containing personal identifi-
able information is required. The MPT pre -
sents an important component of such a 
framework. 
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1. Background 
Privacy, as related to identifiable health infor-
mation, has been a subject of contention 
within public health and health research: the 
literature is littered with comments and 
complaints [1–3], surveys have sought to as-
sess the perceptions of public health profes-
sionals and the general public [4-8], and both 
privacy advocates and public health profes-
sionals appeal to a vaguely painted patch-
work of legislation [1, 9]. The issue does not 
generally lie with direct identifiers such as 
name or an identifying number, but rather 
with attributes that can be used in com-
bination to re-identify individuals. These are 
referred to as key attributes [10] or quasi-
identifiers [11]. For example, age and sex are 
commonly used public health quasi-identi-
fiers that have been characterised as having 
“high utility to an intruder” attempting to re-
identify individuals from a dataset [12].  
As public health methods advance with 
ever-evolving technology to better capture 
the entire context within which health 
events occur, requirements for privacy-
protective methods also increase. In an at-
tempt to address the privacy issue, algo-
rithms for anonymisation and privacy en-
hancing techniques (PETs) have been pro-
posed and implemented [13], and calls for 
public health professionals to challenge 
policies and lobby legislators have been 
made [2]. Anonymisation algorithms are 
often measured as a function of indistin-
guishable records and re-identification 
probability. The term k-anonymisation 
refers to the concept where every record be-
comes indistinguishable from k – 1 other 
records [14, 15]. While no standards for ac-
ceptable anonymity thresholds have been 
established for public health, k values of 5 
and 20 (representing re-identification 
probabilities of 20% and 5% respectively) 
have been suggested and used in the litera-
ture [12, 16]. 
An area that has seen a dramatic increase 
in concern is location privacy, particularly 
given the importance of spatial informa-
tion in public health [17, 18]. With the ubi-
quitous use of Global Positioning Systems 
(GPS), online mapping applications that 
provide high-resolution aerial images, and 
the increasing use of spatial intelligence in 
public health, location privacy is becoming 
increasingly contentious – perhaps more so 
than with other information technologies 
[9, 18]. Over a decade ago, Armstrong et al 
published a paper on various mathematical 
transformations to mask original point lo-
cation [19]. Of the methods described, ran-
dom perturbation was found to perform 
best overall as measured by retention of 
pair-wise relations, event-geography re-
lations, clusters, trends and anisotropies 
[19]. Other public health studies have con-
tinued to build on this type of spatial trans-
form [20–23] and a good overview can be 
found in [18].  
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In a classical random perturbation, a 
circle of radius r is drawn around the point 
to be masked such that sufficient popu-
lation is captured to render the point 
anonymous, and the point is randomly dis-
placed within the area. This is repeated for 
each point, resulting in a series of points 
that are difficult to trace to their original lo-
cations due to the stochastic nature of the 
transform. Not all random perturbations 
are created equal, however, and advances in 
their development and implementation 
have been slow. Ideally, the displacement as 
measured by the perturbation distance 
should be minimised, and generally, the 
more densely populated the area in which a 
point (case) falls, the less it has to be spa-
tially perturbed to meet a desired anonym-
ity threshold. Adjustments to random per-
turbation therefore create dynamic radii 
dependent for each point on its underlying 
population [21]. This “context-sensitive 
approach” can be further improved by 
stratifying on other attributes, such as age 
and sex, to give a more accurate displace-
ment that minimises information loss [21]. 
More elaborate revisions of random per-
turbation have been developed in recent 
years, including the use of Linear Program-
ming (LP) [22] and a “donut” method of 
geomasking [23]. However, all of the pro-
posed versions of these transforms modify 
location-based information almost as an 
afterthought or secondary anonymisation 
technique, either assuming that all other 
identifying information – including im-
portant quasi-identifiers such as age and 
sex – has already been anonymised or 
stripped, or adjusting the transform ac-
cordingly using generalised weighting 
schemes. Instead, what is needed is a trans-
form that operates discreetly on multiple 
attributes, in concert with location as part 
of the overall anonymisation algorithm. 
2. Objectives 
The current methodology refines the ran-
dom perturbation approach by combining 
new and previously studied methods to 
propose a flexible, dynamic and custom-
isable multidimensional point transform 
(MPT) acting on attribute data. In this con-
text, attributes of interest – such as lo-
cation, age, sex, education, etc. – are re-
ferred to as dimensions since they define 
the scope of the transform. Like previous 
context-sensitive studies [20, 21, 23], the 
approach presented is an adaptive geo -
mask. However, unlike others, it allows 
these other dimensions to be incorporated 
into the anonymisation algorithm directly 
based on custodian and user tolerances and 
requirements.  
3. Methods 
3.1 Algorithm: Overview 
The proposed algorithm is dependent on 
the availability of a base population (real or 
synthesised) matrix, A, of N individual rec-
ords with Q attributes. The dimensions of 
interest must be elements of the attribute 
set, and given the spatial nature of the 
transform, must include a location at-
tribute – ideally the geographic coordinates 
of the individual’s relevant address. Given a 
list of patients, B, from this base population 
A, the goal of the algorithm is to randomly 
“move” each patient in B within a maxi-
mum perturbation distance Δ, while con-
trolling on all dimensions of interest for a 
defined anonymity threshold, k. “Move” in 
this case means selecting an alternate rec-
ord from A to represent the patient; in this 
way, the locations are realistic and non-ran-
dom, but the selection is random.  
Consider the example where the dimen-
sions of interest are location, age and sex 
(other dimensions can be added, provided 
they are elements of both datasets). The al-
gorithm ensures that the anonymity 
threshold k is maintained based on these 
dimensions and sequentially perturbs 
them as required based on pre-defined 
conditions and perturbation tolerances. 
Location perturbation is measured as the 
distance moved from the original point, 
and its maximum tolerance is defined by Δ; 
the age perturbation tolerance allows the 
dimension to be categorised, for example in 
1-year increments, up to a maximum 
number of categories; and the sex pertur-
bation tolerance is binary, either requiring 
a perfect match on gender or not.  
The acceptable anonymity threshold is 
defined by k. For example, k = 5 means that 
Methods Inf Med 5/2011 © Schattauer 2011
2
a given patient is indistinguishable from at 
least k – 1 = 4 other individuals within the se-
lection area, which in turn translates to a 
20% chance of correctly identifying the pa-
tient. The maximum perturbation distance 
Δ is the maximum acceptable threshold for 
spatial displacement. This does not mean 
that all eligible records for displacement will 
be up to Δ away from the original point, only 
that this is as far as the algorithm is allowed 
to go to achieve the desired k. The actual 
maximum perturbation radius, R, will de-
pend on the data and defined k. 
Given the patient dataset B with j = 1 to n 
patients, all patients in B are removed from A 
to give the complement non-patient base 
population, C. Removing the patient dataset 
individuals from the base population rec-
ords at the onset of the algorithm has two 
key effects: it prevents selection of one pa-
tient in place of another, and it  reduces  re-
identification  risk  by forcing k – 1 to consist 
entirely of non-patients. Next, for each rec-
ord in B, all records in C matching Bj on sex 
and age are isolated and the distance be-
tween each one and Bj is calculated. If fewer 
than k – 1 matching records are found with-
in Δ, then the sex and age dimensions are 
perturbed (i.e. grouped or categorised), 
based on the pre-defined conditions and in 
parallel in both the case dataset and the 
population dataset, and the matching is re-
done. This is repeated until at least k – 1 
matching records are found. If the algorithm 
is unable to reach the desired k-anonymity, 
then the record is non-transformable within 
the current requirements, is flagged as such, 
and the algorithm proceeds to the next rec-
ord. Otherwise, the algorithm continues. 
Of  the  matching records, the closest 
k – 1 records are identified, and a small ran-
dom distance, δ r  ,  is   added  to  the  farthest 
k – 1 match distance, δmax , defining the per-
turbation radius R. The addition of this 
random distance ensures inclusion of the 
point used to set the farthest match dis-
tance in case any rounding occurs and 
guarantees a minimum k-anonymity. It 
also adds a small stochastic aspect that 
complicates re-identification of the orig-
inal patient location, as not only is the se-
lection of the transformed point different 
with each run, but so also is the underlying 
pool from which the point is selected. A 
record within R of Bj is then randomly se-
© Schattauer 2011 Methods Inf Med 5/2011
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lected from C, and its location assigned as 
the perturbed point. This is repeated for the 
next record until all patient records in B 
have been transformed or flagged. The al-
gorithm flow and components are illus-
trated in Figure 1.  
3.2 Data 
Synthesised population data for New York 
County were acquired from the MIDAS 
project [24] by request. The dataset con-
tained synthesised records at the individual 
level, with the dimensions of interest being 
age, sex and residential location (latitude 
and longitude in decimal degrees). For each 
record, latitude and longitude were con-
verted from decimal degrees to radians 
prior to algorithm execution for use in ex-
tent and distance calculations.  
New York county was specifically chosen 
as the study area to allow for comparison 
with existing published methods – namely 
the results of the LP approach [22] – on 
 distances required to achieve specified 
k-values when additional dimensions are 
taken into consideration. The two ap-
proaches are also similar in that they both 
seek to minimise perturbation distance and 
both rely on the presence of underlying 
spatially-referenced population data. 
3.3 Algorithm: Preliminary Proof-
of-Concept Implementation 
Preliminary testing of the algorithm was 
completed using one thousand iterations 
Methods Inf Med 5/2011 © Schattauer 2011
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Fig. 2 Simplified example of age categorisation using one-year intervals with 5 levels and k = 5. Note that categorisation always starts at age 0 years (i.e. 
birth, consistent with census age strata) 
for each of 25, 50, 100, 200 and 400 patient 
dataset simulations, generated by ran-
domly selecting records from the syn-
thesised New York County population.  
The controlled dimensions were sex, age 
and distance. The anonymity threshold k 
was set to 5 and the maximum pertur-
bation distance Δ to 1 kilometre. An exact 
match to sex was required (i.e. no pertur-
bation allowed), and 5 levels of age cat-
egorisation were permitted (including 
exact age). Age categories were created by 
increasing the age range by one year for 
each successive level: for the first level, age 
range is 0, so it is the exact age; for level 2, 
the range is 1 to give age categories 0–1, 
2–3, 4–5, etc. A simplified illustration of the 
implementation of the age categorisation is 
given in Figure 2. Note that level 5 
matches the age categories used in the 
American Community Survey for age and 
sex stratified population counts [25].  
Extent-limiting steps were also added to 
the algorithm to improve computational 
performance. At the beginning of each iter-
ation and after creation of the patient data-
set, one kilometre was added to the maxi-
mum and minimum latitudes and longi-
tudes of the patient dataset and used to 
constrain the extent of the base population. 
This method was also used when determin-
ing the eligible population for each record. 
The small random distance added to 
create R was restricted to a range of 1 and 10 
metres to minimally impact geographic 
displacement. Distance was measured 
using the great circle formula. 
Cumulative descriptive statistics (mean 
and standard deviations, as well as the 
minimum, maximum and median) were 
calculated for successive iterations to assess 
the effects of the transform on the pertur-
bation distance. Analysis of the age dimen-
sion sought to identify the proportion of 
records requiring categorisation on age to 
achieve the required minimum k. The effect 
of adding the small random distance δr on k 
was also described through descriptive stat-
istics, as was the final perturbation radius. 
The displacement of the spatial mean of 
each patient dataset was also calculated in 
terms of perturbation distance. 
The algorithm was coded and run in 
SAS v9.1; the results were also analysed in 
SAS v9.1 and graphed using Microsoft Of-
© Schattauer 2011 Methods Inf Med 5/2011
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Table 1 Results of the Multidimensional Point Transform (MPT) algorithm with different patient 
 dataset sizes for New York County
 PATIENT DATASET SIZE (n) 
 25 50 100 200 400 
SETTINGS 
Total records 25,000 50,000 100,000 200,000 400,000 
k-anonymity setting 5 5 5 5 5 
Maximum Δ setting (kms) 1 1 1 1 1 
Unique Individuals 24,569 49,191 96,056 187,101 348,947 
MEASURES 
Age-Perturbed records 0 1 1 0 1 
Perturbation Distance (kms) 
Mean 0.046 0.046 0.046 0.046 0.046 
Standard Deviation 0.035 0.034 0.035 0.034 0.034 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 
Maximum 
Perturbation Radius (kms) 
Mean 
Standard Deviation 
Minimum 
Median 
Maximum 
Actual k-anonymity level 
Mean (rounded down) 
Standard Deviation 
Minimum 
Median 
Maximum 
Location Only k-anonymity 
Mean (rounded down) 
Standard Deviation 
Minimum 
Median 
Maximum 
Spatial Mean Displacement (kms) 
Mean 
Standard Deviation 
Minimum 
Median 
Maximum 
0.975 
0.070 
0.042 
0.004 
0.060 
0.994 
5 
1 
5 
6 
17 
809 
909 
19 
587 
38,122 
0.010 
0.006 
0.0004 
0.009 
0.057 
0.979 
0.070 
0.042 
0.003 
0.060 
0.997 
5 
1 
5 
6 
15 
818 
918 
19 
590 
43,782 
0.007 
0.004 
0.0002 
0.007 
0.027 
0.914 
0.070 
0.042 
0.002 
0.061 
0.983 
5 
1 
5 
6 
66 
818 
976 
15 
589 
68,449 
0.005 
0.003 
0.0001 
0.005 
0.016 
0.980 
0.070 
0.042 
0.003 
0.061 
1.000 
5 
1 
5 
6 
17 
817 
931 
19 
593 
66,100 
0.003 
0.002 
0.0002 
0.003 
0.011 
0.992 
0.070 
0.042 
0.002 
0.061 
1.005 
5 
1 
5 
6 
16 
820 
933 
7 
591 
58,965 
0.003 
0.001 
0.0001 
0.002 
0.007 
Median 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.039
fice 2007. The code was run in RAM using 
RAMDisk software [26], as preliminary 
tests showed this to be approximately ten 
times faster than using a SATA 7200 RPM 
hard drive.  
4. Results 
In total, 775,000 records were randomly 
chosen from the synthesised New York 
population of 1,482,104 unique individu-
als and tested with this algorithm, repre-
senting  601,790  unique individuals or 41% 
of the New York county population 
(Table 1). 
Time taken to complete the algorithm 
ranged from about 5 minutes per iteration 
for the 25-patient dataset size, to just under 
two hours per iteration for the 400-patient 
dataset size. 
The age dimension was seldom trans-
formed, as summarised in Table 1. Only 
one record required an age-transform in 
each of the 50, 100 and 400-patient data-
sets, representing 0.0005% of the tested 
unique individuals. 
The mean and median perturbation dis-
tances (46 metres and 39 metres respec -
tively), as well as the mean and median per-
turbation radii (70 metres and 60 to 61 
metres respectively), were consistent ir -
respective of the patient dataset size 
(Table 1). Cumulative means of the dis-
tance between the original and the trans-
formed points are presented in Figure 3 
for successive iterations, showing a plateau 
within 1 metre after less than 200 iterations. 
The actual  k-anonymity achieved across 
all runs averaged five individuals, matching 
on sex and age within the defined pertur-
bation radius as prescribed by the pre-de-
fined k requirement. Ignoring age and sex, 
the average number of individuals within 
the perturbation radius from which the 
random selection was made was just over 
800 individuals.  
The overall spatial mean of the trans-
formed points was within 5.6 metres of the 
original spatial mean across all runs, and 
was inversely related to the patient dataset 
size (Table 1). 
5. Discussion 
This study describes a multidimensional 
point transform (MPT) for anonymising 
data for public health use that includes lo-
cation perturbation as a core component of 
the overall anonymisation algorithm. By 
perturbing the location dimension in con-
cert with other user-defined dimensions, 
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Fig. 3 Mean cumulative perturbation distance for successive runs of the tested patient dataset sizes 
the MPT offers a more comprehensive and 
valid anonymised dataset than existing 
proposed random perturbation trans-
forms. 
Preliminary testing of the algorithm was 
completed on a synthesised New York 
County population using three dimen-
sions: sex, age, and location. Since the sex 
perturbation tolerance was 0, there was no 
loss of information on the sex dimension; 
the age dimension was unaltered for 
99.9995% of all runs; and the mean spatial 
displacement of transformed records was 
46 metres from original patient points, ir-
respective of patient dataset size. Fifty per-
cent of points being displaced across all 
runs were moved less than 40 metres and all 
transformed records were spatially accu-
rate, representing actual household lo-
cations within the population. 
Since New York County has a very high 
population density, it is not surprising that 
a k = 5 anonymity level was achieved with-
in such a small distance and with no impact 
on the age dimension. To further illustrate 
the multi-dimensional aspect of the algo-
rithm, ad hoc analyses were completed 
using 100 iterations of sample sizes of 25 
cases with k = 20 and Δ = 50 m. With these 
tightened constraints, the MPT performed 
precisely as expected: 19 of the total 2500 
records were transformed with no age-
 categorisation required; 148 were trans -
formed with a level 2 age categorisation 
(i.e. a 1-year interval; recall level 1 is the 
exact age with no categorisation); 274 were 
transformed with a level 3 age categori-
sation; 292 were transformed with a level 4 
age categorisation; and 290 were trans-
formed with a level 5 age categorisation. 
The total successfully transformed records 
of the 2,500 was thus 1,023 (41%) with a 
mean perturbation distance of 31 metres. 
The remaining 1,477 records could not be 
transformed within 50 metres of the orig-
inal point at a k = 20 level, and all 1,477 
reached level 5 age-categorisation as ex-
pected.  
Previously described algorithms treat 
other record attributes separately from lo-
cation, sometimes with a weighting to ac-
count for the generalised underlying popu-
lation demographics. Armstrong et al as-
sume that all other potentially identifying 
attributes such as health information, age, 
sex, and so on are sufficiently “non-individ-
ual specific” [19]. Kwan et al [20] acknowl-
edge the arbitrary nature of their weight 
factors, and that their results are specific to 
the unique and particular combination of 
their underlying population and the case-
data. Similarly, Cassa et al. [21] used gener-
alised age-based population density 
weights – which they refer to as “multi-
pliers” – at the census block group level to 
implement a probabilistic Gaussian-
skewed random perturbation transform. 
K-anonymity calculations were also prob-
abilistically based, without taking into con-
sideration other individual dimensions 
(e.g. age and sex). One could reasonably 
argue that, given the general importance of 
and requirement for these dimensions in 
public health practice, they should be in-
cluded in the implementation and assess-
ment of anonymisation algorithms.  
As with the LP approach of Wieland et al 
[22], the MPT seeks to minimise pertur-
bation distance and relies on an existing 
spatial population to do so. However, by ac-
complishing this in the context of multiple 
dimensions, it reveals a significant impact 
on the implications of the transform. Wie-
land et al. [22] suggest that aggregating to 
zip code in New York County yields a k 
value of about 884 and a corresponding 
perturbation distance of 519 metres; their 
LP method perturbation distance using 
census blocks is only 3.3 metres for the 
same k. A similar k-value acting on non-
grouped individual points using the MPT 
requires a mean perturbation of 46 metres. 
However the actual k when taking the other 
dimensions into consideration drops dra-
matically to only five. 
More recently, Hampton et al. [23] 
added a minimum perturbation distance to 
existing context-sensitive approaches [21] 
to implement a “donut” effect. The authors 
argue that allowing a case to be perturbed 
to its original location presents a re-identi-
fication risk, since an intruder will know 
that a few individuals may still be correctly 
identified, and also prevented cases from 
being perturbed outside their original ad-
ministrative boundaries. The authors also 
suggest that their approach is adaptive be-
cause it adjusts for the underlying popu-
lation density and also for minimum and 
maximum k-anonymity, whereas other 
random perturbation methods are only 
“semiadaptive” because they fail to be 
bound by minimum anonymity con-
straints. However, the donut method as de-
scribed is also semiadaptive because it fails 
to consider the details of the population 
demographics, such as age and sex. Given 
the aggregate use of underlying population 
density, the authors’ suggestion for the in-
corporation of these dimensions would 
have to rely on weighting mechanisms 
similar to those previously described [20, 
21]. The donut-algorithm also does not ad-
dress the possibility of randomly gener-
ating a point in a residentially-improbable 
or impossible location, such as a river or 
park, and is subject to a re-identification 
risk associated with multiple iterations [27, 
28]. In contrast, the MPT can easily exclude 
original patient locations, incorporate a 
“donut-like” effect if desired, and retain 
points within defined geographies. 
5.1 Re-Identification Risk 
An issue with random perturbation algo-
rithms is that repeated iterations on the 
same dataset increase the likelihood of re-
identification [27, 28]. The MPT reduces 
this risk by selecting points from a defined 
base population instead of generating ran-
dom points from a uniform distribution 
within a defined area. This avoids inaccur-
ate or unrealistic placement and can skew 
the point pattern. The stochastic distance 
added to create R in the MPT also adds se-
lection variability with each iteration. 
Therefore, the spatial mean of repeated it-
erations will depend on the variable spatial 
distribution of the underlying population 
and will not necessarily approximate the 
original location, unless the population is 
uniformly distributed around the patient.  
A possible weakness is the prevention of 
selection of one case as a transform of an-
other. Given two cases of identical age and 
sex within R of one another, it could be dis-
covered that each is excluded from the 
transformed options for the other in favour 
of a more distant point, allowing potential 
re-identification of both original points. 
Removing the preventative selection cri-
terion can resolve this, though it may also 
allow re-identification since repeated iter-
© Schattauer 2011 Methods Inf Med 5/2011
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ations will result in case location selection 
twice as many times as others. Yet another 
potential for re-identification exists if the 
perturbation tolerances and thresholds 
used are known, though this would require 
extensive time and computing power. The 
multidimensional nature of the transform 
helps complicate re-identification efforts – 
the more dimensions are permitted to be 
perturbed, the more difficult re-identifica-
tion becomes – while exact dimension 
matching is mitigated by the anonymity 
threshold.  
The MPT as described does not anony-
mise records relative to themselves as is the 
general case with current k-anonymity 
techniques. In other words, it anonymises 
case records to an external dataset – in this 
case, a population dataset – and not to the 
case dataset itself. While this does not ad-
dress potential “prosecutor re-identifica-
tion” risk [29], the MPT can be configured 
to anonymise a dataset relative to itself if so 
desired as noted briefly below under 
Strengths. This approach, however, was not 
tested and is not the focus of the current 
study since in the context of location pri-
vacy it only works with generalised or ag-
gregated locations. 
It should be noted that meaningful pri-
vacy preservation is also a function of 
prevalence or incidence. For example, given 
50 HIV cases in a population of 1,000, ran-
dom selection of any one individual has a 
5% chance of correctly identifying an HIV 
case. If all information were stripped for 
the 50 cases except for their location, each 
individual would be unidentifiable from 
999 other individuals (i.e. k = 1,000). How-
ever, while this has achieved the maximum 
possible k for this population, it still re-
mains that correctly identifying an individ-
ual as having HIV has an effective k-value 
of only 20. 
5.2 Limitations 
The MPT relies on the presence of an 
underlying base population containing the 
same dimensions as those required by the 
data-user, with at least k – 1 non-patients 
for each dimensionally-matched patient. 
As the number of dimensions increases, 
available matches decrease, potentially 
necessitating dimensional compromises 
which can be controlled by increasing the 
allowable perturbation of the individual 
dimensions. The MPT allows exploration 
of the optimum context-specific com-
binations for appropriate data release and 
use. 
Some issues were encountered that im-
pacted overall performance, including 
periodic file locks, competing background 
applications, power outages, and system re-
sources. Although using RAM allowed 
faster completion, future implementations 
may be limited by the amount available for 
allocation and machine specifications. 
Other performance-enhancing factors may 
include use of solid state drives, multi-
threading and multiple processors, and 
coding and implementation within an en-
vironment other than SAS. Performance 
will also be a function of the underlying 
population matrix size.  
No amount of masking, de-identifica-
tion or anonymisation will prevent the 
misuse of data. Their release must therefore 
consider other factors such as the user’s 
trustworthiness, the purpose and scientific 
or applied merit for which they will be 
used, implemented security measures and 
so on. 
5.3 Strengths 
Strengths of the MPT algorithm are its 
powerful flexibility and cutomisability, 
easily allowing criteria to be set on appro-
priate dimensions relevant to both the 
study and the target population. For 
example, in the current implementation, 
every individual is indiscriminately associ-
ated with five age classes. However, some 
scenarios may require minimum age classes 
to be set, such that information deemed 
more sensitive is only released if age is 
 categorised within the appropriate classes. 
Base population files containing only age 
classes based on census information can 
still be used, allowing ages to be classed dif-
ferently based on the population distribu-
tion within the region of interest. The MPT 
can even be used to transform non-spatial 
dimensions of the base population for use 
in future implementations of the trans-
form.  
Another advantage of the MPT is its use 
of a granular base population which can be 
assigned to increasingly coarser geography. 
For example, given only postcodes, points 
can still be approximated using the base 
population and other dimensions provided 
in the patient record. Therefore, a 32-year-
old female patient in postcode X1X1X1 can 
be assigned to any point within that post-
code matching on age and sex within the 
allowable perturbations, and the MPT ap-
plied. This will incorporate a maximum 
error approximated by the sum of the 
maximum distance between residential 
points within the postcode area and the 
perturbation radius R, further confound-
ing potential re-identification. 
The MPT does not apply blanket rules to 
the entire patient dataset; rather, it anony-
mises each record individually for its own 
optimum transform. This allows release of 
the data with the best possible configur-
ation. It also allows for more sophisticated 
integration of contextual information, 
 facilitating comparison and calculation 
across datasets. For example, the algorithm 
could include distance to the nearest school 
as an added dimension. A maximum spa-
tial displacement of each record from its 
closest school can be specified in com-
bination with other relevant dimensions, 
preserving the relative spatial distance to 
schools. The algorithm is also not indepen-
dent of the underlying geography. Because 
it uses pre-established locations for the 
random selection to meet the required ano-
nymity threshold, knowledge of the exist-
ence of non-inhabitable regions or features 
will not increase re-identification potential 
(a noted issue with random perturbation 
techniques [19, 22]). These factors allow 
the spatial aspect of the transform itself to 
be bound by multiple, contextually appro-
priate rules.  
If specific dimensions are not known a 
priori, such as education and income, an 
areal dimension can be added as part of the 
control to allow retention of the patient 
within the specified political or adminis-
trative boundary. This allows the flexibility 
to use as little or as much data as are avail-
able to achieve optimum results. The ad-
vantage to including additional dimen-
sions beyond administrative or political 
boundaries is the incorporation of actual 
Methods Inf Med 5/2011 © Schattauer 2011
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contextual variables as opposed to poten-
tially artificially-related areal units.  
As mentioned, New York county is ex-
tremely population dense making it 
relatively easy to achieve reasonable ano-
nymity with very little spatial displace-
ment, even when multiple dimensions are 
considered. As the ad hoc analyses show, 
however, the MPT allows users and custod-
ians to identify this and modify the param-
eters in order to achieve acceptable results. 
In this case, for example, the custodian may 
agree to lower the k-value if acceptable or 
pending certain requirements on the part 
of the user (e.g. use restrictions, security 
requirements, etc). Conversely or simulta-
neously, the user may accept additional 
perturbations (i.e. of sex or age) or in-
creased spatial perturbation. The same 
decisions would have to be made for a 
sparsely populated rural area; either way, 
population density does not impair the 
MPT. By allowing the user and custodian to 
have control over the various aspects of the 
transform, including the appropriate or ac-
ceptable anonymity threshold, the MPT 
provides a “user-sufficient mask” [19].  
5.4 Using Synthesised Populations 
Health data are most valuable and in-
formative in their most granular form, and 
developing a transform that works on indi-
vidual point-level data at the address level 
is highly beneficial. However, such a trans-
form would require knowledge of the 
underlying population – also at the indi-
vidual point-address level. Although avail-
able through population registries, these 
data are themselves subject to privacy and 
confidentiality restraints, and are therefore 
generally not accessible for public health 
use. Instead, public health practitioners 
rely on aggregated census data to infer vari-
ous population demographics. This is 
where synthesised populations may play a 
role. For example, a “synthesised, geospa-
tially explicit” US population based on the 
year 2000 census has been generated to fa-
cilitate agent-based infectious disease mo-
deling for the Modeling of Infectious Dis-
ease Agents Study (MIDAS) [30]. This 
population “correctly and appropriately” 
describes the age and sex demographics by 
household, and accurately reflects the ac-
tual US population. Details on the method-
ology and population characteristics have 
been published [30].  
Since the MPT makes use of a syn-
thesised population, its validity depends on 
how well the synthesised data mirror reality 
on the dimensions of interest. Since the 
population is based on the year 2000 cen-
sus, it may inadequately reflect population 
demographics for earlier or more recent 
studies. However, given the recurring na-
ture of the census, algorithms used to build 
the synthesised populations can be re-run 
to generate new and relevant populations 
with each census year [30]. A synthesised 
population may also be invaluable in ex-
ploring the relationships between pertur-
bation distance and a variety of quasi-
identifiers as illustrated through this study. 
Their use also allows for the creation of 
realistic, non-circular disease clusters for 
investigation – an issue that impacts other 
studies in this field [23]. 
Synthesised populations for the US and 
several other countries have been produced 
for MIDAS and are available by request. 
These populations were developed for epi-
demiological modeling, not for de-identifi-
cation algorithms, further highlighting 
their general utility in public health. As 
such, the development of representative 
synthetic populations would be highly 
beneficial. Indeed, development of a syn-
thetic 2010 US population is currently 
underway by MIDAS scientists, as are tools 
to allow researchers to generate custom 
populations based on demographic vari-
ables of interest [24]. 
5.5 Algorithm Refinement 
Further refinement of the MPT could allow 
the user to set priority levels for the various 
dimensions. In the current example, the 
priority is given to age; age is perturbed 
only if the anonymisation threshold is not 
met within the prescribed maximum dis-
tance. Instead, the algorithm can be modi-
fied to prioritise minimum distance moved 
within a maximum age perturbation (i.e. 
the algorithm could begin with the maxi-
mum age perturbation to minimise dis-
tance and work backwards to achieve the 
optimum result). This provides maximum 
flexibility in exploring the optimal trans-
form for a given dataset and context, as 
minimising changes in one dimension will 
necessarily impact the effect of other di-
mensions.  
As an example, assume our dimensions 
of interest are distance, age, sex and race 
with decreasing priority assignment. In this 
case, the MPT as illustrated in Figure 1 
will first search for k – 1 exact matches on 
age, sex and race. In the absence of meeting 
this requirement, it will generalise race 
within the defined generalisation threshold 
and look for k – 1 exact matches on age, sex 
and generalised race. Assuming it still fails, 
it will then generalise sex, and look for k – 1 
exact matches on age and generalised sex 
and race. And so on. Based on the current 
design, it will only move on to generalising 
the next dimension once it has reached the 
maximum designated generalisation of the 
previous dimensions with failure to ident-
ify k – 1 matches in the population, since 
the loop is intra-dimensional. The loop can 
also easily be changed to allow several di-
mensional generalisations within an iter-
ation – i.e. across dimensions. In this case, 
and using the same example, race would be 
transformed to its first generalisable level, 
followed by sex if required, then age; as-
suming failure, it would then loop back and 
generalise race to its next level, etc. The in-
tent is to minimise loss on those dimen-
sions deemed by the user to be more im-
portant to retain closer to their original 
value, as opposed to finding an overall 
 perceived “optimal” solution, while mini-
mising spatial disturbance (i.e. distance 
perturbed). 
The MPT settings can also be informed 
by other research in this area. For example, 
the maximum number of combinations 
(MaxCombs) of variables of interest is a 
good predictor of uniqueness [12, 31] and 
can be used to determine appropriate “geo-
graphic area population size” (GAPS) [31] 
for privacy preservation. This can be used 
to inform preliminary decisions on setting 
k and Δ for the MPT; for example, one can 
begin by setting D to the approximate mean 
radius of the census geography most closely 
corresponding to a calculated GAPS cutoff. 
MaxCombs can also be used to inform the 
dimensional categorisation levels, particu-
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larly since it is dependent solely on the 
number of response categories and not the 
types of the quasi-identifiers.  
It has been shown that k-anonymity can, 
in some cases, be “over-protective”, particu-
larly for smaller sampling fractions, result-
ing in unnecessary information loss [29]. 
The current methodology helps reduce 
such information loss by incorporating the 
relevant dimensions directly into the an-
onymisation algorithm, allowing the user 
to set permissible categorisation and prior-
ity levels, and performing local recoding 
(i.e. allowing observations to have different 
and overlapping response intervals [29]). 
Appropriate k values should be a function 
of the user and the use of the data, as well as 
the governance structures in place. Some 
general criteria for setting this threshold 
have been proposed [12] and should be in-
corporated into a more comprehensive 
framework for the disclosure of data. 
Preliminary MPT testing was conducted 
on three dimensions: sex, age and location. 
Additional dimensions, larger patient data-
sets and different base populations with 
varying population densities should also be 
explored, as should the effects on common 
spatial statistics used in public health. Since 
random perturbation techniques generally 
increase Type II error probability (e.g. 
cluster dilution) and do not affect Type I 
error probability [19], further studies on 
appropriate thresholds and applications of 
this algorithm are required in various con-
texts and with different base populations. 
Additional analyses quantifying the rela-
tionship between the anonymity level 
achieved and the distance displaced for 
specific contexts and base populations can 
also serve as part of a framework for assess-
ing appropriate uses. Currently, privacy 
legislation applies to “identifiable individu-
als”. However, with the growing literature 
around anonymisation, one can now ask 
the question “at what k-value does an indi-
vidual cease to become identifiable under 
the legislation”? Acceptable anonymity 
thresholds therefore need to be set and 
standardised, and the legislation needs to 
be revised to better reflect this in privacy 
definitions. 
Sophisticated software agents [19, 32] 
could be used to combine the ingredients 
required (e.g. the base population from a 
municipal population registry, the health 
data from the custodian, and the user 
requirements) and return an appropriately 
and optimally transformed dataset (or null 
result, if no adequate transform is feasible 
given the data and user specifications). This 
allows the user to explore analyses that may 
only become evident after visual explora-
tion of the data’s distribution. A graphical 
user “front” would be highly beneficial for 
this purpose, and an image of such an 
 interface is suggested at http://www. 
personplacetime.org/tools/MPTinterface. 
jpg. 
6. Conclusions 
The multidimensional point transform 
proposed in this study works concertedly 
on multiple attributes, including the spatial 
attributes, to give a more complete and ap-
propriate transform that builds location 
privacy into the anonymisation model 
from the beginning. Unlike previous 
studies, this algorithm does not leave other 
attributes “untouched”, but it does result in 
a transformed matrix with the same di-
mensions of the original matrix [19]. 
The ideal transform preserves the con-
fidential and private nature of individual 
health records, as well as the geographic in-
tegrity of the data, to facilitate public health 
practice [19]. The optimal approach de-
pends not only on the purpose for the data 
use and the acceptable disclosure risk [19], 
but also on the characteristics of the data. 
Acceptable disclosure risk by the custodian 
is also a multifaceted consideration based 
on acceptable anonymity thresholds, trust 
in the user, adequate security measures, and 
so on. However, such algorithms cannot 
substitute for secure and ethical conduct, 
and a framework for the appropriate dis-
closure, use and dissemination of data con-
taining personal identifiable information is 
required [1]. There are also instances in 
which the release and use of identifiable in-
formation in public health are essential 
[33], and consideration must be made 
within a developed framework to allow for 
such cases. The proposed algorithm in this 
study presents a multidimensional ap-
proach that allows one to tweak and opti-
mise the trade-offs for any given dataset 
and purpose, presenting a necessary com-
ponent of the much-needed public health 
framework. 
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Abstract
Background: A common disclosure control practice for health datasets is to identify small geographic areas and
either suppress records from these small areas or aggregate them into larger ones. A recent study provided a
method for deciding when an area is too small based on the uniqueness criterion. The uniqueness criterion
stipulates that an the area is no longer too small when the proportion of unique individuals on the relevant
variables (the quasi-identifiers) approaches zero. However, using a uniqueness value of zero is quite a stringent
threshold, and is only suitable when the risks from data disclosure are quite high. Other uniqueness thresholds that
have been proposed for health data are 5% and 20%.
Methods: We estimated uniqueness for urban Forward Sortation Areas (FSAs) by using the 2001 long form
Canadian census data representing 20% of the population. We then constructed two logistic regression models to
predict when the uniqueness is greater than the 5% and 20% thresholds, and validated their predictive accuracy
using 10-fold cross-validation. Predictor variables included the population size of the FSA and the maximum
number of possible values on the quasi-identifiers (the number of equivalence classes).
Results: All model parameters were significant and the models had very high prediction accuracy, with specificity
above 0.9, and sensitivity at 0.87 and 0.74 for the 5% and 20% threshold models respectively. The application of
the models was illustrated with an analysis of the Ontario newborn registry and an emergency department dataset.
At the higher thresholds considerably fewer records compared to the 0% threshold would be considered to be in
small areas and therefore undergo disclosure control actions. We have also included concrete guidance for data
custodians in deciding which one of the three uniqueness thresholds to use (0%, 5%, 20%), depending on the
mitigating controls that the data recipients have in place, the potential invasion of privacy if the data is disclosed,
and the motives and capacity of the data recipient to re-identify the data.
Conclusion: The models we developed can be used to manage the re-identification risk from small geographic
areas. Being able to choose among three possible thresholds, a data custodian can adjust the definition of “small
geographic area” to the nature of the data and recipient.
Background
The disclosure and use of health data for secondary pur-
poses, such as research, public health, marketing, and
quality improvement, is increasing [1-6]. In many
instances it is impossible or impractical to obtain the
consent of the patients ex post facto for such purposes.
But if the data are de-identified then there is no legisla-
tive requirement to obtain consent.
The inclusion of geographic information in health
datasets is critical for many analyses [7-15]. However,
the inclusion of geographic details in a dataset also
makes it much easier to re-identify patients [16-18].
This is exemplified by a recent Canadian federal court
decision which noted that the inclusion of an indivi-
dual’s province of residence in an adverse drug event
dataset makes it possible to re-identify individuals
[19,20].
Records from individuals living in small geographic
areas tend to have a higher probability of being re-iden-
tified [21-23]. Some general heuristics for deciding when
a geographic area is too small with respect to identifia-
bility have been applied by national statistical agencies
[24-29]. For example, the US Health Insurance
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Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy Rule
defines a small geographic area as one having a popula-
tion smaller than 20,000.
Common disclosure control actions for managing the
re-identification risks from small geographic areas are
to: (a) suppress records in the small geographic areas,
(b) remove from the disclosed dataset some of the non-
geographic variables, (c) reduce the number of response
categories in the non-geographic variables (i.e., reduce
their precision), or (d) aggregate the small geographic
areas into larger ones. None of these options is comple-
tely satisfactory in practice. Options (a) and (b) result in
the suppression of records or variables respectively. The
former leads to the loss of data and hence reduces the
statistical power of any analysis, and can also result in
bias if the suppressed records are different in some
important characteristics from the rest of the data. The
latter is often difficult to implement because variables
critical to the analysis of the data cannot be removed.
Options (c) and (d) reduce the precision of the informa-
tion in the dataset through generalization. The former
generalizes the non-geographic information in the data-
set which may make it difficult to detect subtle trends
and relationships. The latter can reduce the ability to
perform meaningful analysis and can conceal variations
that would otherwise be visible at smaller geographical
scales [30-35].
Given the detrimental effects of such disclosure con-
trol actions, it is important to have accurate and propor-
tionate methods for assessing when a geographic area is
too small.
The uniqueness of individuals is often used as a surro-
gate measure of re-identification risk [36]. An individual
is unique if s/he is the only individual with a specific
combination of values on their personal characteristics
that are included in a dataset. There is a monotonically
decreasing relationship between uniqueness and geo-
graphic area population size: uniqueness decreases as
population size gets larger. A recent study developed a
model to decide when a geographic area is too small
based on the uniqueness of its population [37]: if
uniqueness within a geographic area is approximately
zero then the geographic area is not too small.
However, using zero uniqueness as a threshold for dis-
closure control is quite stringent and can result in
excessive record or variable suppression and/or aggrega-
tion. Higher uniqueness thresholds have been found
acceptable and have been applied in practice. Specifi-
cally, previous disclosures of cancer registry data have
deemed thresholds of 5% and 20% population unique-
ness as acceptable for public release and research use
respectively [38-40].
In this paper we extend this line of work by develop-
ing models to determine whether a Forward Sortation
Area (FSA - the first three characters of the Canadian
postal code) is too small based on the 5% and 20%
uniqueness thresholds by analyzing Canadian census
data. We also provide data release risk assessment
guidelines for deciding which one among the 0%, 5%,
and 20% threshold models to use for disclosure control.
Methods
Our approach was to construct models to determine if
the percentage of unique records in a particular FSA
was above the 5% and the 20% thresholds. These models
characterize each FSA in terms of its population size,
and also take into account the characteristics of the
non-geographic variables in the dataset that can be used
for re-identification.
Definitions
Quasi-identifiers
The variables in a dataset that can be used to re-identify
individuals are called the quasi-identifiers [41]. Examples
of common quasi-identifiers are [37,42-44]: dates (such
as, birth, death, admission, discharge, visit, and specimen
collection), race, ethnicity, languages spoken, aboriginal
status, and gender.
Equivalence Class
An equivalence class is defined as the group of records
having a given set of values on the quasi-identifiers. For
example, “50 year old male” represents the equivalence
class of records with the “50” value on the age quasi-
identifier and “Male” on the gender quasi-identifier. The
number of records that have these two values on the
quasi-identifiers is the size of the “50 year old male”
equivalence class.
Uniqueness
The uniqueness of records in the dataset is based only
on the quasi-identifiers. For example, if our quasi-identi-
fiers are age and gender, then say, the only 90 year old
female in the FSA “N3E” would be a unique record on
these quasi-identifiers within that geographic area.
Other sensitive variables that are not considered quasi-
identifiers are not taken into account in the computa-
tion of uniqueness. If an equivalence class is of size one,
then that represents a unique record.
Focus on the Forward Sortation Area (FSA)
The postal code is the basic geographical unit that we
will use in our analysis. The postal code is frequently
collected because it is readily available, and conse-
quently, it is used as the geographical location of resi-
dence in health datasets [45-50]. The full six character
postal code is often more specific than needed for many
analyses. Further, in combination with other variables
the full postal code would make it easy to re-identify
individuals, especially in residential urban areas [43].
While there are many potential ways of aggregating
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geographic regions to construct larger areas for analysis
[35], the FSA, a higher level in the postal code geo-
graphic hierarchy, is the unit that we considered.
Dataset
The dataset we used comes from the 2001 Canadian
census. The census has two forms: the short form and
the long form. Approximately a 20% sample of the
population completes the long form, and the remainder
completes the short form. The long form individual
level data is made available to researchers by Statistics
Canada through its Research Data Centers (RDCs).
The RDC long form dataset only has geographic infor-
mation at the level of the census tract. Because our
desired analysis is at the FSA geographic unit, we devel-
oped a gridding methodology, described in Additional
file 1, to assign the FSAs to individual records based on
their census tracts. Census tracts are only defined for
urban areas and do not cover Prince Edward Island
(PEI). Therefore, rural FSAs and PEI were excluded
from our analysis.
Table 1 contains the list of quasi-identifiers that were
analyzed from the long form census file. These were
selected to be representative of commonly used quasi-
identifiers in health and health systems research. The
table also includes the number of response categories
for each quasi-identifier as they were used in our
analysis.
Quasi-identifier Models
A quasi-identifier model consists of two or more quasi-
identifiers (qid). To manage the scope of the analysis we
consider only combinations of up to and including
5 qids. A total of 358 quasi-identifier models were ana-
lyzed. This results from the following approach of com-
bining the qids.
Initially, for the 11 qids listed in Table 1, there are
some similarities related to ethnicity and therefore
they were treated as a group: HLNABDR, ETH1-6,
RELIGWI, and DVISMIN. We defined a generic ethni-
city variable, and whenever that generic ethnicity vari-
able appears in a model it was replaced by one of the
above four variables. Each substitution represented a dif-
ferent model. Thus, this gives 8 distinct qids: gender,
age, ethnicity (generic), schooling, marital status, total
income, aboriginal identity and activity difficulties.
Categorizing the 8 distinct qids by their utility by an
intruder for re-identification gives the following two types:
• High utility to an intruder: gender, and age
• Possibly used for re-identification/sensitive: ethni-
city, schooling, marital status, total income, aborigi-
nal identity and activity difficulties
The different models were defined by the number of
qids in the model and by having at least one sensitive
qid included in each model.
For models including both age and gender, there are
42 models for the 8 distinct qids as follows:
• 5 qids: have age and gender and 20 combinations
of 3 of the 6 sensitive qids.
• 4 qids: have age and gender and 15 combinations
of 2 of the 6 sensitive qids.
• 3 qids: have age and gender and each of the 6 sen-
sitive qids.
Table 1 The list of quasi-identifiers that were analyzed from the census file
Variable Name in the 2001
Census RDC File
Definition # Response
categories(*)
SEXP Gender 2
BRTHYR Year of birth (from 1880 to 2001).
Age: We defined age categories based on 5 year ranges.
24
HLNABDR Language: Language spoken most often at home by the individual at the time of the census. 4
ETH1-6 Ethnic Origin: Refers to the six possible answers for the ethnic or cultural group(s) to which the
respondent’s ancestors belong.
26
ASRR Aboriginal Identity: Persons identifying with at least one Aboriginal group. 8
RELIGWI Religious denomination: Specific religious denominations, groups or bodies as well as sects, cults,
or other religiously defined communities or systems of belief.
3
TOTYRSR Total Years of Schooling: Total sum of the years (or grades) of schooling at the elementary, high
school, university and college levels. Only available for individuals age 15+.
9
MARST Marital Status (Legal) 5
TOTINC Total income: Total money income received from all sources during the calendar year 2000 by
persons 15 years of age and over. We defined categories in $15K ranges.
22
DVISMIN Visible minority status 4
DISABIL Activity difficulties/reductions: Combinations of one or more activity difficulties/reduction. 4
(*)The number of response categories excludes non-specific responses such as missing values, not available or “other”.
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• 2 qids: have age and gender only - there is only
one model.
Then substituting each of language, religion and visi-
ble minority for ethnicity gives an additional 48 models:
30 (3 × 10) models for 5 qids (ethnicity appears in 10 of
the 20 models), 15 (3 × 5) models for 4 qids (ethnicity
appears in 5 of the 15 models), and 3 (3 × 1) models for
3 qids (ethnicity appears in one of the 6 models).
The subtotal for this group of models containing both
age and gender is 90 (42+48).
We repeated the above process for each one of age
and gender in combination with the sensitive qids. That
is there are 56 models containing:
• 5 qids: have age and 15 combinations of 4 of the 6
sensitive qids.
• 4 qids: have age and 20 combinations of 3 of the 6
sensitive qids.
• 3 qids: have age and 15 combinations of 2 of the 6
sensitive qids.
• 2 qids: have age and each of the 6 sensitive qids
only.
Similarly to the previous group, by taking into account
the ethnicity related variables, there are a sub-total of
134 models for this group.
Lastly, age is replaced with gender for an additional
134 models. Adding up the sub-totals gives a total num-
ber of 358 quasi-identifier models.
For each quasi-identifier model, we denote its maxi-
mum number of equivalence classes as its MaxCombs
value. The MaxCombs value for any quasi-identifier
model can be computed from Table 1. For example, if
we consider the four quasi-identifiers: Age, Marital Sta-
tus, Schooling, Religion, then there are 24 (age) × 5
(marital status) × 9 (years of schooling) × 3 (religion) =
3,240 possible values on these variables, which is the
MaxCombs value. The MaxCombs values range from 6
to 718,848 across all quasi-identifier models.
Estimating Uniqueness
There are a number of different approaches that can be
used to estimate uniqueness in the population from the
20% sample.
The first study to examine uniqueness in the general
population was conducted in the US by Sweeney [51].
Relying on the generalized Dirichlet drawer principle,
she made inferences about uniqueness in specific geo-
graphic areas. This principle states that if N objects are
distributed in k boxes, then there is at least one box
containing at least N k  objects (i.e., the largest integer
within the brackets). If N ≤ k then there is at least one
box with a single object (i.e., a unique).
Sweeney made the conservative assumption that if
there is any unique in a particular geographic area, say
an FSA, then that FSA is high risk. She then reported
the percentage of individuals in high risk geographic
areas. For example, if we consider a quasi-identifier
model with a MaxCombs value of 48 (the k value), then
any FSA with a population smaller than 48, say 15 (the
N value), would likely have a unique individual in it,
and therefore all 15 individuals would be considered at
a high risk of uniqueness.
However, this approach will tend to overestimate the
percentage of uniques because not all individuals in the
FSA will be unique. For example, in the case above, on
average, 26% of the 15 individuals would be non-unique.
Furthermore, the Sweeney method does not help us
with estimating if uniqueness is above 5% or 20% for a
particular FSA.
An earlier study, which predicted when a geographic
area is too small, was based on the zero uniqueness
threshold utilizing a public use census file [37]. That
study assumed that as sample uniqueness approached
zero, the population uniqueness also approached zero.
This assumption is not suitable for directly estimating
population uniqueness at a 5% or 20% threshold.
Another approach to estimate equivalence class sizes
was taken by Golle [52], where he assumed a uniform
distribution of dates of birth of individuals living in a
geographic area in assigning them to equivalence classes.
However, that approach was driven by the author only
having access to high level census tabulations, and was
limited to a single variable. In our case the uniform dis-
tribution assumption cannot be justifiably extended to
all of the quasi-identifiers.
For our analysis we used the individual-level Canadian
census dataset. Given that the long form census dataset
is a 20% sample of the Canadian population, we utilized
uniqueness estimators to determine the proportion of
unique records for each combination of FSA and quasi-
identifier model. The reason we need to estimate popu-
lation uniqueness is because sample uniqueness does
not necessarily equate to population uniqueness, and we
are interested in population uniqueness.
One estimator developed by Bethlehem et al. [36,53]
over-estimates with small sampling fractions and under-
estimates as the sampling fraction increases [54]. We
therefore adopted a different estimation approach devel-
oped by Zayatz [31,55]. While this approach tends to
over-estimate the number of population uniques for small
sampling fractions, our 20% sampling fraction would be
large enough to alleviate concerns about bias [54].
Prediction Models
Based on the uniqueness estimate for each quasi-identi-
fier model and FSA, two binary variables were
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constructed: the first is 1 if the estimated uniqueness for
a particular FSA and quasi-identifier model was above
5% and zero otherwise, and the second was 1 if the esti-
mated uniqueness was above 20% and zero otherwise.
This is illustrated in Table 2 through a series of exam-
ples. Here we have seven example FSAs, and for each
one a set of quasi-identifiers (quasi-identifier model) is
shown. For example, for the “K7N” we have the “age ×
sex” quasi-identifier model. For each FSA and quasi-
identifier model combination we show the uniqueness
estimate. Recall that we only have data on 20% of the
population, therefore the uniqueness estimate gives us
the percentage of individuals in that FSA who are
unique on their quasi-identifier values. For instance, in
“L6P” 16.7% of the population are unique on their gen-
der, aboriginal status, schooling, and language spoken at
home. The last two columns of the table indicate
whether the estimated uniqueness is greater than 5%
and greater than 20% respectively. Such a table was con-
structed for all FSAs and for all quasi-identifier models.
This table had 342,606 rows.
We developed one binary logistic regression model
[56] with the 5% binary variable (denoted by I05) as the
response variable, and another with the 20% binary vari-
able (denoted by I20) as the response variable. The pre-
dictor variables in this model characterize the FSA and
the quasi-identifiers in the quasi-identifier model.
An FSA can be characterized by its population size,
which was obtained from the census data. We denote
this variable by POP. For example, the “K7N” FSA in
Table 3 has a POP value of 6,228, and the “L6P” FSA
has a POP value of 2,247. The POP variable ranged
from 200 to 78,457.
In a previous study it was shown that MaxCombs was
a good predictor of uniqueness [37]. We therefore use it
to characterize the quasi-identifier model used. Table 3
includes the MaxCombs values for each of the quasi-
identifier models in our example, as well as the response
variables for the logistic regression models. The data in
Table 3 are an example of the raw values that we used
in building the regression models. An observation is an
FSA by quasi-identifier model combination (as shown in
Table 3). For example, there is one observation for the
“K7N” FSA for the quasi-identifier model “age × sex”.
The 5% model was defined as:
logit  05 0 1 2         b POP b MaxCombs b POP MaxCombs
where π05 is the probability that an observation is high
risk (uniqueness greater than 5%) and the b parameters
were estimated. The logistic regression models were
estimated and evaluated using SAS version 9.1. We
included an interaction term in the model so that we
can adjust the relationship between MaxCombs and
uniqueness according to the population size of the FSA
(instead of creating a separate model for each FSA). The
20% model was similarly constructed.
To avoid collinearity with the interaction term in the
model, both predictor variables were centered [57]. Col-
linearity occurs when there are linear dependencies
among the predictor variables, and between predictor
variables and the intercept [58]. Because both POP and
MaxCombs have large values, the interaction term in
the logistic regression model can create overflow pro-
blems during computation. We therefore scaled the pre-
dictor variables by 10,000.
Table 2 Example uniqueness estimates, POP and MaxCombs values for some FSA and quasi-identifier combinations.
Example of Uniqueness Estimates for FSA and Quasi-identifier Model Combinations
ID FSA Quasi- Identifiers Uniqueness (Uˆ ) Uˆ >5% Uˆ >20%
1 K7N Age, Sex 0% N N
2 M2K Age, Aboriginal, Religion 1.7% N N
3 K1A Sex, Marital Status, Language 14.3% Y N
4 L6P Sex, Aboriginal, Schooling, Language 16.7% Y N
5 H3T Age, Aboriginal, Income, Marital Status, Language 56.0% Y Y
6 L1 M Sex, Disability, Marital Status, Schooling, Ethnicity 67.80% Y Y
7 K1A Age, Disability, Income, Marital Status, Schooling 94.70% Y Y
Table 3 Example of what the raw data used to build the
models looked like.
Example of Raw Data Used in Building the Logistic Regression
Models
ID POP MaxCombs I05 I20
1 6,228 48 0 0
2 14,047 576 0 0
3 100 40 1 0
4 2,247 576 1 0
5 12,916 84,480 1 1
6 7,080 9,360 1 1
7 100 95,040 1 1
(b) The population uniqueness binary value is used in the logistic regression
model with the other predictor variables. We used the 2001 Canadian Census
population values.
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Influential observations were identified and removed
[59]. As noted below, models on different subsets of the
data were constructed during our evaluation. The per-
centage of influential observations varied from less than
0.5% to 2.2% across these models.
Unbalanced Dataset
Our dataset was unbalanced. This means that the pro-
portion of observations with uniqueness less than 20%
was quite small, and similarly for the proportion of
observations with uniqueness less than 5%. Constructing
regression models with an unbalanced dataset can result
in poor model fit, inaccuracy in predicting the less pre-
valent class, and may even impede the convergence of
the numeric maximum likelihood estimation algorithms.
There are three approaches for dealing with an unba-
lanced dataset: (a) a down-sampling or prior correction
approach reduces the number of observations so that
the two classes in the logistic regression model are
equal, (b) the use of weights, and (c) an alternative cor-
rection which uses the full dataset and shown to be an
improvement over weighting by King and Zeng (KZ)
[60]. It has been noted that the weighting approach suf-
fers a loss in efficiency compared to an unweighted
approach when the model is exact [61], and the KZ
method is shown to be better than using weights [60].
We therefore built models using two approaches and
compared their results: (a) re-balancing using down-
sampling, and adjusting the parameter estimates accord-
ingly [60,62,63], and (b) the KZ method [60].
Method for Model Evaluation
We compared both methods for dealing with the unba-
lanced dataset problem on three values: the area under
the curve (AUC) of the Receiver Operating Characteristic
curve [64,65], sensitivity, and specificity. The latter two
metrics are defined more precisely in Figure 1 (the AUC
is based on the definitions of specificity and sensitivity).
The AUC has an intuitive interpretation: it is the esti-
mated probability that a randomly selected observation
that is above the uniqueness threshold will have a higher
predicted probability from the logistic regression model
than a randomly selected observation that is below the
uniqueness threshold [66,67]. Sensitivity is defined as
the proportion of actually high risk records (above the
threshold) which were correctly predicted as such. Spe-
cificity is defined as the proportion of actually low risk
records (below or equal to the threshold) which were
correctly predicted as such. For computing the above
metrics, if the predicted probability on the 5% threshold
model was greater than 0.5 then the FSA was deemed
to have a uniqueness greater than 5%. A similar pre-
dicted probability cut-off was used for the 20% threshold
model.
We used 10-fold cross-validation to generate the train-
ing and test datasets, which is a generally accepted practice
to evaluate prediction models in the machine learning lit-
erature [68,69]. That is, we divided the dataset used to
build the logistic regression model into deciles and used
one decile in turn as the test dataset, and the remaining
nine deciles to build (train) the model. In the context of
ten-fold cross-validation, the down-sampling and KZ
methods were performed separately on the nine training
deciles each time a model was estimated. All the predic-
tions across the 10-folds were then tabulated in a 2 × 2
confusion matrix and the prediction accuracy was evalu-
ated as illustrated in Figure 1. A confusion matrix shows
the cross-tabulation of the number of observations pre-
dicted to be above/below the threshold vs. the number of
observations that were actually above/below the threshold.
Results
Description of Canadian FSAs
Our models pertain to urban FSAs. We therefore pro-
vide a descriptive comparison of urban vs. rural FSAs in
Canada.
The population distribution for FSAs in the nine
Canadian provinces is shown in Figure 2, and overall in
Figure 3. Except for New Brunswick, rural FSAs tend to
have more people living in them. The majority of the
population lives in urban FSAs, except for Newfound-
land, and to a lesser extent Saskatchewan, where the
population is more evenly split between rural and urban
FSAs. Table 4 shows the distribution of FSAs based on
whether they are rural or urban. Even though they have
smaller populations, the majority of FSAs are urban
rather than rural. Figure 4 shows that in terms of physi-
cal size rural FSAs tend to have a considerably larger
area than urban ones.
Model Comparison
The two approaches for building the logistic regression
models are compared in Table 5 for the two uniqueness
thresholds. These results were obtained using 10-fold
cross-validation. In terms of the AUC, the differences are
very small and for practical purposes their predictive
accuracies can be considered equivalent. The table also
shows the sensitivity and specificity results using a pre-
dicted probability threshold of 0.5, which is consistent
with the way that the models would be used in practice.
Here we see that both modeling approaches had very simi-
lar specificity, but down-sampling had higher sensitivity
for both uniqueness thresholds. Therefore, we will use the
down-sampling model results in the rest of this paper.
Model Results
Both models had a significant goodness of fit (p < 0.001)
[56]. The model parameters are shown in Table 6. All
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model parameters are significant, including the interac-
tion term.
Discussion
Using the Models
In this paper we developed models to predict whether
the population in a geographic area has uniqueness
above the 5% and 20% thresholds using data from the
Canadian census. We also demonstrated that the predic-
tion models are sufficiently accurate to meet the risk
and utility needs of data custodians and data recipients
respectively. The areal unit that we studied was the
urban FSA.
The logistic regression models can be used to deter-
mine whether or not the FSAs in actual datasets are too
small. The MaxCombs value is computed based on the
quasi-identifiers in the dataset. For each FSA, its popula-
tion value can be determined from the Statistics Canada
population tables. With these two values we can predict
the probability that the percentage of uniques is above
the 5% or 20% uniqueness thresholds. If the predicted
probability is above 0.5, then disclosure control actions
are necessary. For example, records in that FSA must be
suppressed or combined with another FSA in the data-
set. Alternatively, some variables may need to be
removed or generalized to reduce the MaxCombs value.
Because the predictor variables in the models were
centred and scaled, this also has to be done when using
the models for actual prediction. Let the MaxCombs
value for a particular dataset be denoted by M. We
index the FSAs in a dataset by j. Let the population size
for a particular FSA in the dataset be denoted by Sj.
We have the centered and scaled MaxCombs value:
   M M 59861 10000 (1)
and the centered and scaled population size value:
   S Sj j 21120 10000 (2)
Then an FSA is considered to be high risk under the
5% threshold if the following condition is true:
1
1 779 1 137 8 37 3 6 5
0 5
         e M S j M S j. . . . . (3)
and an FSA is considered to be high risk under the
20% threshold if the following condition is true:
1
1 63 3 11 8 6
0 5
         e M S j M S j. . . (4)
For the FSAs that are flagged through equations (3) or
(4) then one should apply disclosure control actions.
Generalization of Models
There are two types of generalizations for these models:
generalization to other quasi-identifiers and generaliza-
tions to other urban areal units apart from the FSA.
Our results indicate that MaxCombs is a very good
predictor of uniqueness. The value of MaxCombs does
not care what type of quasi-identifiers we have - it is
only affected by the number of response categories in
Figure 1 Definition of prediction evaluation metrics. Low Risk means that the (predicted) percentage of unique records is below or equal to
the 5% or 20% threshold. High Rish means that the (predicted) percentage of unique records is above the 5% or 20% threshold.
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the quasi-identifiers. A previous study has shown that
taking into account the distribution of the quasi-identi-
fiers using an entropy metric did not result in any
improvement in the prediction of uniqueness [37]. One
explanation for this is that we have a ceiling effect: the
prediction accuracy is quite high already that the addi-
tion of distribution information cannot make a signifi-
cant improvement. Consequently, a strong case can be
made that the models can be used with other demo-
graphic quasi-identifiers even if they are not explicitly
represented in the census dataset, and if the MaxCombs
is within the range used in our study.
Another question is whether there is a basis for gener-
alizing the results to other urban areal units, for
example, full postal codes (which are subsets of FSAs)
or regions (which are aggregates of FSAs) ? Given that
the prediction models are quite accurate using only the
population size as a characteristic of the area, then there
is no a priori reason not to be able to apply the models
to other areas as long as their population sizes are
within the range used for our models and that they are
for urban Canadian areas.
Application of Models
We applied the models to evaluate whether the FSA
sizes were appropriate on two data sets: the newborn
registry of Ontario (Niday) and emergency department
data from the children’s hospital in Ottawa. In this
Figure 2 The population sizes for urban and rural FSAs in Canadian provinces.
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application we assume that the disclosure control action
taken is the suppression of records in small FSAs.
The Niday registry captures information about all
births in the province. We used a data extract for all
births during 2005-2007 fiscal years. There were 164,272
usable records in the registry during that period. The
quasi-identifiers that were considered were: mother’s
age, baby’s month and year of birth, baby’s gender, and
the primary language spoken at home.
The proportion of records in the Niday registry that
would have to be suppressed under each of the three
thresholds was computed. The results of this analysis
are shown in Table 7. For example, under the 0%
uniqueness threshold, 85% of the dataset would be in
FSAs that are deemed too small. These small FSAs
would have to be suppressed. As can be seen, there is a
pronounced difference between using the 0% threshold
and the others, with far less data having to be sup-
pressed for the 5% and 20% thresholds. These results
demonstrate that, where the risk profile is acceptably
low, using a higher threshold can result in significantly
more data being made available.
Using a similar approach, Table 7 also shows the
results for the emergency department data for all pre-
sentations from 1st July 2008 to 1st June 2009, which
consisted of 107,269 records. This data consists of date
of presentation and the age of patient. With the 0%
threshold 93% of the records would have to be sup-
pressed, whereas only 54% would be suppressed for the
5% threshold, and none for the 20% threshold.
Selection of Threshold
An important decision when using the above models is
selecting which of the three uniqueness threshold to
use: 0%, 5%, or 20%. The most stringent uniqueness
threshold of zero percent would be appropriate for data-
sets that are released to the public. This threshold
would result in the most suppression and aggregation.
The most permissive 20% threshold can be used when
Figure 3 The population sizes for urban and rural FSAs in Canada overall.
Table 4 Distribution of FSAs based on whether they are
urban or rural.
Prov Total
Rural
Total
Urban
Grand
Total
%
Rural
%
Urban
AB 12 138 150 8.00% 92.00%
BC 18 171 189 9.52% 90.48%
MB 10 54 64 15.63% 84.38%
NB 110 110 0.00% 100.00%
NL 13 22 35 37.14% 62.86%
NS 14 62 76 18.42% 81.58%
ON 56 466 522 10.73% 89.27%
QC 39 374 413 9.44% 90.56%
SK 11 37 48 22.92% 77.08%
Grand
Total
173 1434 1607 10.77% 89.23%
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disclosing data to trusted recipients where the overall
risks are quite low. This larger threshold would result in
the least suppression and aggregation.
To assist with deciding which of the thresholds is
most appropriate under a broad set of conditions, three
general criteria have been proposed in the context of
secondary use [70-72]:
• Mitigating controls that are in place at the data
recipient’s organization.
Mitigating controls evaluate the extent to which the
data recipient has good security and privacy prac-
tices in place. A recent checklist can be used for
evaluating the extent to which mitigating controls
have been implemented [73]. The fewer security and
privacy practices that the data recipient has in place,
the lower the threshold that should be used.
Figure 4 Areas in km2 for urban and rural FSAs in Canadian provinces.
Table 5 Comparison of unbalanced data modeling
methods.
Model Evaluation for the 5% Uniqueness Threshold
AUC Sensitivity Specificity
Down-Sampling 0.9849 0.87 0.996
KZ 0.9849 0.449 0.992
Model Evaluation for the 20% Uniqueness Threshold
AUC** Sensitivity Specificity
Down-Sampling 0.947 0.74 0.98
KZ 0.949 0.59 0.949
**We tested the difference between the AUC values, and the difference was
statistically significant between the two methods only for 20% uniqueness at
an alpha level of 0.05
Table 6 Logistic regression model results for the 5% and
20% thresholds using down-sampling.
Logistic Regression Model for 5% Threshold
Intercept POP MaxCombs POP ×
MaxCombs
Coefficient 779.1 -37.35 137.8 -6.5
95% CI (744, 815.5) (-60.46,
-13.72)
(131.6,
144.2)
(-10.61, -2.36)
p-value <0.0001 <0.0017 <0.001 0.0019
Logistic Regression Model for 20% Threshold
Intercept POP MaxCombs POP ×
MaxCombs
Coefficient 63.3 -6 11.8 -1
95% CI (61.85,
64.74)
(-6.83, -5.16) (11.59, 12.1) (-1.16, -0.86)
p-value <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001
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• The extent to which a disclosure (inadvertent or
otherwise) constitutes an invasion of privacy for the
patients.
Additional file 2 contains a set of items that have
been developed based on the literature to evaluate
the invasion-of-privacy construct [74-79]. This set of
items was subsequently reviewed by a panel of 12
Canadian privacy experts for completeness, redun-
dancy, and clarity. The greater the risk of an inva-
sion of privacy, the lower the threshold that should
be used.
• The extent to which the data recipient is motivated
and capable of re-identifying the data.
Additional file 2 contains a set of items that have
been developed based on the literature to evaluate
the motives and capacity construct [80-83]. This
construct captures the fact that some data recipients
can be trusted more than others (e.g., researchers vs.
making data available to the general public). The set
of items was subsequently reviewed by a panel of 12
Canadian privacy experts for completeness, redun-
dancy, and clarity. The greater the risk that the data
recipient is motivated and has the capacity to
re-identify the database, the lower the threshold that
should be used.
Admittedly, the use of these checklists remains quali-
tative, but they do provide a starting point for deciding
what an appropriate threshold should be.
Limitations
The FSAs that were included in our analysis were from
urban areas in Canada. As described in Additional file 1,
the reason is that the census tract information from the
census file that we used is only defined for urban areas.
Therefore, FSAs from rural areas were not covered.
However, it should be noted that the majority of the
Canadian population lives in urban areas.
Our analysis was based on data from the 2001 census.
There will be changes in the population over time and
therefore the models may not be an accurate reflection
of uniqueness the further from 2001 we are. Future stu-
dies should replicate this research on subsequent census
data (the 2006 census data was not available in the Sta-
tistics Canada RDC when we conducted this study).
We used the estimated uniqueness values as the cor-
rect values, and validated our prediction model on that
basis. However, the uniqueness estimate will not be per-
fect and such errors will negatively affect the overall
accuracy of the 5% and 20% prediction models.
The MaxCombs value can only be computed for
quasi-identifiers with a finite number of response cate-
gories. Continues variables that are not discretized can-
not be sensibly captured using our approach.
Conclusions
Disclosure control practices for small geographic areas
often result in health datasets that have significantly
reduced utility. These practices include the suppression
of records from individuals in small geographic areas,
the aggregation of small geographic areas into larger
ones, suppression of the non-geographic variables, or
generalization of the non-geographic variables. Previous
work has used a rather stringent definition of a small
geographic area: when it has no unique individuals on
the potentially identifying variables (quasi-identifiers).
However, less stringent thresholds have been used in
the past for the disclosure of health datasets: 5% unique-
ness and 20% uniqueness.
In this paper we develop models to determine whether
urban FSAs in Canada are too small by the 5% and 20%
criteria by analyzing 2001 census data. We have also
provided a set of concrete guidelines to help custodians
decide which one these thresholds to use. Within this
framework, a data custodian can manage the amount of
geographic suppression or aggregation in proportion to
the risks of disclosing a particular dataset.
Additional file 1: Mapping census geography to postal geography
using a gridding methodology. Describes the methodology we used
to assign a postal code to each record in the census file.
Additional file 2: Evaluating dimensions of risk. Presents the validated
checklists for evaluating the “invasion of privacy” and “motives and
capacity” dimensions of disclosure risk.
Acknowledgements
This work was funded by the GeoConnections program of Natural Resources
Canada, the Public Health Agency of Canada, the Ontario Centers of
Excellence, and the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of
Canada. We wish to thank David Paton (Canadian Institute for Health
Information) for his feedback on an earlier version of this paper. We also
wish to thank our panel of privacy experts for reviewing the items we used
to evaluate risk described in Additional file 2.
This study was approved by the research ethics board of the Children’s
Hospital of Eastern Ontario Research Institute.
Author details
1Children’s Hospital of Eastern Ontario Research Institute, 401 Smyth Road,
Ottawa, Ontario K1J 8L1, Canada. 2Pediatrics, Faculty of Medicine, University
of Ottawa, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada. 3GIS Infrastructure, Office of Public
Health Practice, Public Health Agency of Canada, Ottawa, Ontario K1A 0K9,
Canada. 4Ottawa Hospital Research Institute, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada.
Table 7 The percentage of Niday and emergency
department records that would have to be suppressed
because they are high risk for each of the uniqueness
thresholds.
0% Threshold 5% Threshold 20% Threshold
Niday 85% 77% 0%
Emergency Dept. 93% 54% 0%
El Emam et al. BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2010, 10:18
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/10/18
Page 11 of 13
5Children’s Hospital of Eastern Ontario, 401 Smyth Road, Ottawa, Ontario K1J
8L1, Canada.
Authors’ contributions
KEE designed the study, directed the data analysis, and contributed to
writing the paper. AB performed the Statistics Canada RDC statistical analysis
and contributed to writing the paper. PA performed the geospatial data
analysis and contributed to writing the paper. AN performed the model
building analysis work. MW contributed to the application of the results. JB
contributed to the application of the results. TR contributed to the
application of the results. All of the authors have read and approved the
final manuscript.
Competing interests
The authors declare that they have no competing interests.
Received: 28 May 2009 Accepted: 2 April 2010 Published: 2 April 2010
References
1. Safran C, Bloomrosen M, Hammond E, Labkoff S, S K-F, Tang P, Detmer D:
Toward a national framework for the secondary use of health data: An
American Medical Informatics Association white paper. Journal of the
American Medical Informatics Association 2007, 14:1-9.
2. Roy D, Fournier F: Secondary use of personal information held on
national electronic health record systems. Centre for Bioethics, Clinical
Research Institute of Montreal (study commissioned by the Office of the
Privacy Commissioner of Canada) 2007.
3. Kosseim P, Brady M: Policy by procrastination: Secondary use of
electronic health records for health research purposes. McGill Journal of
Law and Health 2008, 2:5-45.
4. Black C, McGrail K, Fooks C, Baranek P, Maslove L: Data, Data, Everywhere
– Improving access to population health and health services research
data in Canada. Centre for Health Services and Policy Research and
Canadian Policy Research Networks 2005.
5. Willison D, Gibson E, McGrail K: A roadmap to research uses of electronic
health information. CIHR Health Information Summit: 20-21 October 2008,
Toronto .
6. PWC Healthcare: Transforming healthcare through secondary use of health
data Dallas: PriceWaterhouseCoopers 2009.
7. Boulos M: Towards evidence-based, GIS-driven national spatial health
information infrastructure and surveillance services in the United
Kingdom. International Journal of Health Geographics 2004, 3(1).
8. O’Dwyer LA, Burton DL: Potential meets reality: GIS and public health
research in Australia. Australian and New Zealand Journal of Public Health
1998, 22(7):819-823.
9. Ricketts TC: Geographic information systems and public health. Annual
Review of Public Health 2003, 24:1-6.
10. Cromley EK: GIS and Disease. Annual Review of Public Health 2003, 24:7-24.
11. Brindley P, Maheswaran R: My favourite software: geographic information
systems. Journal of Public Health Medicine 2002, 24(2):149.
12. Richards TB, Croner CM, Rushton G, Brown CK, Fowler L: Geographic
information systems and public health: mapping the future. Public Health
Reports 1999, 114:359-373.
13. Ricketts T: Geographic information systems and public health. Annual
Review of Public Health 2003, 24:1-6.
14. McLafferty S: GIS and health care. Annual Review of Public Health 2003,
24:25-42.
15. Cromley E: GIS and disease. Annual Review of Public Health 2003, 24:7-24.
16. Mugge R: Issues in protecting confidentiality in national health statistics.
Proceedings of the Social Statistics Section, American Statistical Association
1983, 592-594.
17. Mackie C, Bradburn N: Improving access to and confidentiality of research
data: Report of a workshop Washington: The National Academies Press 2000.
18. Croner C: Public health, GIS, and the Internet. Annual Review of Public
Health 2003, 24:57-82.
19. Gibson Justice: Mike Gordon and The Minister of Health and Privacy
Commissioner of Canada Federal Court of Canada 2008.
20. El Emam K, Kosseim P: Privacy Interests in Prescription Records, Part 2:
Patient Privacy. IEEE Security and Privacy 2009, 7(2):75-78.
21. Hawala S: Enhancing the “100,000” rule: On the variation of percent of
uniques in a microdata sample and the geographic area size identified
on the file. Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the American Statistical
Association: 5-9 August 2001, St. Louis.
22. Greenberg B, Voshell L: Relating risk of disclosure for microdata and
geographic area size. Proceedings of the Section on Survey Research
Methods, American Statistical Association 1990, 450-455.
23. Greenberg B, Voshell L: The geographic component of disclosure risk for
microdata. Statistical Research Division Report Series Washington: Bureau of
the Census 1990.
24. Zayatz L, Massell P, Steel P: Disclosure limitation practices and research at
the US Census Bureau. Netherlands Official Statistics 1999, 14(Spring):26-29.
25. Zayatz L: Disclosure avoidance practices and research at the US Census
Bureau: An update. Statistical Research Division Report Series Washington: US
Census Bureau 2005.
26. Hawala S: Microdata disclosure protection research and experiences at
the US census bureau. Presented at the Workshop on Microdata: 21-22
August 2003, Stockholm .
27. Marsh C, Dale A, Skinner C: Safe data versus safe settings: Access to
microdata from the British census. International Statistical Review 1994,
62(1):35-53.
28. Statistics Canada: Canadian Community Health Survey (CCHS) Cycle 3.1 (2005)
Public Use Microdata File (PUMF) User Guide 2006.
29. Willenborg L, de Waal T: Statistical Disclosure Control in Practice New York:
Springer-Verlag 1996.
30. Fefferman N, O’Neil E, Naumova E: Confidentiality and confidence: Is data
aggregation a means to achieve both? Journal of Public Health Policy
2005, 26(4):430-449.
31. Willenborg L, Mokken R, Pannekoek J: Microdata and disclosure risks.
Proceedings of the Annual Research Conference of US Bureau of the Census
1990, 167-180.
32. Olson K, Grannis S, Mandl K: Privacy protection versus cluster detection in
spatial epidemiology. American Journal of Public Health 2006,
96(11):2002-2008.
33. Marceau D: The scale issue in social and natural sciences. Canadian
Journal of Remote Sensing 1999, 25(4):347-356.
34. Bivand R: A review of spatial statistical techniques for location studies Bergen:
Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration 1998.
35. Ratcliffe J: The Modifiable Areal Unit Problem. [http://www.jratcliffe.net/
research/maup.htm].
36. Bethlehem J, Keller W, Pannekoek J: Disclosure control of microdata.
Journal of the American Statistical Association 1990, 85(409):38-45.
37. El Emam K, Brown A, Abdelmalik P: Evaluating Predictors of Geographic
Area Population Size Cutoffs to Manage Re-identification Risk. Journal of
the American Medical Informatics Association 2009, 16(2):256-266.
38. Howe H, Lake A, Shen T: Method to assess identifiability in electronic
data files. American Journal of Epidemiology 2007, 165(5):597-601.
39. Howe H, Lake A, Lehnherr M, Roney D: Unique record identification on
public use files as tested on the 1994-1998 CINA analytic file. North
American Association of Central Cancer Registries 2002.
40. El Emam K: Heuristics for de-identifying health data. IEEE Security and
Privacy 2008, 72-75.
41. Dalenius T: Finding a needle in a haystack or identifying anonymous
census records. Journal of Official Statistics 1986, 2(3):329-336.
42. El Emam K, Jabbouri S, Sams S, Drouet Y, Power M: Evaluating common
de-identification heuristics for personal health information. Journal of
Medical Internet Research 2006, 8(4):e28.
43. El Emam K, Jonker E, Sams S, Neri E, Neisa A, Gao T, Chowdhury S: Pan-
Canadian De-Identification Guidelines for Personal Health Information Ottawa:
Prepared for the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada 2007.
44. The International Organization for Standardization: ISO/TS 25237: Health
Informatics - Pseudonymization Geneva: The International Organization for
Standardization 2008.
45. Bow C, Waters N, Faris P, Seidel J, Galbraith P, Knudtson M, Ghali W:
Accuracy of city postal code coordinates as a proxy for location of
residence. International Journal of Health Geographics 2004, 3(5).
46. Ng E, Wilkins R, Perras A: How far is it to the nearest hospital? Calculating
distances using the Statistics Canada Postal Code Conversion file. Health
Reports 1993, 5:179-183.
47. Mackillop W, Zhang-Salomons J, Groome P, Pazat L, Holowaty E:
Socioeconomic status and cancer survival in Ontario. Journal of Clinical
Oncology 1997, 15:1680-1689.
El Emam et al. BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2010, 10:18
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/10/18
Page 12 of 13
48. Spasoff A, Gilkes D: Up-to-date denominators: Evaluation of taxation
family for public health planning. Canadian Journal of Public Health 1994,
85:413-417.
49. Demissie K, Hanley J, Menzies D, Joseph L, Ernst P: Agreement in
measuring socio-economic status: Area-based versus individual
measures. Chronic Diseases in Canada 2000, 21:1-7.
50. Guernsey J, Dewar R, Weerasinghe S, Kirkland S, Veugelers P: Incidence of
cancer in sydney and Cape breton County, Nova Scotia 1979-1997.
Canadian Journal of Public Health 2000, 91:285-292.
51. Sweeney L: Uniqueness of Simple Demographics in the US Population.
Carnegie Mellon University, Laboratory for International Data Privacy 2000.
52. Golle P: Revisiting the uniqueness of simple demographics in the US
population. Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society 2006.
53. Skinner C, Holmes D: Estimating the re-identification risk per record in
microdata. Journal of Official Statistics 1998, 14(4):361-372.
54. Chen G, Keller-McNulty S: Estimation of identification disclosure risk in
microdata. Journal of Official Statistics 1998, 14(1):79-95.
55. Zayatz L: Estimation of the percent of unique population elements on a
microdata file using the sample Washington: US Bureau of the Census 1991.
56. Hosmer D, Lemeshow S: Applied Logistic Regression New York: John Wiley &
Sons 1989.
57. Jaccard J: Interaction Effects in Logistic Regression London: Sage Publications
2001.
58. Simon S, Lesage J: The Impact of Collinearity Involving the Intercept
Term on the Numerical Accuracy of Regression. Computer Science in
Economics and Management 1988, 1:137-152.
59. Pergibon D: Logistic Regression Diagnostics. The Annals of Statistics 1981,
9(4):705-724.
60. King G, Zeng L: Logistic regression in rare events data. Political Analysis
2001, 9(2):137-163.
61. Scott A, Wild C: Fitting logistic models under case-control or choice
based sampling. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society 1986, 48(2):170-182.
62. Lowe W: Rare events research. Encyclopedia of Social Measurement
Cambridge: Academic PressKempf-Leonard K 2005, 293-297.
63. Ruiz-Gazen A, Villa N: Storms prediction: Logistic regression vs. random
forests for unbalanced data. Case Studies in Business, Industry and
Government Statistics 2007, 1(2):91-101.
64. Metz C: Basic Principles of ROC Analysis. Seminars in Nuclear Medicine
1978, VIII(4):283-298.
65. DeLong E, DeLong D, Clarke-Pearson D: Comparing the areas under two
or more correlated receiver operating characteristic curves: A
nonparametric approach. Biometrics 1988, 44:837-845.
66. Hanley J, McNeil B: The Meaning and Use of the Area Under a Receiver
Operating Characteristic Curve. Diagnostic Radiology 1982, 143(1):29-36.
67. Spiegelhalter D: Probabilistic Prediction in Patient Management in
Clinical Trials. Statistics in Medicine 1986, 5:421-433.
68. Cherkassky V, Muller F: Learning from data: concepts, theory, and methods
New York: Wiley 1998.
69. Alpaydin E: Introduction to machine learning Cambridge: MIT Press 2004.
70. El Emam K: De-identifying health data for secondary use: A framework
Ottawa: CHEO Research Institute 2008.
71. Jabine T: Statistical disclosure limitation practices of United States
statistical agencies. Journal of Official Statistics 1993, 9(2):127-454.
72. Jabine T: Procedures for restricted data access. Journal of Official Statistics
1993, 9(2):537-589.
73. El Emam K, Dankar F, Vaillancourt R, Roffey T, Lysyk M: Evaluating patient
re-identification risk from hospital prescription records. Canadian Journal
of Hospital Pharmacy 2009, 62(4):307-319.
74. Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat: Privacy impact assessment
guidelines: A framework to manage privacy risks. Government of Canada
2002.
75. Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat: Guidance document: Taking privacy
into account before making contracting decisions. Government of
Canada 2006.
76. Canadian Institutes of Health Research: CIHR best practices for protecting
privacy in health research Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services
Canada 2005.
77. Canadian Institutes of Health Research: Secondary use of personal
information in health research: Case studies Ottawa: Public Works and
Government Services Canada 2002.
78. Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada: Key Steps for Organizations
in Responding to Privacy Breaches. 2007 [http://www.priv.gc.ca/
information/guide/2007/gl_070801_02_e.pdf].
79. Office of the Saskatchewan Information and Privacy Commissioner: Privacy
breach guidelines.[http://www.oipc.sk.ca/Resources/Privacy%20Breach%
20Guidelines1%20(3):.pdf].
80. Elliot M, Dale A: Scenarios of attack: the data intruder’s perspective on
statistical disclosure risk. Netherlands Official Statistics 1999, 14(Spring):6-10.
81. Sweeney L: Guaranteeing anonymity when sharing medical data: The
Datafly system. Proceedings of the American Medical Informatics Association
Symposium, 25-29 October 1997; Nashville. JAMIA 1997, Symposium Suppl:
51-55.
82. Willenborg L, de Waal T: Elements of Statistical Disclosure Control New York:
Springer-Verlag 2001.
83. Pong R, Pitblado J: Don’t take geography for granted ! Some
methodological issues in measuring geographic distribution of
physicians. Canadian Journal of Rural Medicine 2001, 6(2):103-112.
Pre-publication history
The pre-publication history for this paper can be accessed here:
[http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/10/18/prepub]
doi:10.1186/1472-6947-10-18
Cite this article as: El Emam et al.: A method for managing re-
identification risk from small geographic areas in Canada. BMC Medical
Informatics and Decision Making 2010 10:18.
Submit your next manuscript to BioMed Central
and take full advantage of: 
• Convenient online submission
• Thorough peer review
• No space constraints or color figure charges
• Immediate publication on acceptance
• Inclusion in PubMed, CAS, Scopus and Google Scholar
• Research which is freely available for redistribution
Submit your manuscript at 
www.biomedcentral.com/submit
El Emam et al. BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2010, 10:18
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/10/18
Page 13 of 13
K. El Emam et al.: A Method for Managing Re-identification Risk for Small Geographic Areas in Canada 
(Additional file 1: Mapping Census Geography to Postal Code Geography) 
- Page 1 of 8- 
Additional File 1: Mapping Census Geography to Postal 
Geography Using a Gridding Methodology 
Background 
The smallest geographic unit provided in the census microdata file available through Statistics Canada’s 
Research Data Centre (RDC) is the census tract (CT). CTs are only defined for census metropolitan areas 
and census agglomerations with urban core populations of at least 50,000 individuals. They are defined 
by  Statistics  Canada  as  “…small,  relatively  stable  geographic  areas  that  usually  have  a  population  of 
2,500 to 8,000.” [1]. The 2001 census contained a total of 4,798 CTs distributed over 9 provinces (no CTs 
are defined for the Territories or the province of PEI; see Figure 1).  
 
 
Figure 1: Distribution of 2001 census tracts across Canada. 
 
In  order  to  compute  re‐identification  risk  by  Forward  Sortation  Area  (FSA)  in  our  current  study, we 
needed  to devise a method  to estimate conversion between census and postal geography. A gridding 
methodology similar  in nature to the Gridded Population of the World Project (GPW) [2] at the Center 
for  International Earth  Science  Information Network at Columbia University  [3] was utilized, allowing 
assignment of geography based on areal weighting using a population grid for Canada. 
Methods 
Population‐based weights were assigned to CT‐FSA unions based on a created population grid for all of 
Canada. The grid cell size was one kilometre by one kilometre, and assigned populations were based on 
the 2001 census profile at  the Dissemination Area  level  (DA). This  is  the smallest geography at which 
census  profile  information  is  released  by  Statistics  Canada  [4].  Similar  to  the  PCCF+  [5‐8],  these 
population weights were then used to randomly assign census tracts to their associated FSAs. Details of 
the steps taken to create the population grid are described below. 
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Twenty  six  (26)  complete  grids of dimensions 1554 by 546 Kilometres were  created using  a  script  in 
ESRI’s ArcMap 9.2 [9], as specified in Table 1. This created 848,484 one kilometre square cells per grid, 
for a total of 22,909,068 cells covering the Canadian landmass. 
Once the grids were created, the next task was to assign an estimated population to each cell. This was 
done using the Statistics Canada DA file [10]. First, all DA polygons identified as water were removed. A 
new DA shape file containing only land DAs was created. DA boundaries were then dissolved so that DAs 
with disparate polygons were captured within one record. Areas and perimeters were summed for each 
polygon  to give  the  total DA area and perimeter. This reduced  the number of records  from 62,015  to 
52,924, which matches the number of DAs as reported by Statistics Canada. Total population, as well as 
sex and age‐stratified populations were extracted for all DAs across Canada, using four separate profile 
files  (Western Canada and  the Territories, Ontario, Quebec, and Atlantic Canada). Next,  the 2001 DA 
population  file was  joined with  the 2001 DA boundary  file,  to create a 2001 Canada DA boundary  file 
containing total and sex and age stratified populations. 
A “Select by attributes” function where population was not zero (0) was completed on the above file to 
create a new boundary file containing only DA polygons with reported populations. This further reduced 
the number of records to 49,153, creating a boundary file for non‐water, populated DAs only. A “Select 
by location” function was completed on all 26 grids, for any cells that intersected the boundary file from 
the previous function. The resultant grids had a combined total cell count of 2,367,457. 
A model was created using  the ArcGIS model builder, and  run  for each of  the 26 grids,  to create grid 
section  intersects with  the 2001 DAs, FSAs and CTs. The model also calculated proportional grid  sub‐
section areas and the corresponding population, based on underlying DA population and an assumption 
that the population was distributed proportionally to area within each of the geographic areas.  
A  summary  was  done  by  each  CT‐FSA  combination,  to  create  unique  CT‐FSA  records  with  the 
corresponding  sum of  the  calculated grid‐section populations. These  summed populations were  then 
divided by the total sum of the gridded‐CT population to give the proportion of the population in each 
CT  that  lay within  the corresponding FSA.  In essence,  this creates a population‐based weight  for each 
CT‐FSA  combination,  allowing  us  to  randomly  assign  any  given  record within  a  CT  to  its most  likely 
(population‐weighted) FSA.  
A  simplified hypothetical example of  the end  result  is given  in Table 2 and Figure 2.  In  this example, 
64.07% of the population in CT16003 is found in FSA K2S, and 35.93% in FSA K2T. For CT 16004, 49.35% 
of its population is in K2R, 19.48% in K2S and 31.17% in K2T. This reduces the table to five rows, with a 
population‐based  weight  for  each  unique  CT‐FSA  combination.  If,  for  example,  there  were  then  28 
records  from  the microdata  file  falling  in CT 16003, 18  (~65.86%) would be allocated  to K2S, and 10 
(~34.14%) to K2T. 
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Grid 
Section x y rows columns # Cells 
# Cells  
(DA-clipped) 
# Cells  
(populated DA-clipped) 
00 -2341699 310266 1554 546 848,484 147,282 95,225
01 -1795699 310266 1554 546 848,484 323,759 292,052
02 -1249699 310266 1554 546 848,484 400,335 352,048
03 -703699 310266 1554 546 848,484 421,104 252,417
04 -157699 310266 1554 546 848,484 442,583 112,863
05 388301 310266 1554 546 848,484 444,187 47,006
06 934301 310266 1554 546 848,484 588,000 220,587
07 1480301 310266 1554 546 848,484 514,762 202,006
08 2026301 310266 1554 546 848,484 222,848 139,035
09 2572301 310266 1554 546 848,484 79,825 30,635
10 -2341699 1864266 1554 546 848,484 490,304 181,644
11 -1795699 1864266 1554 546 848,484 843,129 253,796
12 -1249699 1864266 1554 546 848,484 753,391 84,386
13 -703699 1864266 1554 546 848,484 749,156 802
14 -157699 1864266 1554 546 848,484 563,822 1,239
15 388301 1864266 1554 546 848,484 192,569 1,005
16 934301 1864266 1554 546 848,484 587,718 1,420
17 1480301 1864266 1554 546 848,484 342,289 683
18 2026301 1864266 1554 546 848,484 220,305 48,694
19 2572301 1864266 1554 546 848,484 55,829 25,720
20 -2341699 3418266 1554 546 848,484 21,506 0
21 -1795699 3418266 1554 546 848,484 168,942 531
22 -1249699 3418266 1554 546 848,484 135,498 686
23 -703699 3418266 1554 546 848,484 229,560 0
24 -157699 3418266 1554 546 848,484 424,214 1,101
25 388301 3418266 1554 546 848,484 258,726 210
26 934301 3418266 1554 546 848,484 26,188 160
TOTAL     22,909,068 9,647,831 2,345,951
 
Table 1: Canadian grid development table. 
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CT  FSAsa  FSAsa Pop Density 
(per Sq. Km.) 
CT Area in FSA 
(Sq. Km.) 
Pop  CT Pop  Weight 
16003  K2S‐1  50   0.95  48  128  0.3750 
16003  K2S‐2  25  0.56  14  128  0.1094 
16003  K2S‐3  42  0.48  20  128  0.1563 
16003  K2T‐1  20  1.23  25  128  0.1953 
16003  K2T‐2  56  0.37  21  128  0.1641 
16004  K2R‐1  37  1.03  38  77  0.4935 
16004  K2S‐1  42  0.36  15  77  0.1948 
16004  K2T‐2  56  0.42  24  77  0.3117 
FSAsa = FSA sub‐area 
Pop = Population 
Table 2: Simplified hypothetical example of the weighted association between CTs and FSAs. 
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Figure 2: Example CT-FSA sub-area overlay to illustrate the hypothetical example. 
 
Results 
The CT population  assignments based on  the  gridding methodology proved  to be  very  similar  to  the 
2001  Statistics  Canada  Census  Tract  population  profile  (Table  3).  The mean  difference  between  the 
populations  was  3.45  individuals,  with  a  standard  deviation  of  48.96  individuals  (median  was  0).  A 
graphical representation of  the distribution of  the population differences, by census  tracts,  is given  in 
Figure 3. 
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 2001 Statistics Canada 
Population Profile 
Census Tract 
Canada Population Grid 
Project 
Census Tract 
Total n 4757 4757 
Mean population 4413.99 4410.54 
Standard 
Deviation 1911.77 1911.33 
Minimum 
population 40 0 
Median 
population 4290 4287 
Maximum 
population 20635 20636 
Table 3: Census tract population comparison between created population grid and 2001 census 
profile. 
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Figure 3: Distribution of Census Tract Population Difference between Grid-Calculated 
Population and 2001 Census Profile. 
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Provincial  analyses  also  showed  a  high  concordance  between  the  CT  populations  using  the  gridding 
methodology as compared to the 2001 Statistics Canada Census Tract population profile (Table 4). The 
greatest differences were  in New Brunswick  (mean difference = 6.97  individuals, standard deviation = 
75.26  individuals)  and  Alberta  (mean  difference  =  6.75  individuals,  standard  deviation  =  81.67 
individuals).  
 
 NL NS NB QC ON MB SK AB BC 
N 45 85 70 1246 2001 164 101 449 596 
Mean 3.71 2.6 6.97 1.55 3.68 2.93 -1.18 6.75 4.79 
Std Dev 12.01 19.37 75.26 26.19 51.38 27.14 37.86 81.67 51.38 
Median 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Table 4: Provincial differences between Profile and grid CT populations. 
 
Conclusions 
The  population  grid  created  in  this  study  provides  a  means  for  linking  census  geography  to  postal 
geography in Canada. While creating population grids in and of itself is not a novel idea, the created grid 
in  this  project  allows  the  mapping  of  census  geography  to  postal  geography,  based  on  population 
weights. The procedure assumes a uniform population distribution within  the geography being used. 
However,  since  CTs  only  occur  in  highly  populated  urban  areas,  this  was  felt  to  be  an  appropriate 
assumption.  A  similar  assumption would  not  hold  in  rural  or  less  densely  populated  areas,  and  this 
technique would  therefore not be appropriate. However,  it  could be utilized, and  further  refined, by 
incorporating  additional  information,  such  as  ecumene  areas,  satellite  imagery  for  residential  and 
inhabited areas, address data, etc.  
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Additional file 2: Evaluating Dimensions of Risk 
 
The purpose of this appendix is to provide a set of items that can be used by a custodian to evaluate the 
risk when health information is disclosed or used for secondary purposes. The specific dimensions we 
look at are “invasion‐of‐privacy” and “motives and capacity”. Some background for the context is first 
provided, followed by a detailed description of each item. 
2B ackground 
As illustrated in XFigure 1 X, personal information is collected from individuals. This collection can be direct 
or indirect through reporters. For example, in the case of an adverse drug event, a hospital or a 
physician may report the adverse event rather than the patient herself. 
This information remains with the custodian. An example of a custodian is a hospital or a disease 
registry. The custodian may have collected the information for a primary purpose, such as providing a 
service to a customer or providing care to a patient, or explicitly for a secondary purpose, such as a 
prospective diabetes registry. 
A custodian may disclose personal information to another custodian. For example, a hospital may 
disclose personal health information to a public health agency. In such a case, the information is not 
coming directly from a patient but indirectly through one (or possibly more) custodians. 
 
individuals
custodian
recipient
disclosure collection
agent
use custodian
disclosure
 
Figure 1: Basic data flow during a disclosure or use of personal information for secondary purposes. 
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An agent of the custodian may use the information for a secondary purpose. An agent is broadly defined 
as a person who acts on behalf of the custodian in respect of the personal information for the purposes 
of the custodian. For example, an analyst employed by a hospital to produce reports on resource 
utilization would be an agent. There is generally no legislative requirement to de‐identify information 
that an agent uses and no requirement to obtain additional consent from the individuals/patients for 
such uses. 
The custodian may also get a request to disclose the information to a recipient (or another custodian, 
but we will subsume that under recipient) for some secondary purpose. The recipient can be an 
individual (e.g., a researcher), or an organization (e.g., a pharmaceutical company or a public health 
agency). The recipient can also be internal or external to the custodian. For example, a researcher may 
be based within a hospital or can be an external researcher at a university or a government department 
requesting the information from the hospital. 
Some disclosures are mandatory and some are discretionary to the custodian. An example of a 
mandatory disclosure is reporting communicable diseases or reporting gunshot wounds in some 
jurisdictions. In these situations the disclosure of personal information to a particular recipient is 
required. 
Otherwise, there are different types of recipients and purposes where disclosures of personal 
information are discretionary. However, the conditions for discretionary disclosure do vary. There are a 
set of permitted disclosures in privacy legislation where personal information may be disclosed without 
consent, for example, disclosures for research and disclosures for planning and improving the health 
system. 
Other discretionary disclosures that are not explicitly permitted in legislation require that either consent 
be obtained from the individuals/patients or that the information be de‐identified. For example, the 
disclosure of personal health information (PHI) to a pharmaceutical company requires that consent be 
obtained or that the information is deemed to be de‐identified. 
Therefore, to summarize, there are four scenarios to consider: 
A. It is mandatory to provide personal information to a recipient (usually external to the 
custodian), and no consent is required. 
B. Personal information is used by an agent without consent. 
C. It is permitted by legislation to provide personal information to a recipient without consent 
(either internal or external to the custodian) under the discretion of the custodian. 
D. The custodian must de‐identify the information or obtain consent before disclosing the data to 
the recipient. 
The need for de‐identification of the information under each of the above scenarios will vary. This is 
discussed further below. 
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3BThe Need for De-identification 
In three out of the above four scenarios where data is used or disclosed by a custodian, a strong case 
can be made for de‐identification. Below we consider each in turn. 
8BScenario A: Mandatory Disclosures 
Disclosures under this scenario are outside our scope since they do not require any de‐identification. 
9BScenario B: Uses by an Agent 
While agents are permitted to access personal information, if that is not necessary to perform their 
functions then it may be better to de‐identify that information to minimize the consequences of a 
breach. The reason would be to mitigate risks due to data breaches, whose frequency has been 
increasing rapidly. 
For example, consider a hospital network that has developed a system to provide its patients web access 
to its electronic health records. The hospital has sub‐contracted the work to perform quality control for 
this software to a testing company across town. The testing company needs realistic patient data to test 
the software, for example, to make sure that the software can handle large volumes of patient records, 
that it displays the correct information to each patient, and so on. The testing company would be 
considered an agent of the hospital, so it can obtain identifiable patient records without consent, and 
use these records for testing. Giving the testing company PHI potentially exposes the hospital to 
additional risk if there is an inadvertent disclosure of this data (e.g., a breach at the testing company’s 
site). It is always preferable from a risk management perspective to minimize the number of people who 
have access to PHI, and making that information available to the whole test team should be avoided if 
possible. Therefore in cases where there is a legitimate use of the PHI, one should still consider using de‐
identification techniques even if this is not a legal or regulatory requirement. 
10BScenario C: Permitted Disclosures 
In some cases, even though the disclosure of identifiable health information is permitted by legislation, 
the custodian may consider de‐identification anyway. This, of course, makes sense only if the purpose 
can be satisfied without having identifiable information. In practice, achieving many purposes does not 
require identifiable information. A good example of that is in the context of research. 
A Research Ethics Board (REB) determines whether custodians can disclose personal information to 
researchers, and whether that information needs to be de‐identified. REBs have total discretion to make 
that decision.  
In practice, most REBs will require that either consent from the patients be sought if the information 
needs to be identifiable or they will require that the disclosed information is adequately de‐identified 
[2]. However, because of the discretionary nature of this type of disclosure, they may allow identifiable 
information to be disclosed without consent. 
For example, consider the situation where a researcher is collecting clinical information from electronic 
health records (EHRs) and wants to link it with data in a provincial administrative database. The linking 
will not work if the EHR data is de‐identified. In that case the REB may allow identifiable information to 
be disclosed for the purpose of linking without requiring the consent of the patients. 
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Scenario D: De-identification vs. Consent 
In this scenario the custodian does not have the option to disclose identifiable information without 
consent. However, there will be situations where obtaining consent is not possible or practical. For 
example, in a health research context, making contact with a patient to obtain consent may reveal the 
individual’s condition to others against their wishes, the size of the population represented in the data 
may be too large to obtain consent from everyone, many patients may have relocated or died, there 
may be a lack of existing or continuing relationship with the patients to go back and obtain consent, 
there may be a risk of inflicting psychological, social or other harm by contacting individuals and/or their 
families in delicate circumstances, it may be difficult to contact individuals through advertisements and 
other public notices, and undue hardship may be caused by the additional financial, material, human, 
organizational or other resources required to obtain consent. In those instances, the disclosure of 
personal information would not be permissible and de‐identification provides the only practical option 
for disclosure (assuming that the purpose can be achieved with the de‐identified information). There is 
no legislative requirement to obtain consent for de‐identified information. 
Even if obtaining consent was possible and practical, it may have a severe adverse consequence on the 
information’s quality because individuals who consent tend to be different on many characteristics than 
those who do not consent (e.g., on age, gender, socioeconomic status, whether they live in rural or 
urban areas, religiosity, disease severity, and level of education) [3]. These differences can result in 
biased findings when the information is analyzed or used. In such circumstances a strong case can be 
made for not seeking consent and de‐identifying the information instead (again, assuming that the de‐
identified information will achieve the purpose of the disclosure). 
Consider an example where a hospital is disclosing prescription data to a commercial data broker. It is 
not practical to obtain consent from the patients for this disclosure. Just the cost of administering the 
additional consent forms for admitted patients would be difficult to justify, and it would be difficult to 
do so retroactively for historical data. Therefore, the hospital would have to de‐identify the prescription 
data before disclosure. 
4BItems 
The following items along the two dimensions of risk, “invasion‐of‐privacy” and “motives and capacity”, 
can be used to decide the risk profile of the disclosure or use. 
12BSubjectivity 
The items that are defined below can be subjective in some cases. The custodian would need to define 
their own standards for interpreting them to reduce the subjectivity. For example, the item on the level 
of detail in the health information that is used/disclosed requires that the custodian define that given 
the nature of their data and apply it consistently across all disclosures/uses. 
13BLayout 
The following is an explanation of the layout of each item that is used to evaluate invasion‐of‐privacy 
and motives and capacity: 
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item being evaluated
explanation of item and
examples
preconditions that should be satisfied
before responding to the item
the categories that will be used
to evaluate the item  
 
1BAssessing Invasion-of-Privacy 
The objective of this section is to define a way to measure the invasion‐of‐privacy construct. There are 
degrees of invasion‐of‐privacy, and the items in this section determine that degree. By measuring the 
extent of the potential invasion‐of‐privacy, it will be possible for the custodian to decide how much de‐
identification needs to be done. For example, if data on a stigmatized disease is disclosed to a recipient, 
then that would score higher on invasion‐of‐privacy than disclosing data on common allergies. In both 
cases there would be an invasion‐of‐privacy, but in terms of degree the latter would be greater and 
therefore the data requires more de‐identification. 
Invasion‐of‐privacy is a hypothetical construct. In our definition of invasion‐of‐privacy we make two 
important assumptions: 
1. An invasion‐of‐privacy can only occur if the data that is disclosed/used is identifiable. Therefore, 
all of the items below are based on the assumption that all of the data is identifiable by the 
recipient/agent. The custodian may have disclosed identifiable data, the disclosed data was de‐
identified and the recipient was able to re‐identify it somehow, or the agent is using identifiable 
information provided by the custodian. When we talk about data in the context of this 
construct, then, we are referring to personal information or personal health information. 
2. The disclosure/use will not entail going back to the patients and seeking their consent. 
With the above assumptions, an invasion‐of‐privacy can occur under three conditions: 
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1. If the custodian inappropriately discloses the data to the recipient or there is an inappropriate 
use of the data. 
2. If the recipient or agent inappropriately processes the data (e.g., in terms of the analysis 
performed on it). 
3. There is a data breach at the recipient or agent site (whether it is deliberate or accidental). 
The items below are intended to assess the different dimensions of invasion‐of‐privacy if any of the 
three conditions above are satisfied. 
The custodian is expected to be able to respond to/assess all of the items below. In some cases the 
custodian may have to exercise their best judgment in order to respond. 
It is assumed that it would be possible to make general assessments about all of the patients covered by 
the data, even if this is an approximation. For example, some patients may care if they have been 
consulted if their data is disclosed/used for secondary purposes, while others may not. However, if a 
nontrivial proportion of the patients would have cared then the particular item would be rated closer to 
the affirmative. 
5BDefinitions 
Data  This is identifiable or potentially identifiable information. The Data can be 
identifiable if it explicitly contains identity information, such as names and 
phone numbers. The Data is potentially identifiable if it is relatively easy for 
the recipient or agent to assign identity to the Data. For example, if the 
identity information was replaced by pseudonyms and the recipient/agent is 
able to reverse engineer the pseudonyms because s/he has the pseudonym‐
to‐identity mappings or can get them. Alternatively, the recipient/agent may 
have the power to compel the release of identity information. For example, if 
the Data has an IP address and the recipient is a law enforcement agency, 
then the agency may be able to compel the ISP to reveal the name and 
address associated with the IP address at the specified date and time. 
Purpose  This is the purpose for which the recipient/agent has requested the Data. 
 
6BDimensions 
The invasion‐of‐privacy construct has four dimensions: 
 The sensitivity of the Data: the greater the sensitivity of the data the greater the invasion‐of‐
privacy. 
 The potential injury to patients from an inappropriate disclosure/use/breach/processing: the 
greater the potential for injury the greater the invasion of privacy. 
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 The appropriateness of consent for disclosing/using the Data: the less appropriate the consent 
the greater the invasion‐of‐privacy. 
These are detailed further below. 
A. 14BSensitivity of the Data 
 
1  The personal information in the Data is highly detailed 
More detail could mean many variables and/or the granularity/precision of the variables in the 
Data is quite high. For example, instead of a general diagnosis it would contain a very specific 
diagnosis. For instance, a high level diagnosis would be “disorders of the thyroid gland”, 
whereas a more detailed diagnosis would be “nontoxic nodular goiter”, and “absence of teeth” 
can be generalized to “diseases of oral cavity, salivary glands, and jaws”. 
Precondition: None 
Response categories: Yes/No  (Yes = more invasion‐of‐privacy; No = less invasion‐of‐privacy) 
 
2  The information in the Data is of a highly sensitive and personal nature 
This could mean, for example, information about: sexual attitudes, practices, and orientation; 
use of alcohol, drugs, or other addictive substances; illegal activities; suicide; sexual abuse; 
sexual harassment; mental health; certain types of genetic information; and HIV status. 
Information about a stigmatized disease/condition or that can adversely affect a patient’s 
business dealings, insurance, or employment would also be considered sensitive. 
Precondition: None 
Response categories: Yes/No  (Yes = more invasion‐of‐privacy; No = less invasion‐of‐privacy) 
 
3  The information in the Data comes from a highly sensitive context 
For example, in most cases data about individuals participating in a youth employment 
program are less sensitive than a similar list containing names and addresses of Hepatitis C and 
HIV compensation victims. But the sensitivity may also be dependent on the specifics. For 
example, a list of customers on a newspaper carrier’s route may not be sensitive, unless the 
newspaper or publication being distributed indicates sexual orientation, for instance. 
Precondition: None 
Response categories: Yes/No  (Yes = more invasion‐of‐privacy; No = less invasion‐of‐privacy) 
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B. 15BPotential Injury to Patients 
 
1  Many people would be affected if there was a Data breach or the Data was processed 
inappropriately by the recipient/agent 
This item pertains to the number of patients covered by the data. More patients would be 
injured if there was, say, a breach of data on 10000 patients than a breach of data on 10 
patients. In both cases it is an undesired outcome, but the former is more severe.  
The new US HITECH Stimulus Package stipulates that any breach involving 500 or more than 
individuals must be reported to the Department of Health and Human Services. This can be used 
as a guide for what is considered as a large number of people. 
If an inappropriate disclosure would affect a defined community (e.g., a minority group living in 
a particular area) then the number of people affected would be larger than the patients covered 
by the Data. 
Precondition: None 
Response categories: Yes/No  (Yes = more invasion‐of‐privacy; No = less invasion‐of‐privacy) 
 
2  If there was a Data breach or the Data was processed inappropriately by the recipient/agent 
that may cause direct and quantifiable damages and measurable injury to the patients 
Damages and injury would include physical injury such as due to stalking or harassment; 
emotional or psychological harm; social harm such as stigmatization, humiliation, damage t 
reputation or relationships; financial harm, such as (medical) identity theft and financial fraud; 
and if the data can be used in making a decision that is detrimental to the patient, for example, 
a business, employment or insurance decision. The damages and injury can occur to the 
patient(s) themselves, their family unit, or to a defined group/community (e.g., neighborhood, 
minority groups, band leaders, Aboriginal people, people with disabilities). 
Precondition: None 
Response categories: Yes/No  (Yes = more invasion‐of‐privacy; No = less invasion‐of‐privacy) 
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3  If the recipient/agent is located in a different jurisdiction, there is a possibility, for practical 
purposes, that the data sharing agreement will be difficult to enforce 
It is assumed that there is some form of data sharing agreement between the custodian and the 
recipient/agent. For example, if the agent is an employee of the custodian, then there would be 
obligations in employment contracts. If the agent is a different company then there would be a 
contract between the custodian and that company. If the recipient is a researcher in a different 
institution, then a data sharing agreement would be signed by the recipient. 
This particular item becomes relevant under the circumstances where the recipient/agent is in a 
different jurisdiction than the custodian, for example, in the US the PATRIOT Act compels 
custodians to disclose data in secret .In that case a law in a different jurisdiction effectively 
overrides the provisions in the data sharing agreement. 
In some jurisdictions enforcing contracts in courts is difficult or exceedingly slow that for 
practical purposes the data sharing agreement cannot be enforced in that jurisdiction. 
Precondition: None 
Response categories: Yes/No (Yes = more invasion‐of‐privacy; No = less invasion‐of‐privacy) 
 
C. 16BAppropriateness of Consent 
 
1  There is a provision in the relevant legislation permitting the disclosure/use of the Data 
without the consent of the patients 
In some cases there will be legislative authority to disclose the Data without consent. For 
example, when the Data is being disclosed to a medical officer of health at a public health 
authority. But if the recipient was a commercial data broker then there is no exception allowing 
the disclosure without consent. In Ontario, custodians can disclose Data to Prescribed Entities 
without the patients’ consent. 
In the case of research, a Research Ethics Board (REB) is permitted in most jurisdictions to 
disclose the Data without consent. If the REB elects not to do so the response to this question 
would still be Yes. 
Uses of Data by agents without consent are permitted in Canadian jurisdictions. Therefore, all 
subsequent items in this section pertain to disclosures only. 
Precondition: None 
Response categories: Yes/No (Yes = less invasion‐of‐privacy; No = no change in invasion‐of‐privacy) 
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2  The Data was unsolicited or given freely or voluntarily by the patients with little expectation 
of it being maintained in total confidence 
This would pertain, for example, to patients posting their Data on a public web site as part of a 
discussion group. It is not always obvious that when patients post their Data on the web there is 
an expectation of privacy, but in some cases they may not understand the privacy settings or 
policies of the web site, or the organization running the web site may change their policy after 
the Data was collected in unexpected ways. Therefore, the response to this question must take 
into account the specific context and history of the location where the patients posted their 
information. 
Precondition: If item C(1) is endorsed, then this item would not apply 
Response categories: Yes/No (Yes = less invasion‐of‐privacy; No = no change in invasion‐of‐privacy) 
 
3  The patients have provided express consent that their Data can be disclosed for this 
secondary Purpose when it was originally collected or at some point since then 
This item refers to obtaining explicit consent from the patients (opt‐in or opt‐out). The consent 
may have been for the recipient’s specific project (for example, in the case of patients 
consenting for the data that was collected during the provision of care to also be used for a 
specific research analysis), or may have been broad to encompass a class of projects that 
include the recipient’s Purpose for processing the Data (for example, the patients consented for 
their data to be used for research on cardiovascular diseases, without knowing in advance what 
the possible research questions may be). 
Precondition: If items C(1) or C(2) are endorsed, then this item would not apply 
Response categories: Yes/No (Yes = less invasion‐of‐privacy; No = more invasion‐of‐privacy) 
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4  The custodian has consulted well‐defined groups or communities regarding the disclosure of 
the Data and had a positive response 
This item would be endorsed Yes if these well defined groups or communities did not raise 
objections to the particular disclosure/use. If they did consult and the outcome was negative, 
then the item is scored No. 
Well defined groups or communities include neighborhood members, minority groups, band 
leaders, Aboriginal people, people with disabilities, consumer associations, community 
representatives, privacy oversight bodies, and patient advisory councils. 
The assumption with this item is that a nontrivial proportion of patents care what their 
group/community thinks about the disclosure and that they be consulted.  
Precondition: If items C(1), C(2), or C(3) are endorsed, then this item would not apply 
Response categories: Yes/No (Yes = less invasion‐of‐privacy; No = more invasion‐of‐privacy) 
 
5  A strategy for informing/notifying the public about potential disclosures for the recipient’s 
secondary Purpose was in place when the data was collected or since then 
The custodian may have given notice of potential disclosures for secondary purposes, for 
example, through well located posters at their site. The notice does not need to explicitly 
mention the particular recipient’s Purpose, but should describe potential purposes that include 
the recipient’s Purpose. 
This is an example of obtaining implicit consent when there are no legislative exceptions and 
express consent was not obtained. 
Precondition: If items C(1), C(2), or C(3) are endorsed, then this item would not apply 
Response categories: Yes/No (Yes = less invasion‐of‐privacy; No = more invasion‐of‐privacy) 
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6  Obtaining consent from the individuals at this point is inappropriate or impractical 
For example, making contact to obtain consent may reveal the individual’s condition to others 
against their wishes, the size of the population is too large to obtain consent from everyone, 
many patients have relocated or died, there is a lack of existing or continuing relationship with 
the patients, the consent procedure itself may introduce bias, there is a risk of inflicting 
psychological, social or other harm by contacting individuals and/or their families in delicate 
circumstances, it would be difficult to contact individuals through advertisements and other 
public notices, and undue hardship that would be caused by the additional financial, material, 
human, organizational or other resources required to obtain consent. 
This assessment may be contextual. For example, obtaining consent may be difficult for a 
researcher with limited funds, but if a large organization is requesting the data and they are 
expected to generate a large amount of revenue from processing the data, then the custodian 
may be able to convince the recipient that it is worth their while to invest in obtaining consent. 
Precondition: If items C(1), C(2), C(3), C(4) or C(5) are endorsed, then this item would not apply 
Response categories: Yes/No (Yes = less invasion‐of‐privacy; No = more invasion‐of‐privacy) 
 
7BAssessing Motives and Capacity 
The objective of this sub‐section is to define a way to measure the motives and capacity construct. This 
construct assumes that the custodian is disclosing/using data that has gone through some kind of de‐
identification. Therefore, we are concerned with the motives and capacity of the recipient/agent to re‐
identify this data. 
This construct has two dimensions: “motives” and “capacity”. Since “motives” pertain to individuals, the 
motives dimension can be considered in terms of the staff, collaborators, or employees of the 
recipient/agent entity. The motive to re‐identify the data implies an intentional re‐identification. The 
capacity dimension evaluates whether the recipient/agent is able to re‐identify the data, irrespective of 
whether the re‐identification is intentional or not. 
The custodian is expected to be able to respond to/assess all of the items below. In some cases the 
custodian may have to exercise their best judgment in order to respond as some of the items are 
subjective. 
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17BDefinitions 
 
Data The data is assumed to have gone through some kind of de‐identification 
before it is disclosed/used. The amount of de‐identification will vary 
depending on the specifics of the disclosure/use. 
Purpose This is the purpose for which the recipient/agent has requested the Data. 
 
A. 18BMotives to Re-identify the Data 
 
1  The recipient/agent has directly or indirectly worked/collaborated with the custodian in the 
past without incident 
This item assumes that this collaboration has not resulted in any incidents where the 
recipient/agent processed the data in an inappropriate way or attempted to re‐identify the data 
(i.e., it was perceived to be a successful collaboration). If the custodian has worked with the 
recipient/agent before then there is an empirical trust that has been built up, suggesting that 
the recipient is trustworthy. 
Precondition: None 
Response categories: Yes/No  (Yes = fewer motive to re‐identify; No = greater motive to re‐identify) 
 
2  The recipient/agent can potentially gain financially from re‐identifying the Data 
The first consideration is whether the recipient/agent is in financial distress. Although, this may 
be difficult to assess in practice. 
Consider if the recipient/agent or his/her family/employees/collaborators may receive financial 
benefits from processing identifiable data. For example, a pharmaceutical company may want 
to contact the patients directly for marketing purposes or to recruit them in a study. 
Another consideration is if the Data, once re‐identified, can be useful for committing financial 
fraud or identity theft (e.g., the database has dates of birth and mother’s maiden name). 
Precondition: None 
Response categories: Yes/No  (Yes = greater motive to re‐identify; No = fewer motive to re‐identify) 
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3  There is possibly a non‐financial reason for the recipient/agent to try to re‐identify the Data 
For example, there may a reason that the recipient/agent may want to embarrass the 
custodian by demonstrating that re‐identification is possible, or say a reporter wanting to do a 
story about a specific identifiable person in the Data or a famous person known to be in the 
Data. Also, a disgruntled employee may wish to adversely affect the custodian’s reputation by 
re‐identifying a patient and making that public. 
Precondition: None 
Response categories: Yes/No  (Yes = greater motive to re‐identify; No = fewer motive to re‐identify) 
 
B. 19BCapacity to Re-identify the Data 
 
1  The recipient/agent has the technical expertise to attempt to re‐identify the Data 
Re‐identification requires some basic database and statistical expertise. However, in real data 
sets there are missing data and data errors which would also have to be accounted for in terms 
of expertise. Of course an incorrect re‐identification can also be problematic, but we are only 
concerned with a correct re‐identification here. 
Precondition: None 
Response categories: Yes/No  (Yes = greater capacity to re‐identify; No = less capacity to re‐identify) 
 
2  The recipient/agent has the financial resources to attempt to re‐identify the Data 
Some types of re‐identification require funds to get data sets to link with. Also, gathering 
background information about a patient in the Data who is a target of re‐identification can be 
costly. 
Precondition: None 
Response categories: Yes/No  (Yes = greater capacity to re‐identify; No = less capacity to re‐identify) 
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3  The recipient/agent has access to other private databases that can be linked with the Data to 
re‐identify patients 
Such private databases would only be useful if they contain the identity information about the 
patients. Then linkage with the de‐identified database could reveal the identity of one or more 
patients in the Data. 
Some data that can be used for linking and re‐identification could be publicly available. In such 
a case we would consider item B(2) on the financial resources of the recipient/agent. This item 
pertains to private databases. 
A recipient may obtain such private databases from previous disclosures by the custodian. For 
example, the custodian may have disclosed a particular dataset to a researcher last year, and 
this year the same researcher wants another dataset that can be linked to the earlier one. The 
recipient may also obtain a private database by colluding with someone else. For example, the 
researcher may arrange to link a new administrative dataset from the custodian with another 
researcher who has obtained a different clinical dataset from the same custodian (and the 
custodian would not approve for the two datasets to be linked). 
An agent can also have access to data useful for linking. For example, in hospitals many staff 
have access to administrative data but not to clinical data. An employee can get a de‐identified 
clinical data set and link it with the readily available administrative data set to re‐identify 
patients in the clinical dataset. 
Precondition: None 
Response categories: Yes/No  (Yes = greater capacity to re‐identify; No = less capacity to re‐identify) 
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Abstract
This paper offers a state-of-the-art overview of the intertwined privacy, confidentiality, and security
issues that are commonly encountered in health research involving disaggregate geographic data
about individuals. Key definitions are provided, along with some examples of actual and potential
security and confidentiality breaches and related incidents that captured mainstream media and
public interest in recent months and years. The paper then goes on to present a brief survey of the
research literature on location privacy/confidentiality concerns and on privacy-preserving solutions
in conventional health research and beyond, touching on the emerging privacy issues associated
with online consumer geoinformatics and location-based services. The 'missing ring' (in many
treatments of the topic) of data security is also discussed. Personal information and privacy
legislations in two countries, Canada and the UK, are covered, as well as some examples of recent
research projects and events about the subject. Select highlights from a June 2009 URISA (Urban
and Regional Information Systems Association) workshop entitled 'Protecting Privacy and
Confidentiality of Geographic Data in Health Research' are then presented. The paper concludes
by briefly charting the complexity of the domain and the many challenges associated with it, and
proposing a novel, 'one stop shop' case-based reasoning framework to streamline the provision of
clear and individualised guidance for the design and approval of new research projects (involving
geographical identifiers about individuals), including crisp recommendations on which specific
privacy-preserving solutions and approaches would be suitable in each case.
Introduction
Definitions–the security-confidentiality-privacy triad
In micro-scale geographical analyses involving data about
specific individuals, data security, confidentiality and pri-
vacy form an intertwined triad. A recent US CDC (Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention) foundation course
on public health law [1] defines privacy as the "individ-
ual's right to control the acquisition, use and disclosure of
their identifiable health information". The same course
goes on to define confidentiality as the "privacy interests
that arise from specific relationships (e.g., doctor/patient,
researcher/subject) and corresponding legal and ethical
duties", and then describes security as the "technological
or administrative safeguards or tools to protect identifia-
ble health information from unwarranted access, use, or
disclosure". To explain the relationships between the
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three terms, the course quotes a key sentence from Ware
[2]: "If the security safeguards in an automated system fail
or are compromised, a breach of confidentiality can occur
and the privacy of data subjects invaded".
Mainstream media and public interest in the subject
Actual or potential breaches (technological or legal) of
data security and confidentiality and the subsequent
actual or potential invasions of individuals' privacy are
quite commonly reported in mainstream media. For
example, in March 2009, the Joseph Rowntree Reform
Trust published its 'Database State' report on the legality,
safety and effectiveness of the British government's major
database systems [3,4]. Of 46 databases assessed in this
report, only six were found to have a proper legal basis for
any privacy intrusions and were deemed proportionate
and necessary in a democratic society. The report authors
concluded that two NHS (National Health Service) sys-
tems, the Detailed Care Record (DCR) and the Secondary
Uses Service (SUS) [5], were almost certainly illegal and
that a number of others including the Summary Care
Record (SCR) would be legal only with patient consent,
but, with the current absence of an effective opt-out, it too
was almost certainly illegal.
We also read the story of an anonymous Canadian girl
whose death was associated with a prescribed acne drug.
She was eventually identified by the media who compared
the de-identified prescription data set against obituaries.
The comparison helped in narrowing down the search to
four possible girls, then by contacting all families the right
one was found [6].
High-profile security breaches (e.g., data loss or theft of
ill-protected confidential data) are also not uncommon.
For example, it was reported in May 2009 that a laptop
containing non-encrypted data (names, addresses, dates
of birth, employers, national insurance numbers, salary
information, and bank details) of 109,000 UK pensioners
has been stolen [7]. The data were merely password-pro-
tected, and possibly without any appropriate safeguards
for data self-destruction in case of brute-force password
attacks. It is very easy to find out passwords in a short time
using common hardware, e.g., NVIDIA CUDA GPUs
(Compute Unified Device Architecture Graphics Process-
ing Units), and readily available software [8], or even to
completely bypass the passwords and directly access the
underlying non-encrypted data.
In public health worldwide, any public identification of
an individual's health status and address, regardless of
contagion level or risk, is usually prohibited. But individ-
ual privacy rights must also be balanced with legitimate
public concerns and interests. The publicly-accessible,
online mapping of SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syn-
drome) in Hong Kong a few years ago using disaggregate
case data at individual infected building level in near real
time was one of the noticeable exceptions to the well-
established public health confidentiality rule [9,10].
Research literature: location privacy concerns 
and solutions
The biomedical and public health literature on geographic
information systems (GIS) and spatio-temporal analyses
features a large number of research papers mentioning or
addressing location privacy, e.g., [11-28]. A must-read
paper (not specifically health-related) dating back to 1994
[29] shows how chronic privacy issues are in GIS research.
Some research papers identified privacy as a potential or
actual issue of concern (e.g., in reproductive health
research [18]; in birth defects surveillance and research
[19]; in research relevant to policy on diet, physical activ-
ity, and weight [20]; in environmental health research
[21]; and in health and social care planning [22]), while
others went one step further by suggesting some compre-
hensive solutions (e.g., [23-26]), workarounds, or frame-
works and principles of practice (e.g., [29]) to mitigate or
resolve these privacy concerns.
A number of confidentiality-preserving statistical and epi-
demiological data processing methods (data aggregation
and transformations) have been proposed that can be
applied to original location data to preserve individuals'
privacy while maintaining some acceptable level of data
usefulness for geographical analyses. But the use of precise
addresses will continue to be needed in many cases to
improve data analysis results or make them possible at all.
The famous John Snow's map of the 1854 Cholera out-
break in London only solved the problem because the
unique locations of individual cases were known [15,30].
There will always be this implicit trade-off between pri-
vacy concerns (e.g., easiness of re-identification) and the
types and accuracy of the results of geographical health
analyses that are possible with a given data set (original,
unaltered vs. transformed or aggregated data) [25,27,28].
And that is where software agents can offer a potential
solution that preserves the full fidelity of the original data
[25].
Moving beyond conventional GIS research and geograph-
ical analyses, mobile phones and other electronic gadgets
are rapidly gaining location awareness and wireless Web
connectivity, thus promising new spatial technology
applications and services (e.g., [31-33]), which will yield
vast amounts of spatial information and online maps that
can even reveal users' whereabouts in real time. These
novel spatial tools and services are certainly opening
many new useful possibilities, but are not without their
challenging security and privacy concerns [34,35].
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The 'missing ring': data security
Data security is relatively under-mentioned in discussions
about confidentiality-preserving solutions for location
data, despite its key importance in the aforementioned
security-confidentiality-privacy triad. Consider the fol-
lowing scenario: a health GIS researcher has legitimate
and IRB (institutional review board)-approved access to
patient data containing precise geographical identifiers
for analysis and reporting purposes, with full patient con-
sent. The reporting is done in ways that do not identify
individual patients when posting publicly-accessible/
online results and maps. If the reporting must be made at
some level of detail or granularity that can potentially
identify individual patients, the results are only shared
within approved, small teams of users with legitimate
access rights and 'need to know'. The whole scenario
seems fine as far as the protection of individuals' privacy
is concerned. IRB approval has been sought, adequate
reporting methods and policies are in place to prevent the
disclosure of any confidential data to non-authorised par-
ties, and we even have the patients' explicit consent to
conduct the study. However, without appropriate addi-
tional security safeguards, there will always be many
unmitigated risks of data theft or loss and of unwanted
data disclosure to non-authorised or non-authenticated
parties, all of which can compromise the privacy of the
data subjects. (Ideally, IRBs should be scrutinising the
security component as well before granting approvals.)
A carefully blended, purpose-built combination of over-
lapping security measures is always the solution, depend-
ing on the type, sensitivity, value, and risks/costs
assessment of the data to be protected. Various types of
advanced cryptography, multimodal biometrics, and
other methods can be combined, as necessary. Data access
can also be controlled or restricted in such a way that two
or more persons must be physically present each time and
authenticated (e.g., via biometrics) to unlock the data.
Security measures cover and include, among other things,
ensuring physical building security, using computer secu-
rity cable locks, using computers with a built-in TPM
(Trusted Platform Module) chip for cryptographic func-
tions, performing full disk encryption with TPM (e.g.,
using BitLocker [36]), implementing brute-force pass-
word attack protection (data are automatically erased after
a pre-set number of failed access attempts), using hard-
ware/software firewalls and other forms of network secu-
rity, implementing adequate access policies and
authentication [37] (at computer BIOS–Basic Input/Out-
put System level, Operating System-level, and application
level), considering Multilevel Security (MLS), using bio-
metrics (e.g., fingerprint readers and facial recognition),
using advanced secure USB flash drives with military
grade hardware encryption (e.g., [38,39]) instead of ordi-
nary flash drives, keeping detailed data inventories and
electronic audit trails of all accesses and transactions,
blanking of computer display and machine locking or
auto-log-off if a machine is left unattended, and the secure
decommissioning and discarding of old equipment and
data storage media, e.g., using software utilities like SDe-
lete [40] to prevent the kind of issues described in [41].
Also equally important are staff training and the develop-
ment of a 'security culture' in the organisation, e.g., guided
by ISO/IEC 27002 2005 (formerly ISO/IEC 17799 2005),
an ISO (International Organization for Standardization)
standard for information security and a code of practice
for information security management.
Personal information and privacy legislations
A discussion on location privacy solutions for health
research would be incomplete without reflecting on some
of the underlying reasons that necessitate their develop-
ment. The very notion of privacy is itself a complex fabric
of interwoven philosophical and psychosocial threads.
Perhaps this is why the associated bureaucratic and legal
landscape is as complex as it is – and often blamed for the
issue. A large majority of public health professionals con-
sider privacy to be an obstacle to public health; when
asked for the underlying reasons, survey respondents in
Canada and the UK most commonly identified bureauc-
racy and legislation [42].
There is no universal legislation to guide and govern the
activities of public health professionals, particularly
where issues of privacy are concerned. Instead, nations
have their own constraining or enabling privacy and data
protection laws, with some being such a maze of cross-ref-
erenced "legalese" that familiarising oneself with them –
let alone gaining a thorough understanding of them –
becomes a daunting task. 'Additional file 1' provides a
brief compilation and comparison of relevant personal
information and privacy legislation in Canada and UK,
with particular focus on location and public health as seen
and understood by an epidemiologist.
Some recent research projects and events about 
the subject
The issues of location privacy were also the subject of
GeoPKDD (Geographic Privacy-Aware Knowledge Dis-
covery and Delivery [43]), a three-year EU-funded project
that was recently completed in November 2008. GeoP-
KDD's main research question was 'how to discover useful
knowledge about human movement behaviour from
mobility data (e.g., location data from mobile phones),
while preserving the privacy of the people under observa-
tion?' The project attempted to develop new privacy-pre-
serving methods for extracting knowledge from large
amounts of raw data about individuals referenced in space
and time. GeoPKDD organised the 'First Interdisciplinary
Workshop on Mobility, Data Mining and Privacy: Preserv-
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ing anonymity in geographically referenced data' on 14
February 2008 in Rome, Italy [44].
Another research activity worth mentioning in our context
is the proposal by Helen Chen at Agfa HealthCare in Can-
ada and her colleagues at the World Wide Web Consor-
tium–W3C Semantic Web for Health Care and Life
Sciences Interest Group (HCLSIG) to explore Semantic
Web solutions for patient data security, confidentiality,
consent and privacy (in general, i.e., they are not focusing
on location privacy, but their proposal is still broadly rel-
evant to our topic). Previously sufficient de-identification
techniques can be rendered inadequate because it is now
possible to re-identify an identity via inference on the
Web. Semantic Web technology is making headway to
even more powerful data links, connections and infer-
ences of this type. However, in the healthcare domain,
this very success of the technology is putting individuals'
privacy at much greater risks. Chen's idea is to develop
novel privacy-preserving solutions by harnessing the very
same Semantic Web technology that can exacerbate these
privacy risks [45].
From 5–8 June 2009, the Urban and Regional Informa-
tion Systems Association (URISA [46]), a non-profit
American association of professionals using GIS and other
information technologies to solve challenges in state/pro-
vincial and local government agencies and departments,
organised its Second GIS in Public Health Conference in
Providence, Rhode Island, USA. One of the pre-confer-
ence workshops held on the 5th of June 2009 focused on
issues related to 'Protecting Privacy and Confidentiality of
Geographic Data in Health Research'. Select highlights
from this workshop are presented in the remaining part of
this article.
Select highlights from a recent URISA workshop 
on location privacy in health research
At the 2009 URISA GIS in Public Health Conference, a
workshop organised by Ellen Cromley and Andrew Curtis
focused on the issue of location privacy in health research.
Among the topics covered by panellists and attendees
were methods of spatial data protection, the need to "edu-
cate" IRBs, challenges facing data owners and custodians
wishing to visualise and disseminate data, how published
maps continue to violate confidentiality, some general
cartographic guidelines and "fixes", and new methods of
spatial data masking. In addition, the participants spent
considerable time discussing the ethical and legal chal-
lenges researchers now face as HIPAA (US Health Insur-
ance Portability and Accountability Act) regulations
change, placing more responsibility on the data user
(researcher). Although the majority of attendees to the
meeting were data owners or custodians, this article is
written mainly from the perspective of the data user, espe-
cially a social science/geographic information science
researcher. As researchers, our usual role is to spatially
analyse data, collect new spatial data with health implica-
tions, and visualise results in multiple forums, especially
academic journals.
In 2006 Curtis et al. published a paper in International
Journal of Health Geographics highlighting the potential for
point level data to be reengineered from published maps
through a process of digital scanning and georeferencing,
even with only limited geographical features [11]. By
heads-up digitising these points, coordinates could be
used to direct field teams to actual homes. This conceptual
approach had previously been impossible to replicate
with real data, but by using this case from Hurricane Kat-
rina, the map of mortality locations, and search and res-
cue markings that actually identified where bodies were
found, validation was possible. Concurrent to this article,
other reengineering approaches appeared using simulated
data and a more systematic approach to identifying
homes from a low resolution map [12]. Both papers
revealed that published maps, even of low resolution and
with limited geographical information, could still be reen-
gineered back to an exact address, or so close to the 'real
world' location that even without resorting to use other
quasi identifiers, the spatial confidentiality of those being
mapped was violated.
As researchers specialising in geographic information, we
need to be proactive in setting guidelines for the display
of confidential data, in policing our own actions, and in
educating those sitting in positions of data power, espe-
cially our IRBs. Critics of the presentation usually focus on
the data source–"this is a newspaper map so there is no
confidentiality violation". However, there have been at
least two maps appearing in journals that have also pub-
lished the same Katrina mortality point locations. But irre-
spective of this, the real message is, any point level map can
be reengineered back in the same way. As academics where
does our ethical path lie with these secondary sources
obtained from the media? We may not legally be violating
confidentiality, but does that give us the right to use non-
official sources, apply our geospatial skills and create sen-
sitive layers in other outlets?
Now in mid-2009, what has changed? Are maps still being
published in academic journals that violate spatial confi-
dentiality? And where are we on the issue of cartographic
guidelines? Unfortunately it is still too easy to find similar
map violations appearing after 2006. One can find exam-
ples of maps with point level mortality locations, preg-
nancies, at-risk pregnancy programme participants, and
people suffering from different respiratory ailments –
indeed we challenge the reader to see how many point
level health maps they can find. Of particular concern are
International Journal of Health Geographics 2009, 8:46 http://www.ij-healthgeographics.com/content/8/1/46
Page 5 of 8
(page number not for citation purposes)
those sub-disciplines which have just discovered the value
of GIS–we cannot expect that confidentiality violation
through cartographic design is uppermost in the minds of
those effusing over the wonders of buffering.
What else has changed? Paradoxically, the attention cur-
rently being paid to geocoding accuracy – which is impor-
tant from a health research perspective, and which has
received considerable attention in International Journal of
Health Geographics – also has a detrimental side in terms
of making published source maps both more accurate and
precise. This means the chance of successful reengineering
in terms of being closer to the actual address has
increased. In effect, this previously unintentional form of
masking has been reduced. Secondly, smoothing
approaches, such as density surfaces, are being used to
preserve confidentiality in maps (and stated as such by the
authors). On one hand this is good news in terms of
researchers' understanding that there is a confidentiality
issue, but on the other hand this quick-fix is problematic
due to a reliance on techniques that do not achieve this
goal. The combination of window/kernel/filter size, the
underlying grid cell resolution, and especially if there is
no option for a minimum denominator, may result in
"bulls-eyes" for areas of the map with relatively few resi-
dential alternatives, otherwise known as the 'geographic
area population size' [47]. It should also be remembered
that less dense geographies are not necessarily rural; many
urban areas also contain physical features (inlets, lakes,
even hills) can remove alternative possible locations. By
referring to high resolution aerial photography (now
found easily in applications such as Google Earth [35]), it
is relatively easy to identify the cause of the intensity. On
this subject, geospatial Internet applications in general
have made the reengineering process even easier for those
with and without a working knowledge of GIS.
From a data users' perspective, we are still limited by data
being released at an aggregation that is limited for
research, the standard for HIPPA being a zip code with
20,000 individuals. A group of Canadian researchers
showed that this is an archaic approach and that mini-
mum denominators should vary when taking into
account the underlying geography and the number of
quasi identifiers [47]. Similar papers written for research-
ers in other countries, possibly even providing a series of
size guidelines for different urban areas, would be invalu-
able. It would also help the job of IRBs.
And on the subject of IRBs, from our experience there is
still a disconnection in terms of understanding exactly
where the risks lie in geospatial output and confidential-
ity. This is understandable given the confusion even
amongst geospatial researchers. What would benefit all
concerned would be a well-respected body in the field of
public health to commission a "guidelines" paper. This
could become the reference in terms that researchers, IRBs,
and even research subjects could understand and cite,
along with other existing key texts, such as [48]. These ref-
erence guidelines should include clear visual examples of
what is not acceptable, including the pitfalls of common
"fixes" such as smoothing. They could also provide guid-
ance for appropriate aggregation denominator sizes. This
is important as researchers seek IRB approval in the use of
mobile geospatial devices for collecting health and built
environment data. We cannot expect IRBs to understand
where such cartographic risks lie. Finally, language should
be included that would help IRBs and be required in any
letter gaining subject permission. In other words, "if we
ask for an address (or a street intersection... or a zip code...)
this is the only way we will display it on a map". This simple
approach would mean that IRB, researcher and subject
would all have the same understanding of what will hap-
pen with these data. (Ellen Cromley has vested considera-
ble time on spatially appropriate language for informed
consent as a guideline for IRBs. She disseminated exam-
ples of this language at the URISA workshop.)
This 'best practice guide' should be circulated to all jour-
nals who publish maps, clearly stating the risks involved
in accepting point level maps. At least this would
enlighten editors [49] and hopefully force them to ask
submitting authors about 'what steps have been taken to pre-
serve confidentiality?'
Until we have such a universally accepted document, self-
policing is the main option, and with this in mind, we
have a few issues a researcher should ponder before pub-
lishing any map. Most importantly, is a point-level (or
smoothed, or small aggregation) map necessary? As a
geographer this last statement certainly hurts, but unless a
map is really needed to help frame a paper's content, or
improve the understanding of the reader regarding a spa-
tial process, and especially if it is not even specifically
referred to in the text, then it is better to err on the side of
caution.
We fully realise that some point-level maps will still need
to be published; it is often easier to explain a spatial proc-
ess through a graphic, but if this is the case then is the
underlying geography needed? If we are overlaying points
against output from a spatial analysis, do we need politi-
cal boundaries or street networks? If geographical refer-
ences are necessary in the map, then data masking is
essential.
There is some good news though, as we have noticed more
researchers referencing steps taken to preserve confidenti-
ality during recent presentations.
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Emerging issues
There are three emerging spatial confidentiality topics of
concern. The first involves Google Street View [50], an
excellent research tool that allows us to "see" areas that are
described or mapped in publications. The implication this
has for reengineering is the ability to see potential candi-
dates within an area. If we again think of the "bulls eye"
effect within a smoothed surface, if this area has been
driven by the Google Street View team (and thankfully at
this point areas of sparse geography also tend to be the
least covered), we could literally view each option within
the central pixel until a house match is found. Even with
multiple alternatives, it might be possible to spatially pri-
oritise the potential buildings based on characteristics of
the health conditions, or other information gleaned from
the paper. For example, is the disease more typically asso-
ciated with a multi-family unit than a single residence?
The second area of concern involves the use of biometric
sensors synched to a GPS (Global Positioning System)
unit. This field of research offers great potential in terms
of linking health outcomes to the fine-scale built environ-
ment. However, a fear expressed at the URISA workshop
was that output from these devices, usually shown as a
series of dots on an aerial photograph, will begin to
accompany research papers. Sure enough, within one day
of the workshop a new issue of a GIS journal published
this exact output. The underlying aerial photograph
makes reengineering from the image extremely easy, and
the point concentrations from the GPS unit correspond to
areas of highest activity, including the home. This is not a
good situation, especially when the participants are part
of a vulnerable population, such as children.
Finally, we are worried about the current trend by social
scientists of including spatial data in their research, espe-
cially those who use mixed methods. A mixed method
approach combines both qualitative and quantitative
data. For example, spatial video data of the recovering
neighbourhoods of New Orleans, LA, USA, are currently
being collected. These data are extracted from the video as
three-dimensional surfaces that can be mapped or ana-
lysed for recovery or abandonment. At the same time, vid-
eos of the narrative of the neighbourhood participants
add further commentary to the surfaces, such as why a
building has not been returned to. Many of these com-
ments contain sensitive information such as the health of
an owner. If we map this information, others could easily
disseminate it through online consumer geoinformatics
services like Google Earth and Google Map, and even link
it using suitable geo-mashups [51] to other readily availa-
ble online information about the individuals concerned
(e.g., on social networking sites), thus revealing a more
detailed picture about them. Do our subjects really know
all what could be exposed through such mapping? (But
one should also consider the difference between what is
technically possible and what is practically likely to happen,
i.e., will there really be someone with the motive, will and
ability to do these privacy threatening Web inferencing
and mapping exercises in each and every case? A risks-
costs-benefits assessment might help in such situations.)
Although these situations may not fall foul of any HIPAA
standard, nor probably concern an IRB, we are now at a
point where changing geospatial technologies must stim-
ulate debate that goes beyond the normal community par-
ticipatory ethical standards used by researchers [35].
Because of the widespread adoption of GIS-light Internet
applications, and cheap and easy-to-use mobile mapping
devices (for example, ones which can tag pictures with
coordinates), health related spatial confidentiality is now
no longer the concern of only geographic information sci-
entists, or even GIS users, but also of a far broader range
of academics and other people.
Conclusion
Although the general public's concerns about privacy in
research have sometimes been exaggerated by the scien-
tific community [52] (and by a few vocal privacy advo-
cates in the media, who do not adequately represent the
position of the wider masses), we believe there are still
many cases where these concerns are real and legitimate,
and where data subjects need to be protected (e.g., from
identity theft). A 'one-size-fits-all' privacy-preserving solu-
tion is unlikely to be successful or to be able to capture
and properly address the complex requirements, which
might also vary from country to country, of the very many
(i) user roles, with different access privileges and 'needs to
know' in relation to various input and output data types;
(ii) intra and extra-mural data sharing arrangements,
especially when data need to be moved across heterogene-
ous organisations; (iii) governing legislations and poli-
cies; (iv) possible forms of data inputs that can be released
for research and the associated conditions; (v) health
study types and goals, data analysis methods and the data
requirements in each case; (vi) possible study outputs/
results reporting and publication forms (closed or pub-
lic); (vii) situation-specific security risks; and (viii) risks-
costs-benefits assessment, among other aspects and
requirements that are involved in this area of research and
need to be considered on a case-by-case basis.
Different privacy-preserving solutions can be applied con-
currently or singly on various elements of this complex
chain, e.g., on input data prior to release to researchers
(e.g., aggregation or transformations) and/or on the
research outputs (e.g., access restriction or masking),
depending on the specific situation at hand; so a compre-
hensive, context-aware approach is needed to assist
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researchers in choosing and applying the right solution(s)
in each case.
Kamel Boulos (unpublished research notes, 2008–2009)
proposed the development of a case-based reasoning soft-
ware framework (cf. case law) that covers, and continu-
ously "learns from", the growing body of possible and
emerging health research scenarios and applications
involving precise geographical identifiers about individu-
als. The goal of such a 'one stop shop' framework would
be to streamline the provision of clear and individualised
guidance for the design and approval of new research
projects, including crisp recommendations on which spe-
cific privacy-preserving solution(s) and approach(es)
would be suitable in each case. This would spare research-
ers and IRBs the need to 'reinvent the wheel' with each
new study, saving them precious time and efforts spent
investigating the same issues every time, and preventing
avoidable errors and omissions along the way. This deci-
sion framework should ideally have an easy-to-use, wiz-
ard-based visual frontend, guiding users throughout the
whole process of describing and diagnosing their needs,
and proposing (with appropriate explanations/justifica-
tions) suitable solutions to address them.
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A brief compilation and comparison of relevant personal information and privacy 
legislation in Canada and the UK, with particular focus on location and public 
health 
 
Philip AbdelMalik - philip.abdelmalik@plymouth.ac.uk 
 
A discussion on location privacy solutions for health research would be incomplete without reflecting on 
some of the underlying reasons that necessitate their development. The very notion of privacy is itself a 
complex fabric of interwoven philosophical and psychosocial threads. Perhaps this is why the associated 
bureaucratic and legal landscape is as complex as it is – and often blamed for the issue. A large majority 
of public health professionals consider privacy to be an obstacle to public health; when asked for the 
underlying reasons, survey respondents in Canada and the UK most commonly identified bureaucracy 
and legislation [1]. 
 
There is no universal legislation to guide and govern the activities of public health professionals, 
particularly where issues of privacy are concerned. Instead, nations have their own constraining or 
enabling privacy and data protection laws, with some being such a maze of cross-referenced “legalese” 
that familiarising oneself with them – let alone gaining a thorough understanding of them – becomes a 
daunting task. What ensues is a brief compilation and comparison of relevant personal information and 
privacy legislation in Canada and the United Kingdom (UK), with particular focus on location and public 
health as seen and understood by an epidemiologist. 
 
Overview 
The Canadian privacy-legislation landscape is additionally muddled by its political system: ten provinces 
and three territories, each with its own legislation and jurisdiction over its own health system. Overarching 
is the federal government, providing guidelines, support, oversight and funding. Although the words 
“privacy” and “personal information” do not occur anywhere in Canada’s Constitution (Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms) [2], Section 7, granting the right to life, liberty and security, and Section 8, guaranteeing 
protection from unreasonable search and seizure, have been determined by the courts to capture the 
right to privacy [3,4]. These cases have expanded on the Charter sections to include privacy as related to 
protection from government or other intrusion, autonomy, and dignity. 
 
Federally, Canada has two privacy laws. The Privacy Act [5] governs roughly 160 federal public bodies, 
whereas the Personal Information and Protection of Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA) [6] governs 
private sector organisations regulated federally and provincially. Provinces with privacy legislation similar 
to PIPEDA are exempt from its provincial aspect. At the time of writing, British Columbia, Alberta and 
Québec have such legislation, and Ontario has health-specific legislation that exempts it from the 
corresponding section. 
 
All provinces and territories have legislation similar to the Privacy Act, whereas only three provinces have 
private-sector legislation similar to PIPEDA. In addition, four provinces have specific health information 
legislation: Alberta, Manitoba, Ontario and Saskatchewan.  
 
The UK has three legal jurisdictions: England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. However, it itself 
is also part of a larger community - the European Union (EU). European Union legislation is generally 
intended to "direct" that of its member states, and takes precedence in cases where there is no 
concurrence; the UK is obligated to align itself with EU law (referred to as Community law) [7] or else give 
way in a court of law to the latter [8]. Let us therefore begin with the EU. 
 
The concepts of privacy and personal information are captured in core EU legislative documents as 
fundamental rights. The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (ECHR), building on the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights [9], includes a “Right to 
respect for private and family life” in Article 8 [10]. The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union, proclaimed in 2000, builds on the ECHR [11]. Updated in 2007, the Charter includes two 
particularly relevant articles. Article 7 reiterates the ECHR’s position on the respect for private and family 
life, whereas Article 8 explicitly limits the processing of personal data to specified purposes, requiring 
either individual consent or legislated “permission”. 
Recognising the importance of data sharing and the threats and benefits of developing technologies, the 
EU introduced a number of legislative pieces to harmonise, regulate and facilitate the flow of personal 
information. In 1995, Directive 95/46/EC was adopted for the protection of personal data [12] - the core 
directive at the heart of data protection in EU member states. It does not, however, apply, to personal 
information used solely for personal reasons, household activities, public security, national defence or 
criminal law enforcement, and falls short when dealing with issues around communication. Two years 
later, the EU adopted Directive 97/66/EC for protecting privacy and confidentiality in telecommunications 
[13]. As technology and the web became increasingly ubiquitous, this directive quickly became limited in 
scope. It was therefore replaced in 2002 by Directive 2002/58/EC [14] covering electronic 
communications more broadly, and updated again in 2006 by Directive 2006/24/EC [15]. In addition, Data 
Protection Regulation (EC) 45/2001 [16] ensures the protection of personal information in EU institutions 
and bodies, such as the European Parliament, for example, and accountability to a governing body, the 
European Data Protection Supervisor. 
In the UK, the Data Protection Act was first enacted on July 12, 1984, thereby preceding the Directive on 
Data Protection adopted by the European Union (EU) by more than a decade. Upon adoption of the EU 
directive, however, the Act was amended in 1998. Though simpler than Canadian legislation in the sense 
that it applies to both public and private entities, it is none-the-less a complex document. In 2003, Lord 
Phillips of the Supreme Court of Judicature, Court of Appeal (Civil Division) in the UK referred to it as “…a 
cumbersome and inelegant piece of legislation” [17]. Other UK health-related Acts have been amended to 
reference the Data Protection Act 1998, including the Access to Health Records Act 1990, the Access to 
Medical Reports Act 1988 and the Access to Personal Files and Medical Reports (Northern Ireland). The 
UK also has a Health and Social Care Act 2008 [18], which replaced its 2001 predecessor and legislated 
the creation of a Care Quality Commission for the protection and promotion of the health, safety and 
welfare of the public. The Act makes it an offence to recklessly disclose confidential personal information 
obtained by the Commission that “relates to and identifies an individual.” (S. 76) 
 
Scotland has a Freedom of Information Act 2002, but a search on the UK Office of Public Sector 
Information website [19] yielded no specific data protection legislation for either Scotland or Northern 
Ireland. Scotland also has a Public Health Act enacted just last year, in 2008 [20], which obligates 
Scottish Ministers, health boards and local authorities to protect public health. It allows for the disclosure 
of information to facilitate its directives despite any other legal prohibition or restriction, except, 
interestingly, the Data Protection Act 1998 (S. 117(6)). Northern Ireland's Health and Social Care 
(Reform) Act 2009 [21] has a similar clause (S. 13(8)). 
 
Both Canada and the UK have a tapestry of legislative documents in place to protect the privacy of 
personal information “…as something worth protecting as an aspect of human autonomy and dignity.” [22] 
But what, exactly, constitutes personal information? 
 
Definitions 
There is no consistent definition for “personal information” in Canadian legislation. Where a 
definition is included, it ranges from “information about an identifiable individual” in Alberta’s 
Personal Information Protection Act [23] to very well-defined and explicit components in 
Manitoba’s Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act [24]. Of the 30 acts and 
regulations reviewed, four include health information in their definition of personal information, 
three include location information, 14 include both and nine include neither (Table 1). 
 
This definition of personal information as pertaining to an “identifiable individual” appears quite often in 
legislation, including in Directive 95/46/EC. However, the Directive goes one step further to clarify: “…an 
identifiable person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an 
identification number or to one or more factors specific to his physical, physiological, mental, economic, 
cultural or social identity" [12]. Health information is defined as a “special” category of personal 
information (S. III, Article 8 (1)), but there is no specific mention of location information in the Directive. 
 
In the UK, the Data Protection Act 1998 defines "personal data" vaguely as any information that, in 
isolation or in concert with other data available to the data controller, can identify a living individual. The 
Act also includes health in the definition of "sensitive personal data", but does not capture location 
information specifically. As mentioned previously, the Health and Social Care Act 2008 also identifies 
confidential personal information as that which “relates to and identifies and individual”, but does not 
specifically identify location as part of that definition. 
 
As recent as April 2009, the Supreme Court of Canada stated that “Privacy analysis is laden with value 
judgements that are made from the independent perspective of the reasonable and informed person who 
is concerned about the long-term consequences of government action for the protection of privacy” [25]. 
As described, the definition of “personal information” in most cases casts a wide net, capturing anything 
and everything that can subjectively be argued as identifying. This has obvious implications on the use of 
disaggregate geographic data in health research. Or does it? The answer depends on the applications 
and exceptions made in the legislation. 
 
Application and exceptions 
Legislation in Canada, the EU and the UK specifically limits the processing of personal information. What 
constitutes “processing”, however, is not consistently defined across legislation. The broadest definition to 
capture what this means is found in EU Directive 95/46/EC: "any operation or set of operations which is 
performed upon personal data, whether or not by automatic means, such as collection, recording, 
organisation, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, 
dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or combination, blocking, erasure or destruction". 
Generally, any such processing of personal information is prohibited in the absence of the individual’s 
informed consent, unless it is first stripped of all identifying information (thereby ceasing to be personal 
information according to the legal definition).  
 
In public health research, however, it is often impossible or impractical to pursue informed consent. 
Despite being incredibly information and data-rich, health researchers in both Canada and the UK have 
often expressed frustration over their inability to use existing data due to privacy concerns [1]. Is the 
prohibition based on the legislation? 
 
Generally, in the absence of an individual's consent, the legislation does explicitly allow for some 
exceptions, particularly in the interests of national security. However, there is a lack of clarity and 
consistency, specifically around processing for public health purposes. Article 35 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union emphasises the right to health care, and states “A high level 
of human health protection shall be ensured in the definition and implementation of all Union policies and 
activities” [11]. In almost all cases, exceptions are also made for research, as long as the individuals 
whose data is processed are not identified in the results. Generally, the individual whose information has 
been disclosed should be informed; however, provisions are also made for cases where doing so is 
impossible or unreasonable. 
The decision around whether or not the processing of the information is permitted under these exceptions 
is somewhat vague and inconsistent. In Canada, for example, the four provinces with health information 
legislation delegate the decision making authority to research ethics boards; otherwise, it is generally 
delegated to the head of the data-holding organisation. In the case of EU institutions, processing is only 
permissible after consultation with the European Data Protection Supervisor [16], whereas the UK Data 
Protection Act 1998 exception for research (S. 4(33)) is unclear as to the decision-making authority. This 
leads to issues around governance. 
Governance 
In Canada, the Office of the Privacy Commissioner (OPC) is responsible for protecting and promoting the 
privacy rights of Canadians by overseeing compliance with Canadian federal privacy legislation. Each 
province and territory also has its own privacy commissioners who oversee their respective jurisdictions. 
As previously noted, health information legislation in Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba and Ontario also 
delegates decision-making authority on these matters to research ethics boards. 
 
The EU, as previously mentioned, has established the office of the European Data Protection Supervisor 
[26] for oversight of EU institution activities. The UK’s equivalent of Canada’s Office of the Privacy 
Commissioner is the Information Commissioner's Office (ICO) [27]. The legislation does not specifically 
mention research ethics boards or committees, and is unclear as to decision-making authority – in most 
cases, it seems to lie with the data controllers.  
 
Implications and final thoughts 
The privacy of personal information is a recognised and important human right, protected through multiple 
intertwined acts and regulations in Canada, the EU and the UK. In the absence of informed consent, the 
legislation generally allows for the processing of an individual’s personal information – which is any 
information that can identify the individual, and therefore includes health and disaggregate location 
information – for research purposes, subject to approval by the appropriate authority. However, guidelines 
are lacking, and authorities tend to err on the conservative side, resulting in much expressed frustration 
by health researchers. In the absence of frameworks to inform the processing of personal information, the 
only other alternative (besides seeking informed consent from every individual) for health researchers is 
the use of de-identification techniques, such as might be applied through privacy-preserving solutions 
involving disaggregate geographic data. 
 
It has been suggested that privacy in the United States, Canada and the European Union have their 
bases in slightly different philosophical constructs: in the United States, privacy is anchored in protection 
from the government; in Canada, in principles of autonomy and control; and in the European Union, the 
focus is more on dignity and public image [28]. The argument is made that the Canadian model offers the 
appropriate “middle-ground” – after all, if individuals truly do have control over their own personal 
information, then they can choose to protect it from the government and others, and their dignity as far as 
public image is concerned is in their own hands. If we accept this definition of privacy – that is, having 
control over one’s own personal information – then one might ask whether de-identification really solves 
the issue. Perhaps what is really needed is public health specific clarification in the legislation, public and 
practitioner education, and clear and concise frameworks and guidelines. 
 
Public health practitioners around the world are increasingly recognising the importance of 
having some understanding of the legal system, and a working relationship with the legal 
profession [29]. Unfortunately, the relationship typically tends to be unidirectional. Just as privacy 
is a multifaceted and complex concept, so too is the required collaboration resulting from the 
interdependency of public health and legislation. And yet, the legal profession has not fully 
recognised the interdependence of the two fields [29]. While the privacy debate in public health 
may be fuelled in part by misperceptions of public health practitioners, it is very much coupled 
with a lack of understanding of the requirements of public health by legal practitioners. “Privacy 
laws are most burdensome and least effective when they apply broadly, without proper concern 
for the settings in which they operate, the types of information that they cover, the obligations that 
they impose and the purposes they were designed to serve” [30]. The issue can only be truly 
addressed through interdisciplinary collaboration. Until that happens, and until we recognise the 
importance and value of public health research and its implications on the health of individuals, 
we will continue to grapple with alternate de-identification solutions and sub-optimal data. 
 
  
Table 1: Inclusion of health and location information in the definitions of "personal information" in Canadian legislation 
Jurisdiction Act Reference 
In Definition 
Health Location 
Canada The Privacy Act [5] R.S.C. 1985, c. P-21   
Canada Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act [6] S.C. 2000, c. 5 P-8.6   
B.C. Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act [31] R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 165   
B.C. Personal Information Protection Act [32] S.B.C. 2003, c. 63   
B.C. Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Regulation [33] B.C. Reg 323/93   
B.C. Personal Information Protection Act Regulations [34] B.C. Reg. 473/2003   
B.C. British Columbia Cancer Agency Research Information Regulation [35] B.C. Reg. 286/91   
B.C. Privacy Act [36] R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 373   
AB Health Information Act [37] R.S.A. 2000, c. H-5   
AB Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act [38] R.S.A. 2000, c. F-25   
AB Personal Information Protection Act [23] S.A. 2003 c. P-6.5   
AB Personal Information Protection Act Regulation [39] AR 366/2003   
SK The Health Information Protection Act [40] S.S. 1999, c. H-0.021   
SK The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act [41] SS. 1990-91, c. F-22.01   
SK The Local Authority Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act [42] SS. 1990-91, c. L-27.1   
MB The Personal Health Information Act [43] C.C.S.M., c. P-33.5   
MB The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act [24] C.C.S.M., c. F-175   
ON Personal Health Information Protection Act [44] S.O. 2004, c. 3   
ON Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act [45] R.S.O. 1990, c. F-31   
ON Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act [46] R.S.O. 1990, c. M.56   
QC An Act respecting Access to documents held by public bodies and the protection of personal information [47] R.S.Q., c. A-2.1   
QC An Act respecting the Protection of personal information in the private sector [48] R.S.Q., c. P-39.1   
N.B. Protection of Personal Information Act [49] S.N.B. 1998, c. P-19.1   
N.S. Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act [50] S.N.S. 1993, c. 5, s. 1   
N.S. Health Protection Act [51] S.N.S. 2004, c. 4, s. 1   
P.E.I. Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act [52] R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. F-15.01   
NL Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act [53] S.N.L. 2002, c. A-1.1   
YK Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act [54] R.S.Y. 2002, c. 1   
N.T. Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act [55] S.N.W.T. 1994, c. 20   
NU Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act [56] S.N.W.T. 1994, c.20   
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Abstract 
 
Background: Many health data sets contain geographic information. However, geographic 
information makes it easier to re-identify the individuals in the data, especially if the geographic 
areas are small. A common way to manage re-identification risk is to aggregate small areas into 
larger ones. Aggregation does result in the loss of information and reduces the utility of the data. 
The most commonly used geocodes in health data sets have been postal/ZIP codes. Thus far, a 
simplistic removal of characters/numbers from the end of the postal/ZIP codes has been used as 
the recommended form of aggregation, and this may result in aggregated areas that are too 
large, with the commensurate loss of utility.  
Objective: Develop and test a clustering algorithm to aggregate areas. 
Design: We developed a clustering algorithm which searches for an optimal way to aggregate 
geographic areas such that they are not too small. The algorithm was compared to the common 
aggregation methods for all Forward Sortation Areas (the first three characters of the postal code) 
in the largest eight Canadian provinces. The aggregated areas were evaluated in terms of a 
penalty metric that measured deviation from the minimum area size. 
Results: The clustering algorithm always had a lower penalty than the common aggregation 
method. This was the case across all provinces and two penalty metrics. 
Conclusion: Given that geographic area aggregation is a common technique for protecting the 
privacy of data sets with geographic information, the clustering algorithm described in this paper 
will ensure that areas are not too small but at the same time will limit the amount of aggregation 
to maximize the utility of the data. 
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1 Introduction 
Location information is critical for many health data sets [1-9]. For example, a common patient 
residence location indicator is the postal/ZIP code [10-15]. However, the inclusion of such 
location information makes it easier to determine the identity of the individuals in the data sets 
[16-18]. Specifically, patients living in small geographic areas (i.e., with small populations) tend to 
be more easily re-identifiable because they are more likely to be unique on their demographics 
[19-21]. 
A common way to address this privacy risk is to stipulate a minimum population size for 
geographic areas (or a population size cutoff) [22-27]. The larger the population in the area, the 
less likely that an individual living there would be unique. For example, the US Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy Rule defines a small geographic area as one 
having a population smaller than 20,000. 
Such population size cutoff rules are implemented by either aggregating small geographic areas 
into larger ones or removing records about individuals in the small geographic areas. A commonly 
used method for aggregation consists of removing the final characters/digits from the postal/ZIP 
codes [28, 29]. Any records in areas that are still too small after aggregation are suppressed. This 
simplistic approach, however, does not consider the population size of the areas and can result in 
too much aggregation or suppression. Aggregation can reduce the ability to perform meaningful 
analysis and conceal variations that would otherwise be visible at smaller geographical scales 
[30-35]. Suppression results in the loss of data and hence reduces the statistical power of any 
analysis, and can also result in bias if the suppressed records are different in some important 
characteristics from the rest of the data. 
Furthermore, the simple aggregation method described above does not account for other 
variables in a data set that can be used for re-identification. For example, a male living in an area 
with 20,000 people is less likely to be unique. Whereas if we knew his date of birth, ethnicity, and 
years of schooling as well, then that person is much more likely to be uniquely identifiable in that 
area. In the latter situation, a stronger case can be made for aggregation than in the former 
situation. The other variables included in the data set do matter. 
In this paper we propose and empirically evaluate a clustering algorithm to find optimal 
aggregations of geographic areas. This method takes into account the population in areas being 
aggregated, and by using the models in [36] to compute the cutoff population size, also takes into 
account the other variables in the data set. 
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2 Methods 
We first describe a clustering algorithm, GeoLeader, which aggregates geographic areas in a 
more optimal manner than commonly used methods of aggregation. After that we describe a 
study on Canadian Forward Sortation Areas (FSAs - the first three characters of the postal code) 
to demonstrate that the algorithm is superior to these traditional methods. 
2.1 Definitions 
2.1.1 Quasi-identifiers 
The variables that can potentially re-identify a patient in a data set are called the quasi-identifiers 
[37]. In the current paper we exclude geographic information from the definition of quasi-
identifiers. Examples of common quasi-identifiers are [28, 38-41]: dates (such as, birth, death, 
admission, discharge, visit, and specimen collection), race, ethnicity, languages spoken, 
aboriginal status, and gender. 
2.1.2 Equivalence Classes 
All the records that have the same values on the quasi-identifiers are called an equivalence class. 
For example, all records in data set for 17 year old males admitted on 1st January 2008 are an 
equivalence class. The number of equivalence classes in a data set is denoted by MaxCombs . 
2.1.3 Definition of a Small Area 
In a recent study [36] we developed models (one for each region of Canada) using census data 
that determine when an area becomes sufficiently large that the risk of re-identification is 
negligible. The models take as input the MaxCombs  value, and estimate the acceptable 
smallest population size for that area. Any geographic area that is smaller than this estimated 
cutoff would have to be aggregated or suppressed. 
For example, if a data set contains age and gender, as well as the FSA, then the MaxCombs  is 
86 (the number of years up to the life expectancy) multiplied by 2 (gender values), to give 172. 
The 172 value would be input into the model and the model would provide an estimate of the 
minimum population size in a geographic area. For Ontario the minimal area size for a 
MaxCombs  of 172 would be 13,135 people. 
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Figure 1: An example of an FSA “K1G” and the adjacent FSAs to it. Note that one FSA can be a 
collection of multiple nested, contiguous or non-contiguous polygons. 
 
2.2 The GeoLeader Algorithm 
The algorithm is based on the Leader clustering technique. Our adaptation of the basic Leader 
algorithm had to meet two criteria: 
• Only adjacent areas should be aggregated. If non-adjacent areas are allowed to be 
aggregated then there would be no geographic relationship among the new larger areas. 
The example in Figure 1 shows an FSA and its adjacent FSAs. 
• The aggregated areas should be as close as possible geographically or clustered (i.e., 
the aggregated areas should be all close to each other to the extent possible rather than, 
say, stretched out in a thin strip over a long distance). This is illustrated in Figure 2, 
where example (a) shows a localized clustering, and example (b) shows an aggregation 
that is stretched out in a longer strip that is less localized. The aggregation showed in (a) 
would be more desirable. 
In our study the basic area was the Canadian FSA. We constructed an adjacency matrix which 
indicates, for each FSA, all other adjacent FSAs in the same province. This adjacency matrix is 
then used within the algorithm. It should be noted that the same algorithm will work with any 
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geographic unit for which an adjacency matrix can be created. We just happen to use FSAs in 
this paper. 
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 2: Aggregation options for FSA polygons adjacent to K1G: (a) “clustered”, minimizing 
distance between aggregated FSAs, and (b) “string”, where aggregation is stretched based on 
other parameters, irrespective of geography. 
 
We use the term “cluster” to denote a group of FSAs that have been merged together. 
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2.2.1 The Homogeneity Metric 
A homogeneity metric was defined to ensure that areas that were aggregated together are 
geographically close to each other. It measures the proportion of FSAs in a cluster that a 
separate FSA is adjacent to. For example (see Figure 3), consider two adjacent FSAs, K1N and 
K1G, that are merged together during aggregation into a single cluster. A third FSA, K1X, is only 
adjacent to K1G. Therefore, its homogeneity with the cluster is 0.5 since it is only adjacent to half 
the FSAs in the cluster. However, the FSA K1K is adjacent to both K1N and K1G, and therefore 
its homogeneity with the cluster is one. 
 
 
Figure 3: Considering two adjacent FSAs, K1G and K1N, this figure shows how K1K is adjacent 
to both, and therefore has a homogeneity metric of 1. K1X, however, is only adjacent to K1G and 
therefore has a homogeneity metric of 0.5. 
 
Our GeoLeader algorithm sets a minimum value of homogeneity that is required for a merge to 
occur. For example, if the minimum homogeneity is 0.75, then the K1X FSA would not be merged 
with the cluster in our example above, but the K1K FSA would be merged with the cluster. 
2.2.2 Information Loss 
FSAs are merged if the information loss from doing so is small. Information loss is defined as a 
weighted population size. Let  be the homogeneity metric value, then information loss is H
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defined as 1  multiplied by the cluster population size. This metric penalizes merges that are 
less homogeneous, and penalizes merges with clusters that are larger. 
H−
For example, the 2001 census population of the cluster K1N and K1G is 59,209. The population 
of K1X is 843. Therefore the information loss from merging K4P to this cluster would be 0.5 
multiplied by the total population of the merged areas, 60,052 = 30,026. 
This information loss metric is used within the algorithm to select between alternative merges. 
2.2.3 GeoLeader Algorithm Walk-Through 
We define the smallest homogeneity that is allowed for an FSA to be merged with another 
FSA/cluster. Let this minimum homogeneity be denoted by . The search for good mergers is 
iterative and starts with a homogeneity of 1, and then decrements it to  in subsequent 
iterations. We therefore have the most homogeneous mergers of FSAs happening first. 
L
L
We first consider the FSAs that are smaller than our area size cutoff, and we put them in a set . 
The remaining FSAs, that are equal to or larger than the cutoff, are put in another set 
A
B . 
One FSA from the set   is selected randomly to start off with and is removed and put in a new 
set 
A
Z . A second FSA is then selected randomly from . If the homogeneity with the FSA in A Z  
is one, then they are merged. If the homogeneity is zero, then that second FSA is put in Z  and 
removed from the set A . A third FSA is selected from the set A  and compared to the 
FSAs/clusters in Z  with a homogeneity equal to one, and merged with the FSA/cluster where the 
merged cluster would have the smallest information loss. Then it is removed from the set A . 
This process is repeated until all of the FSAs in the set  are exhausted, and then the 
acceptable homogeneity value is decremented from one to say 0.95. All areas in the set 
A
Z  which 
are smaller than the cutoff are put back in the set , and the remaining areas moved to the set A
B . Then the search for a good merger is started over again with the decremented minimum 
homogeneity. 
While this algorithm does not find the globally optimal aggregation of FSAs, it only needs to 
perform better than the current simplistic method in use today to provide tangible value in terms 
of improved data quality (and still protect privacy). 
A more precise definition of the GeoLeader algorithm is described below. 
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Function Description 
a b  Merge area a and area b together, 
Adjacent(a) Returns a set of all areas that are 
geographically adjacent to area a. 
Population(a) Returns the population of area a. 
isBig(a) Determines whether an area a is bigger 
than the cutoff population size or not. 
Returns True or False. It is computed as: 
Population(a) > Cutoff, where Cutoff is 
computed for a particular set of 
variables. 
H(a,b) Computes the homogeneity of the two areas 
a and b. 
InfoLoss(a,b) Computes the information loss if area a is 
merged with area b. This is computed as: 
(1 – H(a,b)) x Population(b). 
 
The full GeoLeader algorithm is then defined as follows: 
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GeoLeader Algorithm  
// The set  consists of all of the areas D
// The set A consists of all areas that are too small 
{ }( )A a a D isBig a= ∈ ∧¬  
// The L1 value is decremented to L, which is the minimal allowable homogeneity 
For  to  do 1 1L = L
Z =∅  
For every  do a A∈
If 0Z =  then 
{ }Z a=  
A A a= −  
Else 
// find all areas adjacent to a 
{ }( )Q q q Z q Adjacent a= ∈ ∧ ∈  
// q’ is the cluster that is being merged with a 
( ) ( ) 1,q q a q Q H a q L′ ′ ′ ′= ∈ ∧ ≥ ∧ 
( ) ( )( ), min ,
q Q
InfoLoss a q InfoLoss a q∈′ =  
If  then q′ = ∅
Z Z a= +  
End If 
A A a= −  
End If 
End For 
// Recompute A as the set of all small areas 
{ }( )A a a Z isBig a= ∈ ∧¬  
// The set B consists of all areas that are larger than the cutoff 
{ }( )B b b Z isBig b= ∈ ∧  
End For 
 
For every  do a A∈
{ }( )R r r B r Adjacent a= ∈ ∧ ∈  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ), , min
r R
r r a r R H a r L InfoLoss a r InfoLoss a r∈′ ′ ′ ′ ′= ∈ ∧ ≥ ∧ = ,  
End For 
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2.3 Empirical Evaluation 
We conducted an empirical evaluation to compare the GeoLeader algorithm to the commonly 
used method for aggregating geographic areas to protect privacy: the removal of characters/digits 
at the end of the postal code [28, 29]. We used the three character FSA as the area being 
aggregated. The three approaches that were compared were: (a) the GeoLeader aggregation of 
FSAs, (b) removing the last character of the FSA, and (c) removing the last two characters of the 
FSA. 
FSA adjacency matrices were created for the eight largest provinces in Canada. The FSA 
adjacency matrices was created using the geographic information systems (GIS) software 
ArcMap 9.2. First order adjacency matrices were created, by province [42]. The adjacency 
matrices were used to compute aggregations using GeoLeader. Each province was analyzed 
separately to account for variations in the mix of population density across the country. 
To evaluate the three approaches, we used two penalty metrics that: 
• penalized areas that were smaller than the estimated cutoff computed from the models, 
and  
• penalized areas that were too large. 
Therefore, any aggregated areas that diverge too much from the cutoff value would be penalized. 
This balances the need to protect privacy with the negative consequences on the utility of the 
data if the geographic areas are excessively aggregated. 
The penalties were computed relative to the three character FSA (the baseline penalty) and 
expressed as a percentage. For example, if the penalty is 50% then this means that it is 50% less 
than the penalty with the baseline three character FSA. 
The first penalty metric weights the total population in a cluster. If a cluster is smaller than the 
cutoff value then its weight is one. For clusters that are larger than the cutoff, we use a weight 
based on the homogeneity metric. Each FSA in a cluster is taken out and its homogeneity with 
the remainder of its cluster is computed. The average across all FSAs in the cluster is computed. 
One minus the average homogeneity is used as a weight, and multiplied by the population size of 
the cluster. The weighted cluster population is summed across all clusters. For example, if all 
FSAs are smaller than the cutoff then their weights are all one, and the penalty would be equal to 
the population of the province. This penalty is referred to as the Homogeneity Information Loss 
(HIL). 
The second penalty metric is derived from the commonly used discernability metric (DM) in the 
computational disclosure control literature [43-51]. This is defined as: 
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( )
( )
( )
( )
2 2
pop a cutoff pop a cutoff
pop a pop D
≥ <
+∑ ∑  where  is an FSA within the province, a ( )pop a  is 
the population of an area, and  signifies the whole province (i.e., D ( ) ( )pop a∑pop D = ). 
This metric severely penalizes areas that are too small and would therefore need to be 
suppressed. 
The MaxCombs  value was varied from 500 to 50,000 to account for different possible variables 
that may be included in a data set. 
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3 Results 
The results are shown in Figure 4. These plot the two penalty metrics for the algorithm, 
aggregation by removing the last character of the FSA, and aggregation by removing the last two 
characters of the FSA. As is clear, the GeoLeader algorithm always performs better than the 
other two commonly used approaches across all the provinces we evaluated. 
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Figure 4: Evaluation results of the GeoLeader algorithm on the two penalty metrics for eight 
Canadian provinces. The FSA1 plots show the penalty when only the first character of the FSA is 
used, and the FSA2 plots show the penalty when only the first two characters of the FSA are 
used. 
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4 Discussion 
4.1 Summary 
Because individuals living in small geographic areas tend to be easier to re-identify, the 
aggregation of smaller areas into larger ones is a common method for protecting privacy. In this 
paper we have presented a clustering algorithm for performing this aggregation. This algorithm 
builds on recent work to empirically define when an area becomes too small [36], and we have 
shown that the algorithm works better than currently used simplistic methods of aggregation. Our 
evaluation was done for all FSAs in Canada’s eight largest provinces. 
This clustering algorithm has two main advantages. First, it takes into account the other (non-
geographic) variables in a data set that can be used for re-identification. It does so through the 
MaxCombs  value that is used to estimate the area size cutoff. Secondly, it results in less 
aggregation and suppression. This means data sets will be of higher utility for subsequent 
analysis that requires geographic detail, for example, health services research and public health 
investigations. 
While our analysis used FSAs as the geographic area, the algorithm itself is not limited to FSAs 
and can be used with any definition of an area, whether it is based on political boundaries, 
service provision boundaries, or some other criterion. 
4.2 Limitations 
To apply this clustering algorithm requires an adjacency matrix to be constructed. An adjacency 
matrix shows for each area what other areas are physically adjacent to it. We have found that 
such matrices are not readily available and we therefore had to construct them for FSAs in the 
eight provinces ourselves. 
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Executive Summary 
 
Objective: A common disclosure control practice for health data sets is to identify small 
geographic areas and either suppress records from these areas or aggregate them into larger 
ones. A recent study provided a method for deciding when an area is too small based on the 
uniqueness criterion. This uniqueness criterion stipulates that an the area is no longer too small 
when the proportion of unique individuals on the relevant variables (the quasi-identifiers) 
approaches zero. However, using a uniqueness value of zero is quite a stringent threshold, and is 
only suitable when the risks from disclosure are quite high. Other uniqueness thresholds that 
have been proposed for health data are 5% and 20%. 
Design: We estimated uniqueness for urban Forward Sortation Areas (FSAs) by using the 2001 
long form Canadian census data representing 20% of the population. We then constructed two 
logistic regression models to predict when the uniqueness is greater than the 5% and 20% 
thresholds, and validated their predictive accuracy using 10-fold cross-validation. Model 
parameters included the population size of the FSA and the maximum number of possible values 
on the quasi-identifiers. 
Results: All model parameters were significant and the models had very high prediction 
accuracy, with sensitivity above 0.9, and specificity at 0.87 and 0.74 for the 5% and 20% 
threshold models respectively. The application of the models was illustrated with an analysis of 
the Ontario newborn registry. At the 5% and 20% thresholds less than 1% of the records would 
have to be suppressed, but the majority of the records would have to be suppressed at the 0% 
threshold. We have also included checklists to provide guidance for data custodians in deciding 
which one of the three uniqueness thresholds to use (0%, 5%, 20%), depending on the mitigating 
controls that the data recipients have in place, the potential invasion of privacy if the data is 
disclosed, and the motives and capacity of the data recipient to re-identify the data. 
Conclusion: The models we developed can be used to manage the re-identification risk from 
small geographic areas. Being able to choose among three possible thresholds, a data custodian 
can adjust the definition of “small geographic area” to the nature of the specific data and recipient. 
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1 Introduction 
 
The disclosure of health data for secondary purposes, such as research, public health, marketing, 
and quality improvement, are increasing [1-5]. In many instances it is impossible or impractical to 
obtain the consent of the patients ex post facto for such purposes. But if the data is de-identified 
then there is no legislative requirement to obtain consent. 
The inclusion of geographic information in health data sets is critical for many analyses [6-14]. 
However, the inclusion of geographic details in a data set also makes it much easier to re-identify 
patients [15-17]. This is exemplified by a recent Canadian federal court ruling which implied that 
the inclusion of an individual’s province of residence in a data set may re-identify individuals [18].  
Records from individuals living in small geographic areas tend to have a higher probability of 
being re-identified [19-21]. Some general heuristics for deciding when a geographic area is too 
small have been applied by national statistical agencies [22-27]. For example, the US Health 
Information Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy Rules defines a small geographic 
area as one having a population smaller than 20,000. 
Two common ways of managing the re-identification risks of small geographic areas are to: (a) 
remove records in the small geographic areas, or (b) aggregate the small geographic areas into 
larger ones. The former results in the loss of data and hence reduces the statistical power of any 
analysis, and can also result in bias if the suppressed records are different in some important 
characteristics from the rest of the data. The latter can reduce the ability to perform meaningful 
analysis and conceal variations that would otherwise be visible at smaller geographical scales 
[28-33]. 
The uniqueness of individuals is often used as a surrogate measure of re-identification risk [34]. 
An individual is unique if s/he is the only individual with a specific combination of values of their 
personal characteristics that are included in a data set. A recent study has provided a direct 
empirical link between the geographic area size heuristics used by the national statistical 
agencies to uniqueness [35]: if uniqueness within a geographic area is approximately zero then 
the geographic area is not too small. 
However, using zero uniqueness as a threshold for disclosure control is quite stringent, and 
higher thresholds have been found acceptable and applied in practice. Specifically, previous 
reports have proposed thresholds of 5% and 20% population uniqueness as acceptable for public 
release and research use respectively [36-38]. 
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In this paper we extend on this line of work by developing models to determine whether a 
Forward Sortation Area (the first three characters of the postal code) is too small based on the 
5% and 20% uniqueness thresholds.  
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2 Methods 
Our approach was to construct models to determine if the proportion of unique records in a 
particular FSA was above the 5% and the 20% thresholds. These models characterize the FSA in 
terms of its population size, and also take into account the characteristics of the variables in the 
data set that can be used for re-identification. 
2.1 Definitions 
2.1.1 Quasi-identifiers 
The variables in a data set that can be used to re-identify individuals are called the quasi-
identifiers [39]. Examples of common quasi-identifiers are [35, 40, 41]: dates (such as, birth, 
death, admission, discharge, visit, and specimen collection), race, ethnicity, languages spoken, 
aboriginal status, and gender. 
The uniqueness of records in the data set are based on the quasi-identifiers. For example, if our 
quasi-identifiers are age and gender, then say, the only 90 year old female in the FSA “N3E” 
would be a unique record on these quasi-identifiers within that geographic area. 
2.1.2 Equivalence Classes 
An equivalence class is defined as the set of records having a given set of values on the quasi-
identifiers. For example, “50 year old male” represents the equivalence class of records with the 
“50” value on the age quasi-identifier and  “Male” on the gender quasi-identifier. The number of 
records that have these two values on the quasi-identifiers is the size of the equivalence class. 
2.1.3 Focus on Forward Sortation Area (FSA) 
The postal code is the basic geographical unit that we will use in our analysis. While the postal 
code is often collected because it is readily available, and consequently, used as the 
geographical location of residence in health data sets [42-47], the full six character postal code is 
clearly too specific. Further, in combination with other variables the full postal code would make it 
easy to re-identify individuals, especially in residential urban areas [41].  
While there are many potential ways of aggregating geographic regions to construct areas for 
analysis [33], the FSA, a higher level of thepostal code geographic unit, is the unit that we 
considered. 
2.2 Data Set 
The data set we used is the 2001 long form census microdata file (collected from 20% of the 
households) made available by Statistics Canada through its Research Data Centers (RDCs). 
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The RDC data set only has geographic information at the level of the census tract. We developed 
a gridding methodology, described in Appendix A, to assign the FSAs from the census tracts. 
 
Variable Name in the  
2001 Census RDC File 
Definition # Response 
categories (*) 
SEXP Gender 2 
BRTHYR Year of birth (from 1880 to 2001). 
Age: We defined age categories based on 5 year 
ranges. 
24 
HLNABDR Language: Language spoken most often at home 
by the individual at the time of the census.  
 
4 
ETH1-6 Ethnic Origin: Refers to the six possible answers 
for the ethnic or cultural group(s) to which the 
respondent’s ancestors belong.  
26 
ASRR Aboriginal Identity: Persons identifying with at 
least one Aboriginal group. 
8 
RELIGWI Religious denomination: Specific religious 
denominations, groups or bodies as well as 
sects, cults, or other religiously defined 
communities or systems of belief.  
3 
TOTYRSR Total Years of Schooling: Total sum of the years 
(or grades) of schooling at the elementary, high 
school, university and college levels. Only 
available for individuals age 15+. 
9 
 
MARST Marital Status (Legal) 5 
TOTINC Total income: Total money income received from 
all sources during the calendar year 2000 by 
persons 15 years of age and over. We defined 
categories in $15K ranges. 
22 
DVISMIN Visible minority status 4 
DISABIL Activity difficulties/reductions: Combinations of 
one or more activity difficulties/reduction. 
4 
(*) The number of response categories excludes non-specific responses such as missing values, not available or “other”. 
Table 1: The list of quasi-identifiers that were analyzed from the census file. 
 
2.3 Quasi-identifier Models 
A quasi-identifier model consists of two or more quasi-identifiers (qid). The subset of quasi-
identifiers from the census file that we analyzed is shown in Table 1. These were selected to be 
representative of commonly used quasi-identifiers. 
To manage the scope of the analysis we consider only combinations of up to and including  5 
qids. A total of 358 models were analyzed. This results from the following approach of combining 
the qids. 
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Initially, for the 11 qids listed in the above table, there are some similarities related to ethnicity 
and therefore they were treated as a group: HLNABDR, ETH1-6, RELIGWI, and DVISMIN. 
Whenever the ethnicity variable appears in a model it was replaced by one of its similar variables. 
Each substitution represented a different model.  
Thus, this gives 8 distinct qids: gender, age, ethnicity, schooling, marital status, total income, 
aboriginal identity and activity difficulties.    
Categorizing the 8 distinct qids by their sensitivity and availability for re-identification gives the 
following two types:  
• Very sensitive and available: gender, and age  
• Possibly used for re-identification/sensitive: ethnicity, schooling, marital status, total 
income, aboriginal identity and activity difficulties 
The value for  gives the number of possible combinations of size r from a larger group of size 
n. The different models were defined by the number of qids in the model and by having at least 
one very sensitive qid included in each model.  
n
rC
For models including both age and gender, there are 42 models for the 8 distinct qids as follows: 
• 5 qids: have age and gender and 20 combinations of 3 of the 6 sensitive qids.  
• 4 qids: have age and gender and 15 combinations of 2 of the 6 sensitive qids.  
• 3 qids: have age and gender and each of the 6 sensitive qids.  
• 2 qids: have age and gender only – there is only one model. 
Then substituting each of language, religion and visible minority for ethnicity gives an additional 
48 models: 30 (3X10) models for 5 qids (ethnicity appears in 10 of the 20 models), 15 (3x5) 
models for 4 qids (ethnicity appears in 5 of the 15 models), and 3 (3x1) models for 3 qids 
(ethnicity appears in one of the 6 models).  
The subtotal for this group of models containing both age and gender is 90 (42+48).   
We repeated the above process for each one of age and gender in combination with the sensitive 
qids. That is there are 56 models containing: 
• 5 qids: have age and 15 combinations of 4 of the 6 sensitive qids. 
• 4 qids: have age and 20 combinations of 3 of the 6 sensitive qids. 
• 3 qids: have age and 15 combinations of 2 of the 6 sensitive qids.  
• 2 qids: have age and each of the 6 sensitive qids only. 
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Similarly to the previous group, by taking into account the ethnicity related variables, there are a 
sub-total of 134 models for this group.  
Lastly, age is replaced with gender for an additional 134 models. Adding up the sub-totals gives a 
total number of 358 quasi-identifier models.  
2.4 Estimating Uniqueness 
Given that the data set is a sample from the census, we will use uniqueness estimators to 
determine the proportion of unique records for each FSA by quasi-identifier model combination. 
The fraction of population uniques can be estimated by using the poisson–gamma model with the 
α and  β parameters estimated by the method of moments [34, 48]. However, this approach over-
estimates with small sampling fractions and under-estimates as the sampling fraction increases 
[49]. We will therefore adopt a different estimation approach that is based on sub-sampling [21, 
29, 50]. While this approach tends to over-estimate (positive bias) the number of unique 
population estimates for small sampling fractions, the 20% sampling fraction of households 
should alleviate concerns about bias. 
2.5 Prediction Models 
We developed one binary logistic regression model [51] to determine whether the estimated 
uniqueness for a particular FSA and quasi-identifier model was above 5%, and another to 
determine if the estimated uniqueness was above 20%. We denote the probability that the 
uniqueness on a particular FSA and quasi-identifier model is above 5% as 05π , and the 
probability that the uniqueness on a particular FSA and quasi-identifier model is above 20% as 
20π . Whether the uniqueness is above the threshold or not depends on the population size of the 
FSA and on the characteristics of the quasi-identifiers. The population size of the FSA can be 
obtained from Statistics Canada from the 2001 census. We denote this variable as . In a 
previous study it was shown that the maximum number of combinations of values on the quasi-
identifiers was a good predictor of uniqueness [35]. We denote this variable 
POP
MaxCombs . For 
example, if we have two quasi-identifiers, age and gender, and age has 86 possible values (age 
range 0-85) and gender has two, then the value of MaxCombs  is 86x2=172, which represents 
the maximum possible values for these two quasi-identifiers.  
The 5% model was therefore: ( ) ( )05logit ~ POP MaxCombs POP MaxCombsπ + + × . To 
avoid collinearity with the interaction term in the model, both independent variables were centered 
[52]. The 20% model was similarly constructed. Because both independent variables in this 
model have large values, the interaction term can create overflow problems during computation. 
We therefore scaled the independent variables by 10,000. 
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An observation for these logistic regression models was an FSA by quasi-identifier model 
combination. For example, there is one observation for the “K1J” FSA for the quasi-identifier 
model “age x gender”. In total there were 957 FSAs and 358 quasi-identifier models, giving 
342,606 observations. 
This data set was unbalanced. This means that the proportion of observations with uniqueness 
less than 20% was quite small, and similarly for the proportion of observations with uniqueness 
less than 5%. Constructing regression models with an unbalanced data set can result in poor 
model fit, inaccuracy in predicting the less prevalent class, and may even impede the 
convergence of the numeric maximum likelihood estimation algorithms. We re-balanced the data 
set using down-sampling, and adjusted the parameter estimates accordingly [53-55]. 
To validate that the models can correctly predict which FSAs are above the 5% and 20% 
threshold respectively, we used 10-fold cross-validation [56, 57]. That is, we divided the data sets 
into deciles and used one decile in turn as the test data set, and the remaining nine deciles to 
build the model. The down-sampling was performed separately on the nine deciles each time a 
model was estimated. 
If the predicted probability, 05πˆ , was greater than 0.5 then the FSA was deemed to have a 
uniqueness greater than 5%. A similar predicted probability cut-off was used for 20πˆ . The overall 
prediction accuracy was evaluated in terms of average sensitivity and specificity across the 10-
folds. 
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3 Results 
In this section we present the results of the regression models and the 10-fold cross-validation. 
Both models had a Hosmer & Lemshow goodness of fit p<0.001 [51]. The model parameters are 
shown in Table 2. All model parameters are significant, including the interaction term. The 
sensitivity and specificity values averaged across the 10-fold cross validation are shown in Table 
3, demonstrating that both of the models have good predictive power. 
 
Logistic Regression Model for 5% Threshold 
 Intercept POP  MaxCombs  POP MaxCombs×
Coefficient 775.7 -37.35 137.8 -6.5 
p-value <0.0001 <0.0017 <0.001 0.0019 
Logistic Regression Model for 20% Threshold 
 Intercept POP  MaxCombs  POP MaxCombs×
Coefficient 63.3 -6 11.8 -1 
p-value <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 
Table 2: Logistic regression model results for the 5% and 20% thresholds. 
 
 Sensitivity Specificity 
5% Model 0.996 0.87 
20% Model 0.98 0.74 
Table 3: Sensitivity and specificity results for the 10-fold cross-validation on the 5% and 20% 
models. 
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4 Discussion 
4.1 Summary 
A common disclosure control practice for health data sets is to identify small geographic areas 
and either suppress records from these areas or aggregate them into larger ones. A recent study 
provided a method for deciding when an area is too small based on the uniqueness criterion [35]. 
That is, the uniqueness criterion in that study stipulated that an the area is no longer too small 
when the proportion of unique individuals on the quasi-identifiers approaches zero. 
However, using a uniqueness value of zero is quite a stringent threshold. Thresholds of 5% and 
20% uniqueness have been proposed for the disclosure of sensitive health data. Such higher 
thresholds would be preferred if the overall risk of disclosing the data can be managed. 
In this paper we developed models to predict whether the population in a geographic area has a 
uniqueness above the 5% and 20% thresholds using data from the Canadian census. We also 
demonstrated that the prediction models are quite accurate with high sensitivity and specificity. 
The areal unit that we studied was the urban FSA. 
4.2 Using the Models 
The logistic regression models can be used to determine whether or not the FSAs in actual data 
sets are too small. The MaxCombs  value is computed based on the quasi-identifiers in the data 
set. For each FSA, its population value can be determined from the Statistics Canada population 
tables. With these two values we can estimate the probability that the proportion of uniques is 
above 5% or 20%. If the estimated probability is above 0.5, then that FSA must be suppressed or 
combined with another FSA in the data set. 
Because the independent variables in the models were centred and scaled, this also has to be 
done when using the models for actual prediction. Let the MaxCombs  value for a particular data 
set be denoted by M . We index the FSAs in a data set by j . Let the population size for a 
particular FSA in the data set be denoted by . jS
We have the centered and scaled MaxCombs  value:  
( )59861
10000
MM −′ = ..……………………………… (1)
and the centered and scaled population size value:  
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( )21120
10000
j
j
S
S
−′ = ..……………………………… (2)
Then an FSA is considered to be high risk under the 5% threshold if the following condition is 
true:  
( )779.1 137.8 37.3 6.5
1 0.5
1 j jM S M Se ′ ′ ′ ′− + − −
>
+
..……………………………… (3)
and an FSA is considered to be high risk under the 20% threshold if the following condition is 
true:  
( )63.3 11.8 6
1 0.5
1 j jM S M Se ′ ′ ′ ′− + − −
>
+
..……………………………… (4)
For the FSAs that are flagged through equations (3) or (4) the options are to then either 
aggregate the FSAs or to suppress the records in those FSAs. 
4.3 Application of Results 
We applied the models to evaluate whether the FSA sizes in the newborn registry of Ontario 
(Niday) were appropriate. This registry captures information about all births. We used a data 
extract for 2006-2007. There were 124,933 births in the registry during that period. The quasi-
identifiers that were considered were: baby’s date of birth, mother’s date of birth, baby’s gender, 
and the primary language spoken at home. 
The proportion of records in the Niday registry that would have to be suppressed under each of 
the three thresholds was computed. We computed this proportion for every combination of 1, 2, 3, 
and 4 quasi-identifiers. For the 2 and 3 quasi-identifiers we averaged that proportion across the 
quasi-identifier combinations. 
 
 0% Threshold 5% Threshold 20% Threshold 
1 quasi-identifier 0.69 0.0078 0.0039 
2 quasi-identifiers 0.85 0.0125 0.00634 
3 quasi-identifiers 0.86 0.0126 0.0064 
4 quasi-identifiers 0.86 0.0126 0.0064 
Table 4: The proportion of Niday records that would have to be suppressed for each of the 
uniqueness thresholds. 
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The results of this analysis are shown in Table 4. As can be seen there is a pronounced 
difference between using the 0% threshold and the others, with far less data having to be 
suppressed for the 5% and 20% thresholds. These results demonstrate that, where the risk 
profile is acceptably low, using a higher threshold can result in significantly more data being made 
available. 
4.4 Selection of Threshold 
An important decision when using the above models is selecting which of the three uniqueness 
threshold to use: 0%, 5%, or 20%. The most stringent uniqueness threshold of zero would be 
appropriate for data sets that are released to the public. This threshold would result in the most 
suppression and aggregation. The most permissive 20% threshold can be used when disclosing 
data to trusted recipients where the overall risks are quite low. This larger threshold would result 
in the least suppression and aggregation. 
To assist with deciding which of the thresholds is most appropriate under a broad set of 
conditions, three general criteria have been proposed in the context of secondary use [58]: 
• Mitigating controls that are in place at the data recipient’s organization. 
Mitigating controls evaluates the extent to which the data recipient has good security and 
privacy practices in place. A recent checklist can be used for evaluating the extent to 
which mitigating controls have been implemented [59]. The fewer security and privacy 
practices that the data recipient has in place, the lower the threshold that should be used. 
• The extent to which a disclosure (inadvertent or otherwise) constitutes an invasion of 
privacy for the patients. 
Figure 1 contains a checklist has been developed based on the literature [60-63]. The 
greater the risk of an invasion of privacy, the lower the threshold that should be used. 
• The extent to which the data recipient is motivated and capable of re-identifying the data. 
Figure 2 contains a checklist has been developed based on the literature [64, 65]. The 
greater the risk that the data recipient is motivated and has the capacity to re-identify the 
database, the lower the threshold that should be used. 
Admittedly, the use of these checklists remains qualitative, but they do provide a starting point for 
deciding what an appropriate threshold should be. 
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Criteria for Evaluating the Risk of Invasion of Privacy 
Sensitivity of the data 
• The personal information in the database is highly detailed 
• The information in the database is of a highly sensitive personal nature (e.g., sexual attitudes, 
practices, and orientation; use of alcohol, drugs, or other addictive substances; illegal activities; 
suicide; sexual abuse; sexual harassment; mental health; certain types of genetic information; 
HIV status) 
• The information in the database comes from a sensitive context (e.g., data about individuals 
participating in a youth employment program are less sensitive than a similar list containing 
names and addresses of Hepatitis C and HIV compensation victims) 
Appropriateness of Consent 
• The conditions that were established at the time the information was first collected from the 
patients are consistent with the intended purpose of the recipient 
• Consent for secondary uses was obtained at the time the data was originally collected 
• The information was unsolicited or given freely or voluntarily by the patients with little 
expectation of it being maintained in total confidence 
• The custodian has sought consultation from well‐defined groups or communities (e.g., minority 
groups, family groups, band leaders, Aboriginal people, people with disabilities, consumer 
associations, community representatives, patient advisory councils) regarding the disclosure 
• A strategy for informing/notifying the public about the secondary uses is in place (e.g., posters) 
• There was a commitment or promise made to the patients not to disclose the database to any 
third party or institution 
• The patients from whom the information was originally collected have previously objected to 
having their data used for this purpose 
• Obtaining consent from the individuals at this point is inappropriate or impractical (e.g., making 
contact to obtain consent may reveal the individual’s condition to others against their wishes, the 
size of the population is too large, many patients have relocated or died, there is a lack of existing 
or continuing relationship with the patients, the consent procedure itself may introduce bias, 
there is a risk of inflicting psychological, social or other harm by contacting individuals and/or 
their families in delicate circumstances. It would be difficult to contact individuals through 
advertisements and other public notices, and undue hardship that would be caused by the 
additional financial, material, human, organizational or other resources required to obtain 
consent) 
Potential Injury to Patients 
• The database is large / many people would be affected if there was an inappropriate 
disclosure/breach 
• Inappropriate disclosure of the information carries a probability of causing measurable injury 
(e.g., identity theft, fraud, etc) 
• There is a risk in terms of the possible application of foreign laws 
• Inappropriate disclosure of the data may cause harm to individuals, a defined community (e.g., 
neighbourhood, minority groups) or a family (for example, physical injury, emotional or 
psychological harm, social harm such as stigmatization, financial harm such as employment or 
insurability)  
Figure 1: A checklist that can be used to evaluate the invasion of privacy risk. 
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Criteria for Evaluating the Recipients Motives and Capacity 
to Re-identify the Data 
Motives to Re‐identify the Database 
• The recipient has directly or indirectly worked/collaborated with the data custodian in the past 
• The database has potential commercial value (e.g., the recipient or his/her family may receive 
financial benefits from using the data; a pharmaceutical company may want to contact the 
patients directly for marketing purposes or to recruitment them in a study) 
• The disclosed database has potential criminal value (e.g., the database has dates of birth and 
mother’s maiden name and can potentially be useful for financial crimes) 
• There is a likely non‐commercial motive for the recipient to try to re‐identify the disclosed 
database (e.g., a reporter or researcher making the point that the data is not safe, or to reveal 
health information about a famous person) 
• The recipient may want to harm or embarrass the data custodian 
• If the recipient does have a possible motive to attempt re‐identification, they can achieve their 
objectives through other means apart from re‐identification 
Capacity to Re‐identify the Database 
• The recipient has had a data breach in the last two years 
• The recipient has the technical expertise to attempt to re‐identify the disclosed database 
• The recipient has the financial resources to attempt to re‐identify the disclosed database 
Figure 2: A checklist that can be used to evaluate motives and capacity of the data recipient to 
re-identify data. 
 
4.5 Limitations 
The FSAs that were included in our analysis were from urban areas in Canada. As described in 
the appendix, the reason is that the census tract information from the census file that we used is 
only defined for urban areas. Therefore, FSAs from rural areas were not covered. 
The prediction models that we constructed were based on the uniqueness of the quasi-identifiers 
in FSAs. There is wide variation in FSA population size and we take that into account in our 
models. It is an empirical question whether our models are suitable for other areal units within the 
same population size range as urban FSAs. 
Although we contend that the ten quasi-identifiers we considered represent basic demographics 
that are quite common in health research, they will not cover all possible quasi-identifiers that 
may be used in practice. Thus, our results are limited to the specific variables that we have 
considered in our analysis. 
4.6 Relationship to Previous Work 
The first study to examine uniqueness in the general population was conducted in the US by 
Sweeney [66]. In that study Sweeney only considered date of birth and gender as the 
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demographic variables. Since she did not have access to census microdata, she used publicly 
released tabulations that indicate the population per zip code. Relying on the generalized Dirichlet 
drawer problem she was able to make inferences about uniqueness in the population. For 
example, if we consider date of birth and gender, there are 2 (gender) x 365 (year) x 76 (life 
expectancy) = 55,480 possible values on these two variables. If a zip code has less than 55,480 
individuals living in it then all individuals in that zip code were considered potentially at risk. 
Based on such calculations. She concluded that 87% of the US population are uniquely 
identifiable by their date of birth, gender, and zip code. However, because of the approach used 
in the analysis, this number would be expected to be an overestimate. 
A subsequent analysis by Golle [67], again using publicly available census tabulations, assumed 
that births are uniformly distributed throughout the year. His analysis concluded that only 63% of 
the US population is uniquely identifiable with such simple demographics. 
Neither of the above studies examined more than two quasi-identifiers, and did not specifically 
address the problem of determining the appropriate population size for the geographic area. 
The earlier study which predicted when a geographic area is too small, was based on the zero 
uniqueness threshold, utilized a public use census file, and made a number of assumptions about 
the relationship between uniqueness and area size [35]. As opposed to this current study, it was 
constrained by the small sampling fraction of the public use file which made it difficult to directly 
estimate the Canadian population uniqeness if it was above zero.  
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6 Appendix A: Mapping Census Geography to Postal 
Geography Using a Gridding Methodology 
6.1 Background 
The smallest geographic unit provided in the census microdata file available through Statistics 
Canada’s Research Data Centre (RDC) is the census tract (CT). CTs are only defined for census 
metropolitan areas and census agglomerations with urban core populations of at least 50,000 
individuals. They are defined by Statistics Canada as “…small, relatively stable geographic areas 
that usually have a population of 2,500 to 8,000.” [68]. The 2001 census contained a total of 
4,798 CTs distributed over 9 provinces (no CTs are defined for the Territories or the province of 
PEI; see Figure 3).  
 
 
Figure 3: Distribution of 2001 census tracts across Canada 
 
In order to compute re-identification risk by Forward Sortation Area (FSA) in our current study, we 
needed to devise a method to estimate conversion between census and postal geography. A 
gridding methodology similar in nature to the Gridded Population of the World Project (GPW) [69] 
at the Center for International Earth Science Information Network at Columbia University [70] was 
utilized, allowing assignment of geography based on areal weighting using a population grid for 
Canada. 
6.2 Methods 
Population-based weights were assigned to CT-FSA unions based on a created population grid 
for all of Canada. The grid cell size was one kilometre by one kilometre, and assigned 
populations were based on the 2001 census profile at the dissemination area level (DA). This is 
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the smallest geography at which census profile information is released by Statistics Canada [71]. 
Similar to the PCCF+, these population weights were then used to randomly assign census tracts 
to their associated FSAs. Details of the steps taken to create the population grid are described 
below. 
Twenty six (26) complete grids of dimensions 1554 by 546 Kilometres were created using a script 
in ESRI’s ArcMap 9.2 [72], as specified in Table 5. This created 848,484 one kilometre square 
cells per grid, for a total of 22,909,068 cells covering the Canadian landmass. 
Once the grids were created, the next task was to assign an estimated population to each cell. 
This was done using the Statistics Canada DA file [73]. First, all DA polygons identified as water 
were removed. A new DA shape file containing only land DAs was created. DA boundaries were 
then dissolved so that DAs with disparate polygons were captured within one record. Areas and 
perimeters were summed for each polygon to give the total DA area and perimeter. This reduced 
the number of records from 62,015 to 52,924, which matches the number of DAs as reported by 
Statistics Canada. Total population, as well as sex and age-stratified populations were extracted 
for all DAs across Canada, using four separate profile files (Western Canada and the Territories, 
Ontario, Quebec, and Atlantic Canada). Next, the 2001 DA population file was joined with the 
2001 DA boundary file, to create a 2001 Canada DA boundary file containing total and sex and 
age stratified populations. 
A “Select by attributes” function where population was not zero (0) was completed on the above 
file to create a new boundary file containing only DA polygons with reported populations. This 
further reduced the number of records to 49,153, creating a boundary file for non-water, 
populated DAs only. A “Select by location” function was completed on all 26 grids, for any cells 
that intersected the boundary file from the previous function. The resultant grids had a combined 
total cell count of 2,367,457. 
A model was created using the ArcGIS model builder, and run for each of the 26 grids, to create 
grid section intersects with the 2001 DAs, FSAs and CTs. The model also calculated proportional 
grid sub-section areas and the corresponding population, based on underlying DA population and 
an assumption of uniform population distribution within each of the geographic areas.  
A summary was done by each CT-FSA combination, to create unique CT-FSA records with the 
corresponding sum of the calculated grid-section populations. These summed populations were 
then divided by the total sum of the gridded-CT population to give the proportion of the population 
in each CT that lay within the corresponding FSA. In essence, this creates a population-based 
weight for each CT-FSA combination, allowing us to randomly assign any given record within a 
CT to its most likely (population-weighted) FSA.  
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A simplified hypothetical example of the end result is given in Table 6 and Figure 4. In this 
example, 64.07% of the population in CT16003 is found in FSA K2S, and 35.93% in FSA K2T. 
For CT 16004, 49.35% of its population is in K2R, 19.48% in K2S and 31.17% in K2T. This 
reduces the table to five rows, with a population-based weight for each unique CT-FSA 
combination. If, for example, there were then 28 records from the microdata file falling in CT 
16003, 18 (~65.86%) would be allocated to K2S, and 10 (~34.14%) to K2T. 
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Grid 
Section x y rows columns # Cells 
# Cells  
(DA-clipped) 
# Cells  
(populated DA-clipped) 
00 -2341699 310266 1554 546 848,484 147,282 95,225
01 -1795699 310266 1554 546 848,484 323,759 292,052
02 -1249699 310266 1554 546 848,484 400,335 352,048
03 -703699 310266 1554 546 848,484 421,104 252,417
04 -157699 310266 1554 546 848,484 442,583 112,863
05 388301 310266 1554 546 848,484 444,187 47,006
06 934301 310266 1554 546 848,484 588,000 220,587
07 1480301 310266 1554 546 848,484 514,762 202,006
08 2026301 310266 1554 546 848,484 222,848 139,035
09 2572301 310266 1554 546 848,484 79,825 30,635
10 -2341699 1864266 1554 546 848,484 490,304 181,644
11 -1795699 1864266 1554 546 848,484 843,129 253,796
12 -1249699 1864266 1554 546 848,484 753,391 84,386
13 -703699 1864266 1554 546 848,484 749,156 802
14 -157699 1864266 1554 546 848,484 563,822 1,239
15 388301 1864266 1554 546 848,484 192,569 1,005
16 934301 1864266 1554 546 848,484 587,718 1,420
17 1480301 1864266 1554 546 848,484 342,289 683
18 2026301 1864266 1554 546 848,484 220,305 48,694
19 2572301 1864266 1554 546 848,484 55,829 25,720
20 -2341699 3418266 1554 546 848,484 21,506 0
21 -1795699 3418266 1554 546 848,484 168,942 531
22 -1249699 3418266 1554 546 848,484 135,498 686
23 -703699 3418266 1554 546 848,484 229,560 0
24 -157699 3418266 1554 546 848,484 424,214 1,101
25 388301 3418266 1554 546 848,484 258,726 210
26 934301 3418266 1554 546 848,484 26,188 160
        
TOTAL     22,909,068 9,647,831 2,345,951
 
Table 5: Canadian grid development table. 
 
CT FSAsa FSAsa Pop Density
(per Sq. Km.) 
CT Area in FSA
(Sq. Km.)
Pop CT Pop Weight
16003 K2S-1 50  0.95 48 128 0.3750
16003 K2S-2 25 0.56 14 128 0.1094
16003 K2S-3 42 0.48 20 128 0.1563
16003 K2T-1 20 1.23 25 128 0.1953
16003 K2T-2 56 0.37 21 128 0.1641
16004 K2R-1 37 1.03 38 77 0.4935
16004 K2S-1 42 0.36 15 77 0.1948
16004 K2T-2 56 0.42 24 77 0.3117
FSAsa = FSA sub-area 
Pop = Population 
Table 6: Simplified hypothetical example of the weighted association between CTs and FSAs. 
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Figure 4: Example CT-FSA sub-area overlay to illustrate the hypothetical example. 
 
6.3 Results 
The CT population assignments based on the gridding methodology proved to be very similar to 
the 2001 Statistics Canada Census Tract population profile (Table 7). The mean difference 
between the populations was 3.45 individuals, with a standard deviation of 48.96 individuals 
(median was 0). A graphical representation of the distribution of the population differences, by 
census tracts, is given in Figure 5. 
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 2001 Statistics Canada Population 
Profile 
Census Tract 
Canada Population Grid Project
Census Tract 
Total n 4757 4757 
Mean population 4413.99 4410.54 
Standard 
Deviation 
1911.77 1911.33 
Minimum 
population 
40 0 
Median population 4290 4287 
Maximum 
population 
20635 20636 
 
Table 7: Census tract population comparison between created population grid and 2001 census 
profile. 
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Figure 5: Distribution of Census Tract Population Difference between Grid-Calculated Population 
and 2001 Census Profile. 
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Provincial analyses also showed a high concordance between the CT populations using the 
gridding methodology as compared to the 2001 Statistics Canada Census Tract population profile 
(Table 8). The greatest differences were in New Brunswick (mean difference = 6.97 individuals, 
standard deviation = 75.26 individuals) and Alberta (mean difference = 6.75 individuals, standard 
deviation = 81.67 individuals).  
 
 NL NS NB QC ON MB SK AB BC 
N 45 85 70 1246 2001 164 101 449 596 
Mean 3.71 2.6 6.97 1.55 3.68 2.93 -1.18 6.75 4.79 
Std Dev 12.01 19.37 75.26 26.19 51.38 27.14 37.86 81.67 51.38 
Median 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Table 8: Provincial differences between Profile and grid CT populations. 
 
6.4 Conclusions 
The population grid created in this study provides a means for linking census geography to postal 
geography in Canada. While creating population grids in and of itself is not a novel idea, the 
created grid in this project allows the mapping of census geography to postal geography, based 
on population weights. The procedure assumes a uniform population distribution within the 
geography being used. However, since CTs only occur in highly populated urban areas, this was 
felt to be an appropriate assumption. A similar assumption would not hold in rural or less densely 
populated areas, and this technique would therefore not be appropriate. However, it could be 
utilized, and further refined, by incorporating additional information, such as ecumene areas, 
satellite imagery for residential and inhabited areas, address data, etc.  
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Model Formulation 
Evaluating Predictors of Geographic Area Population Size
Cut-offs to Manage Re-identification Risk
KHALED EL EMAM, ANN BROWN, PHILIP ABDELMALIK
A b s t r a c t Objective: In public health and health services research, the inclusion of geographic information
in data sets is critical. Because of concerns over the re-identification of patients, data from small geographic areas
are either suppressed or the geographic areas are aggregated into larger ones. Our objective is to estimate the
population size cut-off at which a geographic area is sufficiently large so that no data suppression or further
aggregation is necessary.
Design: The 2001 Canadian census data were used to conduct a simulation to model the relationship between
geographic area population size and uniqueness for some common demographic variables. Cut-offs were computed for
geographic area population size, and prediction models were developed to estimate the appropriate cut-offs.
Measurements: Re-identification risk was measured using uniqueness. Geographic area population size cut-offs
were estimated using the maximum number of possible values in the data set and a traditional entropy measure.
Results: The model that predicted population cut-offs using the maximum number of possible values in the data
set had R2 values around 0.9, and relative error of prediction less than 0.02 across all regions of Canada. The
models were then applied to assess the appropriate geographic area size for the prescription records provided by
retail and hospital pharmacies to commercial research and analysis firms.
Conclusions: To manage re-identification risk, the prediction models can be used by public health professionals, health
researchers, and research ethics boards to decide when the geographic area population size is sufficiently large.
 J Am Med Inform Assoc. 2009;16:256–266. DOI 10.1197/jamia.M2902.
Introduction
Privacy legislation in Canada applies to identifiable infor-
mation. This means that if health information is deemed
sufficiently de-identified, then there is no legislative require-
ment to obtain consent from patients to collect it and use it.1
In addition, Research Ethics Boards (REBs) are more likely to
waive the consent requirement if the information collected
for research is deemed de-identified.2 The option to waive
consent is important as there is evidence that currently used
methods for obtaining opt-in consent can result in low
recruitment and selection bias in health research.3–10 The
ability to make precise claims about identifiability therefore
is needed to inform this consent waiver decision.
It is obvious that variables such as name and address would
have to be removed, or not collected to start off with, to
de-identify a data set. However, beyond the elimination of
such variables, the definition of identifiability is often vague
and remains an active area of research.11
The inclusion of geographic information (geocoding) in
health data sets is critical for public health investigations
and health services research.12–17 However, the inclusion of
geographic details in a data set also makes it much easier to
re-identify patients.18,19 The more specific the geographic
detail included, the easier it is to use the other variables/
information in the data to uniquely identify an individual. In
fact, recently the federal court accepted evidence that the
inclusion of the “Province” field in Health Canada’s adverse
drug events database can potentially re-identify individu-
als.20 Therefore, the province where the adverse event
occurred cannot be disclosed by Health Canada in response
to an access to information request. It has also been shown
that patient addresses can be re-identified from published
maps.21–23 Consequently, there is a risk that geographic
detail in health data sets makes Canadians identifiable.
To protect privacy one can mask geocodes,24,25 or control
geographic area population size (GAPS) to minimize the risk
of re-identification. Due to its relative simplicity, controlling
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GAPS has been adopted widely in practice. Controlling
GAPS means either that data about individuals living in
areas with small populations are suppressed, or that areas
with small populations are aggregated into larger ones.
Suppression results in the direct loss of data, and aggrega-
tion reduces the utility of a data set.26–28 This is justified
because of the demonstrated empirical relationship between
GAPS and re-identification risk29–31: re-identification risk
tends to be higher in areas with smaller populations.
Examples of GAPS cut-off use include the United States
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA) Privacy Rule. The HIPAA Privacy Rule defines 18
variables in the Safe Harbor List that need to be removed or
generalized to ensure that a data set is de-identified. One of
these 18 items stipulates that the first three numbers of the
ZIP code can be collected/disclosed if the population living
within that geographic area is greater than 20,000 people.
The US Bureau of the Census has a 100,000 GAPS cut-off for
releasing public use microdata files.32–34 That same cut-off is
used for making disclosure control decisions with public
health data sets.35,36 Only data from areas with a population
of 120,000 or more are released as microdata from the British
census.37 Similarly, Statistics Canada uses a 70,000 popula-
tion size cut-off for health regions to control the risk of
disclosure when releasing data from the Canadian Commu-
nity Health Survey (CCHS).38 It has been suggested that
different GAPS cut-offs should be applied depending on the
user, with a 25,000 cut-off for data disclosed to researchers,
and a 100,000 cut-off for data disclosed to the public.39
The dearth of evidence supporting the specific cut-offs that
are used in practice, and the “real research need to develop
empirical evidence to justify recommendations regarding
geographic specificity”19 make the continued search for
GAPS cut-offs important. Furthermore, existing GAPS cut-
offs do not account for the fact that a cut-off is inherently
dependent on the number and nature of the variables under
consideration.31,40 For example, the cut-off to apply when
one has two variables will be smaller than a cut-off to apply
when there are 15 variables. When the variables have few
response categories, the cut-off will be smaller than when
they have many response categories. Therefore, many GAPS
cut-offs in current use (summarized above), may be over-
protecting data sets or not protecting them enough depend-
ing on the specific variables in question.
The purpose of our study is to provide an empirically
grounded basis for using GAPS cut-offs. The primary contri-
butions of this work are to (a) provide models for predicting
the GAPS cut-offs that explicitly account for re-identification
risk and the variable characteristics based on two simple
metrics: the number of possible combinations of data fields and
entropy, (b) validating these models using Canadian census
data, and (c) demonstrating their applicability with two exam-
ples of pharmacy prescription data.
Methods
Definitions and Preliminaries
Quasi-identifiers
When considering re-identification risk, we are only inter-
ested in a subset of variables in a data set.41 These are called
the quasi-identifiers.42 They are variables that make individ-
uals unique in the population and are possibly publicly
known. Therefore, they do not directly identify an individ-
ual, but can be used for indirect re-identification. While
there is no universal definition of what constitutes a quasi-
identifier, there are some quasi-identifiers that have been
studied more extensively than others such as gender, date of
birth, ethnicity, income, years of education, and geocodes. In
addition, quasi-identifiers may differ across data sets. For
example, gender will not be a meaningful quasi-identifier if
all of the individuals in a data set are female. Lastly, in this
study, the quasi-identifiers that are assessed have a finite set
of possible discrete values.
Uniqueness as a Measure of Re-identification Risk
We define a unique individual as the one individual with
specific values on the quasi-identifiers in a particular geo-
graphic area. For example, if there is only one 95-year-old
male in a postal code, then that individual is unique within
that postal code. The uniqueness of individuals is often used
as a surrogate measure for re-identification risk: unique
records in a data set are more likely to be re-identified by an
intruder than non-unique records.43 We therefore use
uniqueness as our measure of re-identification risk.
Nested Geographic Areas
Geographic area aggregation implies a nesting relationship
among those areas. For example, if we decide that re-
identification risk is too high when we geocode using full
postal codes, then we can aggregate the geographic area to
Forward Sortation Areas (FSA), which are the first three
characters of the postal code. Postal codes are nested within
FSAs.
Determining the GAPS Cut-offs
Geographic areas can be measured in terms of the physical
area or population size. In this paper we refer only to the
population size of the geographic area.
Previous research has identified two characteristics of the
relationship between uniqueness and GAPS:29–31
• Uniqueness in a data set is inversely proportional to the
population size of the geographic area. This means that
the proportion of unique individuals in a large area will
be smaller than in a nested smaller area. As smaller areas
are aggregated into larger areas, the proportion of
uniques goes down (see Fig 1).
• Once GAPS reaches a certain point, uniqueness tends to
plateau. This trend applies irrespective of the quasi-
identifiers in question.
A case has been made that the 100,000 GAPS cut-off used by
the Census Bureau is justified by computing the uniqueness
plateau noted above (i.e., the point at which uniqueness no
longer changes).29 The rationale is that increasing the size of
the geographic area any further has little impact on unique-
ness, and hence little impact on re-identification risk.29–31
For example, if the uniqueness plateau is reached at 100,000
then this means the re-identification risk changes insignifi-
cantly between 100,000 and 110,000. Therefore, there is no
disclosure control benefit in increasing the size of the
geographic region or of aggregation beyond 100,000, and a
reasonable cut-off would be 100,000.
In our analysis we build on a methodology used in a previous
study at the Census Bureau29,31 and proceed as follows:
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• Define a quasi-identifier model as a specific quasi-iden-
tifier or combination of quasi-identifiers and evaluate its
uniqueness.
• Plot uniqueness against GAPS and compute the cut-off
point as the point where the derivative approaches zero
(illustrated in Fig 1).
Let the geographic areas under consideration be indexed by
1..K, and their population size denoted by Si where i:1..K.
The area indexed by i is nested within the area indexed by
i1. Consequently, we also have Si  Si1 for all i. We
denote the percentage of individuals on a particular quasi-
identifier model that are unique in an area i by U(Si).
Because of the monotonically decreasing relationship be-
tween GAPS and uniqueness, we expect the following
relationship to hold: U(Si)  U(Si1). The GAPS cut-off was
then defined as the value of Si where the approximate
derivative, the change in the percentage of uniques, is close
to zero31:
GAPS _CUTOFF SiUSiUSi1Si1 Si  0 (1)
This approach, however, may identify local plateaus where
the uniqueness remains temporarily steady, followed by a
more substantial decrease to reach the asymptotic value. To
address this we adopted a model building approach where
the uniqueness function is defined asU(Si) 0 Si

1, where
the 0 and 1 are estimated using ordinary least squares
regression. We then take the derivative of this function and
compute the cut-off as the size value where the derivative
approaches zero:
GAPS _CUTOFF Si01 Si11 0 (2)
The cut-off values were computed separately for central
Canada (which includes Ontario and Quebec), western
Canada (which includes all territories and provinces west of
Ontario), and eastern Canada (which includes all provinces
east of Quebec).
Data Source
The data set used for our study is the 2001 Canadian census
Public Use Microdata File (PUMF) made available by Statis-
tics Canada.44 The PUMF represents approximately 2.7% of
the Canadian population. The variable subset that is ana-
lyzed is shown in Table 1. These are common demographics
that are often available in health data sets. There are 10
quasi-identifiers. These variables were selected because they
can be used to link with other databases, because they
describe attributes which are visible on individuals, or
because they describe attributes which would make individ-
uals easily identifiable.41
Disclosure control was already applied to the PUMF by
Statistics Canada. The specifics that are relevant to this study
consist of: (a) suppression for some variables for the Eastern
region of Canada, and (b) the age variable was top coded at
85 years. As a result, there were three variables in the
Eastern region, as seen in Table 1, which corresponded to
variables in the West and Central regions but with a smaller
number of response categories, where these response cate-
gories were coarsened.
Quasi-identifier Models
A quasi-identifier model consists of one or more quasi-
identifiers (qids). To manage the scope, we only consider
combinations of up to five quasi-identifiers.
There are some similarities among the ethnicity related
variables, and therefore they were treated as a group:
variables ETHNICRA, HLNPA, RELIGRPA, VISMINP.
Whenever the ethnicity variable appears in a model it was
replaced by one of the above individual variables. Each
substitution represented a different model. This gives 7
distinct qids: sex, age, ethnicity, schooling, marital status,
total income, and aboriginal identity.
Categorizing the 7 distinct qids by their sensitivity and
availability to an intruder gives the following two types:
• Easily used and available for re-identification: sex and
age
• Possibly usable for re-identification/sensitive: ethnicity,
schooling, marital status, total income, and aboriginal
identity
F i g u r e 1. Illustration of how the GAPS cutoff is calculated. Uniqueness is computed as the proportion of individuals who
are unique on the values of the quasi-identifiers. For example, a uniqueness of 0.02 for a geographic area of 10,000 individuals
on age, ethnicity, and gender means that 200 individuals have unique values on the combination of these three variables. At
the limit, with an infinitely sized area, the uniqueness approaches zero. The delta value is the uniqueness at the GAPS cutoff
value.
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The value for Cr
n gives the number of possible combinations
of size r from a larger group of size n. The different models
will be defined by the number of qids in the model with both
age and gender being included in each model. That is,
models containing:
• 5 qids: have age and gender and 10 combinations of 3 of
the 5 sensitive qids.
• 4 qids: have age and gender and 10 combinations of 2 of
the 5 sensitive qids.
• 3 qids: have age and gender and each of the 5 sensitive
qids.
• 2 qids: have age and gender only—there is only one
model.
This gives 26 models for the 7 distinct qids. Substituting each
of home language, religion and visible minority for ethnicity
then gives us 18 (3  6) models for 5 qids (ethnicity appears
in 6 of the 10 models), 12 (3  4) models for 4 qids (ethnicity
appears in 4 of the 10 models), and 3 (1  3) models for 3
qids. The subtotal for this group is 59 models.
We repeated the above process by using each one of age or
gender in combination with the sensitive qids. That is,
models containing:
• 5 qids: have age and 5 combinations of 4 of the 5 sensitive
qids.
• 4 qids: have age and 10 combinations of 3 of the 5
sensitive qids.
• 3 qids: have age and 10 combinations of 2 of the 5
sensitive qids.
• 2 qids: have age and each of the 5 sensitive qids only.
This gives 30 models. Similarly to the previous group, by
taking into account the ethnicity related variables gives a
subtotal for this group of 75 models. For the last group, age
is replaced with gender for an additional 75 models.
Therefore, in total we tested 209 different quasi-identifier
models.
Varying Region Size
We performed a simulation following the nested sampling
method described by Greenberg and Voshell.30,31 We took a
simple random sample of 200,000 individuals from western
Canada, 200,000 from central Canada, and 60,000 from
eastern Canada. For each of these three regions of Canada,
we varied the size of the region by randomly removing
individuals in 5,000 decrements. For example, for central
Canada, we started with a random sample of 200,000 indi-
viduals, then a subsample of 195,000 was randomly selected,
and then another subsample with 190,000 individuals, and
so on. For each subsample we computed the proportion of
unique records on each of the 209 quasi-identifier models
described above. The cut-off was selected when the deriva-
tive was less than 0.001 using Eq (2).
This simulation approach has been shown to produce results
that are quite similar to using actual contiguous areas (e.g.,
Census Tracts).30,31 Furthermore, it has been argued that this
simulation approach ensures that the results are controlled,
replicable, and generalizable.31
When computing the cut-off using the derivative (Eq 2), the
potential cut-offs were evaluated only within the GAPS range
in our data set (i.e., 5–200 k for western and central Canada,
and 5–60 k for eastern Canada) to ensure that we did not
extrapolate beyond the original data used to build the models.
Predicting the GAPS Cut-off
We developed a prediction model to have the results of the
simulation be more practical for an end-user, such as a
privacy analyst or epidemiologist, to calculate the GAPS
cut-off for their particular study or data set. As noted earlier,
we expected that a cut-off is related to the quasi-identifiers
that are being considered. The following are two traditional
ways used to characterize the quasi-identifiers:
Entropy. A previous study formulated an entropy measure
that captures the dispersion in the quasi-identifiers.31 This was
found to be strongly related to uniqueness within a region. We
computed the standard information theoretical entropy mea-
sure from the full samples using  	k1L tkkN log
kN where tk is the number of equivalence classes of size k,
L is the size of the largest equivalence class, and N the total
number of records in the sample. An equivalence class is
defined as a possible value on the quasi-identifiers, for exam-
ple, “50 year old male” is an equivalence class. We found that
entropy computed from sub-samples were very strongly cor-
related, therefore, they produce similar results as full sample
entropy.
Table 1 y Quasi-identifiers to be Included in the Models for the Three Regions of Canada
Number Response Categories*
Variable Name in the Census File Definition Western and Central Canada Eastern Canada
SEXP sex 2 2
AGEP single years of age from 0 to 84, 85 86 86
HLNPA language: the language spoken most often at
home by the individual
14 4
ETHNICRA ethnic or cultural group to which
respondent’s ancestors belong
41 26
ABSRP aboriginal identity 4 4
TOTSCHP total years of schooling 9 9
MARST marital status (legal) 5 5
RELIGRPA religious denomination 11 3
TOTINCP total income: we defined categories of total
income in $ 15-K intervals
11 11
VISMINP visible minority 4 4
*The Number of response categories excludes nonspecific responses such as missing value, not available, or “other”.
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MaxCombs. The maximum number of possible different
values for the quasi-identifiers. For example, if we have two
quasi-identifiers, say, age and gender, and assume that age
has 86 possible values and gender has 2 values, 86 2 172
is the maximum number of different possible combinations
of values for these two quasi-identifiers. It is expected that
the greater the maximum number of combinations the more
uniques will be in a data set.31
We constructed two prediction models, each with a single
independent variable: Entropy, or MaxCombs. An exam-
ination of the data indicated an obvious logarithmic
relationship between each of these variables and the GAPS
cut-off, giving us the following two linear models: log
(GAPS_CUTOFF)  0  1log (Entropy) and log (GAPS_
CUTOFF)  0  1log (MaxCombs). For each of the two
prediction models we had 209 observations representing the
quasi-identifier models.
The GAPS cut-off value is truncated from below at 5,000
because that is the smallest subsample that was selected.
It is also truncated at the top at 200,000 for central and
western Canada, and 60,000 for eastern Canada because
that was the size of the total sample that we used. Neither
Entropy nor MaxCombs is truncated. A suitable modeling
technique for such a censored data set is Tobit regres-
sion.45–47
Let y denote the actual value of the GAPS cut-off, the point
at which the approximate derivative is close to zero, pro-
duced during our simulations. We have y  c1 and y 	 c2,
where c1 and c2 are the bottom and top truncation threshold
values respectively. Also, let there be an underlying latent
variable y∗ of which y is the realized observation, such that
yi
∗ xi  
i, where xi is a matrix with the first column equal
to 1 and the second value is the independent variable we are
using to predict the GAPS cut-off,  is a vector of parame-
ters, and 
i are independent and normally distributed errors
with zero mean and constant variance. The latent variable is
the value that we would expect to observe if there was no
censoring.
The Tobit model takes the form:
yi  yi
∗ if c1 	 yi
∗ 	 c2
yi  c1 if c1  yi
∗
yi  c2 if c2  yi
∗
Maximum likelihood estimators were computed using SAS
version 9.1 (proc LIFEREG).
To determine the goodness of fit of the models, we used the
pseudo-R2 of McKelvey and Zavoina,48 which was shown to
be valid for the Tobit model.49 A Monte Carlo simulation
compared different pseudo-R2 measures for the Tobit model
and found this one to be the best,50 with the main criterion
being equivalence to the R2 measure that would be obtained
using ordinary least squares regression if there was no
censoring in the data.
Validation of GAPS Cut-off Predictions Models
To validate the GAPS cut-off values that we used, the delta
score was computed for each of the three regions of Canada.
This score indicates how far the uniqueness at the GAPS
cut-off was from the asymptotic value. Small values of the
delta score indicate that uniqueness is close to zero, and that
any additional geographic area aggregation would have an
insignificant impact on uniqueness.
An end-user can enter either the Entropy or MaxCombs values
in the Tobit models to predict the GAPS cut-off value for their
study. To validate the accuracy of the prediction models, we
used the Tobit models to predict the GAPS cut-off using
10-fold cross-validation.51,52 That is, we divided the data sets
into deciles and used one decile in turn for validation, and the
remaining nine deciles to build the model.
The predicted cut-off used for validation was the uncondi-
tional value of the realized variable y —the full equation for
this estimate is provided in the literature.45–47 Using y in the
validation ensured that the predicted value was also cen-
sored. The quality of the prediction was evaluated by
considering the median and trimmed mean of the error
(yy ) and the relative error, defined as (yy )/y.
Applying the Prediction Models
Since an end-user does not need to worry about censoring
(which is an artifact of our simulation), the predicted value
of the latent variable would be used instead, y *. This is given
by y *  e0Entropy1 or y *  e0MaxCombs1 where 0 and 1
are the model parameter estimates.
After presenting the results in the next section, the
application of the prediction models in several real exam-
ples pertaining to the disclosure of retail and hospital
pharmacy data to commercial data aggregators is illus-
trated in the discussion.
Results
An example of the relationship between GAPS and propor-
tion uniqueness is shown in Fig 2. A similar pattern was
observed for all regions and variable combinations. As
illustrated in Fig 1, the cut-off was calculated from such a
F i g u r e 2. Example showing the actual relationship be-
tween geographic area size and proportion uniques in the
central region for the three variables: age, gender, and
ethnicity.
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graph by fitting a model and taking its derivative. The
cut-off values were then used to develop the prediction
models, as described in the previous section.
Table 2 shows the delta scores, which indicate how far unique-
ness was from the asymptotic value at the various GAPS
cut-offs that were calculated. As can be seen, there is very little
difference in uniqueness across the regions, suggesting that
there is little disclosure control benefit in increasing area sizes
beyond the cut-offs that were calculated.
In Tables 3 and 4 we show the model parameters and diag-
nostics to predict the GAPS cut-off as a function of Entropy and
MaxCombs, respectively. As is clear, all of the parameters are
statistically significant, and the goodness of fit is high.
For both the Entropy and MaxCombs prediction models, the
prediction errors are quite small. While theMaxCombsmodels
have a slightly higher goodness-of-fit than the entropy models,
the accuracy of the prediction for both are very similar.
Discussion
The results suggest that the three regional models we have
constructed for predicting the GAPS cut-off from both the
Entropy and MaxCombs values can be quite accurate. They
also make clear that having a single GAPS cut-off would be
a serious oversimplification and that the appropriate cut-off
is a function of the quasi-identifiers that will be collected and
the region of Canada.
Geographic areas that are larger than the GAPS cut-off
represent low re-identification risk since they are close to the
asymptotic risk value of zero, and there is also no disclosure
control benefit in aggregating areas beyond the cut-off.
The prediction accuracy results were similar for MaxCombs
and Entropy. One would expect Entropy to perform better
given that it represents more information about the data
distribution. However, there may be a ceiling effect in that
the accuracy for either variable is sufficiently high that it is
difficult for Entropy to outperform MaxCombs.
In practice, the MaxCombs value is easier to compute than
the Entropy value. It is also possible to compute MaxCombs
at the outset of a study during the design phase before any
data are collected. We therefore recommend using the
MaxCombs results in practice since in terms of accuracy they
are very comparable to the Entropy results.
To apply these results an analyst first needs to compute the
maximum number of combinations for the quasi-identifiers
in the data set. Once this MaxCombs value is determined,
the prediction models in Table 5 can be used to compute the
GAPS cut-off. If the cut-off is deemed too large then the
analyst can look at ways to reduce the value of MaxCombs
by collapsing or coarsening the response categories. This
process can be repeated until the cut-off is sensible for the
particular study.
Applying the Results
The following disclosure control example is about the re-
identification of patients from their prescription records—it
illustrates the application of our results. Many retail and
hospital pharmacies across Canada provide prescription
data to commercial data aggregators (we will refer to these
data as “prescription records”). Prescription records are
used to produce reports on physician prescription patterns
Table 2 y Table Showing the Delta Scores for the
Three Regions. The Delta Score Represents the
Proportion of Uniques at the Computed
Geographical Area Population Size (GAPS) Cutoff
Value. For Example, 0.0036 of the Individuals in
Western Canada Were Unique at the GAPS Cutoff
(median value)
West Central East
Trimmed mean 0.007 0.0068 0.0061
Median 0.0036 0.0033 0.0037
Table 3 y Tobit Model Results for the Three Canadian Regional Models Using Entropy and Validation Accuracy
Expressed in Terms of the Prediction Error and Relative Prediction Error
Entropy Prediction Model (Western)
Pseudo-R2 0.89
Intercept 6.3; p  0.0001
Log (entropy) parameter est. 2.8; p  0.0001
Prediction error (10-fold) Relative prediction error (10-fold)
Trimmed mean 4,433 Trimmed mean 0.012
Median 1,500 Median 0.02
Entropy Prediction Model (Central)
Pseudo-R2 0.8
Intercept 6.5; p  0.0001
Log (entropy) parameter est. 2.6; p  0.0001
Prediction error (10-fold) Relative prediction error (10-fold)
Trimmed mean 1,218 Trimmed mean 0.015
Median 7,405 Median 0.019
Entropy Prediction Model (Eastern)
Pseudo-R2 0.9
Intercept 7.0; p  0.0001
Log (entropy) parameter est. 1.8; p  0.0001
Prediction error (10-fold) Relative prediction error (10-fold)
Trimmed mean 1,284 Trimmed mean 0.0024
Median 524 Median 0.019
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and drug use53 These reports are then sold primarily to the
pharmaceutical industry and government agencies.
In practice, the prescription records provided to commercial
data aggregators do not contain directly identifying infor-
mation about the patients (e.g., patient names and telephone
numbers). However, it has been argued that the patient
information that is disclosed in such records can still re-identify
patients,54,55 and that this possible re-identification jeopardizes
the confidentiality of Canadians’ health information.54
The relevant quasi-identifiers in the prescription record are
summarized in Table 6. We relied on five sources to con-
struct this table: (1) the Canadian Pharmacists Association
(CPhA) Pharmacy Claim Standard which defines all fields in
the pharmacy electronic record used for claims adjudica-
tion,56 (2) a report provided to us on the variables collected
by the data management group at IMS Health Canada Inc,
one of the largest commercial data aggregators in Canada,57
(3) the investigation report by the Office of the Information
and Privacy Commissioner of Alberta (OIPCA) which listed
the 37 fields that are collected by commercial data aggrega-
tors,58 (4) the results of a survey of provincial pharmacy
regulatory authorities,54 and (5) a specification of the data
collected by Brogan Inc from Canadian hospital pharmacies
(Brogan is another large commercial data aggregator in
Canada).59
Key variables that are disclosed pertaining directly to pa-
tients are gender and year of birth.
Brogan also collects the patient FSA, but IMS Health does
not do so directly. However, it is often possible to infer new
information about individuals from variables that already
exist in a record:11 it may be possible to infer the patient
(residence) postal code from the postal code of their phar-
macy or the prescriber if one assumes that there is some
regularity in the distances that patients travel to see their
general practitioner, specialist, or pharmacist. A simulation
concluded that a patient would have to live at most within
a 100-m radius from the pharmacy or prescriber to be able to
accurately predict the full postal code in urban areas.11 For
rural areas, the distance varies from 1 km in Nova Scotia, 5
km in Ontario, to 10 km in Alberta.11 We conducted a similar
simulation to determine the accuracy of inferring the FSA
and concluded that this can be accurately predicted if the
patient lives within 10 km of the pharmacist/prescriber for
rural areas, and within 1 km for urban areas in Nova Scotia
and Alberta, and 0.5 km in Ontario.
In our analysis, we therefore made the assumption that
the FSA was being collected or that it was reasonable to
accurately infer the FSA for some of the patients if it is not
collected.
Example 1
In this example, the prediction models were applied to assess
patient re-identification risk for pharmacy prescription records
in ten Canadian provinces, for the two quasi-identifiers of age
and gender. The MaxCombs value is 172; the number of all
possible values of age (86)  gender categories (2). For each of
the three regions of Canada the GAPS cut-off was computed
using the values in Table 5. The percentage of FSAs whose
population size is above the predicted cut-off for each province
along with the percentage of the population that resides in
these FSAs was then calculated.
The results are summarized in Table 7, and compared to the
three other cut-offs that were being used: the 20,000 cut-off
used in HIPAA (in practice the HIPAA Privacy Rule is
sometimes used in Canada60), the Statistics Canada 70,000
Table 4 y Tobit Model Results Using MaxCombs for the Three Canadian Regions and Validation Accuracy
Expressed in Terms of the Prediction Error and Relative Prediction Error
MaxCombs Prediction Model (Western)
Pseudo-R2 0.9
Intercept 7.4; p  0.0001
Log (MaxCombs) parameter est. 0.4; p  0.0001
Prediction error (10-fold) Relative prediction error (10-fold)
Trimmed mean 2,175 Trimmed mean 0.012
Median 1,325 Median 0.016
MaxCombs Prediction Model (Central)
Pseudo-R2 0.9
Intercept 7.3; p  0.0001
Log (MaxCombs) parameter est. 0.4; p  0.0001
Prediction error (10-fold) Relative prediction error (10-fold)
Trimmed mean 2,472 Trimmed mean 0.0002
Median 1,156 Median 0.013
MaxCombs Prediction Model (Eastern)
Pseudo-R2 0.9
Intercept 7.6; p  0.0001
Log (MaxCombs) parameter est. 0.3; p  0.0001
Prediction error (10-fold) Relative prediction error (10-fold)
Trimmed mean 920 Trimmed mean 0.007
Median 445 Median 0.015
Table 5 y Prediction Models to Use for Determining
the Smallest Region Size Using MaxCombs
Region of Canada GAPS Cut-off
Western 1588MaxCombs0.42
Central 1436MaxCombs0.43
Eastern 1978MaxCombs0.304
GAPS  geographical area population size.
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cut-off for the CCHS, and the Census Bureau 100,000 cut-off.
These data show that, except for New Brunswick, the vast
majority of the provincial populations live in FSAs that are
larger than the GAPS cut-off and therefore there is no
disclosure control benefit in aggregating the geography any
further.
For commercial data aggregators, there are three possible options:
1. Suppress the FSAs that are smaller than the cut-off. For
example, in Ontario data from 31% (100–69%) of FSAs
would need to be suppressed. These 31% of FSAs repre-
sent 9% of the Ontario population.
Table 6 y Fields That can be Used to Re-identify Patients in the Prescription Record According to Our Five
Sources. For Hospital Pharmacies Other Data, Such as Dates for Admission and Discharge, are Collected.
However, Here We Focus on the Variables That are Common Between Retail and Hospital Pharmacies
Variable
CPhA Standard
IMS57
Field in
OIPCA
Report?58
Disclosed
According to
Survey?54 Brogan59 Additional Explanations
Defined in
CPhA
Std?56
CPhA
Mandatory?56
Patient gender Y O R Y Y** Y All sources indicate that patient gender is
collected.
Patient year of
birth
Y O R Y Y** Y The survey suggests that some provinces
collected the full date of birth.54 But both
the OIPCA report58 as well as the IMS
Health Reports57 indicate that only the year
of birth is collected.
Patient postal
code
Y O — — n*** Y† The survey indicated that only PEI allowed
the collection of postal codes.54 When we
contacted the pharmacy registrar in PEI it
was made clear that if geographic
information was disclosed by pharmacies,
only the FSA was being disclosed rather
than the full postal code. The IMS health
report indicated that neither the full postal
code nor FSA are collected from any
province.57 The Brogan document indicated
that the FSA was being collected.59
Pharmacy postal
code
Y M Y Y — Y Brogan’s data are from hospital pharmacies,
therefore the pharmacist is known.
Prescriber postal
code
Y O Y* Y Y¶ Y Prescriber group is in the record layout for the
Brogan data.
MMandatory field in the CPhA claims standard; O optional field. These fields will not necessarily be available for every pharmacy submitting
data; CPhA  Canadian Pharmacists Association; SD  standard deviation; OIPCA  Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner of
Alberta; R The field is required by IMS health Canada from all pharmacies submitting data, but if it is missing that would not invalidate the record.
The field is not defined or collected at all.
*whether this field is collected depends on the arrangement with a particular pharmacy and on the province (not collected in BC, MN, QC).
**except MN, QC, NS.
***except PEI.
¶except BC, SK, MN, Nfld.
†Brogan collects the patient FSA as part of its record layout.
Table 7 y The Percentage of FSAs and the Provincial Populations That Would be Above the GAPS Cut-off for
an Age  Gender Quasi-identifier Combination for All Ten Canadian Provinces. These Counts are Based on
the 2001 Census FSA Population Numbers Provided by Statistics Canada
Province
Our GAPS Models 20,000 Cut-off 70,000 Cut-off 100,000 Cut-off
FSA Pop FSA Pop FSA Pop FSA Pop
Alberta 55% 84% 38% 71% 1.4% 5% 0.00 0
British Columbia 68% 87% 46% 70% 1.1% 4.% 0.00 0
Manitoba 59% 88% 39% 68% 0 0 0.00 0
New Brunswick 20% 51% 4.5% 19% 0 0 0.00 0
New found land 55% 83% 30% 62% 0 0 0.00 0
Nova Scotia 47% 82% 16% 43% 0 0 0.00 0
Ontario 69% 91% 49% 76% 1.4% 5% 0.20% 1%
PEI 57% 90% 43% 79% 0 0 0.00 0
Quebec 59% 84% 36% 63% 1% 5% 0.25% 0
Saskatchewan 60% 93% 49% 84% 2% 7% 0.00 2%
FSA  forward station area; GAPS  geographical area population size; PEI  Prince Edward Island.
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2. Given that sex and gender are collected, determine what
level of geographic aggregation would be suitable to
avoid suppression of any data.
3. The analyst coarsens or collapses the response categories
of the quasi-identifiers given that the level of geography
is fixed at the FSA.
Suppression of data from small FSAs means that pharma-
cists would not be permitted to provide that data to the
commercial data aggregators. Nevertheless, there would
be far less FSA suppression using our models compared
to the other cut-offs in current use: our models take into
account the characteristics of the variables and calibrate
the cut-off. For some provinces, no data would be released
at all if some of the other GAPS cut-offs are applied.
For the second option described above, one can aggregate
FSAs to the postal region, the first character of the postal
code. We found that all postal regions in the ten provinces
are above the GAPS cut-off. Therefore, inclusion of the sex
and gender variables in the prescription record is possible
as long as the geographic detail is at the postal region
level, since this level of geography is always higher than
the cut-off. The advantage of this option is that no data
needs to be suppressed at all; however the disadvantage is
that the aggregated geographic unit is quite large.
For the third option described above, it is assumed that
the FSA geographic detail needs to be retained—the
question then is which one of sex and gender is to be
coarsened and the interval for grouping the coarsened age
categories. For example, instead of disclosing the age in
years, age can be disclosed as part of a 2-year interval, a
5-year interval, or a 10-year interval. The results for such
coarsened categories are shown in Table 8. As expected
the percentage of FSAs that can be disclosed increases as
the amount of coarsening increases. However, for smaller
provinces, such as New Brunswick, the proportion of the
population in large FSAs remains low even with 10-years
age intervals. Table 8 also shows the effect of coarsening
the categories for age in terms of the percentage of the
population. With 5-years age intervals, 98% of the Ontario
population would be living in regions that are larger than
the cut-off.
Example 2
In this example we consider a specific data set from a
hospital pharmacy. Records for all prescriptions dispensed
from the Children’s Hospital of Eastern Ontario pharmacy
during the period beginning January 2007 to the end of June
2008 were obtained following institutional ethics approval.
In total there were 94,100 records. These represent 10,259
patient visits and 6,902 unique patients.
The MaxCombs value for these data are 54 since the patient
ages in years range from 0 to 26. Also, almost all of the
patients of the hospital come from Ontario and Quebec.
Therefore, we used the Central Canada model from Table 5.
The results were that 95% of the patients in the prescription
record database reside in FSAs that are larger than the
cut-off. However, for pediatric hospital patients it is impor-
tant to know the age in weeks for patients younger than 1
year. Here, the MaxCombs value is 156, and the result is that
89% of the patients live in FSAs that are larger than the
Central Canada cut-off.
Summary
These examples show that using the MaxCombs predic-
tion models given in Table 5 provide a straightforward
technique to determine the GAPS cut-offs for datasets so
the re-identification risk is managed while allowing for an
increased amount of data to be available to the health
researcher.
Relationship to Other Work
There have been previous descriptive studies of uniqueness
in the United States population on basic demographic vari-
ables, such as age and gender.61,62 However, these studies
did not explicitly consider the impact of nested geographic
areas and their population size on uniqueness.
We used uniqueness as the measure for re-identification
risk. Another common criterion for evaluating re-identifica-
tion risk is k-anonymity.63,64 This criterion considers that
non-unique records are also risky. However, even under
k-anonymity, unique records are still those with the highest
probability of re-identification. Therefore, managing the risk
of re-identification from uniques remains an important
objective in disclosure control.
Table 8 y The Percentage of FSAs and the Provincial Populations That Would be Above the GAPS Cut-off for
an Age  Gender Quasi-identifier Combination for All Ten Canadian Provinces When the Age Variable is
Coarsened to Different Sized Intervals
Province
Original Variables
2-yrs Age
Intervals
5-yrs Age
Intervals
10-yrs Age
Intervals
FSA Pop FSA Pop FSA Pop FSA Pop
Alberta 55% 84% 68% 92% 79% 96% 84% 98%
British Columbia 68% 87% 78% 93% 90% 99% 93% 99%
Manitoba 59% 88% 66% 92% 72% 95% 78% 98%
New Brunswick 20% 51% 26% 59% 37% 70% 45% 75%
Newfoundland 55% 83% 70% 91% 79% 95% 88% 98%
Nova Scotia 47% 82% 54% 86% 66% 93% 72% 95%
Ontario 69% 91% 78% 96% 84% 98% 87% 99%
PEI 57% 90% 71% 97% 71% 97% 71% 97%
Quebec 59% 84% 70% 91% 82% 96% 88% 99%
Saskatchewan 60% 93% 69% 97% 69% 97% 71% 98%
FSA  forward station area; GAPS  geographical area population size; PEI  Prince Edward Island.
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Earlier work at the United States Census Bureau evaluated
nested geographic areas, and provided the basic methodol-
ogy for our study.29,31 This work did not document a general
model that can be applied by individuals outside the bureau
and that takes into account the characteristics of the quasi-
identifiers, which is what we did in this study.
Limitations
The prediction models we present here should be consid-
ered as one element in a toolbox of heuristics that can be
used for disclosure control. Some other heuristics have been
described in previous work.65,66
Although we contend that the ten quasi-identifiers we
considered represent basic demographics that are quite
common in health research, they will not cover all possible
quasi-identifiers that may be used in practice. Thus, our
results are limited to the specific variables that we have
considered in our analysis.
Conclusions
Data custodians often use general population size cut-offs to
determine the level of geographic information to disclose in
a data set. For example, the HIPAA Privacy Rule’s Safe
Harbor list allows the release of the first three digits of the
ZIP code only if that area has 20,000 or more individuals
living in it. National statistical agencies in the United States,
UK, and Canada also use such cut-offs as part of their
disclosure control practices. The primary rationale for such
cut-offs is that there is no disclosure control benefit for
aggregating geographic areas beyond that size.
In this paper we performed an empirical evaluation of such
cut-offs using Canadian census data. Our results indicate
that the appropriate cut-off depends on characteristics of the
variables included in the data set; therefore there is not a
single cut-off. We developed and validated models to pre-
dict such population size cut-offs for Canada. The model
which predicted population cut-offs using the maximum
number of possible values in the data set had R2 values
approaching 0.9, and relative error of prediction less than
0.02 across all regions of Canada. Our prediction models
were then applied in a risk assessment of the prescription
records that are provided by Canadian pharmacies to com-
mercial data aggregators. This assessment indicated that for
most of the Canadian population, that there is no disclosure
control benefit to aggregating geography beyond the FSA
when releasing patient age and gender.
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Abstract
Background: The "place-consciousness" of public health professionals is on the rise as spatial
analyses and Geographic Information Systems (GIS) are rapidly becoming key components of their
toolbox. However, "place" is most useful at its most precise, granular scale – which increases
identification risks, thereby clashing with privacy issues. This paper describes the views and
requirements of public health professionals in Canada and the UK on privacy issues and spatial data,
as collected through a web-based survey.
Methods: Perceptions on the impact of privacy were collected through a web-based survey
administered between November 2006 and January 2007. The survey targeted government, non-
government and academic GIS labs and research groups involved in public health, as well as public
health units (Canada), ministries, and observatories (UK). Potential participants were invited to
participate through personally addressed, standardised emails.
Results: Of 112 invitees in Canada and 75 in the UK, 66 and 28 participated in the survey,
respectively. The completion proportion for Canada was 91%, and 86% for the UK. No response
differences were observed between the two countries. Ninety three percent of participants
indicated a requirement for personally identifiable data (PID) in their public health activities,
including geographic information. Privacy was identified as an obstacle to public health practice by
71% of respondents. The overall self-rated median score for knowledge of privacy legislation and
policies was 7 out of 10. Those who rated their knowledge of privacy as high (at the median or
above) also rated it significantly more severe as an obstacle to research (P < 0.001). The most
critical cause cited by participants in both countries was bureaucracy.
Conclusion: The clash between PID requirements – including granular geography – and limitations
imposed by privacy and its associated bureaucracy require immediate attention and solutions,
particularly given the increasing utilisation of GIS in public health. Solutions include harmonization
of privacy legislation with public health requirements, bureaucratic simplification, increased
multidisciplinary discourse, education, and development of toolsets, algorithms and guidelines for
using and reporting on disaggregate data.
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Background
Although "place" has been coined one of the three pillars
of epidemiological data, only relatively recently has it gar-
nered significant attention in the public health field, as
Geographic Information Systems (GIS) have increasingly
become more affordable, accessible, and intuitive.
Indeed, the public health community's "place-conscious-
ness" is on the rise as spatial analyses and GIS, now
defined as part of the medical and health literature [1-3],
are rapidly becoming key components of the public
health professional's toolbox [4].
Privacy, an evolving "principle as old as the common law"
[5], has been cited as an issue in a variety of public health
events, reports, and media releases [6-11]. So much so, in
fact, that one sometimes cannot help but wonder if pri-
vacy is, indeed, the enemy of public health [12], and
whether they could ever peacefully co-exist [13]. A distinc-
tion should here be made between the related concepts of
privacy, confidentiality, and security within the context of
the current discussion. Privacy is attributable to the indi-
vidual about whom identifiable information pertains,
and refers to that individual's right to control such infor-
mation, thereby freeing the individual from un-invited
intrusion and identification. Confidentiality obligates oth-
ers who have been entrusted with such information to
respect the individual's privacy, and is therefore attributa-
ble to third parties; a breach of confidentiality violates the
privacy of the individual because the individual has had
no control over the release of the data. Finally, security
refers to tools and methods used to safeguard confidenti-
ality and privacy [14,15]. This research deals specifically
with privacy issues as regulated and defined by legislation
and ethical guidelines surrounding consent. From within
this context, an individual's privacy is not deemed to have
been violated if data shared in the absence of consent can-
not be used to identify the individual. Exception clauses
generally exist in legislation, allowing authorities to
release personally identifiable data under various circum-
stances – such as where it is deemed to be in the best inter-
est of society or where it is impractical to obtain consent.
Examples include Section 60 of the UK's Health and Social
Care Act 2001 [16], and Sections 8 and 7 of Canada's Pri-
vacy Act [17] and Personal Information Protection and
Electronic Documents Act [18], respectively. While an
analysis of privacy legislation as it pertains to health data
and the concept of "place" is beyond the scope of this
paper, suffice it to say that such clauses are often ambigu-
ous and subjective, particularly when combined with
vague definitions of "sensitive personal information" and
the scale at which geographic data becomes "identifiable".
The concept of place, for example, is not explicitly speci-
fied as "sensitive personal data" in the UK's Data Protection
Act 1988 [19], nor in the generic EU Data Protection Direc-
tive of 1995 [20] (though it is explicitly mentioned in var-
ious telecommunications directives), but postcodes are
specifically mentioned in a 2005 NHS data protection and
medical research POSTnote [21]. In Canada's Privacy Act
[17], "address" is specifically listed as "personal informa-
tion", while in the Personal Information Protection and Elec-
tronic Documents Act [18], it is not (though implied). Such
ambiguities deter the sharing of data, causing organisa-
tions and authorities to err on the side of caution and not
release identifying information [22], including spatial
data.
It is no surprise, therefore, that the increasing popularity
of "place" in public health has further exacerbated the
public health research-privacy debate. Traditional health-
data anonymisation techniques, such as pseudonymisa-
tion and aggregation, cannot be applied to spatial data
without significantly altering or destroying the spatial
relationships under investigation [23-26], and hence the
very reason for which they are to be used in the first place.
The problem with "place" is that it is most useful at its
most precise, granular scale [15,23]. Yet with increasing
spatial precision and accuracy comes a corresponding
increase in the risk of identification, and therefore a
breach of privacy [15]. This becomes particularly trouble-
some when the spatial data is linked to health, social or
demographic data. The development of methods by
which to mitigate these risks continues to be an active area
of research, but thus far, proposed solutions have limita-
tions, risks and tradeoffs, and lack guidelines on their
appropriate use. Consequently, the acquisition of geo-
graphic data tends to be either limited, or at a sub-optimal
or unusable scale. Not only do privacy issues impact data
acquisition and use for analysis, but also visualisation and
dissemination of the results. Researchers have been able
to "reverse engineer" maps, for example, to successfully
re-identify individuals [27-29].
While the debate between the fields of privacy and public
health has raged on for decades [5] despite their interde-
pendence on one another [14], tension continues to rise
in concert with the rampant growth of information tech-
nology and e-Health. From a health research perspective,
both Canada and the UK place strong emphasis on evi-
dence-based public health policies and services [6], yet in
both countries, this seems to be hampered by privacy
issues. While some argue that this debate is the product of
a lack of understanding of the legislation and regulations
by the public health community [14,30,31], there is little
in the way of formal collection and synthesis of the corre-
sponding views and perspectives of those directly
involved in public health activities. This paper describes
the views and requirements of public health professionals
in Canada and the UK on privacy issues and spatial data,
as collected through a web-based survey. Given that Can-
ada's health care and public health systems were both
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largely modeled after those of the UK [6,32,33], that each
continues to be studied by the other for improvements
and lessons learned [6,34], and that privacy issues for
public health have been cited in both, it is expected that
survey responses in the two countries will also be similar.
Methods
Development & Content
The survey was first developed on paper in the summer of
2006, and piloted with select public health individuals in
Canada and the UK. It was then submitted for privacy
assessment by the Access to Information and Privacy
Branch of Health Canada, and for ethics review and
approval from the Health Canada Research Ethics Board
and the Southwest Multicentre Research Ethics Commit-
tee in the UK. Throughout the process it was clear that the
survey would be developed as a closed web-based survey,
running between November 2006 and January 2007. The
final paper versions of the survey are provided (see Addi-
tional files 1, 2, 3) and can also be found on the research
website [35].
The paper survey was then converted to a web-version by
the ALPHA Project [36] team at the Public Health Agency
of Canada (PHAC), and piloted by the author and several
colleagues within the PHAC. The survey launch was
delayed by two weeks, with only some of the concerns
identified during the pilot being implemented due to lim-
itations of the ALPHA architecture. Issues and limitations
with the design of the web-based survey are addressed in
a later section.
Three versions of the survey were developed and
launched: Canada-English, Canada-French and UK-Eng-
lish. A summary of the survey's structure and contents is
given in Table 1.
Target
The survey targeted government, non-government and
academic GIS labs and research groups involved in public
health, as well as public health units (Canada), ministries,
and observatories (UK). Potential participants were iden-
tified through web searches of public health sites, mailing
databases, personal contact, referrals/word of mouth, and
postings on the research website [35], a PHAC Public
Health Portal website [37], and the NHS Public Health
Informatics Community website [38].
Participation
Potential participants were invited to participate through
a standardised but personally addressed email outlining
the reason for the invite, the mechanisms by which their
contact information was retrieved, a brief summary of the
research and survey, a description of the data handling
methods, an estimate of the time it would take to com-
plete the survey (approximately 20 minutes), a unique
user ID and password, the URL to the survey site, the URL
to the research website, and the principle investigator's
contact information.
The survey website had no other content. In order to par-
ticipate, invitees were required to (1) successfully log in,
and (2) consent to participation. Only the most recent
responses for any given user ID were collected, ensuring
only one survey was completed per participant. The con-
sent screen outlined the voluntary and anonymous nature
of the survey, indicated the approximate time it would
take to complete the survey, the risks and benefits to the
Table 1: Sections of the survey
Section Title Description
I A little about you... Participant scope, roles, use of GIS, etc
II Current access to data Asks participants with current access to PID to score 15 kinds of PID* on various 
dimensions, such as ease and frequency of access, usefulness and importance, etc.
III No current access to data Asks participants without current access to PID to score same as above
IV Privacy issues Collects participant opinions on the overall impact of restricted access to PID on 
public health practice (research, surveillance, health service delivery, etc)
V Current data holdings and provision to others... Collects information on the sharing of PID within and between participant 
organisations
VI Solutions and research Presents two distinct solutions to overcome barriers posed by privacy to public health 
research, and gather participant views on usefulness, usability and preference for each
VII Qualitative component Allows participants to provide views and opinions on knowledge of privacy and 
confidentiality issues/legislation, impact of privacy, proposed research and solutions, 
and additional thoughts or comments
VIII Further participation and contact Allows participants to provide contact information if they choose, for follow-up, 
updates, or piloting of potential solution(s)
* For all participants: first name; last name; initials; sex; date of birth; date of death; registered GP or family physician; street address; postal code; 
community name; city/town/village; region/geographic area; latitude/longitude.
For Canadian participants: provincial health insurance plan number; hospital ID.
For UK participants: old NHS number; new NHS number
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participants, the intellectual property and ownership of
all data collected, and the protection of any personal data
provided under Canadian and UK law. Failure to success-
fully complete either of these two requirements resulted
in termination of the survey. After consenting, partici-
pants were given the option to select their country and
language of choice, and the relevant survey then com-
menced.
All questions included a "Skip" option. Progress through
the survey required the selection of a response for each
question, and participants could terminate the survey at
any time or complete it over multiple sessions, at their
convenience. Questions were not randomized or alter-
nated, but adaptive questioning was utilized. Question
types varied, and included single-choice, multiple-choice,
scale, and free-form response questions, thereby collect-
ing both quantitative and qualitative responses. There was
typically only one question per screen with multiple
potential responses, the maximum number of which was
17. Depending on the responses of the participants, the
survey was distributed over approximately 40 screens.
Key questions addressed by the survey included the fol-
lowing:
- Is there a requirement for personally identifiable data,
including spatial data?
- What spatial resolution is ideal for public health
research?
- Is privacy perceived to be a significant obstacle to public
health practice?
- How knowledgeable do public health professionals con-
sider themselves on privacy?
- What is the most critical obstacle to the access and use of
personally identifiable data?
- What are the views of the public health community on
public awareness and perceptions?
- Which is preferred: raw, case-level data, or aggregated,
anonymised data?
Collected responses were analysed using basic descriptive
statistics and non-parametric methods in SAS 9.2. The
Checklist for Reporting Results of Internet E-Surveys
(CHERRIES) [39] was used as a guideline in the reporting
of the web-based survey methodology.
Results
Of 112 invitees in Canada and 75 in the UK, 66 (59%)
and 28 (37%) participated in the survey, respectively. Of
the Canadian participants, three responded to the French
version. The completion proportion for Canada was 91%,
and 86% for the UK.
There were no differences in the distribution of roles
reported by participants in both countries, with most par-
ticipants (49% in Canada; 64% in the UK) identifying
their main role as falling within the research and analysis
domain (Table 2). Participant expertise varied, and
included aboriginal health (Canada only), chronic dis-
eases, paediatric public health, infectious diseases, dental
public health, emergency preparedness and response,
environmental public health, ethics and public health
law, food and nutrition, health services, injuries and disa-
bilities, mental health and substance misuse, social deter-
minants of health, surveillance, and education.
No response differences were observed between the two
countries on each of the key questions, and the overall,
combined results are therefore reported. A summary of
the findings is given in Table 3.
Is there a requirement for personally identifiable data, 
including spatial data?
Almost all participants identified a need for personally
identifiable data (PID) in their roles; only one Canadian
participant indicated no need for PID. Five Canadian par-
ticipants and one UK participant chose not to answer the
question. In total 93% of participants indicated a require-
ment for PID in their public health activities.
What spatial resolution is ideal for public health research?
All participants identified geographic location of health
data as a requirement for their roles or organisation.
When asked "...what level of geography would you ideally
like to visualise your data and/or conduct spatial analy-
ses," 69% of respondents identified "latitude and longi-
tude, exact street address, or exact household."
Is privacy perceived to be a significant obstacle to public 
health practice? AND How knowledgeable do public 
health professionals consider themselves on privacy?
When asked "Are you or have you been restricted in your
use of GIS for any public health activity because of privacy
concerns (i.e. map or data might identify an individual or
community)?" 79% of respondents marked "YES".
Of 83 participants who responded to the question "In
your opinion, do current restrictions to PID pose an
obstacle to any aspects of public health practice?" 59
(71%) agreed, rating the obstacle severity at 6 or higher.
Of these 59, 36 (61%) rated their knowledge of privacy
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and confidentiality issues/legislation at 6 out of 10 or
higher, with a mean score of 7.5 (std = 1.0) and a median
score of 7.
Using the median, respondents with a self-rated knowl-
edge score lower than 7 were classified as "low" on knowl-
edge (47%), while those at or above the median score
were classified as "high" (53%). Those classified as high
were more likely to rate privacy as an obstacle (one-sided
Wilcoxon exact P < 0.001). A trend was evident for the
overall correlation between restriction score and self-rated
privacy knowledge score (Spearman r = 0.22, P = 0.057).
What is the most critical obstacle to the access and use of 
personally identifiable data?
The most common obstacles were reported as bureaucracy
and legislation by 33% and 25% of the participants,
respectively. Other responses included public disap-
proval/paranoia (15%), practitioner paranoia (7%), lack
of knowledge (6%), combination of these factors (4%),
other (2%), and none (skipped question, 7%).
What are the views of the public health community on 
public awareness and perceptions?
Fifty seven percent of participants felt that under 10% of
the public population is aware of the impact of restricted
access to PID on public health practice; 74% felt it to be
under 20%, and 84% felt the proportion to be less than
30% (cumulative frequencies). Most identified education
Table 2: Number and percent of survey participants by main role and geographical scope
Main Role
Scope Strategic decision/
policy maker
Manager/
Coordinator
Consultant Research & 
Analysis
Front-Line Responder/
Patient Care/Clinical
Other
Canadian Participants
North American or 
National
3 (4.5%) 6 (9%) - 9 (13.6%) 1 (1.5%) 2 (3.0%)
Provincial/Territorial 1 (1.5%) 3 (4.5%) 4 (6.1%) 6 (9.1%) - 2 (3.0%)
Local/Regional 2 (3.0%) 7 (10.6%) 1 (1.5%) 17 (25.8%) 1 (1.5%) 1 (1.5%)
Totals 6 (9.1%) 16 (24.2%) 5 (7.6%) 32 (48.5%) 2 (3.0%) 5 (7.6%)
UK Participants
European or 
National
1 (3.6%) 1 (3.6%) - 1 (3.6%) - -
Regional 2 (7.1%) 1 (3.6%) 2 (7.1%) 12 (42.9%) - -
Local 2 (7.1%) - - 4 (14.3%) - 1 (3.6%)
Totals 5 (17.9%) 2 (7.1%) 2 (7.1%) 17 (60.7%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (3.6%)
*One UK participant who identified a main role in research and analysis declined a response to the question on scope.
Table 3: Summary of findings
Question Response Summary†
1. Is there a requirement for personally identifiable data? Yes (93%)
2. What spatial resolution is ideal for public health research? Lat/Long or address (69%)
3. Is privacy perceived to be a significant obstacle to public health practice? Yes (71%)
4. How knowledgeable do public health professionals consider themselves on privacy? High Knowledge* (53%)
5. What is the most critical obstacle to the access and use of personally identifiable data? Bureaucracy
Legislation
(33%)
(25%)
6. What are the views of the public health community on public awareness and perceptions? Less than 30% of the public is aware (84%)
7. Which is preferred: raw, case level data, or aggregated, anonymised data? Raw, case-level data (66%)
†Numbers in parentheses are the percent of participants who responded as described
*Participants rating their knowledge as high were also more likely to rate privacy as a more severe obstacle (P < 0.001)
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and awareness (through media, reports, case studies, sce-
narios, etc) as the best methods to increase this propor-
tion. When then asked what proportion of the public they
felt would allow the use of their PID if they were educated
on the usefulness of such data to public health practice,
67% said 50% or higher.
Which is preferred: raw, case-level data, or aggregated, 
anonymised data?
More respondents identified a preference for having
access to granular-level rather than aggregate data (53 vs.
27; 66% of those responding to this question).
Discussion
This survey and user-needs assessment on privacy and
public health shows a definite requirement by public
health professionals – in various fields and positions in
both Canada and the UK – for personally identifiable
data, including spatial data. The requirement for this spa-
tial data is at its most granular level – latitude and longi-
tude, or exact street address – which necessarily
compromises patient privacy. It is not surprising, there-
fore, that public health professionals perceive privacy to
be a significant obstacle to public health practice.
There are those who would argue that this perception is
the product of a lack of understanding of the legislation
and regulations by the public health community. The
results of this research, however, indicate the contrary.
Not only did public health professionals in both countries
generally rate themselves high on knowledge of privacy
legislation and related issues, but those with the highest
self-rated scores also tended to rate privacy as more of an
obstacle. That these self-ratings of knowledge are not rep-
resentative of actual knowledge remains possible.
Participants perceived the most critical obstacles to shar-
ing or acquisition of health data with PID to be bureauc-
racy, followed by legislation.
Bureaucracy surrounding health research in both Canada
and the UK generally revolves around data ownership,
academic competitiveness, ethics review boards or com-
mittees, and in particular, requirements for informed con-
sent, even if they compromise public health, or are not in
the best interests of the patients involved [40-42]. Since
seeking subject consent with every new hypothesis to be
tested or model to be developed is an impossible task,
some have suggested that thought be given to "blanket"
consent. At the Canadian Institutes for Health Research
(CIHI) 2003 workshop on the legal and ethical issues fac-
ing the Canadian Lifelong Health Initiative [43], partici-
pants spent some time discussing such issues, only to
emphasise the importance of the establishment of ethical
governance and structure; essentially, more necessary
bureaucracy. Interestingly, while the debate continues, a
relatively recent survey found that most of the British pub-
lic did not consider the use of their National Cancer Reg-
istry PID for public health research and surveillance to be
an invasion of their privacy [30]. While the ethics of blan-
ket consent are not discussed in this study, it is nonethe-
less offered as a potential solution in light of the
requirements of the public health community. This does
not, however, address other issues of data ownership and
control that contribute to the bureaucratic debate.
While many individuals recognised the importance of pri-
vacy legislation, participants generally indicated a concern
and, in some cases, first-hand frustration that legislation
unduly restricts public health activities, compromising
surveillance and research. Many phrases were used by
respondents to describe the implications of privacy legis-
lation on public health, including, among others:
"increasingly restrictive;" "serious;" "incomplete;"
"fuzzy;" "does more harm than good;" "two-edged
sword;" "causes challenges;" "delays and restricts access
[to data];" " [is a] hindrance to the improvement and effi-
ciency of public health;" "disappointing;" "frustrating;"
"difficult to interpret;" "very worrisome;" "disadvantages
the public interest;" "not properly understood;" "over-
protective;" "limiting;" "hinders knowledge;" and "used
as an excuse not to share data." A large proportion of the
public health community represented in this sample
clearly expressed major concerns with the impact of pri-
vacy legislation on their work – both in Canada, and in
the UK – in spite of having a good understanding and
acceptance of its purpose and necessity. It is also impor-
tant for legislation to be written in an unambiguous man-
ner that is clearly understood by both public health
professionals and the general public [4].
Public health professionals are largely of the opinion that
the general public's level of awareness of the impact of
restricted access to PID on public health practice is
extremely low. Surveys by the Office of the Privacy Com-
missioner in Canada [44] repeatedly show that the major-
ity of Canadians surveyed (up to 80%) place an extremely
high level of importance on strong laws to protect per-
sonal information, particularly health information, and
that they feel that the level of protection of their personal
information has declined over the past ten years. Yet inter-
estingly, only 20% are clearly aware of existing laws, and
even fewer (12%) are aware of their rights around the col-
lection, use and disclosure of this information. The "need
to raise Canadians' awareness about the current laws in
place and what their rights are" [44] must therefore be
coupled with the corresponding need to address this from
within the context of public health requirements.
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Educating the public, therefore, as well as practitioners,
data users, policy makers and politicians, was not surpris-
ingly identified by participants as a potential solution.
Participants put emphasis on the utilisation of the media
to educate and increase awareness, as well as demonstrat-
ing the impact of a lack of data, and the benefits of its use
when available. Demonstration of the benefits to the indi-
vidual (e.g. streamlining of the system, not being asked
for personal information with every visit to a new clini-
cian, improved dissemination of public health informa-
tion and intelligence directly to the public) was also
offered as a solution, and summed up by one participant
in the phrase "seeing is believing". It is worth noting,
however, that a number of participants displayed a certain
level of pessimism that until a crisis or extreme event
occurs, no amount of education or awareness-increasing
activities would make a difference.
Public health professionals generally prefer disaggregate,
case-level data, but access to this data is an issue. The lim-
itations imposed by privacy on public health have
resulted in the development of a variety of techniques for
data anonymisation [15,23,45]. However, all unavoida-
bly have their issues, risks and limitations, and there is
currently no framework to guide public health profession-
als in their appropriate use and interpretation.
Generalisability
Although the findings of this paper may be generalisable
to public health professionals in Canada and the UK,
issues of privacy and public health are not unique to these
countries. Privacy is defined as a fundamental human
right in the legislation of many countries, and the concept
is enshrined in Article 12 of the United Nations' Universal
Declaration of Human Rights [46] and Article 8 of the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights [47]. Similarly, public
health is an international discipline; both diseases and
information are ubiquitous, and neither is constrained by
political boundaries and oceans. The increasing require-
ment for spatial data and its inherent clash with privacy
legislation therefore extend beyond the UK and Canadian
contexts, and the results, requirements and conclusions
drawn from this research can be generalised to wherever
such a clash exists. The implementation of solutions by
national governments may be further exacerbated by
issues of social political trust. General public distrust in
government initiatives and motives, such as in most coun-
tries of the European Union, Canada, and the United
States [48,49], complicates changes that may be perceived
by the public to be intrusions of privacy. Such issues may
currently be less of a concern in countries such as Finland,
Sweden, Denmark, and the Netherlands, where social
political trust, though declining, has traditionally tended
to be much higher [50-53]. However, even in such nations
where privacy and health have traditionally not clashed,
increased international data sharing requirements and
spatial data implications may pose unanticipated and
challenging obstacles.
Limitations
No comprehensive lists of public health and health GIS
professionals were found in either country, so it was not
possible to invite a random sample. In addition, the
response rate in the UK was relatively low, and it is there-
fore uncertain that the sample is representative of all pub-
lic health professionals in the two countries. However,
responses between the two countries were consistent, with
no significant differences.
Since knowledge of privacy legislation and policies was
based on self-rated scores, a thorough review and assess-
ment of privacy legislation as it pertains to public health
practice is required in both Canada and the UK to validate
the findings of this survey.
A number of limitations and issues pertaining to the web-
survey were identified. Most notable of these was the pres-
ence of a scroll bar in sections II and III which most par-
ticipants missed, thereby eliminating the ability to capture
items in reference to "place", such as usefulness. However,
these items were also captured more broadly in other sec-
tions of the survey. Other issues involved the inability of
the architecture to support various designs and types of
questions that would have facilitated the completion of
the survey, and shortened the length of time required. Par-
ticipants also noted frustration with the navigation and
structure of the survey pages. A document outlining these
issues and others was submitted to the ALPHA team after
the initial pilot for future enhancements to the architec-
ture.
Conclusion
It is clear that privacy is perceived to be a major obstacle
and issue for public health – the literature illustrates it,
and the current study provides both quantitative and
qualitative evidence. Together, these provide a more holis-
tic portrayal of public health community viewpoints, and
can be used to educate the public, and as evidence for
decision makers to implement changes in policies and
legislation. The clash between a requirement for person-
ally identifiable data – including exact, individual loca-
tion – by public health professionals, and the limitations
imposed by privacy and its associated bureaucracy, must
be addressed and appropriate solutions developed, partic-
ularly given the increasing utilisation of geographic infor-
mation systems in public health and the imminent
completion of comprehensive electronic health systems.
Privacy legislation is critical for the protection of this fun-
damental human right, and to prevent the abuse of per-
sonal information, particularly in the health field.
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However, the legislation must be harmonised with the
requirements of public health practice if the health of
societies and populations is to be maintained and
improved. Since health is not limited by political bound-
aries, this must be pursued at an international level, and
solutions must address these perceptions in the public
health community, simplify the bureaucratic process, pro-
mote multidisciplinary discussions between legislators,
bureaucrats and the public health community, educate
communities, and develop and provide public health pro-
fessionals with toolsets, algorithms and guidelines for
using and reporting on disaggregate data. While the
results of this study should inform and justify the devel-
opment of techniques that better anonymise health data
with minimal impact on its integrity and frameworks for
implementing them, it seems fitting to echo the warning
of Curtis et al: "...health and spatial scientists should be
proactive and suggest a series of point level spatial confi-
dentiality guidelines before governmental decisions are
made which may be reactionary toward the threat of
revealing confidential information, thereby imposing dra-
conian limits on research using a GIS [27]."
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